Enviado por: Ricardo Nunes em Maio 24, 2004, 06:04:48 pm
Como não existia nenhum tópico dedicado a este conflito em particular, aqui fica um espaço de discussão.
Estejam à vontade para comentar as possíveis abordagens chinesas, as expectativa da formosa, e qual o papel que os Estados Unidos teriam e têm em todo este jogo diplomático.
Para começar aqui fica uma notícia:
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China Says Pay Any Price to Stop Taiwan Statehood
Mon May 24, 2004 05:54 AM ET
But China's leaders have not relented in their war of words against Chen since the speech, deriding him as a slippery politician in state media editorials.
"We noticed that although under great pressure from all sides Chen did not give a timetable for constitutional revisions, he did use some vague phrases about territory and sovereignty in his speech which carry a foreshadowing of Taiwan independence later," Zhang said in the first official reaction on Monday.
Beijing would protect its territorial unity above all else, including the Olympic Games which it hosts in 2008, he said.
"If Chen Shui-bian dares to challenge the people of the world...we will safeguard our sovereignty and territorial integrity at any cost," he said when asked if China would be willing to risk the Olympics over Taiwan.
The United States last week welcomed Chen's speech as "responsible and constructive" for avoiding an immediate showdown with China and added it created an opportunity for the two rivals to resume dialogue.
But China told Washington not to be deceived.
After the independence-leaning Chen's first inauguration in 2000, Beijing said it would listen to his words and watch his actions.
Four years on, China made a pre-emptive declaration ahead of the inauguration, threatening to crush any moves toward independence.
But there was no sign that Chen was willing to alter course, Zhang said.
"For such a faithless man, we do not care what he says. The key is what he does, which road he would choose," he said. "He is riding near the edge of the cliff, and there is no sign that he is going to rein in his horse."
© Reuters 2004. All Rights Reserved.
Enviado por: komet em Maio 24, 2004, 06:35:43 pm
Sugestões? 50 milhões?
Enviado por: JNSA em Maio 24, 2004, 06:53:43 pm
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Pergunto-me qual seria o potencial em números, de infantaria que a China conseguiria reunir neste momento, no máximo.
Sugestões? 50 milhões?
Duvido muito, Komet... :wink:
Enviado por: JNSA em Maio 24, 2004, 06:56:45 pm
Claro que se fosse preciso os Chineses poderiam distribuir armas a todos os homens dos 16 aos 65 (por armas, eu quero dizer tudo desde AK-47's, Simonovs, Mausers, mosquetes, arcabuzes, mocas, etc... :wink:
Enviado por: JNSA em Maio 24, 2004, 07:21:08 pm
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To carry out a successful surprise attack against key Taiwanese assets, China could not start loading and sailing most of its ships toward Taiwan until after the missile and air strikes began.
In fact, the PRC would do extremely well simply to prepare its air and missile forces for the attack without having those preparations noticed by Taiwanese and U.S. intelligence.
Consider first China’s large ballistic missile force. These missiles are numerous, perhaps now totaling 200 in southeastern China near Taiwan, with the PRC adding an estimated 50 missiles a year there, according to U.S. Pacific Comdr. Adm. Dennis Blair.19 (China is also reportedly modernizing its air defenses in that vicinity and elsewhere, replacing SA-2 surface-toair missile systems with the SA-10, also known as the S-300.20) China’s ballistic missiles are inaccurate, however.21 They might achieve an occasional hit on a runway, but the missiles’ accuracy—typically no better than 300 meters—would be too poor to make that happen more than every tenth shot or so.22 And runways can absorb a number of hits before being incapacitated; up to 100 properly distributed craters could be needed to shut down operations at a single runway.23 China presently lacks advanced submunitions that could reduce the number of missiles required per base.24 To shut down a runway even temporarily using conventional munitions, therefore, literally hundreds of ballistic missiles might be required—virtually the entire PRC inventory.
