Citação de: "ricardonunes"Deixar de lhes comprar petróleo seria uma boa medida.Se usares a bicicleta como meio de transporte não há problema :lol: , vou ter que pensar nisso.Mas se o intuito do enrequecimento do uranio e exclusivamente para fins civeis, produção de energia, porquê tanto secretismo com o programa?Para mim algo está mal contado neste história tanto da parte do Irão como por parte dos inspectores internacionais.
Deixar de lhes comprar petróleo seria uma boa medida.
Mas se o intuito do enrequecimento do uranio e exclusivamente para fins civeis, produção de energia, porquê tanto secretismo com o programa?
Citação de: "ricardonunes"Mas se o intuito do enrequecimento do uranio e exclusivamente para fins civeis, produção de energia, porquê tanto secretismo com o programa?Para fins civis nao e' necessario enriquecer uranio...
Enriched uranium is a critical component for both civil nuclear power generation and military nuclear weapons. The International Atomic Energy Agency attempts to monitor and control enriched uranium supplies and processes in its efforts to ensure nuclear power generation safety and curb nuclear weapons proliferation.
Highly enriched uranium (HEU) A billet of highly enriched uraniumHighly enriched uranium (HEU) has a greater than 20% concentration of 235U or 233U.The fissile uranium in nuclear weapons usually contains 85% or more of 235U known as weapon(s)-grade, though for a crude, inefficient weapon 20% is sufficient (called weapon(s)-usable); some argue that even less is sufficient, but then the critical mass required rapidly increases. However, judicious use of implosion and neutron reflectors can enable construction of a weapon from a quantity of uranium below the usual critical mass for its level of enrichment, though this would likely only be possible in a country which already had extensive experience in developing nuclear weapons. The presence of too much of the 238U isotope inhibits the runaway nuclear chain reaction that is responsible for the weapon's power.HEU is also used in fast neutron reactors as well as in nuclear submarine reactors, where it contains at least 50% 235U, but typically exceeds 90%. The Fermi-1 commercial fast reactor prototype used HEU with 26.5% 235U.Low-enriched uranium (LEU)Low-enriched uranium (LEU) has a lower than 20% concentration of 235U. For use in commercial light water reactors (LWR), the most prevalent power reactors in the world, uranium is enriched to 3 to 5 % 235U. Fresh LEU used in research reactors is usually enriched 12% to 19.75% U-235, the later concentration being used to replace HEU fuels when converting to LEU. Low-enriched uranium powderSlightly enriched uranium (SEU)Slightly enriched uranium (SEU) has a concentration of 235U between 0.9% and 2%.This new grade is being used to replace Natural uranium (NU) fuel in some heavy water reactors like the CANDU. Costs are lowered because less uranium and fewer bundles are needed to fuel the reactor. This in turn reduces the quantity of used fuel and its subsequent waste management costs.Recovered uranium (RU) is a variation of SEU. It is based on a fuel cycle involving used fuel recovered from light water reactors (LWR). The spent fuel from a LWR typically contains more U-235 than natural uranium, and therefore could be used to fuel reactors which customarily use natural uranium as fuel.
Citação de: "Azraael"Para fins civis nao e' necessario enriquecer uranio...Olhe que não.........
Para fins civis nao e' necessario enriquecer uranio...
A pressurised heavy water reactor (PHWR) is a nuclear power reactor that uses unenriched natural uranium as its fuel and heavy water as a moderator (deuterium oxide D2O). The heavy water is kept under pressure in order to raise its boiling point, allowing it to be heated to higher temperatures and thereby carry more heat out of the reactor core. While heavy water is expensive, the reactor can operate without expensive fuel enrichment facilities thus balancing the costs.
The acronym "CANDU", a registered trademark of Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, stands for "CANada Deuterium Uranium". This is a reference to its deuterium-oxide (heavy water) moderator and its use of natural uranium fuel.
