Serviços Secretos em Acção

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Re: Serviços Secretos em Acção
« Responder #150 em: Abril 10, 2025, 12:49:04 pm »
Putin’s Spies for Hire: What the U.K.’s Biggest Espionage Trial Revealed about Kremlin Tactics in Wartime Europe
Daniela Richterova



In early 2023, in the sleepy English seaside town of Great Yarmouth, a covert operation was quietly revving into gear. Second-hand Chryslers and a Mercedes Viano van were being transformed into mobile spy units — outfitted with tinted windows, cloned foreign license plates, and kitted out with military-grade surveillance tech. International mobile subscriber identity (IMSI) catchers — devices that mimic mobile towers to intercept phone data — were to be placed into the blacked-out cars and powered by their batteries. Behind it all was a middle-aged Bulgarian man holed up in a cluttered, three-story, former guesthouse, working tirelessly to configure the IMSIs and build hidden cameras disguised as bottles, fake stones, and a birdhouse, which would allow him to monitor the operation in real time.

Soon, he planned to deploy his operatives to ferry the refitted vehicles across Europe. Their destination: Patch Barracks just outside Stuttgart, Germany — an unassuming U.S. military base housing U.S. European Command and Special Operations Command Europe. Their mission: to circle the base for a months-long surveillance operation designed to grab the ID numbers of mobile phones belonging to Ukrainian soldiers. One year into Russia’s full-scale invasion, these soldiers were believed to be training in the operation of U.S.-made Patriot air defense systems. The ultimate goal: deliver targeting intelligence to Putin’s security services, which could be used to kill the operators and destroy the critical missile batteries.

The operation never got off the ground. On February 8, 2023, as the team was preparing to set off for Stuttgart and begin months of clandestine surveillance around the key U.S. base, the plan was abruptly halted. Officers from SO15, Scotland Yard’s elite counterterrorism and counter-espionage command, moved in, arresting most of the suspects in a coordinated sweep across the United Kingdom. By November 2024, six Bulgarian nationals stood before the Old Bailey — the storied London court known for trying the Kray twin gangsters, an ensemble of Cold War terrorists, and the infamous Portland Spy Ring. During the pre-trial hearings, the group’s top three operatives stepped forward, each with a nervous smirk, and pleaded guilty. The remaining three faced a three-month trial. On  March 7, 2025, the jury returned its verdict: guilty. The group was convicted of conspiring to collect information that would be directly or indirectly useful to Russia, explicitly referred to as an enemy during the trial, and of endangering public safety and the U.K.’s national security interests.

This was the largest spy ring ever tried in the United Kingdom. I attended the trial alongside two dozen journalists. The 80,000 Telegram messages, financial, travel records, and court testimonies offered unprecedented access to the inner workings of modern espionage networks, providing a rare glimpse into the Kremlin’s evolving espionage playbook. Here is what we learned.

The Contractor Network

The trial pulled back the curtain on the anatomy of an unusual espionage structure. Rather than a traditional “spy ring,” led by an experienced intelligence officer or “principal agent” — a senior asset trusted with running other agents — the structure exposed in the Old Bailey resembled a state-commercial contractor relationship. In this multilayered, delegated chain, Russia’s domestic security services — the Federal Security Service (FSB) and military intelligence, the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU), now officially known as the GU — acted as the “clients.” According to lead Prosecutor Alison Morgan, they were looking to fill a “gap in the market” that emerged following expulsions of Russian spies shortly after the GRU’s 2018 attempt to poison Sergei Skripal. To fill this need, they outsourced operations to a “contract manager,” Jan Marsalek, the Prada-wearing, disgraced, Austrian ex-Wirecard Chief Operating Officer (COO) believed to be hiding in Russia since the company’s collapse in June 2020. Marsalek, who had pre-existing networks of private operatives and longstanding ties to Russian intelligence, appeared to volunteer for FSB or GRU operations — perhaps as a means to sustain his shadowy business ventures — or to ingratiate himself with the government on whose whims his life now depended.