Chinese attack aircraft could probably do better. If China could get several hundred of its 800 to 1,000 attack aircraft through to runways, it could render some of them unusable at least temporarily, and perhaps destroy part of the Taiwanese combat air fleet on the ground as well.25
But it is not clear that all or even most of China’s attack planes would be available against airfields. Moving the bulk of them to bases near Taiwan could tip Taipei and Washington off about a pending military action, allowing Taiwanese air defenses to be alerted, mines to be laid, and reservists to be mobilized. Even if China could move most attack aircraft within combat range of Taiwan clandestinely, it might have to use substantial numbers against Taiwan’s air defenses and command-and-control assets, as well as Taiwan’s 37 surface combatants and 59 smaller coastal combatants that carry antiship missiles. China has a large number of submarines that it could try to use against these ships, but most are in poor condition, and surging them to sea could tip off Taiwanese authorities about a pending attack. Finally, China has never
demonstrated the capacity to orchestrate more than a few hundred air sorties a day.26 Assume nonetheless for the sake of conservatism that China could use the majority of its entire attack plane inventory against Taiwan’s air bases. Most PRC attack aircraft could carry only a few unguided bombs (China’s cruise-missile and precision-strike capabilities are quite limited and rudimentary).27 Making very favorable assumptions about the accuracy and effectiveness of the Chinese munitions, it is likely that at least three dozen planes would be needed to shut down a given runway—meaning that about fifty planes might have to be dedicated to each location (allowing for aircraft breakdowns, attrition, poor aiming, and other problems).28
Theoretically, the entire PRC air armada might thus incapacitate Taiwan’s best dozen or so airfields. More likely, it might shut down operations at the three or four bases where Taiwan keeps its most advanced fighters. But Taiwan would immediately begin to repair its airfields.
China could undertake subsequent attack sorties, but Taiwan’s antiaircraft artillery and SAMs would then be on a high state of vigilance. Because Chinese planes do not carry precision munitions as a rule, they would have to fly low; China could easily lose 10 percent of its planes on each subsequent sortie. Also, given their poor state of repair, and their lack of night-flying capabilities, it is implausible that most PLAAF (People’s Liberation Army Air Force) and PLAN (People’s Liberation Army Navy) aircraft could fly more than two sorties before darkness or maintenance requirements grounded them. PRC aircraft rarely fly more than one sortie every two to three days; their mission-capable rates are poor, and repairs are frequent as well as timeconsuming.
29 Given that most PRC amphibious ships would need more than a day to reach Taiwan (most are not based near the strait in peacetime, and moving them there as well as loading them prior to an attack would alert Taiwan), Taiwan could use the night to repair many runways. PRC attacks on subsequent days would be much less effective.30 They would become
particularly ineffective if the weather turned cloudy, since Chinese pilots generally require visual identification of targets to attack them.31
China could try to directly attack Taiwanese aircraft, as well as early warning and command-and-control installations, on the ground. Taiwan does not do enough to protect such assets at present.32 Carrying out such attacks is difficult, however, for aircraft lacking precisionguided
bombs, for pilots receiving only limited training in low-altitude flight, and against air defenses like those Taiwan deploys at its airfields and other critical infrastructure. Even if China could destroy some planes on the ground, Taiwan already has hardened shelters for many of its
fighters and should soon be able to provide 60 percent of them with protection against anything but laser-guided bombs.33 The costs of doing so are not insignificant—perhaps $4 million per plane—but are far less than the purchase costs of the aircraft themselves.34
The Desert Storm experience is instructive here as an analogy. Coalition aircraft averaged dozens of strike sorties daily against Iraqi airfields during the war’s first week, yet did not stop the Iraqi air force from flying about forty sorties a day.35 The attacks included British planes dropping advanced runway-penetrating weapons known as the JP-233, and doing so precisely and from low altitude. Yet Iraqi airplanes continued to fly. So would Taiwanese planes, despite China’s best efforts to stop them.
There are caveats to these generally optimistic conclusions. Shelters will probably not be constructed for larger planes, such as airborne warning and control aircraft, given the difficulty of doing so. For the sake of conservative planning, it should probably be assumed that Taiwan
would not have such aircraft available for combat, having lost them to preemptive PRC attacks. In addition, China could use chemical weapons against Taiwanese airfields, drastically complicating air operations. The standard assumption is that operating in a chemical environment would reduce a military’s flight operations in half, such that an air force that would otherwise fly two sorties per aircraft per day might manage only one if personnel needed to wear protective gear and frequently decontaminate equipment. China would need to weigh the potential benefits of attacking Taiwanese military infrastructure with chemical weapons against the risks that doing so would only steel Taipei’s resolve and convince the United States to come to Taiwan’s military aid regardless of which side was viewed by Washington as having provoked
the conflict. In the end, however, it must be acknowledged that China’s precise assessment of the pros and cons of such an attack cannot be predicted, and there is some chance it would use chemical weapons.36 (It seems highly unlikely that China would use nuclear weapons against the
island; it has stated that it would not do so, and the political repercussions would surely be enormous.37)
Even if runways were badly damaged and airfields were contaminated with chemical weapons, Taiwan would be able to keep aircraft in the air. It might use some highways for limited flight operations by fixed-wing aircraft, once it repaired runways sufficiently to move planes off airfields and onto secondary sites.38 (Taiwan would also probably retain most of its 20 armed maritime helicopters.)