Enriched uranium is a critical component for both civil nuclear power generation and military nuclear weapons. The International Atomic Energy Agency attempts to monitor and control enriched uranium supplies and processes in its efforts to ensure nuclear power generation safety and curb nuclear weapons proliferation
Low-enriched uranium (LEU) Low-enriched uranium (LEU) has a lower than 20% concentration of 235U. For use in commercial light water reactors (LWR), the most prevalent power reactors in the world, uranium is enriched to 3 to 5 % 235U. Fresh LEU used in research reactors is usually enriched 12% to 19.75% U-235, the later concentration being used to replace HEU fuels when converting to LEU.
Em que é que ficamos
Russia’s Nuclear Deal with IranIntroductionAs the world struggles to find a formula for dealing with suspicious nuclear developments in Iran, Russian diplomats have been holding bilateral talks with Iranian officials on a proposal they say could defuse the crisis. The proposal, which has won support from other UN Security Council members—including the United States—would allow Iran to obtain enriched uranium it says it needs for civilian nuclear power directly from Russia. More importantly, the plan would obviate the need for Iran to enrich uranium on its own soil, which many fear could be used to create fuel for nuclear weapons.Have the Iranians signed on to the Russian proposal?In principle, yes, but negotiations continue. The tentative deal, the details of which still need to be worked out, comes one week before the board of the International Atomic Energy Agency meets March 6 to discuss potential measures—including UN sanctions—to deter Iran from developing nuclear weapons. Iran, which rejected earlier versions of Russia’s proposal, continues to press for what it says is its sovereign right to enrich uranium—an activity the international community, led by the United States, has condemned. Experts say there are a number of other uncertainties with the Russian plan, including the scale of the program, the role of Iranian scientists, and the program’s economic feasibility. Others suspect agreeing to the plan is a red herring by Iran to avoid censure by the UN Security Council.What would the deal entail?The plan, as reported, would essentially subcontract Iran’s uranium-enrichment process to Russia. Moscow says the deal is contingent on Iran permanently freezing its enrichment activities. Tehran, however, would be allowed to continue converting uranium ore concentrate, or yellowcake, into the gas uranium tetrafluoride (UF-4). (Iran resumed this conversion last summer.) The UF-4 would then be shipped to Russia to be converted into uranium hexafluoride (UF-6) and enriched into low-enriched uranium, which can fuel nuclear-power reactors but is not weapons-grade. The uranium would then be converted back to oxide for fuel fabrication and sent back to Iran for use at Bushehr, a Russian-built civilian-use nuclear reactor. All spent fuel would be sent back to Russia.Alternatively, Iran could convert UF-4 into UF-6 on Iranian soil. Whichever of these options is employed, the deal, as currently reported, would require Russia to enrich the UF-6 into low-enriched uranium. At this stage, it’s also unclear whether Russia or Iran would be doing the fuel fabrication; the most proliferation-resistant option, experts say, would require Russia to make the fuel. If Iran were allowed to take possession of the low-enriched uranium that has not been converted into fuel, experts say there’s the possibility Iran could use it as input to a clandestine enrichment plant to make weapons-grade uranium.Would Iranian or Russian scientists be enriching the uranium?Technically, only Russian scientists would be allowed to enrich the uranium. According to recent statements by Russian officials, Iranian scientists would not be given access to the nuclear sites. Nor would Russia share its technological know-how with Iranian technicians under the plan. “The big concern is that once Iranian scientists achieve the mastery of uranium enrichment, in essence they’ll have the capability to break out into nuclear-weapons capability,” says Charles Ferguson, fellow for science and technology at the Council on Foreign Relations. What are the main criticisms of the plan?There are several, experts say. First, it’s unclear if Russia will take on all or just some of Iran’s uranium enrichment activities. “Iran is not agreeing yet to end enrichment activities. It simply wants to add activities in Russia,” says Matthew Bunn, a senior research associate and acting director of the Managing the