Fighting into the Future: The Problem of Eastern European Soldier Modernisation
(Source: Frost & Sullivan; issued Oct. 1, 2004)
Cash-strapped Central Eastern European (CEE) militaries will need to adopt a German model of soldier modernisation as NATO interoperability and the need to leverage superior battle-space situational awareness will force tough procurement choices for MODs.
Departing from the traditional two-dimensional ‘blue-red’ war-fighting concept into complex peace support operations, the so-called ‘modern-day battle-space’ requires the soldier to rely on information superiority to safely locate, identify, track and engage opposing forces. Since the mid-1990s, this has manifested itself in a reliance on advanced night-fighting equipment, sophisticated intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTARs) technology and in a shift to flexible, rapidly-deployable high-readiness forces. The challenge for NATO’s Central Eastern European Allies will be to find a level of network-enhanced capability that facilitates interoperability, contributes to net battle-group situational awareness, leverages information flow at the tactical level and yet comes with a reasonable price tag.
Led by the United States, the UK, France, Germany and Sweden (to name the most advanced) have adopted soldier modernisation programmes that seek to equip the warfighter with every conceivable piece of electro-optical situational-awareness enhancing kit. This of course comes at considerable cost, one that the US (c.$30,000), UK (c.£20,000), and France (c.26,000 euros) can justify in terms of international obligations, the pace and nature of deployment and force modernisation, but to CEE countries would be no more than useless prestige projects. That said, if CEE forces aspire to become effective Alliance partners, they must find a level of network-enhanced capability that enables CEE warfighters to leverage information superiority at the tactical level.
Defence procurement officers should take their clues from Germany. The Bundeswehr’s common-sense COTS approach, its emphasis on the fighting squad and its trickle-down/percolate-up integration are founded on the need to rationalise force modernisation with static (or declining) defence budgets. The Infanterist der Zukunft programme ‘Realisation 1’ (IDZ-R1) is conditioned by Germany’s tight budgetary constraints and force re-invention. As Berlin reduces its intake of conscripts, decommissions legacy equipment and reduces it’s armoured and mechanised components by a factor of four, it is diverting these net savings to fund research and development (R&D).
Unlike its American, British and French ‘cousins’, the IDZ program focuses on the dismounted squad rather than the dismounted soldier. Thus IDZ-R1 ‘units’ consist of nine rifleman modules, and an enhanced command module. In terms of equipment, the IDZ-R1 carries a helmet-mounted intercom, a shoulder-mounted tactical radio-cum-GPS, tactical eye-wear, modular ballistic protection, and a lighter, enhanced personal weapon. The associated battery-pack is being engineered around solar power, so the soldier’s sustainability on deployment is increased by his relative independence from an energy source.
Although IDZ R-1 functions as a ‘package’, there is little reason why these enhancements cannot be translated into a substantially COTS-based acquisition strategy in Central Eastern Europe. It is a simply a question of finding a model of soldier-to-system interface that is best suited to the operational needs of the objective force.
Modelling their military restructuring on Germany’s experience would allow CEE states to generate savings through economies of scale and standardisation rather than pushing budgets to the bursting point with uncoordinated, ad hoc immediate-need-based purchases. Although initial block acquisitions are unlikely to happen before 2011-2015, CEE defence planners would wise to emulate their Bundeswehr counterparts in adopting a uniform, though phased approach to ‘networking’ their warfighters at the section and squad level. Furthermore, this would contribute to asset longevity rather than instigate a more costly cycle of ad hoc purchase and replacement.
Given their tight monetary of constraints and likely future force commitments, cash-strapped CEE militaries would be best served by adopting a German model of soldier modernisation even as the need to field network-enabled troop contingents forces tough procurement choices on MODs. Any effective modernisation rather than a ‘catch-up’ will require the introduction of high-technology networked elements into the soldier’s personal gear. The real cost of such efforts will simply be a reflection of whether appropriate procurement strategies are chosen.
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