What about attacks by China’s special forces against Taiwanese airfields and aircraft, which are less well-protected than they should be?39 Clandestinely infiltrating enough personnel into Taiwan to launch attacks on airfields would be a challenge, though it is possible that China already has several thousand agents ashore in Taiwan.40 Even if that is true, however, actually conducting the attacks would be far from trivial. For example, the United States and its allies lost fewer than 400 aircraft (fixed-wing planes and helicopters) this way in Vietnam—a conflict that
lasted many years and involved tens of thousands of airplanes, many of which could not be placed in hardened facilities given their sheer numbers and locations. Chinese special forces might be able to avail themselves of improved equipment, such as long-range sniper rifles and precision mortar shells, not available in earlier conflicts. But most of the tactics of attacking aircraft and their fuel supplies and support facilities with special forces remain similar to what they were previously. Even in a worst case, Chinese special forces would be unlikely to destroy more than a couple dozen Taiwanese planes.41 All told, of Taiwan’s 600 or so combat aircraft, at least half would likely survive even a well-coordinated, large-scale Chinese preemptive attack that caught them by surprise. Most of
Taipei’s airborne control aircraft might be lost, and remaining combat jets might be reduced to flying only a sortie a day, at least in the war’s first day or two, given damage to runways and the possible use of chemical weapons by the PRC. But Taiwan’s remaining capability would be
quite substantial. The ability of Taiwan’s ships and key command-and-control assets to survive a Chinese preemptive attack is more difficult to assess quantitatively, based on publicly available information. It is likely that the Taiwanese armed forces should make greater efforts to protect
them, notably by hardening key fixed infrastructure. But China’s limited capacity for large-scale precision strike casts doubt on its ability to conduct a successful surprise attack against these assets as well.
Enviado por: komet em Maio 24, 2004, 07:27:19 pm
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Já agora, o número de 10 milhões que eu sugeri é apenas uma aproximação...
Claro que se fosse preciso os Chineses poderiam distribuir armas a todos os homens dos 16 aos 65 (por armas, eu quero dizer tudo desde AK-47's, Simonovs, Mausers, mosquetes, arcabuzes, mocas, etc... ), mas duvido que isso constituísse uma força de combate realmente eficaz...
Era esse o tipo de forças que me referia lol
Mas claro, que se os EUA ou quem sabe mais se metessem ao barulho, seriam carne pa canhão (o que, apesar de tudo, não deixa de ter a sua eficácia, veja-se as guerrilhas somalis, ou iraquianas).
Enviado por: JNSA em Maio 24, 2004, 07:27:42 pm
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A PRC Amphibious Assault China would face several daunting constraints and challenges if it attempted to invade Taiwan by sea. Few PRC troops could deploy over water, given China’s very limited amounts of military sealift. Its 70 or so amphibious ships could move no more than 10,000 to 15,000 troops with their equipment, including some 400 armored vehicles (airlift could move another 6,000 troops, or perhaps somewhat more counting helicopter transport).42 These shortfalls would be magnified by China’s other military weaknesses. Although Chinese military personnel are generally competent at basic infantry skills, the armed forces do not tend to attract China’s best, nepotism is prevalent, party loyalty is of paramount importance, most soldiers are semiliterate peasants serving short tours of duty, and a strong professional noncommissioned officer corps is lacking. Combined-arms training, while somewhat enhanced of late for elite rapid reaction forces, is infrequent. To quote the Pentagon, “China probably has never conducted a large-scale amphibious exercise which has been fully coordinated with air support and airborne operations.”43
Taiwan of course has weaknesses of its own, above and beyond those cited above. It fails to foster cooperation and joint training between the different arms of its military; it also has not integrated communications systems to make systematic use of early-warning data and other key
information.44 Among its other, generic military shortcomings, Taiwan continues to rely on conscription to fill out its force structure; thus, turnover in the ranks is high, and the quality of the force is limited.45