Atom Project at Harvard University. Second, critics say the plan fails to dismantle Iran’s future nuclear capabilities. “Even if Russia took over Iran’s nuclear energy work, the religious radicals in Tehran would be left with a huge amount of dangerous equipment,” wrote Valerie Lincy and Gary Milhollin of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, in a February 2006 New York Times op-ed. Instead, they favor the Libya model: “[In 2003], Libya allowed everything useful for enriching uranium to be boxed up and carted out of the country,” they write.Others say naturally occurring contaminants in Iran’s domestic supply of uranium will make the Russian plan difficult to carry out. Iranian uranium contains high levels of molybdenum, which is a contaminant lighter than uranium and therefore becomes more concentrated throughout the enrichment process. “It will gunk up the [Russian] centrifuges,” Bunn says.Why did Tehran originally object to the Russian plan?Because it requires Iran to relinquish control of the key stage in completing the nuclear fuel cycle, experts say. Iranians maintain their right to retain some level of enrichment activity in Iran. Ferguson says Russia and Iran may reach some kind of compromise that allows a limited level of nuclear research and development to continue within Iran’s borders, but stipulates that the bulk of the enrichment and conversion activities would be carried out by Russia. Other Iranians oppose the plan out of economic concerns and national pride. It does not make sense, they argue, for Iran to pay for the enrichment process and for nuclear fuel if Iranian scientists are not employed. “Persian culture is at stake,” Ferguson says. “They have a long history of scientific accomplishment and don’t want their scientists to be idle and not engaged in this grand enterprise.” Further, Iran is reportedly seeking security assurances by Russia to safeguard against the threat of UN sanctions, or—even worse—a preemptive military strike against its nuclear facilities by Israel or the United States.What does Russia get out of the deal?Russia is motivated by a number of interests. Although Russia already enjoys good relations with Tehran, it is not interested in a nuclear-armed Iran on its southern doorstep. Nor does Russia want to see nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, experts say. In addition, an agreement would be a boon to Russia’s image as a peace broker in international politics. “Russia wants to be seen as one of the big players, not as sitting on the sidelines,” Bunn says. Russia also has strong economic interests in Iran. Besides conventional arms, Moscow sells Iran nuclear reactors. For example, the light-water commercial reactor at Bushehr, built by Russians, was sold for more than $800 million. Two other similar nuclear projects are in the works, Ferguson says. “The Russians might cut a deal with Iran by saying, ‘We’ll give you a good price on fuel if you allow us to build.’” Russian trade with Iran is also growing. In 2005, Russian exports to Iran totaled roughly $2 billion. Nikolai Sokov, of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, predicts Russian exports to Iran could reach $10 billion in the coming years.Is the international community’s behind Russia’s plan?In principle, all five members of the UN Security Council have backed the Russian plan. President Bush explicitly endorsed the proposal in late January, provided that all of the nuclear fuel is produced on Russian soil and that UN inspectors can monitor the transport of the fuel back toIran. However, there have been a number of objections raised privately about the plan—and Iran’s willingness to act in good faith—particularly in light of a newly released IAEA report that details Iran’s stonewalling of weapons inspections. “We remain skeptical” about the plan, White House spokesman Scott McClellan told reporters February 27. Javier Solana, the European Union’s foreign policy chief, also urged caution. Others say Iran may be buying time to avoid being referred to the UN Security Council and facing punitive sanctions. Bunn says the plan leaves open the possibility Iran will carry on with its nuclear research and development. “Once Iranians have all the technical kinks worked out,” he says, “there’s a more significant risk they might go ahead and use the technology for nuclear-weapon purposes.” When would this plan go into effect?Not before the IAEA Board of Governors’ meeting March 6. Most experts say concrete action on the Russian plan is unlikely any time soon, if ever. “This could drag on for months,” Ferguson predicts.
