Conflictos sino-indianos

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Conflictos sino-indianos
« em: Maio 19, 2020, 02:41:34 pm »
https://thediplomat.com/2020/05/fistfighting-in-the-himalayas-india-and-china-go-another-round/

Fistfighting in the Himalayas: India and China Go Another Round

On May 5, the two sides came to blows on the banks of Pangong Lake, where Ladakh meets Tibet, and where the two sides have registered multiple confrontations in recent years. On May 9, dozens of soldiers from both sides tussled along the Sikkim-Tibet border, resulting in injuries on both sides. In both cases, tensions were quickly defused, forces disengaged, and local commanders opened lines of communication. Nevertheless, the incidents draw attention to, and raise questions about, the apparent uptick in volatility along the disputed boundary.

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The 2,167-mile China-India border, by some estimates the longest disputed border in the world, has witnessed ongoing friction since a short but intense war in 1962. The Line of Actual Control (LAC), as the perceived boundary is known, is far calmer than the one separating Pakistan and India in Kashmir, where deadly artillery shelling and kidnappings occur regularly. Yet the mostly desolate and mountainous LAC is the site of frequent “transgressions” by Chinese border patrols, regular face-to-face meetings between patrolling units from both sides, and occasionally violent or prolonged confrontations.

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On May 9, Chinese and Indian forces reportedly engaged in a separate clash where the Indian state of Sikkim meets Tibet. Four Indian and seven Chinese soldiers suffered injuries in a scuffle that involved roughly 150 soldiers in total. The Indian press has carried reports of other, more minor incidents along the border the last few weeks as well, including ongoing Chinese tent-building and construction near the Galwan River in Ladakh.

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Which brings us to the second point. While it’s unclear whether infrastructure development was a catalyst for the recent confrontations, it played a part in the 2013 and 2014 incidents in Ladakh. Last year, the Chinese military constructed a new bunker and underground facility 30 miles from the site of the 2014 standoff. Last month, India completed construction of a new bridge near a sensitive border point in Arunachal Pradesh “to enable faster movement of troops and artillery.” Meanwhile, India continues to construct and modernize over 60 “strategic roads” along the LAC, with an expected completion date of 2022. As India attempts to negate China’s substantial infrastructure advantage at the border, the opportunities for friction increase. Still, this doesn’t fully explain why tensions would flare at multiple noncontiguous points along the border in such a short time span.

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The United States also formally recognizes India’s territorial claims in the border dispute, at least in the Eastern Sector where Arunachal Pradesh meets Tibet. This suggests that, were Chinese forces to engage in hostilities across the LAC in Arunachal, it would be viewed by the U.S. as an attack on India, not a skirmish in a disputed territory — a potentially consequential distinction.

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Perhaps most significant, in recent years the United States has been a source of intelligence for India during border incidents with China. Washington reportedly provided the Indian government with “information on [Chinese] troop reinforcements and deployments” during the 2017 Doklam standoff. Indian interest in strengthening those intelligence-sharing arrangements was reportedly one impetus for Delhi signing a key “enabling” military agreement with the United States in 2018. The Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) facilitates the exchange of encrypted communications and equipment between the two militaries.

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Just as the U.S. looks to India to play a more active role in balancing China’s growing power and influence — including taking more forward-leaning positions on issues like the South China Sea and Taiwan, the Quad, and the Indo-Pacific — India is looking to the U.S. to help shore up its own vulnerabilities vis-à-vis China, not least at the disputed border. The United States has already helped the Indian military make considerable strides with the acquisition of world-class U.S. attack helicopters, surveillance and heavy lift transport aircraft, and artillery. Should there be another prolonged Doklam-like incident at the border or inadvertent escalation, India will likely again be looking to the U.S. for diplomatic and intelligence support, and calibrating its Indo-Pacific strategy accordingly.
 