Most of Taiwan’s weaknesses are not, however, as severe as China’s. Moreover, the basic numbers work strongly in Taiwan’s favor. It has a large military of 240,000 active-duty ground troops and 1.5 million more ground-force reservists. With a coastal perimeter of about 1,500 kilometers, it could deploy roughly 1,000 defenders per kilometer of coastline along all of its shores if it wished. So over any given stretch of 10 to 15 kilometers, a fully mobilized Taiwanese defense force could station as many troops as China could deploy there with all of its amphibious fleet. (An attacker would need to seize a shoreline of roughly that length, to create areas safe from enemy artillery.46)
The above presupposes no advance knowledge by Taiwan about where the PRC intended to come ashore. In reality, unless completely blinded and paralyzed by China’s preemptive attacks—a most unlikely proposition—Taiwan would see where ships sailed and be able to react
with at least some notice. (It is also likely that, if necessary, the United States would provide Taiwan with satellite or aircraft intelligence about the objective of China’s attack, even if U.S. forces stayed out of combat operations.) Although the strait is typically only 100 miles wide, Taiwan itself is about 300 miles long, so ships traveling 20 knots would need more than half a day to sail its full length, and could not credibly threaten all parts of the island at once. In addition, amphibious assault troops cannot come ashore just anywhere. Only about 20 percent of the world’s coastlines are suitable for amphibious assault; on Taiwan’s shores, the percentage is even less, given the prevalence of mud flats on the west coast and cliffs on the east. As a practical matter, then, Taiwan would not need to mobilize all of its reservists to achieve force parity in places most likely to suffer the initial PRC attack. If it could mobilize even 20 percent of its reservists in the twenty-four to forty-eight hours that China would require, at a bare minimum, to assemble and load its amphibious armada and then cross the strait, it could achieve force parity along key beachlines while maintaining thinner defenses elsewhere.47
Taiwan also has two airborne brigades that it could use for rapid reaction to any point experiencing amphibious or paratroop attack (and is developing an airborne cavalry brigade equipped with helicopters for that purpose as well).48 So China would be unlikely to establish even a local, temporary advantage along the section of beach where it elected to try coming ashore—meaning it lacks the second element of most successful amphibious attacks shown in Table 1.
Nor could China subsequently build up its initial force as quickly as Taiwan could strengthen local defenses at the point of attack. In other words, China also lacks the third crucial element of most successful invasions identified above. Whatever happened during the first day of conflict, Taiwan could almost surely deploy large numbers of reinforcements by road on the first night of the war and thereafter. The Chinese air force has limited capacity for finding and attacking mobile ground targets, and limited capacity to operate at night, so it could not seriously slow such reinforcements.49
China’s naval gunfire would not be particularly effective either. Its ship-based guns are relatively small and few. In previous experience using guns of comparable size and ordnance in the Korean War, for example, such weapons were generally mediocre at destroying land targets
or impeding enemy reinforcements.50 China also does not have nearly enough guns to cover a tactical battlefield of several miles on a dimension. Maintaining enough naval gunfire to make it difficult for defending troops to approach and enter a zone under attack might require 25 fiveinch rounds per minute for every zone of 100 yards on a side, according to U.S. Navy estimates.
Given that China’s entire surface fleet has only about 100 guns, firing 25 to 30 rounds per minute, China could not maintain the requisite fire over more than a square mile of land.51
China’s inability to stop Taiwanese road traffic would have dire consequences for the PRC. Countries on the tactical offensive on foreign soil often attain movement rates of twenty to thirty kilometers every twenty-four hours.52 Faced with nothing more than Chinese aerial
harassment, most of it only during daylight hours, Taiwan could certainly move reinforcements at least 50 kilometers per day. That would make more than 100,000 troops available within fortyeight hours on most parts of the island.53
Taiwan would not have this same buildup capacity everywhere. Near major military bases and cities, its capacities would tend to be greater, whereas in some rural areas they would be less. But that would not constitute a major vulnerability. For one thing, if China wished to
attack a port and airfield (see below), it would need to do so near a city. In addition, even if China chose a spot for amphibious assault where Taiwan’s initial reinforcement capacity was limited, Taiwan could bring overwhelming firepower to bear within a couple days, having used air-mobile and local forces in an initial defense.
