SEA DRAGON 2025: Small Unit Leaders’ ThoughtsBased on experiences from the 2016 MAGTF Integrated Experiment (MIX), six months of different battalion training events, and executing Integrated Training Exercise 1-17 (ITX 1-17) as part of our Corps’ SEA DRAGON campaign, 3d Bn, 5th Marines’ small unit leaders have identified trends in using new technology and different tables of organization through repetitive, hands-on employment. Cast against a variety of enemy threat scenarios forecasted in the Marine Corps Operating Concept (MOC),1 we have experienced firsthand: the friction of previous training meeting new ideas, gaps in conceptual understanding causing missteps in execution, and had the opportunity to create new techniques and procedures to solve emerging problems – all while still dealing with the day-to-day infantry battalion life and training requirements. We are grateful to have had all of these opportunities to date. The goal of this article is to provide feedback on the “best of” or “most critical” concepts and capabilities that we feel must be pursued to ensure “superior infantry is a Marine Corps asymmetric advantage,” as per the MOC’s explicit guidance.2
C2: Digital, Interoperable, Flat, Federated, and SharedOur command and control (C2) networks must be brought into the future, now. First and foremost, we must re-invent the acquisitions wheel, specifically figuring out ways to enable our small units to leverage the revolution in commercial information technological advances that our enemies are readily using. There is no reason that it takes us almost a decade to field a new communications device while our adversaries just pre-order the latest Samsung or iPhone, create an ad-hoc network over whatever waveform is available, and out communicate us at the tactical level. The C2 acquisitions system must be streamlined to allow our small units to rapidly test and field current and emerging technologies.
With so many emerging technologies, what kind of system, or system of systems, should be developed? For understandable reasons, each element of the MAGTF has unique requirements that input into their respective C2 system to help enable and drive decision making. Thus, the baseline network should enable operating on different waveforms, depending on the best suited or least interfered with (much the way we have historically chosen between VHF or HF, for example). Components of the MAGTF, to include smaller tactical formations down to the rifle squad level, should be able to access this backbone – or Wider Area Network (WAN) to use a civilian model – through a radio such as the soon-to-be fielded next generation handheld (NGHH) or SOF tactical communications (STC).3 This WAN is our tactical Internet, allowing us to share information seamlessly and fluidly whenever, and however, we are able to connect to it. To this end, we need a digital battalion Tac 3 and 4 (and platoon, company, and even regiment) that are on available waveforms to serve as our Local Area Network (LAN). Americans have secure, modifiable, and adaptable LANs in every house in neighborhoods across the Nation – the same should be true for tactical, small unit formations. The tactical LANs will allow digital sharing of information, key to decentralized decision making in the future, and multiple LANs should be available at any time to allow us to use the best available waveform. For example, a complete list of company tactical nets to be used for voice and data, both internal as LANs or to the higher headquarters in the WAN would read:
Co Tac 1 – VHF SINCGARS voice
Co Tac 2 – VHF SINCGARS voice
Co Tac 3 – ANW2, simultaneous data and voice, including sensor information
Co Tac 4 – Trellisware-TSM-X, simultaneous data and voice, including sensor information
(This framework for useable communications nets could be replicated at every level.)
Utilizing a common radio and common handheld or wearable device that can plug into this network would allow specific elements of the MAGTF to have their own applications to provide information management while also allowing seamless consolidation and sharing of information on the network. Radios at the headquarters elements at all levels would be responsible for bridging information across the LANs and to higher headquarters as well. The endstate should be a federated – no longer hierarchal – network that allows individual combat formations to operate independently if required, while also, depending on the conditions in a given combat environment, enable the unit to connect and share information across all networks to provide a common operational picture. A small multi-terabyte hard drive attached to a computer power unit, which is connected to each network, could mean a server to cache information and store it to share with adjacent, higher, and subordinate units whenever connectivity is achieved from even the most dispersed units. This would create the following:
1st Squad, 1st Platoon, Company X is part of a company clearing operation and has a sUAS airborne that has identified an enemy position. 3rd Squad, 3rd Platoon, Company X is on the opposite side of the company formation, but the enemy is to his front. The squad leader, after being informed and shown by his infantry systems operator (ISO) or his assistant to the squad leader (ASL) and joint fires observer (JFO), is able to “see” what the sUAS is able to see, multiple kilometers away, and orient on the enemy. All the while, depending on the situation, he, his ISO, or ASL is text chatting and talking VOIP [voice over Internet Protocol] over Co Tac 4 to their very adjacent squad leader. Simultaneously, the company sees what the squads and small unit leaders are all seeing. Within seconds the battalion is tracking all the digital traffic as well, to include locations of all friendly units and any possible geometry of fire issues resolved. No traffic was passed over VHF communications, which are often degraded in urban environments, rather than optimized for them such as the NGHH/STC’s TSM-X illustrated in Figure 1. This scenario has been trained to and the operations order accounted for this – with no direction from higher the 3rd Squad Leader in 3rd Platoon understands his intent, knows he is able to defeat this enemy position organically, and he acts – Immediately and With Knowledge!
