Um artigo sobre assunto do U.S. Naval Institute:
Russian and Chinese Threats to Greenland and the New Arctic Sea Routes Are LowWhile the security situation in the Arctic bears close monitoring, it is important not to overhype it.By Lyle GoldsteinJanuary 2026
All of Europe and not a few Americans are breathing a sigh of relief after President Donald Trump’s January speech in Davos, Switzerland,
in which he ruled out the use of force to secure Greenland. To say that this crisis was on the cusp of prompting the deepest Trans-Atlantic breach in decades is an understatement. That is doubly the case, since 24 hours prior it was reported that Danish troops were reinforcing their geographically huge, but sparsely populated island colony in North America, setting up what heretofore had been an impossible-to-imagine armed conflict between NATO allies. The future of European security is ripe for extended debate and no doubt this will be occurring in 2026 and beyond. Some have already pointed out that a silver lining of present U.S.-Europe fractures could be that it forces Europeans to take their own security with greater seriousness. However, the issue of Arctic security, along with Greenland’s specific role in that region, also deserves closer scrutiny. Indeed, U.S. maritime strategists must focus on this question, since it will undoubtedly impact the future shape, structure, doctrine, and deployments of the U.S. Navy in coming decades. However, evidence from a new book-length investigation on China-Russia cooperation in the maritime domain makes clear that the naval threat to the Arctic and Greenland from this quasi-alliance is actually minimal. To claim otherwise reflects unfortunate tendencies in Washington and elsewhere toward threat inflation.
Many arguments have been put forward regarding the imperative for the United States to control Greenland for its national security. Such arguments are not all outlandish and have a firm basis in both history and geography. It should be sufficient to simply recall the island’s crucial role in U.S. military operations during World War II, both to win the Battle of the Atlantic and to transfer massive fighting power safely to Europe.
Putting the issue of resource exploitation aside, another key aspect of the White House argument concerns the future construction of the “Golden Dome” to better protect the United States from air and missile attack. Some efforts in this regard are perhaps warranted, but the fact that both China and Russia now seem to possess ample nuclear weaponry that use myriad penetration aids (e.g. multiple independent reentry vehicles [MIRVs], decoys, and non-elliptical flight paths) as well as the ability to substantially alternate attack routes may cast doubt on this plan. Of course, it is worth underlining that the United States already has a missile-tracking station on Greenland and could add more under the existing 1951 Treaty governing U.S. military deployments to the island.
Arctic Sea Lanes
The opening of and threat to Arctic sea lanes has been a hot topic in the past decade and it is now conventional wisdom that new sea lanes are gradually emerging, along both the Russian Arctic and Canadian coastlines because of melting ice precipitated by climate change.
Indeed, shipping along Arctic routes has been gradually climbing in recent years and this partially does reflect improving relations between Russia and China in the region. Russia badly wants to upgrade its extensive communities across the enormous, frozen expanse that comprises the Russian Arctic, including further tapping into its natural resources. China also is pursuing these resources, along with the tantalizing possibility to dramatically shorten shipping routes and avoid vulnerable chokepoints, such as the Malacca Strait and Suez Canal. Thus, China already has invested substantially in the Northern Sea Route (NSR) along Russia’s northern coast, and has identified the “Polar Silk Road” as a key development to enhance China-Russia maritime ties.
However, the codevelopment of the NSR has almost zero implications for military and strategic affairs, especially with respect to U.S. national security. The vessels that are chiefly involved in developing and maintaining the route, notably icebreakers including nuclear icebreakers, are unarmed and vulnerable to attack. Moreover, the difficulties associated with the hazardous navigation through the ice suggest the amount of commercial traffic on the NSR will remain relatively limited for the foreseeable future. Actually, the biggest threat to the United States from these developments is not military, but rather environmental with the possibility of a major oil spill in the region. The significant transport of oil along the NSR and through the Bering Strait near Alaskan shores is a new phenomenon.
Arctic Military Developments
While it is obvious that both Russian and Chinese activities in the Arctic are of a commercial nature, it is true that some limited military activities have taken place. In particular, the upgrade of Russia’s military deployments in the Arctic was evident before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and indeed has been limited by the demands of that on-going conflict. Still, some new bases were set up, others were modernized, and even some novel platforms were developed for Arctic warfare, such as a “combat icebreaker,” though on a very limited basis.
China has been building icebreakers too, but not on anything near the scale that Russia has committed to for obvious reasons. In addition, there have been signs that the Chinese Navy has the intent to operate submarines in the Arctic. Yet, a glimpse at a map illustrates clearly that Chinese submarines would have serious trouble getting to the Arctic, as they would have to pass through narrow straits proximate to potential adversaries (e.g. Japan). They also would be very hard to support in such a forbidding climate so far from Chinese shores. And their value for striking the continental United States from the northern flank also is quite negligible, particularly as other long-range Chinese strike options are coming on line. Yes, a Chinese mining firm did try to buy a former naval port in Greenland about a decade ago, but Copenhagen quickly snuffed out this possibility, since it did not want to jeopardize its close relations with America.
U.S. and Allied Arctic Upgrades
Both the United States and its allies have undertaken upgrades over the years, reflecting the altered situation in the Arctic and increasing great power competition. Among these upgrades, the Pentagon’s establishing a new airborne division in Alaska, along with basing F-22 fighters at Elmendorf Air Force Base stand out. For its part, the U.S. Navy has increased its patrols in the Arctic by sending some of its newest ships to operate off Norway in recent years. While none of these measures is especially significant on its own, taken together they have likely been seen by the Kremlin as a sign of Washington's commitment to the region.
In late 2024, China and Russia carried out a joint coast guard exercise near the Bering Strait. In mid-2025, their two navies conducted a joint naval patrol in the north Pacific proximate to Alaskan shores. And a Russian strategist even called for regular Chinese basing of submarines out of Russia’s Arctic ports. But at this point, while tensions have been rising in the Arctic, China-Russia naval cooperation in the Arctic is still practically nonexistent. Both Russia and China are exercising some level of restraint, likely understanding that the consequences of strategic cooperation in this sensitive domain could be dire.
Indeed, Washington also has exercised some admirable restraint. To this date, the U.S. Navy still has no active bases in Alaska. Arctic sea lanes are not under threat, nor is the island of Greenland. In fact, the situation of Danish sovereignty turns out to be quite ideal for U.S. security, since Copenhagen bears many of the major costs of this northern outpost, and the United States can recalibrate its military presence in the region quickly if needed. In the meantime, U.S. submarines remain a steadfast force for deterrence in the region, as they have for more than half a century.
For now, the Arctic remains largely demilitarized and at peace. The continued exercise of cautious realism and restraint can help preserve stability and protect this unique zone of growing commercial and environmental importance during a time of great turbulence in world politics.
https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2026/january/russian-and-chinese-threats-greenland-and-new-arctic-sea-routes
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