If it somehow established an initial lodgment ashore, China could try to reinforce it using its small amphibious fleet. But it would probably need at least two days for each round trip of its ships, and even that schedule would be highly contingent on encountering good seas in the notoriously foul-weathered Taiwan Strait.54 Moreover, returning ships would need to resupply troops already ashore, limiting their ability to deliver reinforcements. After forty-eight hours, therefore, Taiwan would likely have more than 100,000 troops facing the PRC’s total of perhaps
20,000 at Beijing’s chosen point of attack—and the situation would continue to deteriorate from there for China.
The above analysis has ignored attrition to PRC forces as they approach land and come ashore. In reality, such losses would be enormous. Mounting an amphibious assault against prepared defenses is extremely difficult and bloody. For example, during the D-Day assault of 1944, the United States lost roughly 10 percent of its forces as they tried to reach land. Comparable loss rates characterized other invasions, such as the 1943 assault on Betio Island in the Battle of Tarawa, in which attackers had to directly overrun prepared defenses to get ashore, just as China would have to do here.55 The PRC, not enjoying the air dominance or battleship firepower that U.S. forces possessed in World War II, would surely lose an even higher proportion of its assaulting forces in this way.56
China would also have to deal with precision-guided munitions fired from shore batteries, airplanes, and any surviving Taiwanese ships. As one way of getting a very rough bound on the problem, consider that the British lost 5 ships to missiles and aircraft and had another 12 damaged, out of a 100-ship task force, in the Falklands War—and that they did not generally have to approach any closer than 400 miles from the Argentine mainland during the war. That amounts to an effective attrition rate of 5 to 15 percent—against an outclassed Argentine military that only owned about 250 aircraft, and that was not capable of conducting effective low-altitude bombing runs (among other problems, many of its bombs were not fused to detonate quickly, meaning that many hit and passed through British ships before they could explode).57 PRC losses would surely be greater against a foe whose airfields it would have to approach directly, whose air forces would likely retain at least 300 planes even after a highly effective Chinese preemptive attack (see above), and whose antiship missile capabilities substantially exceed Argentina’s in 1982. Taiwan possesses significant numbers of antiship missiles such as Harpoon and its own Hsiung Feng.58 Nor would China’s underdeveloped ship defenses save the day.59
In conducting such operations, Taiwan would lose airplanes to Chinese fighters, but only gradually, given the poor quality of those PRC aircraft and their command-and-control support.60
Because Taiwan’s attack aircraft could fly low and concentrate their efforts near Taiwan’s coasts, China’s ground radars and control centers would contribute little to the battle. Thus many Taiwanese aircraft would sneak through PRC fighter cover and carry out attacks, using antiship
missiles or even dumb bombs against the poorly defended Chinese ships. They could similarly use air-to-air missiles against transport aircraft.61 They would probably suffer no more than 5 percent attrition per sortie, meaning that a given plane could fly many missions before being shot
down.62
China could face other problems too. Taiwan reportedly does not have a large number of shallow-water mines, but even a mediocre mine capability could be effective; in 1991, Iraq damaged two U.S. ships and frustrated Pentagon aspirations to mount an amphibious assault with
just 1,300 sea mines. Sweeping against mines in shallow waters is very difficult. In fact, given the lack of good technology, the U.S. armed forces continue to depend on divers and dolphins in such waters.63
Adding these loss rates together suggests that the PRC would likely lose at least 20 percent of its forces just in approaching Taiwan’s coasts and fighting its way onto land.64 It would continue to suffer high attrition rates during subsequent efforts to reinforce troops already ashore. On average, China could not hope to add more than about 5,000 troops per day to its
initial beachhead—assuming that the beachhead could be established in the first place (see Table 2 for estimates of reinforcement rates, which are further discussed below). [insert table] More likely, given expected attrition, the PRC would do well to deploy 3,000 to 4,000 amphibious
troops daily after its initial assault. What if the PRC used chemical weapons in this part of its attack? If it could fire chemical
munitions from its ship-based guns, it might be able to deliver enough ordnance to cover a battlefield several kilometers on a dimension within several minutes. China would presumably want to use nonpersistent agent, like sarin, so that its troops could occupy the area within a short
time without having to wear protective gear. The effects of the weapons on Taiwan’s defenders would depend heavily on whether they had gas masks handy, the accuracy of Chinese naval gunfire, weather conditions, and the speed with which Taiwan could threaten the PRC ships
doing the damage.65 Historical experiences with chemical weapons suggest, however, that China should not expect these weapons to radically change the course of battle. Even in World War I, when protective gear was rudimentary, chemical weapons caused less than 10 percent of all deaths; in the Iran-Iraq War, the figure was probably less than 5 percent.66 China would need to worry that, if its timing and delivery were not good, its own exposed troops could suffer larger
numbers of casualties than the dug-in defenders, either from its own chemical weapons or from Taiwan’s.67 All told, this approach would slightly improve China’s odds of getting an initial foothold on Taiwan, but it would not change the fact that Taiwan could build up reinforcements
far faster than the PRC. Could the PRC use its fishing fleet to put tens if not hundreds of thousands of troops quickly ashore on Taiwan? That is extremely unlikely. First, the ships could not carry heavy equipment. Second, shore-based coastal defense guns and artillery, as well as Taiwanese aircraft, small coastal patrol craft, and mines, would be highly lethal against the unarmored ships as they approached shore.68 Third, the fishing ships could not carry landing craft, leaving soldiers
completely defenseless after they disembarked from the ships and trudged through mudflats or swam in the face of Taiwanese fire.69
In summary, China would probably not be able to get enough troops ashore to establish even the rudiments of an initial beachhead. Even if it somehow could, Taiwan could send forces to the chosen point of attack more than five times faster than China could, assuring that PRC
forces would be promptly overrun.