Figure 1.
Additionally, we have learned so far there is no such thing as too much information. There can certainly be poor information management, but increased information, if we have proper information management processes in place, becomes increased knowledge. Today’s Marine grew up in the Information Age and was nurtured by the Internet. Today’s Marine had Google instead of a hard spine encyclopedia. He is comfortable in an information rich environment. Just as Google organizes our search results, with simple information management techniques we can trust today’s Marine to sort and identify what information is critical to him at that time and place. Applications, common interfaces, and consolidation and sharing of information across all networks is critical. The Marine Corps would be wise to devise a flat network that maximizes information organization and sharing (simply!) and that will update as distant units come on and off the net.
Rifle Squad Size: 15 Marines“We recognize that operations in urban areas are the most likely to occur and the most dangerous. Urban areas are complex terrain, which emphasizes the need to maneuver in the human dimension of conflict… Conducting operations in very large urban areas… can soak up personnel resources in labor-intensive ground actions.”
- Marine Corps Operating Concept, September 2016
If our Service truly desires to achieve all that the MOC describes for our infantry small units, the 15 Marine rifle squad, as illustrated in Figure 2 is, at a minimum, the way to go. This organization accounts for the integration of advanced technologies to enhance the squad’s situational awareness and battlefield understanding per the unanimously approved Marine Requirements Oversight Council August 2015 Marine Expeditionary Rifle Squad (MERS) Initial Capabilities Document (ICD).5 This organization also provides the rifle squad the flexibility and lethality required to win the direct fire fight in a complex, most likely urban environment.
Figure 2.
The 13 Marine rifle squad is a proven construct to fight and win in complicated direct fires engagements. The employment of assault, support, and security is easily accomplished, squad leaders are able to effectively lead subordinate elements of “3,” and each fire team is capable of independent combined arms. This model has proven effective on islands in the Pacific, mountains in Korea, jungles in Vietnam, dense urban sprawl in Iraq and villages and intersecting farmlands in Afghanistan – in everything from daily patrols to deliberate attacks to straight up clearing in zone. We cannot afford to sacrifice the killing efficiency and combat power that three combined arms fire teams possess, but we do need to enhance their capabilities to provide the currently absent asymmetric advantages that the MOC mandates.
The “new” fire team should be fundamentally constructed in the same manner as today. However, the fire team’s Marines’ weapons should all be M27 IARs [infantry automatic rifles], with one Marine still designated as the true “automatic rifleman.” This frees up the old “assistant” automatic rifleman to become a combat multiplier. Each fire team within the squad would have a different specialty training requirement for their new “combat multiplier” capability, creating enhanced fire teams with unique abilities that together enhance overall squad combat power. 1st Fire Team will have an infantry Marine with specialized demolitions and rocket proficiency, 2nd Fire Team an unmanned air/ground/water system (UxS) operator that will be operated as needed, and the 3rd Fire Team a counter-UxS. The strength of this model is that it builds a table of organization that allows the infantry to adapt to the future -- the combat multiplier is an infantry Marine with additional, specialized, and formal training which can be modified to fit future requirements.