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Lusitano89

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Re: Conflictos sino-indianos
« Responder #1 em: Maio 28, 2020, 04:20:16 pm »
 

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Lusitan

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Re: Conflictos sino-indianos
« Responder #2 em: Junho 16, 2020, 09:05:01 am »
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-53061476

India soldiers killed in clash with Chinese forces

Three Indian soldiers have been killed in a clash with Chinese forces in Ladakh in the disputed Kashmir region, amid rising tensions between the two countries.
The Indian army said in a statement that "senior military officials of the two sides are currently meeting to defuse the situation", but did not give any further details.
The deaths are believed to be the first in decades in a confrontation between the two powers.

https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/ladakh-standoff-india-china-indian-army-officer-jawan-killed-lac-1689544-2020-06-16

A Colonel-rank officer and two soldiers of the Indian Army were killed in a violent face-off with Chinese troops in the Galwan Valley area of Ladakh on Monday night. The officer killed was commanding an infantry battalion. The face-off took place during efforts to de-escalate the prevailing tensions along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in eastern Ladakh.
In an official statement, the Army said, "During the de-escalation process underway in the Galwan Valley, a violent face-off took place yesterday (Monday) night with casualties. The loss of lives on the Indian side includes an officer and two soldiers."
The statement added that senior military officials of the two sides are currently meeting at the venue to defuse the situation.
Details of what exactly led to the violent face-off are not clear at the moment.

This major development comes at a time when Indian and Chinese troops are involved in a massive standoff in eastern Ladakh for the past one-and-a-half-month.
Significant numbers of Chinese troops have been camping in the Indian side of the LAC in Galwan Valley and Pangong Tso.
Indian and Chinese troops were engaged in a bitter standoff in several areas along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in mountainous eastern Ladakh for close to a month. Both the countries are holding talks at military and diplomatic levels to resolve the dispute.

The trigger for the face-off was China's stiff opposition to India laying a key road in the Finger area around the Pangong Tso Lake besides construction of another road connecting the Darbuk-Shayok-Daulat Beg Oldie road in Galwan Valley.
China was also laying a road in the Finger area which is not acceptable to India.
Government sources said military reinforcements including troops, vehicles and artillery guns were sent to eastern Ladakh by the Indian Army to shore up its presence in the areas where Chinese soldiers were resorting to aggressive posturing.
The situation in eastern Ladakh deteriorated after around 250 Chinese and Indian soldiers were engaged in a violent face-off on the evening of May 5 which spilt over to the next day before the two sides agreed to "disengage".
However, the standoff continued.
The incident in Pangong Tso was followed by a similar incident in North Sikkim on May 9.
The India-China border dispute covers the 3,488-km-long LAC. China claims Arunachal Pradesh as part of southern Tibet while India contests it.
Both sides have been asserting that pending the final resolution of the boundary issue, it is necessary to maintain peace and tranquillity in the border areas.
 

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Lusitano89

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Re: Conflictos sino-indianos
« Responder #3 em: Junho 18, 2020, 09:06:56 pm »
 

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Re: Conflictos sino-indianos
« Responder #4 em: Junho 18, 2020, 09:54:10 pm »
Após escaramuça mortífera, China e Índia gritam vingança
https://ionline.sapo.pt/artigo/700350/apos-escaramuca-mortifera-china-e-india-gritam-vinganca?seccao=Mundo_i

Citar
Os dois países, ambos potências nucleares, já enviaram mais tropas para a disputada fronteira em Caxemira.Depois de dezenas de soldados indianos e chineses terem morrido em confrontos numa ravina nos Himalaias, esta segunda-feira, enfrentando-se com pedras e mocas com pregos, Nova Deli e Pequim estão num impasse. Apesar de terem cumprido a velha regra de não haver tiros na fronteira, ouvem-se gritos de vingança de ambos os lados, entre duas potências nucleares.

“O meu marido costumava comparar as brigas com soldados chineses como lutas entre rapazes na escola”, contou Neha Ojha, mulher de Kundan, um dos vinte indianos mortos na disputada Caxemira. Do lado chinês não há dados números oficiais, mas a imprensa indiana fala em 43 vítimas. À semelhança de Kundan - que dias antes se rira da ideia de chamar Branca de Neve à filha, por ter nascido quando patrulhava os gelados Himalaias - nunca mais regressarão a casa.