Acting as a liaison with his Russian clients, Marsalek brought on board a U.K.-based “country manager” — that tech-savvy, middle-aged Bulgarian operating from the cluttered three-story guesthouse in Great Yarmouth. Orlin Roussev, with a murky background in private investigation and IT, had met the Wirecard COO in 2015. By 2020, they were plotting operations on behalf of Russia: Marsalek would bid for covert missions, and Roussev would refine them into detailed operational plans. Together, the pair acted as espionage contractors, fulfilling Moscow’s requests and hustling for the next job.

With the client’s approval, Roussev delegated further operational responsibilities to his close associate, Biser Dzhambazov, who acted as second-in-command or “deputy country manager”. The Bulgarian-born medical courier and community organiser based in the United Kingdom assembled a curious crew of amateur, also Bulgarian-born, “sub-contractors” — individuals who were personally or romantically intertwined — with no formal intelligence training. They included: Dzhambazov’s long-term partner and fellow laboratory assistant Katrin Ivanova; his lover and beautician Vanya Gaberova; her ex-boyfriend, a painter and decorator named Tihomir Ivanchev; and Dzhambazov’s close friend and laboratory colleague, mixed martial-arts fighter Ivan Stoyanov. While Roussev and Dzhambazov planned all operations, typically with Marsalek’s input, the four sub-contractors executed them. Referring to them as the “minions,” Roussev kept them at arm’s length, maintaining a degree of insulation from direct fieldwork.


Image: MET Police; visual by Barbora Ruscin.

However, at times, Roussev was forced to step out of the shadows — especially when the “minions” struggled to operate the high-tech gadgets he had assigned for each mission. Fashioning himself as “Q” — a nod to the technology mastermind from the James Bond franchise — Roussev assembled what SO15 described as a “spy factory,” packed with hundreds of surveillance and espionage tools. His arsenal included three IMSI catchers, which the jury heard were valued at around $250,000, nearly a dozen drones, and covert cameras concealed in sunglasses, ties, a Coca-Cola bottle, and even a Minion soft toy. There were also Wi-Fi and GPS jammers, bug detectors, eavesdropping gear, vehicle trackers, and an ID card printer, alongside counterfeit passports and driver’s licenses from nearly a dozen European countries.

This equipment gave Marsalek’s contractors the means to conduct surveillance, identity theft, and collect intelligence in multiple countries, and they were all paid handsomely for this work. Records show Dzhambazov receiving a sum equivalent to $215,000, which he distributed to other network members. The hefty rewards received by Roussev’s sub-contractors are in stark contrast with the paltry amounts paid to so-called gig-economy agents-saboteurs — online recruits hired by Russia to conduct high-risk, one-off surveillance and sabotage operations across Europe.

While well paid, the ring was rife with romantic entanglements and personal drama. Dzhambadzov and Ivanova were in an open relationship, but he secretly began an affair with another member of the spy crew, Vanya Gaberova. To further complicate matters, he also recruited Gaberova’s ex-boyfriend, Tihomir Ivanchev. In a bizarre twist, Dzhambadzov is believed to have faked a brain cancer diagnosis — possibly to cover for his double life and elicit sympathy from his partners.

...

https://warontherocks.com/2025/04/putins-spies-for-hire-what-the-u-k-s-biggest-espionage-trial-revealed-about-kremlin-tactics-in-wartime-europe/
Contra a Esquerda woke e a Direita populista marchar, marchar!...

 
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Lusitano89

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Re: Serviços Secretos em Acção
« Responder #151 em: Maio 21, 2025, 06:28:24 pm »
 

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Cabeça de Martelo

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Re: Serviços Secretos em Acção
« Responder #152 em: Maio 23, 2025, 11:16:26 am »
Contra a Esquerda woke e a Direita populista marchar, marchar!...