The rifle squad also needs a “fighting headquarters” which will bring the unit size to 15 Marines. This headquarters will consist of the three Marines: the rifle squad leader (0365), the assistant to the squad leader (0311 that has graduated the Advanced Infantry Course and JFO course6) and an infantry systems operator (0311 that is the squad’s UxS and digital communications subject matter expert). The ISO’s primary mission is to operate and employ assigned unmanned systems in support of the rifle squad, be it UAS or UGV, and if and when necessary, he integrates the 2d Fire Team’s UxS operator to assist in carrying equipment or to operate a second system. The ASL is knowledgeable on the employment of the rifle squad, will act as an “in the know” radio operator and serve as the squad’s certified fires coordinator and observer. On one end, this Marine will manage information and provide to the squad leader knowledge that is critical to his decision making and reporting with higher headquarters. He will also assist the squad leader in the employment of technologies such as KILSWITCH and its connection to persistent close air support (PCAS) airborne systems (more on this below), as well as other fires capabilities.7 On the other end, the ASL will also conduct pre-combat check/pre-combat inspection of the squad’s new equipment. Ultimately, the ASL and ISO allow the actual rifle squad leader to control his teams, fight his squad, and supervise the employment of new capabilities to support his Marines in the “last 600 meters.”
Infantry Weapons SystemsTo achieve the MOC vision, our infantry small units need different weapons and equipment:
1. M27 should be the Marine Infantry Service Rifle. Infantry Marines serving in the rifle squad should carry the M27 for its increased accuracy, cleaner operating system, and higher rate of fire. Some worry that equipping Marines with the M27 will lead to wasting ammunition, but we have found that through proper training, which would be enhanced through introduction at Infantry Training Battalion, the proper fire discipline is able to be taught and understood by Marines. Within the fire team, one Marine is still designated as the true automatic rifleman. The other Marines in the fire team carrying the M27 will allow the squad leader the ability to order his entire squad to fire on automatic as required. As a general rule, any automatic fire should be employed on the bipods (which should be improved and made more durable like the old M249 bipods) and at ranges up to 50m unless ordered by exception from the unit leader. The abundance of automatic fire enhances the close in, urban fight as well; for example, making entry into rooms. Additionally, one M27 per platoon should be given an improved scope to use in the designated marksman role.
2. The M4A1, which provides automatic fire but is lighter weight, should be the Marine Infantry Support Service Rifle and should be carried by the squad’s fighting headquarters as well as all unit leaders and those carrying crew-served systems.
3. Our rifles should be suppressed. This will cost money up front (but much will be saved in Veteran’s Affairs disability claims for tinnitus and hearing loss in the long term), but allows for a greater level of concealment/force protection and communication when in contact with the enemy.
4. The Carl Gustav should exist at the squad and platoon level. Its increased range and use by the U.S. Army, Special Operations Command, and key U.S. allies provides us increased, sustainable combat power when we have to fight ashore and integrate into the joint logistics infrastructure. The multiple munitions to choose from also grant new capabilities in the direct fire fight. An example for Range 400, the popular “standard” company attack of ITX: bunkers could be destroyed from Machine Gun Hill before closure occurs, greatly increasing the company and platoon’s ability to shape the enemy appropriately and increase tempo. The image below, taken by 3/5’s Kilo Company, highlights the battalion’s experiences with the Carl Gustav.
5. Precision guided munitions (PGM) must be brought to the company level as a way to reduce the amount of ammunition to be carried, increase probability of hit, and reduce collateral damage in the forecasted urban fight. This may be done in two ways. First, develop a PGM for the Carl Gustav (see China Lake’s Spike Missile as an example for innovation or possible adaptation). Second, increase the capability and use of light miniature attack munition (LMAM) systems. Currently, LMAMs provide the company commander the ability to support platoons and squads with a hip pocket PGM. Again, at Range 400 at ITX, we used LMAMs effectively, especially when teamed with other intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets, to rapidly destroy the enemy 82mm mortar position. The LMAMs should be capable of using GPS or terminally controlled by each squad’s ASL and certified JFO.
6. The M320 Grenade Launcher. This weapons system is a reliable, proven grenade launcher used by the US Army. Attachment becomes an issue: The M27 becomes very front heavy and unstable, and is only mounted via drilling holes in the M27 handrail or using a different handrail. Our recommendation is that M320s be assigned to grenadiers as secondary weapons much like the old M79; M203s are still employed on M4A1s, and in the future a lighter weight, under-barrel mounted grenade launcher may be developed for the M27. Additionally, development of a medium velocity round that can increase the range and transition from an HEDP [high explosive, dual purpose] to an HE round would be advantageous for general purpose and more realistic for use against strong points often protecting enemy crew-served weapons....
https://www.mca-marines.org/gazette/2017/03/sea-dragon-2025-small-unit-leaders-thoughts