“Errámos em confiar nos chineses... eles devem ser punidos”, disse Ojha à Reuters, devastada. A sua voz, como a das outras famílias que enterraram os seus entes queridos nos últimos dias, complica a tarefa do Governo nacionalista hindu de Narendra Modi.

Por um lado, Modi sempre se baseou na imagem de homem forte, duro contra o inimigo externo; por outro, precisa de evitar um conflito bélico de consequências imprevisíveis. E a tensão vai aumentando: por toda a Índia queimam-se efígies do Presidente Xi Jinping, ou destroem-se aparelhos eletrónicos de fabrico chinês.

Enquanto Nova Deli avança para uma guerra comercial, aumentando as tarifas em bens importados da China, ao mesmo tempo que envia tropas para a fronteira, Pequim mostra que também está preparado para tudo. Aliás, divulgou vídeos de exercícios militares perto do vale de Galwan, com uns sete mil soldados, artilharia e snipers. “O fosso entre as nossas forças é claro”, gabou-se o jornal chinês Global Times. Já a revista indiana Bharat Shakti questionava: “Estará a China a sobrestimar a sua força?”.
Os chinocas além de convencido são arrogantes.
A Vida é um teste e uma incumbência de  confiança.
 

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Re: Conflictos sino-indianos
« Responder #5 em: Junho 19, 2020, 03:56:52 pm »
https://warontherocks.com/2020/06/chinas-strategic-assessment-of-the-ladakh-clash/

CHINA’S STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT OF THE LADAKH CLASH

[...]

Chinese analysts believe that India is taking advantage of Beijing by trying to make tactical gains along the border. While China is trying to ease the seemingly bottomless deterioration of relations with the United States due to the COVID-19 crisis, India’s road-building is seen as “an attempt to stab it [China] in the back while China was trying to deal with” the United States. From the perspective of China, not only is India trying to capitalize on China’s moment of distraction, vulnerability, and overextension in its foreign policy, it also puts China in a dilemma between responding to India’s road construction and being labeled “aggressive and provocative” — or acquiescing to it and losing territory in a time of weakness.

China sees India as being emboldened by its strategic alignment with the United States — articulated by Washington in its Indo-Pacific Strategy. Such emboldening is believed to have directly led to the revocation of Article 370 of India’s constitution in 2019, which removed Ladakh’s limited autonomy and changed it into a Union Territory directly under the central government’s control. The Ladakh Union Territory included Aksai Chin (currently under Chinese authority), and is vital to Chinese control of its “ethnic frontiers” in Tibet and Xinjiang, causing vehement protest by the Chinese Foreign Ministry at the time of its creation. America’s position in the standoff exacerbated Beijing’s suspicion. Then-Assistant Secretary of State Alice Wells criticized China’s “aggression” as “provocative and disturbing” on May 21 and reacted similarly to President Donald Trump’s offer to mediate between China and India several days later. Both China and India rejected Trump’s offer. However, for the Chinese, Modi quickly smoothed over the rejection by having a direct phone conversation with Trump three days later, and accepting Trump’s invitation to the G-7 Summit, a sign of strategic ambiguity and obscurity.

Because of COVID-19 and the sustained criticism China has suffered due to its role in the delayed response globally, officials in Beijing feel particularly vulnerable to perceived attacks on China, both in narratives and in reality. It has been more prone to escalatory and assertive responses, which put the “Wolf Warriors” image on steroids in both diplomacy and military/paramilitary actions. Chinese diplomats and official media have been fully mobilized to defend China’s reputation and attack any critics around the globe. At the same time, China went after the Vietnamese in the South China Sea due to the perception of a Vietnamese exploitation of China’s lockdown in February and March. At this time, Beijing longs for foreign policy victories and has no appetite for any perceived defeat or transgression, for fear of domestic discontent, which was already high due to the COVID-19 crisis.

That gets into another important question: Was the Ladakh standoff pre-meditated? In other words, did China stage the standoff in order to divert domestic attention away from the government’s poor handling of the pandemic in its early stage?