 
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Re: Serviços Secretos em Acção
« Responder #153 em: Julho 17, 2025, 01:02:19 am »
Pro-Russian Hacker Group Targeting Ukraine And Allies Dismantled In Europe

https://menafn.com/1109810441/Pro-Russian-Hacker-Group-Targeting-Ukraine-And-Allies-Dismantled-In-Europe
слава Україна!
“Putin’s failing Ukraine invasion proves Russia is no superpower".
"Every country has its own Mafia. In Russia the Mafia has its own country."
1917 - The Russian Empire collapsed. 1991 - The Soviet Union collapsed.  The collapse of the Russian Federation is next
 

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Lusitano89

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Re: Serviços Secretos em Acção
« Responder #154 em: Julho 17, 2025, 01:00:02 pm »
Universidades dinamarquesas rejeitam investigadores estrangeiros por receio de espionagem


 

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Duarte

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Re: Serviços Secretos em Acção
« Responder #155 em: Julho 17, 2025, 09:36:45 pm »
British spies and SAS named in Afghan data breach

https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cj4ek9njknvo
слава Україна!
“Putin’s failing Ukraine invasion proves Russia is no superpower".
"Every country has its own Mafia. In Russia the Mafia has its own country."
1917 - The Russian Empire collapsed. 1991 - The Soviet Union collapsed.  The collapse of the Russian Federation is next
 

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Cabeça de Martelo

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Re: Serviços Secretos em Acção
« Responder #156 em: Julho 27, 2025, 02:47:47 pm »
Contra a Esquerda woke e a Direita populista marchar, marchar!...

 

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PTWolf

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Re: Serviços Secretos em Acção
« Responder #157 em: Julho 27, 2025, 05:33:03 pm »
 

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Lusitano89

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Re: Serviços Secretos em Acção
« Responder #158 em: Julho 30, 2025, 01:32:02 pm »
 

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Re: Serviços Secretos em Acção
« Responder #159 em: Agosto 07, 2025, 07:14:02 pm »
 

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Re: Serviços Secretos em Acção
« Responder #160 em: Setembro 28, 2025, 07:54:00 pm »
Two Dutch teenagers arrested in spying case linked to Russia

https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cgj1wy3eexyo
слава Україна!
“Putin’s failing Ukraine invasion proves Russia is no superpower".
"Every country has its own Mafia. In Russia the Mafia has its own country."
1917 - The Russian Empire collapsed. 1991 - The Soviet Union collapsed.  The collapse of the Russian Federation is next
 

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Duarte

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Re: Serviços Secretos em Acção
« Responder #161 em: Fevereiro 18, 2026, 10:02:58 pm »
“Professional thief” charged in Portugal for attempting to sell NATO information to Russians
23-year-old in preventive custody

https://www.portugalresident.com/professional-thief-charged-in-portugal-for-attempting-to-sell-nato-information-to-russians/
слава Україна!
“Putin’s failing Ukraine invasion proves Russia is no superpower".
"Every country has its own Mafia. In Russia the Mafia has its own country."
1917 - The Russian Empire collapsed. 1991 - The Soviet Union collapsed.  The collapse of the Russian Federation is next
 

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Re: Serviços Secretos em Acção
« Responder #162 em: Fevereiro 19, 2026, 02:07:25 pm »
Inspetor da PJ apanhado na teia do alegado espião da Rússia - Justiça - Jornal de Negócios
 https://share.google/2MC8tDudKArGBMfcg
 

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Re: Serviços Secretos em Acção
« Responder #163 em: Fevereiro 20, 2026, 05:53:30 am »
Portuguese Security Services Uncover Russian Intelligence Operation Targeting NATO Drone Developments
Compromised Conference Reveals Systematic Data Theft Attempt

https://24brussels.online/top-stories/portuguese-security-services-uncover-russian-intelligence-operation-targeting-nato-drone-developments/
слава Україна!
“Putin’s failing Ukraine invasion proves Russia is no superpower".
"Every country has its own Mafia. In Russia the Mafia has its own country."
1917 - The Russian Empire collapsed. 1991 - The Soviet Union collapsed.  The collapse of the Russian Federation is next
 

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Re: Serviços Secretos em Acção
« Responder #164 em: Março 11, 2026, 02:06:50 am »
Dutch govt warns of Signal, WhatsApp account hijacking attacks

Russian state-sponsored hackers have been linked to an ongoing Signal and WhatsApp phishing campaign targeting government officials, military personnel, and journalists to gain access to sensitive messages.

