http://valdaiclub.com/politics/70060.htmlRussia’s Geo-Political Dilemmas10:07 10/07/2014
LANE, David
The advent of Vladimir Putin to political power in the Russian Federation led to a new climate both in Russia and in world politics. While Putin has had widespread support at home, difficulties have been experienced abroad. Western media have interpreted Putin’s policy in terms of a renewal of the ‘Soviet threat’ to the West. They claim that this is manifested in a revived nationalistic, authoritarian Russia fortified by its natural resources, a large land army and nuclear weapons. Leading Western, and particularly American, writers and pundits have labelled the Russian leadership as ‘nostalgic for imperial status’ (Z. Brzezinski), seeking a ‘revival of Russian imperialism’. Russia is portrayed as an economic and military threat to the West. This is summed up by the cover of The Economist which, on 13 December 2006, portrayed a picture of a trilbyed Vladimir Putin totting a petrol pump as a light machine gun, with the caption, ‘Don’t Mess with Russia’. These views cannot be ignored as the Western media has captured the public mind set. As Castells has put it: ‘What does not exist in the media does not exist in the public mind’ .
However, such observations are one-sided, alarmist and create a negative atmosphere of distrust towards the Russian Federation. The policy of the current Russian leadership has been essentially reactive and restitutive. It might be interpreted as ‘assertive’. But such assertiveness has not been hostile to Western powers or even to international capitalism. It has sought to reinstate some of the things lost when socialism was dismantled and to restore respect - which Russia expects as a major European power.
Understanding of political reality has to be rooted in the political and economic consequences of the transformation from communism, which seriously weakened the economic and social well-being of the post-socialist states, as well as their ideological and political orientation.
The Footprint of TransformationOne of the major policies underpinning reforms in, and later the transformation of, the socialist bloc was a movement towards, and participation in, the world economic system. Mikhail Gorbachev’s intention was for the USSR to ‘rejoin its European home’. This led to the reunification of Germany within NATO and the departure of Soviet troops from the German Democratic Republic which weakened Russia’s strategic defence. Boris Eltsin’s objective was to ensure that Russia would be a full and accepted member of the economically advanced capitalist community. Initially, to demonstrate its commitment to international political cooperation and distance itself from the previous Soviet confrontational stance, Eltsin’s policy accepted American leadership. Russia supported the USA over Libya and Iraq, and UN sanctions against Yugoslavia. Russia joined the IMF and other international organisations, such as the Council of Europe. A process of privatisation, marketisation and democratisation followed prescriptions formulated by the West, particularly the USA.
However, Eltsin’s overtures were not reciprocated by the West. While the Treaty of Rome provided that any European country could apply for membership of the European Economic Community (and later the European Union defined the conditions for membership), it became clear that the Central European States as well as the former Soviet states in the Baltic were favoured to become members, while Russia was not. Russia was regarded as an unstable political state, only partially economically ‘reformed’ and with military potential. Despite assurances given by US Secretary of State, James Baker to Gorbachev on 8/9 February 1990, that there would be ‘No extension of NATO’s jurisdiction for forces of NATO one inch to the east’, such expansion occurred to include the post communist states of Central Europe and the Baltic which also joined the European Union.
Before Vladimir Putin came to power, Russia had lost out on the post-Soviet settlement. The socialist political and economic alliances (Warsaw Pact and Comecom) were disbanded and their previous commercial and economic networks were dismantled. Whereas NATO and the European Union were strengthened and enlarged. Moreover, Russia’s move to open markets globally, a private-property market economy and competitive electoral politics did not lead to the economic and political advances anticipated. Privatisation involved the theft of public property on a vast scale accompanied by rampant corruption. The anticipated ‘creative destruction’ of state socialism resulted in demolition of the former Soviet Union’s manufacturing industry and research capacity, but not in the promised renewal and innovation. Failures in electoral democracy led to widespread disenchantment among elites and people. While the population had expected pluralistic capitalism to lead to significant improvement in well-being, the result was economic decline, gross inequality and moral decay. Russia was widely regarded, domestically as well as abroad, as a failed state.
An assumption of many advocates of entry to the world economy, both before and after the fall of state socialism, is that participation benefits all. What is lacking in these accounts is recognition that the world economy is composed of rich and poor states, economically advanced and economically backward, militarily powerful and politically weak. Economically, evidence suggests that market-led globalisation leads the core countries to extend their lead and keep to themselves research, design and development, finance; their ownership of intellectual and physical property rises. Their economic power is a necessary condition of their political hegemony.
The peripheral states act as manufacturing sub-contractors, as well providing primary and secondary products; they experience an outflow of profits and labour in return for FDI and manufactured products. Neo-liberalism severely weakens the nation state which loses its ability to provide welfare to its impoverished population and economic support to its own companies. Russia joined this second group of states.