At least three pieces of empirical evidence side against this theory. First, since the beginning of the standoff, the Chinese government has resorted to a low-key approach toward the tensions instead of stoking domestic nationalism with sensational media headlines and organized internet news, which would be indispensable components of a premediated and coordinated campaign. Second, since COVID-19, China has been stirring up tensions to boost internal solidarity, but this has been focused primarily on Taiwan, Hong Kong, the South China Sea, and the United States. One could argue that China has opened too many “fronts” diplomatically, but militarily, China has always been careful to avoid a two-front confrontation with America in the east and India in the west. Given Beijing’s plan to initiate the Hong Kong security law during the parliamentary sessions in May, and the rising uncertainty across the Taiwan strait in light of President Tsai Ing-wen’s second inauguration on May 20, it is unlikely that Beijing intentionally planned for the Ladakh standoff to happen at this time. Third, China’s top South Asia experts were not consulted until roughly ten days after the beginning of the standoff. The late involvement of the policy community suggests that the standoff was not based on advanced planning.

The current crisis was the result of China reacting to the perception that India was stabbing it in the back by its move into territories China sees as off-limits to India. The unique timing of COVID-19, the context of the U.S.-Chinese strategic rivalry and China’s self-perceived vulnerability all contributed to a sense of insecurity amongst officials in Beijing. All of these factors have aggravated China’s response to what would otherwise have been a relatively common interaction in the disputed border.

China’s Tactical Objectives

Some argue it was strategically unwise for China to clash with India in Ladakh. Doing so will inevitably damage China’s reputation among the Indian military, diplomatic corps, and population at large. The move could also drive New Delhi into a closer partnership with Washington. But for Beijing, standing up for its interests and territorial claims is worth the cost. India is believed to be strategically unreliable to begin with and China has no interest in acquiescing to India’s attempt to advance its position on territorial disputes to trade for concessions. That is almost an established rule in China’s India playbook: Having dealt with India in the past, such acquiescence will not be seen as China’s good will, but a concession extracted due to India’s strength. This will only lead to even more aggressive Indian behavior down the road.

If a strategic friendship with India is untenable, it frees up room for tactical gains. In the near term, China’s tactical objective seems clear —to advance its position roughly to the occupation line by the end of the 1962 war, according to pro-Beijing media outlets. This will push the Chinese presence to the intersection of the Galwan river and the Shyok river, making the Galwan Valley off limits to India. The Chinese construction of posts in this location clearly points to this direction. Indeed, the statement from China’s Western Command after the deadline clash on June 16 confirms this position. It claims that sovereignty over the Galwan valley has always belonged to China. Whether this position is sustainable remains unclear, as the Chinese may not be able to station troops at this location during the winter months. However, China sees these actions as military retaliations to India’s persistent infrastructure development in the region, including roads and airstrips, especially the completion of the Darbuk-Shayok-DBO Road in April 2019. They are also retaliations against the creation of the Ladakh Union Territory in August 2019, which included “the Chinese territory in the western sector of the China-India boundary into its administrative jurisdiction” in India’s reissued map.

The good news, if any, is that the turbulence is necessary (but not sufficient) to consolidate a LAC that neither side will like but which both could likely accept in the future. After all, China is not inclined to accept the “clarification of LAC” based on historical evidence, so the LAC can only be “consolidated” on the ground. The eventual solution of the border disputes will have to be based on diplomatic negotiations. Having a mutually accepted LAC will be the beginning of that process.

The bad news is that the process will be long, destabilizing, and could include more casualties. Neither side will easily abandon their tactical objectives. In that sense, the current standoff is unlikely to see a quick resolution. The 2013 Daulat Beg Oldi incident saw a 20-day standoff before the Indians agreed to dismantle bunkers in the Chumar sector and the Chinese withdrew. The 2017 Doklam standoff lasted for much longer — 72 days — and ended with the withdrawal of troops by both sides. If these precedents serve as indicators, China and India will eventually negotiate disengagement and mutual withdrawal. However, it is even more likely that both sides will sneak to return in the next year to encroach in what they both believe to be their rightful territory. The heart of the matter is that India believes the construction it is conducting is on its undisputed territory. But since there is no boundary, the Chinese see the Indian construction as changing the status quo. These two perspectives will be hard to reconcile.