Ja para nao dizer que mesmo que preferissem a via que recorre ao uranio enriquecido, a russia disponibilizou-se para o fazer (penso que gratuitamente)
Iran Says It Will Ignore U.N. Deadline on Uranium ProgramCAIRO, Aug. 6 — Iran’s chief national security official said Sunday that Iran would defy the United Nations Security Council by refusing to halt enrichment of uranium by the end of the month.During a news conference in Iran, Ali Larijani, the country’s security chief and top nuclear negotiator, condemned the West. He said it had engaged in double-dealing, by first offering a package of incentives in exchange for suspension of its nuclear-enrichment program, and then by issuing a threat.In remarks reported by the official Iranian News Agency, Mr. Larijani did not appear to chart new ground, sticking with Iran’s position that it would not halt enrichment as a precondition of negotiations.Western diplomats in Iran said in recent interviews that it appeared that Iran’s leadership had bet on the notion that it was more likely to get what it wanted if it refused to budge from its position, believing that the Security Council, and the West in particular, would do anything to avoid another ugly confrontation in the Middle East.The remarks appeared to be consistent with the government’s initial reaction at the end of July, when the Security Council passed a resolution demanding that Iran halt its enrichment work or face the possibility of economic and political sanctions.“The resolution is illegal,” said Mr. Larijani, echoing comments made in July by Javad Zarif, Iran’s ambassador to the United Nations. The two have said that since Iran has signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and since it has not violated that treaty, it cannot be forced to suspend enrichment.Under the treaty, members are entitled access to peaceful nuclear energy. Iran hid its nuclear program for more than a dozen years from the International Atomic Energy Agency, the nuclear monitoring arm of the United Nations, and now the United States and Europe contend that Iran is pursuing an arms program. Iran insists it is pursuing peaceful nuclear energy.The United States and Europe offered the incentives in June. Iran had said it would look favorably on the package and give a reply by Aug. 22. The West, along with Russia and China, pushed Iran to reply sooner. When it did not, the Security Council adopted the resolution with the Aug. 31 deadline.“If they are to solve the problem, they should find a solution in fair negotiations,” the news agency quoted Mr. Larijani as saying. “They should not harm the course of the negotiation.”Mr. Larijani did not say what Iran’s response would be to the incentive package, only that it was being viewed less favorably after the Security Council resolution.Christina Gallach, spokeswoman for Javier Solana, the European Union’s foreign policy chief, called on Iran to carry out the Security Council resolution. “We encourage Larijani and Iran to comply with the resolution,” she said, adding that Iran had ample time to make its case before the resolution was passed.In Iran, the issue of its nuclear program has become intertwined with the rest of the turmoil in the Middle East. Western diplomats in Iran said it appeared that the chaos had given an upper hand to the more hard-line members of Iran’s leadership.
Iran threatens to use 'oil weapon' in nuclear standoff Iran warned Britain and the US yesterday that the international community could face a new oil crisis if the United Nations security council imposes sanctions on Tehran over its alleged attempt to acquire a nuclear weapons-making capability.Speaking in Tehran, Ali Larijani, the country's chief nuclear negotiator and head of the supreme national security council, said Iran would be reluctant to cut its oil exports. "We do not want to use the oil weapon. It is them who would impose it upon us." But Mr Larijani added that if the west did decide on sanctions, "we will react in a way that would be painful for them ... Do not force us to do something that will make people shiver in the cold."Iran is the world's fourth largest oil exporter and is estimated to have the second largest oil and gas reserves.Global energy prices could be expected to reach new highs if Tehran's threat is carried out - although analysts point out that one of the first economic casualties might be Iran itself.Urged on by Britain, the US, France and Germany, the UN security council passed a resolution last week imposing a deadline of August 31 for Iran to accept a western package of incentives in return for suspending uranium enrichment at its Natanz facility, or face the prospect of political, economic and financial sanctions.Mr Larijani rejected the resolution as "illegal" and said Iran would not abide by the deadline. He reiterated Tehran's argument, repeated during the course of three years of largely fruitless negotiations with the "EU three" (Britain, France and