President Putin’s PoliciesWhen Vladimir Putin came to power as President in 2000, the economic, political, international and moral standing of the Russian Federation could not have been lower. What precipitated the forceful policies adopted by the Putin political elite was the abject failure of transformation, orchestrated on Western principles and Western advice, to fulfil popular expectations. The political leadership sought to change Russian policy both domestically and in foreign affairs. The intention was to re-establish Russia as a major world power.
President Putin sought: to establish the internal authority of the Federal government in Russia over the regions and over the political and economic elites – this gave rise to an authoritarian style of leadership; to create a new moral ethos and political ideology which would legitimate a politically-led economy – Eurasianism was adopted as a philosophy; to rebuild the economy through the transfer of energy wealth to strategic industries, science and research – these measures took the form of a national state-led capitalism; to restore citizens beliefs in Russia as a moral order – Russia was portrayed as a vibrant ‘civilization’; and to restore the Russian Federation as a world power worthy of respect in foreign affairs – this has led to a critique of American hegemony.
Policy entailed a major change towards the West which infringed some established Western interests. In its Foreign Policy Concept (2000), Russia’s objectives were to preserve the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country. It noted critically ‘a growing trend towards the establishment of a unipolar structure of the world with the economic and political domination of the United States.’ It identified ‘attempts to create an international relations structure based on domination by developed Western countries in the international community, under US leadership and designed for unilateral solutions (including the use of military force) to key issues in world politics in circumvention of the fundamental rules of international law’ .
The emphasis on national sovereignty reversed globalisation trends which have seriously weakened the powers of nation states. Consequently the interests of global companies with headquarters based in Western countries (particularly in the USA) are circumscribed. Unlike in the new post-socialist member states of the European Union, in Russia the role of transnational companies has been limited.
Russia is not incorporated into the neo-liberal world system, as its economy has a high level of state ownership, and foreign companies have relatively little penetration. (Its transnationality index is below the average for developed and developing economies). Russia’s military and political elites are not integrated into the international organisations led by the Western hegemonic states. This is in contrast to the elites of the Central European post communist new member states who are incorporated, economically and politically, in the European Union and militarily in NATO.
What is the Russian Challenge?The strengthening of the regulatory power of the state in Russia is a challenge to American political hegemony and could be regarded as a hostile ‘threat’ to American interests. It provides an alternative form of politics and an ideology which challenges neo-liberal policies guiding the dominant Western powers and the type of globalisation operating under the hegemony of the USA.
Many nations on the periphery, when confronted with the economic, political and military power of the core states, have little alternative but to accede to their policies. But countries such as Russia (and including Brazil, India, and China) have more options than assumed by those who envisage a ‘one world’ economy. There is divergence as well as convergence in the world economy. The economies of many countries have production which is local in character, and regional companies and political actors have considerable scope for action independently of the global economy.
The articulation of a national state-led model of development is the key to understanding why Putin’s policy is distorted and opposed in the West, particularly by the neo-liberal press. Any moves to strengthen the geo-political position of Russia is interpreted as a menace irrespective of the merits of the case. Russia does not have the resources to pose a serious economic or military ‘threat’ to the West. What is being established is a challenge to the hegemony of the USA and its neo-liberal order. Unlike the early reformers, such as Gorbachev and Eltsin, who sought to move closer to, and to develop a positive image of, ‘the West’, Putin has defined the USA and its hegemony as ‘the other’, as something not to be emulated.
The Russian leadership has articulated an empowering ideology to those who oppose the West’s neo-liberal hegemony. But policy does not entail autarchy or exclusion; for example, Russia under Putin has jointed the World Trade Organisation. The country is also open to foreign direct investment which keeps it exposed to the world economy. The current political leadership offers a critique and an alternative, phrased in terms of a corporate state and economy, and predicated on national sovereignty. Russia has no inherent propensity to expand aggressively either militarily or economically. In the light of its post-communist past its recent history has been reactive and defensive. Its intervention in Crimea, for example, should be interpreted as securing its geo-political interests in the face of possible future NATO expansion. The objective is a more pluralistic world order.
Why Putin and his associates are regarded so disapprovingly by many politicians and journalists is because they challenge the universality of the version of capitalist globalisation and electoral democracy advocated academically, and pursued politically, by the agents of the West. ‘Sovereign democracy’ is an ideological and political challenge to the Western notion of ‘global democracy’. Putin’s policy of strengthening a form of national capitalism presents an alternative, a model which already has an affinity with China, and has a resonance with countries such as India, and Latin America. It might also appeal to others in the West seeking to retain more powers for the nation state – as a depository of democracy and economic regulation, which is widely regarded as being undermined by interests benefitting from political and economic neo-liberal globalisation.
David Lane is an Emeritus Fellow of Emmanuel College at the University of Cambridge.
This article was originally published in Hungrian in Voci VB2014, Debatte (Budapest, Hungary).