Enviado por: JNSA em Maio 24, 2004, 07:33:29 pm
Vão a este site http://www.brookings.edu/dybdocroot/views/articles/ohanlon/2000fall_IS.htm e procurem quase no fundo da página onde diz - "Download the entire article". Garanto-vos que vale a pena. 8)
Enviado por: komet em Maio 24, 2004, 07:41:05 pm
)? Fala-se aí que um dos pontos fracos da aviação Chinesa é falta de munições de precisão e anti-SAM, penso que estes países orientais teem grande poder de inovação, improvisação e cientistas experientes não devem faltar para desenvolver este género de material através de modelos ocidentais ou russos ou retro-engenharia...
Enviado por: JNSA em Maio 24, 2004, 07:47:02 pm
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Pergunto-me com todo o potencial industrial chinês que a todos é conhecido, não poderão eles desenvolver armamento mais avançado (aviões, mesmo que baseados em material russo) ou que comprem material directamente à Russia ou mercado negro (vai quase dar ao mesmo )? Fala-se aí que um dos pontos fracos da aviação Chinesa é falta de munições de precisão e anti-SAM, penso que estes países orientais teem grande poder de inovação, improvisação e cientistas experientes não devem faltar para desenvolver este género de material através de modelos ocidentais ou russos ou retro-engenharia...
O problema Komet, é que essas capacidades demoram anos a adquirir (e Taiwan não vai ficar quieta enquanto os chineses se armam
). Mas a principal questão não é só obter as armas inteligentes - é treinar pessoal para as utilizar e criar uma estrutura de comando e controlo que os possa dirigir num dos cenários mais exigentes que pode existir (basta ver as forças que os EUA tiveram que juntar para atacar o Iraque em 91 ou o Kosovo)
Enviado por: Spectral em Maio 24, 2004, 08:28:08 pm
Isto porque a capacidade anfíbia chinesa era ( e é) praticamente inexistente.
No entanto, nos últimos anos, a diferença tecnológica ( principalmente a nível da Força Aérea e da Marinha) tem diminuído consideravelmente, e hoje em dia a China é capaz de causar estragos gravíssimos em Taiwan.
Agora invádi-la continua a ser outra questão, para a qual a china continua a não ter meios.
( Isto tudo sem contar com uma intervenção directa americana)
Cumptos
Enviado por: emarques em Maio 24, 2004, 08:29:24 pm
Enviado por: Spectral em Maio 24, 2004, 08:36:51 pm
Além de que a China já tem a vantagem de ser uma potência nuclear. Realmente, a única coisa que safa Taiwan é a sua aliança com os EUA e a sua insularidade...
Cumptos
Enviado por: Ricardo Nunes em Maio 24, 2004, 08:47:44 pm
Citação de: "emarques"
Se a China decidisse fazê-lo, o que é que Taiwan faria? Protestos diplomáticos? Ataques preventivos? Não me parece que qualquer das duas hipóteses desse resultados por aí além. Quanto a tentar armar-se acima das capacidades chinesas, também não acho que Taiwan pudesse competir com a China numa verdadeira corrida aos armamentos.
emarques, mas isso é óbvio. O objectivo de Taiwan nunca seria tentar superiorizar-se tecnologicamente e militarmente face à China. O seu pressuposto de defesa passa simplesmente pelo facto de se armar de tal forma que a invasão por parte da china continental seria insuportavelmente cara e dispendiosa.