Germany), that Iran was legally entitled to pursue uranium enrichment for peaceful purposes under the terms of the 1970 nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT)."We won't accept suspension. Such resolutions will not have any impact on our behaviour," he said. He went on to warn that Iran was prepared to further expand its nuclear research activities "if required". That could include building additional cascades of centrifuges at Natanz for enrichment purposes.Iran has built a cascade of 164 centrifuges and announced plans to build 3,000 this year. Experts say it would need more than 50,000 centrifuges for industrial production of low-grade enriched uranium, a process that could take years.Tehran insists its aim is to increase Iran's ability to generate electricity for domestic use. The US and others believe the technology could be used to enrich uranium to atomic weapons grade.Mohammad Saeidi, vice-president of Iran's Atomic Energy Organisation, said yesterday that Iran needed to find alternative energy supplies because its fossil fuel resources would run out in 25-30 years' time. "In the 21st century, the only way for any country to provide electricity is nuclear power." This was the same conclusion that Britain, France, the US and many others had reached, he added.Mr Saeidi said Iran's nuclear facilities and future power stations would continue to be open to inspection by the UN's International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) under the terms of the NPT. If an agreement was reached with the western countries, short-notice challenge inspections under the "additional protocol" could be resumed, he said. It was "impossible" for Iran to divert materials for bomb-making purposes under such an intrusive inspection regime, he added.Iranian officials said yesterday there would be a formal response to the west's nuclear offer on August 22, as previously announced by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. While Tehran was likely to reject demands that it suspend enrichment immediately, the officials said the government would offer to resume negotiations on all outstanding issues without preconditions.But pressure from hardliners in parliament is increasing. They are demanding that if sanctions are imposed Iran should discontinue cooperation with the IAEA and suspend its NPT membership.
A Venezuela está disposta a armazenar mísseis nucleares iranianos no seu território.Segundo o jornal "Folha de S. Paulo", o assunto foi discutido o mês passado quando o Presidente da Venezuela Hugo Chavez fez a sua quarta visita ao Irão.Chavez e Ahmadinejad terão discutido esta hipótese, no caso do Irão vir a fabricar estas armas.O jornal brasileiro acrescenta que, para o Presidente venezuelano, o facto de ter armas nucleares no seu território seria uma forma de dissuadir qualquer ataque dos Estados Unidos.Até agora, o Irão tem afirmado que o objectivo do seu programa nuclear é apenas a produção de energia mas Estados Unidos e União Europeia receiam que a meta seja mesmo o fabrico de armas nucleares.
Deve ser uma interessante leitura, deve..................para quem percebe persa
August 22 - Does Iran have something in store?During the Cold War, both sides possessed weapons of mass destruction, but neither side used them, deterred by what was known as MAD, mutual assured destruction. Similar constraints have no doubt prevented their use in the confrontation between India and Pakistan. In our own day a new such confrontation seems to be looming between a nuclear-armed Iran and its favorite enemies, named by the late Ayatollah Khomeini as the Great Satan and the Little Satan, i.e., the United States and Israel. Against the U.S. the bombs might be delivered by terrorists, a method having the advantage of bearing no return address. Against Israel, the target is small enough to attempt obliteration by direct bombardment.It seems increasingly likely that the Iranians either have or very soon will have nuclear weapons at their disposal, thanks to their own researches (which began some 15 years ago), to some of their obliging neighbors, and to the ever-helpful rulers of North Korea. The language used by Iranian President Ahmadinejad would seem to indicate the reality and indeed the imminence of this threat.Would the same constraints, the same fear of mutual assured destruction, restrain a nuclear-armed Iran from using such weapons against the U.S. or against Israel?There is a radical difference between the Islamic Republic of Iran and other governments with nuclear weapons. This difference is expressed in what can only be described as the apocalyptic worldview of Iran's present rulers. This worldview and expectation, vividly expressed in speeches, articles and even schoolbooks, clearly shape the perception and therefore the policies of Ahmadinejad and his disciples.Even in the past it was clear that terrorists claiming to act in the name of Islam had no compunction in slaughtering large numbers