[mafets]

https://www.aereo.jor.br/2023/10/15/forca-aerea-israelense-usa-bombas-de-demolicao-da-epoca-da-guerra-da-coreia-contra-alvos-em-gaza/

F-16I Soufa (F-16D Block 50/52) armado com um par de bombas não guiadas M117 de 750 libras (340 kg)

Saudações

[os_pero]

https://twitter.com/hoje_no/status/1713908383009349984

A Agência para os Refugiados Palestinos da ONU informou que o Hamas roubou combustível e material médico destinado à assistência aos civis palestinos, mas reparem que a ONU, para não "ferir sensibilidades", nem sequer cita o Hamas, limitando-se a dizer que o combustível foi roubado pelas "autoridades de fato em Gaza". E, ainda por cima, nem usam a palavra "roubar", preferindo o termo "retirar".

Ou seja, os terroristas do Hamas invadiram a sede da ONU na Faixa de Gaza e "roubaram combustível, equipamentos e material médico" que estava destinado a atender a população civil palestina.

https://twitter.com/hoje_no/status/1713924417951072484

Após dizer que "as autoridades de fato em Gaza removeram combustível, equipamentos e material médico da ONU" destinado aos civis palestinos, uma forma mais branda para dizer que os terroristas do Hamas invadiram as instalações da ONU na Faixa de Gaza e roubaram remédios e combustível destinado aos civis palestinos, a ONU levou uma checagem da comunidade e, logo em seguida, foi lá e APAGOU O POST!

Não se desculparam, não esclareceram, não reescreveram o post, simplesmente apagaram!

Isso mostra, mais uma vez, que os terroristas palestinos do Hamas não se importam com os civis palestinos, usados por eles apenas como escudos humanos, e que a ONU, que não classifica o Hamas como organização terrorista, está mais preocupada em não ferir sensibilidades do que em efetivamente se posicionar contra o terrorismo no mundo.

Se muita gente criticasse Israel tivesse mais preocupada em criticar o Hamas secalhar estávamos mais próximos da paz do que estamos hoje em dia.

[dc]

Merkava com o chapéuzinho (relembrar que quando os Russos começaram a usar o dito chapéu, os Israelitas comentaram que não era preciso porque tinham sistemas de protecção activa):

Aqui está uma imagem com melhor qualidade:

Retirada daqui:
https://x.com/hoje_no/status/1713894651227234376?s=20

Os israelitas disseram isso em algum artigo? Não me lembro de ter ouvido tal coisa deles. Além de que se sabe que o Trophy tem um ângulo de visão e intercepção relativamente limitado, não conseguindo destruir munições com trajectória vertical em direcção ao veículo. Fica a questão se esta alteração se prende apenas pelos drones, a lançarem munições de RPG por cima dos tanques, ou também para defender de emboscadas lançadas de edifícios, de um ângulo superior ao que o Trophy cobre.

[dc]

https://www.aereo.jor.br/2023/10/15/forca-aerea-israelense-usa-bombas-de-demolicao-da-epoca-da-guerra-da-coreia-contra-alvos-em-gaza/

F-16I Soufa (F-16D Block 50/52) armado com um par de bombas não guiadas M117 de 750 libras (340 kg)

Saudações

Farão parte dos stocks americanos no país?

[os_pero]

Merkava com o chapéuzinho (relembrar que quando os Russos começaram a usar o dito chapéu, os Israelitas comentaram que não era preciso porque tinham sistemas de protecção activa):

Aqui está uma imagem com melhor qualidade:

Retirada daqui:
https://x.com/hoje_no/status/1713894651227234376?s=20

Os israelitas disseram isso em algum artigo? Não me lembro de ter ouvido tal coisa deles. Além de que se sabe que o Trophy tem um ângulo de visão e intercepção relativamente limitado, não conseguindo destruir munições com trajectória vertical em direcção ao veículo. Fica a questão se esta alteração se prende apenas pelos drones, a lançarem munições de RPG por cima dos tanques, ou também para defender de emboscadas lançadas de edifícios, de um ângulo superior ao que o Trophy cobre.

https://twitter.com/TheDeadDistrict/status/1713909883844591832

[CruzSilva]

https://www.aereo.jor.br/2023/10/15/forca-aerea-israelense-usa-bombas-de-demolicao-da-epoca-da-guerra-da-coreia-contra-alvos-em-gaza/

F-16I Soufa (F-16D Block 50/52) armado com um par de bombas não guiadas M117 de 750 libras (340 kg)

Saudações

Já tinha visto esta imagem há uns dias - deve estar aí uma precisão brutal nessas bombas. 

[Drecas]

https://www.aereo.jor.br/2023/10/15/forca-aerea-israelense-usa-bombas-de-demolicao-da-epoca-da-guerra-da-coreia-contra-alvos-em-gaza/

F-16I Soufa (F-16D Block 50/52) armado com um par de bombas não guiadas M117 de 750 libras (340 kg)

Saudações

Farão parte dos stocks americanos no país?

