Este artigo é bastante interessante. Coloca a hipótese dos países do Báltico, contrariamente à estratégia defendida pela maioria dos analistas, usar os centros urbanos como zonas de conflicto em caso de invasão por parte dos russos. Baseiam-se em conflictos recentes entre forças regulares e forças irregulares, como o ISIS.
https://warontherocks.com/2020/10/for-baltic-defense-forget-the-forest-brothers/FOR BALTIC DEFENSE, FORGET THE ‘FOREST BROTHERS’A key lesson for the Baltics to consider from this campaign is the struggle between the Philippine government and the Islamic State for control of the narrative. The Philippine government was simultaneously involved in a conflict for the control of information, which demonstrates how non-kinetic warfare has emerged as a major determinant of ultimate victory, alongside conventional kinetic means. Both sides sought to target audience opinion and encourage recruitment. In this respect, the Islamic State has its own particular modus operandi. Seeking to retain urban holdouts allowed the Islamic State to portray a narrative of symbolic defiance. Conventional doctrine holds that an encircled force should surrender, but in the modern digital era, there is a greater informational advantage in constructing a narrative of resistance that can portray the opposing side as callous and indifferent to the wider population. Future urban conflicts are likely to continue this trend of combining conventional armed struggles with a battle to control the narrative via social media.
Baltic defense and deterrence capabilities could therefore be improved by developing plans to wage an information war concurrently with any Russian incursion. It should be noted that such an information war would not be waged by those physically fighting in the urban environment. For one thing, in a besieged city, the lack of power and other infrastructure mitigates against this happening in situ. In the case of the Islamic State in Marawi, the war of the narratives was undertaken by Islamic State information operations elements located away from the fighting and operating online. We expect this might also be the case with the Baltics, perhaps led by a computer-savvy Baltic diaspora.
Modern examples of small-state capitulation have further reinforced for the Baltic political class the importance of retaining independence. The examples of Panama (1989) and Kuwait (1990) being invaded by a larger power show how vulnerable small states can be when faced with overwhelming force. Baltic defense planners need to recognize that deterrence and defense can be strengthened by accepting the possibility of urban operations. The Forest Brothers-ideal presents a more palatable and more emotionally acceptable prospect, than taking lessons from the Islamic State as defenders in an asymmetric conflict. Yet, the Forest Brother myth neglects how such a form of paramilitarism is likely to be operationally obsolete, and as militarily ineffective as it was in 1949. Baltic defense planners and allied members of NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence need to consider the possibilities for future urban-based resistance. Clinging to the Forest Brothers ideal will only reinforce a collective unwillingness among Baltic states to contemplate the likely threat posed to the populations of the three nations. In 2020, nostalgia for a paramilitarism of national resistance may strengthen the bonds of national unity. But it is poor preparation for defending against an aggressive larger power.
