Exército Francês

  • 321 Respostas
  • 77639 Visualizações
*

Lusitan

  • Perito
  • **
  • 419
  • Recebeu: 129 vez(es)
  • Enviou: 126 vez(es)
  • +150/-11
  • Hic et Ubique
Re: Exército Francês
« Responder #315 em: Julho 08, 2020, 01:10:11 pm »
https://warontherocks.com/2020/07/modern-war-for-romantics-ferdinand-foch-and-the-principles-of-war/

[...]

The French army is inclined to agree, by affirming Foch’s premise that there are in fact principles of war and continuing to enshrine Foch’s. It places Foch’s Principles at the heart of its doctrine, or rather at the pinnacle of its “hierarchy of norms” as spelled out in the 2016 Future Land Action. More specifically, the French army today recognizes five principles of war. The first three are straight Foch: liberty of action, economy of means, and concentration of efforts. To these the French have added two more, reportedly derived from the 1992 book on strategy by Adm. Guy Labouérie (1933–2016). These are “uncertainty” and foudroyance.

Uncertainty quite simply is something one most go to great lengths to cultivate among one’s adversaries: uncertainty about what one is doing and going to do, where, when, and why. Foudroyance, derived from the word for thunder (foudre), means a sudden crippling shock. In truth, it amounts to a rephrasing of Foch’s principle of strategic surprise. To cite Labouérie (who mentions Foch but does not take up his principles specifically):

The principle of foudroyance has as its goal not destroying everything, which is without interest in any conflict, but breaking the rhythm or rhythms of the Other in its diverse activities, in such a way as to keep it from pulling itself together and to keep it a step behind the action.

To do that, one must strike at the right moment, at just the right place, where the effect would be to block the enemy’s attempt to retake the advantage or restore cohesion.

At the Centre de doctrine et d’enseignement du commandement’s 2019 conference, participants discussed whether or not new technologies, new forms of conflict, and new contextual realities (such as new political landscapes, the role of the media, and the much smaller size of most militaries) had changed or would in the foreseeable future change warfare so significantly as to make Foch finally useless. In essence, the answer was no, although participants agreed that commanders today and in the near future would have to change how they applied Foch’s principles. To some extent, the old terms mean different things or imply different courses of action. Liberty of action, for example, now requires access to information and protection of information networks. It also requires political legitimacy, especially since often it is public opinion at home that limits commanders’ choices and confines their liberty of action. Indeed, politics weighs far more heavily on military operations now than in Foch’s day. Also, modern forces are smaller and more likely to be dispersed to a far greater extent than Foch had in mind, giving new importance to economy of means and concentration of efforts. Information networks can facilitate both, though they will challenge command-and-control practices while also becoming a potential vulnerability (Gen. Guy Hubin’s 2003 Perspectives Tactiques stands in the French army as the most influential vision of how networked technology will affect ground operations). Concentration of efforts must also take into account the fact that more often than not military operations are conducted by coalitions. Conference-goers also suggested that recent evolutions oblige the adoption of new principles. Proposed examples include agility, comprehension, proportionality, and resilience. Similarly, French army doctrine itself evokes “legitimacy of action” and “reversibility of action.”

Beaufre perhaps said it best when he wrote that Foch’s principles have the advantage of being sufficiently abstract as to remain universally valid, though he complained that they were too abstract to have any practical application. Nonetheless his own work reflects a strong influence by Foch, and it seems that today the French army at least has inherited a measure of Foch’s aggressiveness. France’s 2013 intervention in Mali, for example, featured a rapid series of aggressive maneuvers that demonstrated a will to deny the enemy liberty of action and, in effect, cripple it through sheer relentlessness and speed. In that sense, the Mali war bore a remarkable resemblance to Foch’s vision of future combat in 1903 and the great counter-offensive of the autumn of 1918. Foch’s principles also make particular sense given the French army’s lack of resources, compared not just to the U.S. military but even the French army of Foch’s day. Economy of means when means are limited is not a thought exercise. Foch above all counseled fighting smart, and trying always to answer “de quoi s’agit-il?” even if this amounts to nothing more than the imperative to take a moment and think through what one is trying to achieve. This seems self-evident, but recent American military history suggests civilian and military leaders could benefit from the reminder.
 

*

Vitor Santos

  • Moderador Global
  • *****
  • 4855
  • Recebeu: 429 vez(es)
  • Enviou: 335 vez(es)
  • +2322/-1724
Re: Exército Francês
« Responder #316 em: Julho 17, 2020, 03:20:13 am »
French 21st Marine Infantry Regiment Receives VBMR Griffon Armored Vehicles


Citar
Thirteen new VBMR Griffons have arrived in Fréjus in the French 21st Marine Infantry Regiment. The 21st Marine Infantry Regiment thus becomes the fourth army unit to receive these vehicles on which two combat companies will be formed from August for a period of two months. The training phase will allow pilots, weapon operators and group commanders to practice directly on the vehicle. From November, two additional companies of the regiment will be trained in turn. The French Army (Armée de terre) had already received 92 of these VBMR Griffons in 2019. According to the French Army’s 2020 Defense White Paper it plans to buy up to 2,122 VBMR vehicles between 2018 and 2025.The French army has been preparing to replace the VAB since the early 2000s.