At the minimum, a mutual withdrawal will de-escalate the current tension. Understanding that both sides will return to change the status quo and improve their position, Beijing is stringing New Delhi along, bogging it down, and forcing it to eventually “accept reality,” and make compromises on the border demarcation. The trick for Beijing is to maintain the struggle on the ground without triggering a war, of course. It’s a long process of friction and attrition. The tactical objective of returning to the occupation line by the end of the 1962 war could be one move to inflate China’s negotiation position and force India to accept the fait accompli.

Conclusion

The Ladakh clash should not have been a surprise. Similar events have been happening along the disputed border between China and India for years, but only the few most heated ones make the news. Beijing believes India is exploiting a temporary period of Chinese weakness and is responding forcefully as a result. Strategically, it may not help China’s desired goal to keep India neutral. But since Beijing sees a neutral India as untenable to begin with, tactical gains that can bog India down along the disputed border, frustrate New Delhi’s regional and global ambitions, and remind India of the eventual need for compromise may not be the worst case in China’s cost-benefit analysis. Tactically, China appears to be aiming for what it achieved in the 1962 war. Despite what the outsiders might see as China’s mistake, China is unlikely to change its current strategic assessment. China and India will eventually find a face-saving mutual compromise to end the Ladakh standoff, as neither wants a war. However, the unsettled border will continue to destabilize, fester, and brew more clashes down the road.
 

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Re: Conflictos sino-indianos
« Responder #6 em: Junho 22, 2020, 05:30:46 pm »
 

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Re: Conflictos sino-indianos
« Responder #7 em: Junho 26, 2020, 03:04:05 pm »
https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2020/06/26/russia-to-speed-up-s-400-delivery-to-india-amid-china-standoff-a70707

Russia to Speed Up S-400 Delivery to India Amid China Standoff

Russia will accelerate S-400 air defense system deliveries to India by a year following tense standoffs with China and Pakistan in contested border regions, the Kommersant business daily reported Friday.

New Delhi and Beijing have blamed each other for a June 15 battle in the Ladakh region in which 20 Indian soldiers were killed while China suffered an unknown number of casualties. India has also ordered Pakistan to cut its embassy staff by half this week, a month after New Delhi expelled two diplomats over spying claims.

India now expects Russia to send the first of five S-400 batteries in 2020 following the Indian defense chief’s visit to Moscow for Russia’s landmark Victory Day parade this week, according to Kommersant. The first delivery was originally scheduled for late 2021.

“If this scenario is realized, then we’ll see the first S-400 at Republic Day in the Indian capital next Jan. 26,” an unnamed Indian military source told Kommersant.

“This system will be our silver bullet against our enemies,” they added.

India plans to deploy three S-400 batteries on the border with Pakistan and two with China, Kommersant cited its Indian sources as saying. Russia will reportedly send one S-400 battery per year, with all five expected to reach India by 2024.

“The disbalance [with China and Pakistan] will be eliminated after the S-400s assume the main role of protecting Indian airspace,” the sources were quoted as saying. “The S-400s will free up our multi-purpose fighters to strike ground targets, eliminating the need for them to conduct aerial combat with  enemy fighters.”

The S-400 would give India’s military the ability to shoot down aircraft and missiles at unprecedented ranges.

“I have been assured that ongoing contracts will… in a number of cases will be taken forward in a shorter time,” India’s defense minister Rajnath Singh tweeted Tuesday.

India, the largest buyer of Russian military hardware, agreed on the roughly $5 billion deal in 2018. The United States, which blacklisted China that year for its S-400 and warplane purchases, has said countries trading with Russia's defense and intelligence sectors would face automatic sanctions.

China and India have deployed “large numbers” of troops to the Ladakh region despite calls to de-escalate the territorial showdown.

Chinese and Indian military commanders have held talks and their foreign ministers have also discussed ways to end the Himalayan showdown.