Não Israel sempre as usou, é possível encontrar fotos dos F-16 com M117 para treinos de á uns meses atrás

[dc]

https://www.reddit.com/r/MilitaryPorn/comments/176tfyg/iaf_israeli_air_force_f16_fighting_falcon_and_750/


A verdadeira questão, é porquê andarem com 2 AMRAAM. Das duas uma, ou andam permanentemente com os AMRAAM, para o caso de surgir uma ameaça aérea enquanto estão no ar, e não andarem sempre a tirar e pôr os mísseis, ou estas bombas não são para largar em Gaza, mas sim no Líbano e/ou Síria.

[sergio21699]

Agora em Bruxelas.. 2 mortos e suspeito em fuga.

https://twitter.com/racismocontrapt/status/1713993071598133752?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1713993071598133752%7Ctwgr%5Edce852c9156c6b9828f7bbeffc1519aff140f7d3%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fforum.zwame.pt%2Fthreads%2Fconflito-israel-palestina.1079447%2Fpage-34

[CruzSilva]

Why has the Gaza ground invasion been delayed since Friday? - analysis

Is Hezbollah waiting to strike until forces are in a Gaza quagmire?

It seemed crystal clear on Thursday: the IDF counter-invasion of Gaza would start either Friday or Saturday.

The IDF had given certain deadlines for Palestinians to evacuate northern Gaza, with the deadlines expiring by midday Friday.

The drum beat toward an invasion had started as early as Sunday-Monday and was only getting louder, with the air force having already paved the way with several days of withering bombing.

Yet, now we have arrived at late Monday, and if anything, the signs (which could also be psychological warfare) are that the invasion is further away, and not yet imminent.

What changed?

A number of factors seem to have caused a delay, but sources have told The Jerusalem Post that one factor has been a growing concern that Hezbollah is waiting for the moment that most IDF ground forces are committed to Gaza to open a full front with the IDF in the north.

In this narrative, the fact that Hezbollah did not engage at the start of the war Saturday morning and has kept its attacks on Israel at a fairly low threshold does not prove that it is deterred but is part of an elaborate fake-out to lure the IDF into a false sense of security, similar to what Hamas pulled off in the south.

As fodder for such suspicions, sources would note that Israeli intelligence and the political echelon must have a new level of humility about their assessments of enemy intentions after missing the boat regarding Hamas in the south.

This will not stop the IDF from invading Gaza, but it may have caused a delay to better double-check signs regarding Hezbollah's intentions as well as to further reinforce the northern forces in case the worst comes to pass.

There is also a deepening recognition in the IDF and at the political level, that the IDF has not done anything like this in decades, and that rushing in unprepared, simply to more quickly satisfy the wider population's thirst for retribution, could be a large mistake.

In this perspective, the 2006 Second Lebanon War ground invasion was a complete mess, with the airpower being the successful part, with both the 2008-9 and 2014 invasions of Gaza being more symbolic.

In other words, with all of the many "rounds" of conflict, the IDF should not be overconfident about its talent at conducting large land invasion operations.

Strategy against Hamas

While achieving strategic "surprise" would be impossible given that Hamas started this war, the IDF would also like to achieve at least a tactical surprise against Hamas, which requires planning.

A number of other delaying factors could be US pressure to avoid civilian casualties, domestic concerns about Israeli hostages in Gaza, and giving more time for Palestinians to evacuate.

Another factor is the US and world response to date.

Currently, Israel feels huge support and like it has more time to work with to deal with Hamas.

One question that arises at this point though is whether top IDF and civilian leaders are misjudging the clock.

According to Hamas' numbers, already a couple thousand Palestinians are dead and many more wounded. In 2014, when 2,000 Palestinians were killed, at least half were civilians despite the IDF's attempts to avoid civilian casualties.

Such is the fog of war.

The second that those numbers balloon, which will likely be when the invasion starts in a real way, there will be powerful US and world pressure to stop.

Also, the Post has confirmed from many sources that no one has yet decided what will happen to Gaza after the IDF will supposedly topple Hamas' rule.

This and all of the other above factors have left top Israeli officials huffing and puffing for new superlatives for what they will do to Hamas...while still basically having done very little new for about a week.

Only after the war will we know whether this extra time was spent wisely crafting a smarter and more effective invasion and post-invasion plan, or whether the delay will be looked back on as having wasted precious days to "change the reality in Gaza" and avoid future near term Hamas attacks.

Fonte: Jerusalem Post

[mafets]

https://www.pprune.org/military-aviation/655199-gaza-air-war-5.html

First confirmed IDF aircraft loss.

Shortly before the start of the Hamas attack, a CH-53D Sea Stallion (Yasur) transport helicopter with several paratroopers on board arrived in the Gaza Strip area.

Due to a malfunction, the helicopter made an emergency landing at Kibbutz Beeri.