The 21st Marine Infantry Regiment (21e Régiment d’Infanterie de Marine, 21e RIMa) is a unit of the French military issued by filiation from the 2e RIC. In recent years the 21e RIMa has been engaged in theatres in central-Europe. The regiment was cited at the orders of the brigade for action in Kosovo in 1999. The regiment can be deployed in overseas missions or fill the service of missions in service of the public in metropolitan France. The regiment is the designated guardian of the traditions of the Troupes de Marine. Motoryzed infantry regiment on vehicles of the avant blindés (VAB), the 21e RIMa has for preponderant missions, the protection of national territories, the intervention in Europe and outre-mer territories privileging Amphibious warfare.


The VBMR Griffon (Véhicule blindé multi-rôles Griffon, lit. ‘Multi-role armored vehicle Griffon’) is a French multi-role armored vehicle that will replace the French Army’s VAB armored personnel carrier. A consortium of Nexter, Thales, and Renault Trucks Defense is building the vehicles. The same consortium also builds the EBRC Jaguar reconnaissance and combat vehicle for the French Army, which shares 70% of its components with the VBMR Griffon. The consortium building the “Griffon” and “Jaguar” is contractually obliged to keep the price per Griffon under €1 million. The vehicles are designed for simple maintenance and logistics. For example, Griffon and Jaguar both use standard commercial truck engines, which have been adapted to use a wider range of fuel.


The vehicle is based on a 6×6 commercial all-terrain truck chassis and will carry up to eight infantry soldiers. After 2021 a much lighter 4 × 4 version might be ordered, which will be used as a reconnaissance vehicle. Currently, six versions of the Griffon are planned, with four of these (Armored Personnel Carrier, Command Post, Ambulance, and Artillery Observer) ordered in the first tranche. The Griffon is equipped with a remote weapons station that can be armed with either a 12.7mm or 7.62mm machine gun, or a 40mm automatic grenade launcher. The addition of two Missile Moyenne Portée (MMP) anti-tank guided missiles is optional. Eight launchers for smoke grenades are fitted to the remote weapon station, which also includes an acoustic sniper localisation system.

 :arrow:   https://militaryleak.com/2020/07/13/french-21st-marine-infantry-regiment-receives-vbmr-griffon-armored-vehicles/
 

*

LM

  • Investigador
  • *****
  • 1297
  • Recebeu: 247 vez(es)
  • Enviou: 1170 vez(es)
  • +202/-6
Re: Exército Francês
« Responder #317 em: Julho 17, 2020, 10:11:12 am »
Citar
The Griffon is equipped with a remote weapons station that can be armed with either a 12.7mm or 7.62mm machine gun, or a 40mm automatic grenade launcher. The addition of two Missile Moyenne Portée (MMP) anti-tank guided missiles is optional. Eight launchers for smoke grenades are fitted to the remote weapon station, which also includes an acoustic sniper localisation system.

Pois... e 1 milhão de euros (talvez sem armamento?)... e grande logística simplificada com versão reconhecimento e (futura) 4x4... interessante.   
Quidquid latine dictum sit, altum videtur
 

*

LM

  • Investigador
  • *****
  • 1297
  • Recebeu: 247 vez(es)
  • Enviou: 1170 vez(es)
  • +202/-6
Re: Exército Francês
« Responder #318 em: Julho 27, 2020, 10:26:17 am »
France’s reforged, digitized ground forces

2018/07/08 Extenso e "datado" mas interessante...

Citar
(...)At the end of the Cold War, the French Army was relegated to a lower priority among the three services. The threat of Russian tanks rolling though the Fulda gap did not come to pass, and the peacekeeping operations in Africa did not require high-end, heavy fighting capabilities. Thus, the investment was redirected to the Air Force, which was starting its Rafale fighter programme, and the Navy.

The recent operations the Army was involved in proved this was a reasonable decision: neither the deployment in Afghanistan nor the African theater featured a symmetric ground threat. In Libya, French ground troops consisted only of special forces and the campaign relied on western air power and on the rebellion’s forces. The only time the Leclerc Main Battle Tanks were deployed was for a UN blue helmets peacekeeping operation in Lebanon, to set up a buffer zone between the Israeli and Hezbollah forces. Even what was arguably the largest French-only combined arms operation in decades, the Serval campaign in Mali, was against jihadists with no heavy equipment.(...)