of fellow Muslims. A notable example was the blowing up of the American embassies in East Africa in 1998, killing a few American diplomats and a much larger number of uninvolved local passersby, many of them Muslims. There were numerous other Muslim victims in the various terrorist attacks of the last 15 years.The phrase "Allah will know his own" is usually used to explain such apparently callous unconcern; it means that while infidel, i.e., non-Muslim, victims will go to a well-deserved punishment in hell, Muslims will be sent straight to heaven. According to this view, the bombers are in fact doing their Muslim victims a favor by giving them a quick pass to heaven and its delights--the rewards without the struggles of martyrdom. School textbooks tell young Iranians to be ready for a final global struggle against an evil enemy, named as the U.S., and to prepare themselves for the privileges of martyrdom.A direct attack on the U.S., though possible, is less likely in the immediate future. Israel is a nearer and easier target, and Mr. Ahmadinejad has given indication of thinking along these lines. The Western observer would immediately think of two possible deterrents. The first is that an attack that wipes out Israel would almost certainly wipe out the Palestinians too. The second is that such an attack would evoke a devastating reprisal from Israel against Iran, since one may surely assume that the Israelis have made the necessary arrangements for a counterstrike even after a nuclear holocaust in Israel.The first of these possible deterrents might well be of concern to the Palestinians--but not apparently to their fanatical champions in the Iranian government. The second deterrent--the threat of direct retaliation on Iran--is, as noted, already weakened by the suicide or martyrdom complex that plagues parts of the Islamic world today, without parallel in other religions, or for that matter in the Islamic past. This complex has become even more important at the present day, because of this new apocalyptic vision.In Islam, as in Judaism and Christianity, there are certain beliefs concerning the cosmic struggle at the end of time--Gog and Magog, anti-Christ, Armageddon, and for Shiite Muslims, the long awaited return of the Hidden Imam, ending in the final victory of the forces of good over evil, however these may be defined. Mr. Ahmadinejad and his followers clearly believe that this time is now, and that the terminal struggle has already begun and is indeed well advanced. It may even have a date, indicated by several references by the Iranian president to giving his final answer to the U.S. about nuclear development by Aug. 22. This was at first reported as "by the end of August," but Mr. Ahmadinejad's statement was more precise.What is the significance of Aug. 22? This year, Aug. 22 corresponds, in the Islamic calendar, to the 27th day of the month of Rajab of the year 1427. This, by tradition, is the night when many Muslims commemorate the night flight of the prophet Muhammad on the winged horse Buraq, first to "the farthest mosque," usually identified with Jerusalem, and then to heaven and back (c.f., Koran XVII.1). This might well be deemed an appropriate date for the apocalyptic ending of Israel and if necessary of the world. It is far from certain that Mr. Ahmadinejad plans any such cataclysmic events precisely for Aug. 22. But it would be wise to bear the possibility in mind.A passage from the Ayatollah Khomeini, quoted in an 11th-grade Iranian schoolbook, is revealing. "I am decisively announcing to the whole world that if the world-devourers [i.e., the infidel powers] wish to stand against our religion, we will stand against their whole world and will not cease until the annihilation of all them. Either we all become free, or we will go to the greater freedom which is martyrdom. Either we shake one another's hands in joy at the victory of Islam in the world, or all of us will turn to eternal life and martyrdom. In both cases, victory and success are ours."In this context, mutual assured destruction, the deterrent that worked so well during the Cold War, would have no meaning. At the end of time, there will be general destruction anyway. What will matter will be the final destination of the dead--hell for the infidels, and heaven for the believers. For people with this mindset, MAD is not a constraint; it is an inducement.How then can one confront such an enemy, with such a view of life and death? Some immediate precautions are obviously possible and necessary. In the long term, it would seem that the best, perhaps the only hope is to appeal to those Muslims, Iranians, Arabs and others who do not share these apocalyptic perceptions and aspirations, and feel as much threatened, indeed even more threatened, than we are. There must be many such, probably even a majority in the lands of Islam. Now is the time for them to save their countries, their societies and their religion from the madness of MAD.