After the attack began, Hamas militants were able to strike the helicopter with a guided missile, which led to its complete destruction.

  After Israeli attacks on the Assad regime airports of Damascus and Aleppo, the Iranian regime now uses the Russian air base in Latakia to transport fighters and weapons to the region.
https://twitter.com/julianroepcke/status/1713583311874863240?s=61&t=rmEeUn68HhlFHGKbTPQr_A

Saudações

[dc]

Why has the Gaza ground invasion been delayed since Friday? - analysis

Is Hezbollah waiting to strike until forces are in a Gaza quagmire?

It seemed crystal clear on Thursday: the IDF counter-invasion of Gaza would start either Friday or Saturday.

The IDF had given certain deadlines for Palestinians to evacuate northern Gaza, with the deadlines expiring by midday Friday.

The drum beat toward an invasion had started as early as Sunday-Monday and was only getting louder, with the air force having already paved the way with several days of withering bombing.

Yet, now we have arrived at late Monday, and if anything, the signs (which could also be psychological warfare) are that the invasion is further away, and not yet imminent.

What changed?

A number of factors seem to have caused a delay, but sources have told The Jerusalem Post that one factor has been a growing concern that Hezbollah is waiting for the moment that most IDF ground forces are committed to Gaza to open a full front with the IDF in the north.

In this narrative, the fact that Hezbollah did not engage at the start of the war Saturday morning and has kept its attacks on Israel at a fairly low threshold does not prove that it is deterred but is part of an elaborate fake-out to lure the IDF into a false sense of security, similar to what Hamas pulled off in the south.

As fodder for such suspicions, sources would note that Israeli intelligence and the political echelon must have a new level of humility about their assessments of enemy intentions after missing the boat regarding Hamas in the south.

This will not stop the IDF from invading Gaza, but it may have caused a delay to better double-check signs regarding Hezbollah's intentions as well as to further reinforce the northern forces in case the worst comes to pass.

There is also a deepening recognition in the IDF and at the political level, that the IDF has not done anything like this in decades, and that rushing in unprepared, simply to more quickly satisfy the wider population's thirst for retribution, could be a large mistake.

In this perspective, the 2006 Second Lebanon War ground invasion was a complete mess, with the airpower being the successful part, with both the 2008-9 and 2014 invasions of Gaza being more symbolic.

In other words, with all of the many "rounds" of conflict, the IDF should not be overconfident about its talent at conducting large land invasion operations.

Strategy against Hamas

While achieving strategic "surprise" would be impossible given that Hamas started this war, the IDF would also like to achieve at least a tactical surprise against Hamas, which requires planning.

A number of other delaying factors could be US pressure to avoid civilian casualties, domestic concerns about Israeli hostages in Gaza, and giving more time for Palestinians to evacuate.

Another factor is the US and world response to date.

Currently, Israel feels huge support and like it has more time to work with to deal with Hamas.

One question that arises at this point though is whether top IDF and civilian leaders are misjudging the clock.

According to Hamas' numbers, already a couple thousand Palestinians are dead and many more wounded. In 2014, when 2,000 Palestinians were killed, at least half were civilians despite the IDF's attempts to avoid civilian casualties.

Such is the fog of war.

The second that those numbers balloon, which will likely be when the invasion starts in a real way, there will be powerful US and world pressure to stop.

Also, the Post has confirmed from many sources that no one has yet decided what will happen to Gaza after the IDF will supposedly topple Hamas' rule.

This and all of the other above factors have left top Israeli officials huffing and puffing for new superlatives for what they will do to Hamas...while still basically having done very little new for about a week.

Only after the war will we know whether this extra time was spent wisely crafting a smarter and more effective invasion and post-invasion plan, or whether the delay will be looked back on as having wasted precious days to "change the reality in Gaza" and avoid future near term Hamas attacks.

Fonte: Jerusalem Post

Apareceu na CNN Portugal, que o Hamas pedia uma troca de 6000 prisioneiros palestinos, pelos reféns.
É possível que outra razão, seja uma possível negociação em torno das pessoas sequestradas.

https://x.com/hoje_no/status/1714029870034866595?s=20

[dc]

Aqui poderá ser a confirmação de que Israel está mais preocupado com o Hezbollah a Norte, antes de se aventurar em Gaza.

https://x.com/hoje_no/status/1714049091183718477?s=20

E aqui vemos a ameaça do Irão. Se se concretizarem estes ataques "preventivos" do Irão, é quase certo um envolvimento americano, e quiçá de mais países.*

https://x.com/hoje_no/status/1714051427696288030?s=20

*E com isto, mais o terrorismo a ressurgir na Europa, quem beneficia é a Rússia e a China. Se a Rússia neste momento permanece entalada na Ucrânia, a China, para já, continua em paz, continuará a preparação para atacar Taiwan, e quando achar o momento adequado, pode mesmo avançar, aproveitando um possível foco americano no MO.

[nelson38899]

[P44]