Front view of the Jaguar with all the electronics circled in blue, the direct optics for the crew in green and the weapons in red

Lateral view revealing the second ANTARES sensor
« Última modificação: Julho 27, 2020, 10:57:36 am por LM »
Quidquid latine dictum sit, altum videtur
 

*

LM

  • Investigador
  • *****
  • 1297
  • Recebeu: 247 vez(es)
  • Enviou: 1170 vez(es)
  • +202/-6
Re: Exército Francês
« Responder #319 em: Julho 27, 2020, 11:32:46 am »
Ao ler o artigo acima ("France’s reforged, digitized ground forces") lembrei-me dos Pandur Checos que custam 3x os nossos, do trabalho da AM sobre os nossos BIMec(R) e as dificuldades nas comunicações (e nas Secções VCB na Vigilância do Campo de Batalha...); mas também no possível problema dos franceses se o oponente tem forte capacidade EW e na logística (manutenção no terreno). 
« Última modificação: Julho 27, 2020, 11:33:34 am por LM »
Quidquid latine dictum sit, altum videtur
 

*

LM

  • Investigador
  • *****
  • 1297
  • Recebeu: 247 vez(es)
  • Enviou: 1170 vez(es)
  • +202/-6
Re: Exército Francês
« Responder #320 em: Julho 28, 2020, 03:24:47 pm »
Sobre os "Kampfgruppen" dos franceses:

A SGTIA is the basic building block of the French ground forces and consists of, at its most basic form, three infantry or armor platoons and one platoon from the other arm (i.e., three infantry and one armor, or vice versa), with some associated support elements and a company-level command capability, all led by two captains, one with a fires coordination responsibility (see discussion that follows). More platoons and support elements can be added as required, with the limit being eight platoons total.

On a larger scale, there is the combined arms tactical group (groupement tactique interarmes; GTIA), which has the same structure as the SGTIA, only its component parts are companies, not platoons. Thus, the basic GTIA has three infantry companies and one armor company (or three armor and one infantry), a variety of support elements, and a battalion-level headquarters capability. More can be added as needed. Both GTIA and SGTIA are, by definition, scalable, and both are purpose-built for specific tasks.
 
Finally, the French do not adhere strictly to the textbook doctrine: GTIAs and SGTIAs in Mali and now in the Central African Republic are not consistently built around the 3/1 model.

The "Chadian SGTIA" primarily consisted of two companies of the 21st Marine Infantry Regiment (21e Régiment d’infanterie de marine; RIMa) operating armored personnel carriers
(the armored forward vehicle [véhicule de l’avant blindé; VAB]); a squadron from the 1st Foreign Legion Cavalry Regiment (1er Régiment étranger de cavalerie; REC) operating AMX-10RC
light tanks; and a battery of howitzers and mortars from the 3rd Marine Artillery Regiment (3e Régiment d’artillerie de marine; RAMa).



Como eles estão a substituir os AMX-10RC (e os ERC-90) pelos "ERBC Jaguar", que têm "apenas" um canhão de 40mm (e 2x MMP e muita electrónica), podemos considerar os "VBR PANDUR II 8X8 Porta Canhão 30mm" o nosso equivalente... 30mm não é 40mm, mas principalmente falta poder colocar na SP30 uns ATGM, a "electrónica", etc... depois é comprar muitas RWS 12,7mm para as VBR TP... equipamento para os pelotões "especializados", soldados...         

« Última modificação: Julho 28, 2020, 03:40:21 pm por LM »
Quidquid latine dictum sit, altum videtur
 

*

Cabeça de Martelo

  • Investigador
  • *****
  • 15836
  • Recebeu: 1319 vez(es)
  • Enviou: 1216 vez(es)
  • +208/-193
Re: Exército Francês
« Responder #321 em: Julho 29, 2020, 09:57:41 am »
Citação de: Miguel Machado
De Legionários (soldados) a Sargentos e agora Oficiais!
Na Legião Estrangeira do Exército francês a evolução na carreira por mérito é uma realidade.
Hoje, por exemplo no Exército Português, um Sargento do Quadro Permanente pode ascender a Oficial?





7. Todos os animais são iguais mas alguns são mais iguais que os outros.

 
Os seguintes utilizadores agradeceram esta mensagem: HSMW

 

High Tech "Battlelab" para o Exército Britânico

Iniciado por JLRC

Respostas: 0
Visualizações: 3086
Última mensagem Outubro 28, 2004, 11:04:28 pm
por JLRC
Grupo de Aviação Ligeira do Exército Osprey...Apache/Tiger

Iniciado por Boina_Verde

Respostas: 40
Visualizações: 15887
Última mensagem Setembro 19, 2007, 12:28:14 pm
por Luso
Imagem da nova espingarda de assalto do exército americano

Iniciado por lf2a

Respostas: 2
Visualizações: 2920
Última mensagem Outubro 01, 2004, 05:43:15 pm
por lf2a
Para que serve o Grupo de Aviação Ligeira (Exército)

Iniciado por papatango

Respostas: 19
Visualizações: 8221
Última mensagem Maio 14, 2008, 01:00:06 am
por tyr
Exército, Alemanha, França,Inglaterra, TOPS Pesquisa

Iniciado por Heer.Skuda

Respostas: 2
Visualizações: 3752
Última mensagem Junho 15, 2007, 01:11:48 am
por Nuno Bento