This report comes from the Netherlands Defence Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD) and the Netherlands General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD), who confirmed that Dutch government employees have been targeted in the attacks.

The Dutch intelligence agencies say the operation relies on phishing and social-engineering techniques that abuse legitimate authentication features to take over accounts and covertly monitor new messages.

Signal posted on social media that it is aware of targeted phishing attacks that have resulted in account takeovers and warned users to remain vigilant.

"We are aware of recent reports regarding targeted phishing attacks that have resulted in account takeovers of some Signal users, including government officials and journalists," Signal posted on BlueSky.

"We take this very seriously. To be clear: Signal's encryption and infrastructure have not been compromised and remain robust. These attacks were executed via sophisticated phishing campaigns, designed to trick users into sharing information – SMS codes and/or Signal PIN – to gain access to users' accounts."

Signal says that when sending SMS codes, they always warn not to share SMS codes or PINs with anyone, including Signal employees or services.

Phishing messages impersonate Signal support
One of the primary attack methods involves impersonating a fake "Signal Security Support Chatbot" that warns the user that suspicious activity was detected on their account.

The message then tells the user to complete a "verification procedure" by sharing a verification code sent to their phone.

"We have noticed suspicious activity on your device, which could have led to data leak. We have also detected attempts to gain access to your private data in Signal," reads the Signal phishing message.

"To prevent this, you have to pass verification procedure, entering the verification code to Signal Security Support Chatbot."

After the victim provides the SMS verification code and their Signal PIN, attackers can take full control of the account by registering it on their own device.

According to the advisory, once attackers gain access to an account, they can also change the phone number associated with it to one under their control. This allows them to access the victim's contact list and incoming messages, including messages sent in group chats.

Attackers may also impersonate the victim by sending messages from the compromised account.

As Signal stores chat history locally on the device, when victims re-register a new account, they would regain access to their old messages, potentially leading them to believe nothing unusual occurred.

"The victim is unable to access their account, although they are able to create a new Signal account using their existing telephone number, as the actor has already linked the compromised account to a new telephone number," warns the Dutch intelligence agencies.

"Because Signal stores the chat history locally on the phone, a victim can regain access to that history after re‑registering. As a result, the victim may assume that nothing is wrong. The Dutch services want to stress that this assumption could be incorrect."

The advisory also says a second method was observed abusing Signal's and WhatsApp's device linking functionality.

Attackers send victims a malicious QR code or link that appears to be an invitation to join a chat group or connect with another user. When the victim scans the code or opens the link, it links the attacker's device to the victim's account instead.

Both Signal and WhatsApp offer a linked device feature that allows users to connect devices, such as computers or tablets, to their accounts so they can send and receive messages from multiple devices. This is typically done by scanning a QR code generated by the main mobile device, which authorizes the new device to access and synchronize the account's messages.

Once connected, the attacker gains access to the victim's messages and may be able to read chat history, monitor conversations in real time, and send messages in the victim's name.

Unlike account takeovers, victims typically retain access to their accounts, which can make a breach harder to detect.

The Dutch intelligence agencies advise users not to share sensitive or classified information via messaging apps unless specifically approved.

They also recommend checking the list of devices linked to Signal and WhatsApp accounts and immediately removing unknown devices.

The same precautions against email phishing attacks apply to messaging apps, which include ignoring unsolicited invitations, links, or QR codes unless they have verified their legitimacy through another trusted communication channel.

These types of messaging app phishing campaigns are not new.

Last year, Google reported that Russian threat actors targeted Signal users by abusing features such as device linking to gain access to victims' communications.

In December, GenDigital detected a WhatsApp device-linking QR code phishing campaign targeting users in Czechia, though it was not attributed to any specific threat actor.

https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/dutch-govt-warns-of-signal-whatsapp-account-hijacking-attacks/