Uma invasão de Taiwan saíria tão cara à China ( em qualquer das suas variáveis ) que a torna quase inviável.
Agora claro, a questão que se coloca é: será que a China está disposta a tantos sacrifícios apenas por um pedaço de terra, no meio de um oceano, que deveria ser unificado segundo uma ideologia que a maior parte dos chineses já desconhece?
Nem na mais remota hipótesse se coloca aqui o uso de armas de caracter nuclear, pois se tais fossem usadas aí o melhor que tinhamos a fazer era rezarmos todos pois estaríamos na primeira guerra nuclear ( EUA - China ).
Enviado por: emarques em Maio 24, 2004, 08:58:48 pm
Enviado por: Ricardo Nunes em Maio 24, 2004, 09:00:42 pm
Enviado por: JNSA em Maio 24, 2004, 10:13:04 pm
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Emarques - Se a China decidisse fazê-lo, o que é que Taiwan faria? Protestos diplomáticos? Ataques preventivos? Não me parece que qualquer das duas hipóteses desse resultados por aí além. Quanto a tentar armar-se acima das capacidades chinesas, também não acho que Taiwan pudesse competir com a China numa verdadeira corrida aos armamentos.
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Spectral - Claro, mas Taiwan já está a perder a corrida aos armamentos. Basta comparar o melhor equipamento chinês contra o melhor equipamento de Taiwan, e a China ganha em praticamente todas as aéreas!!
Além de que a China já tem a vantagem de ser uma potência nuclear. Realmente, a única coisa que safa Taiwan é a sua aliança com os EUA e a sua insularidade...
Sectral e Emarques - essa é que é a beleza da estratégia :wink:
Como Napoleão disse: "The art of war consists, with a numerically inferior army, in always having larger forces than the enemy at the point which is to be attacked or defended." (claro que ele disse isto em francês :wink: )
Enviado por: Spectral em Maio 24, 2004, 10:25:21 pm
Mas a batalha aérea seria bem renhida. Poderia começar com uma "chuva" de mísseis balísticos ( com ogivas convencionais - a China proclama ter várias dezenas apontados a Taiwan) sobre as principais bases de Taiwan, seguido de um ataque maciço da F.A- chinesa ( eu atacava com tudo o que voasse), liderado pelos Flankers...
Já agora, o que são os "outros transportes" ? Submarinos ou teleporte ?
A ver se leio o artigo...
Enviado por: JNSA em Maio 24, 2004, 10:31:43 pm
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Poderia começar com uma "chuva" de mísseis balísticos ( com ogivas convencionais - a China proclama ter várias dezenas apontados a Taiwan) sobre as principais bases de Taiwan, seguido de um ataque maciço da F.A- chinesa ( eu atacava com tudo o que voasse), liderado pelos Flankers...
Se forem como os Scud, com um CEP de 450m num dia bom, então seria um milagre se acertassem em alguma coisa :lol:
Enviado por: emarques em Maio 24, 2004, 10:57:22 pm
komet: "Fala-se aí que um dos pontos fracos da aviação Chinesa é falta de munições de precisão e anti-SAM, penso que estes países orientais teem grande poder de inovação, improvisação e cientistas experientes não devem faltar para desenvolver este género de material através de modelos ocidentais ou russos ou retro-engenharia..."
JNSA: "O problema Komet, é que essas capacidades demoram anos a adquirir (e Taiwan não vai ficar quieta enquanto os chineses se armam)."
eu: "Se a China decidisse fazê-lo, o que é que Taiwan faria? Protestos diplomáticos? Ataques preventivos?"
Não estou a discutir que a China não seria capaz de invadir Taiwan presentemente. Mas muitos dos problemas apontados à situação chinesa é que muito do seu armamento e doutrina não é adequado à tarefa. Se os chineses desenvolvessem mísseis mais precisos e as doutrinas para os usar, uma das premissas básicas do estudo (que seria impossível à China conseguir superioridade aérea sobre Taiwan) caía por terra. E Taiwan não tem muito como evitar que a China faça essas alterações.
Enviado por: JNSA em Maio 24, 2004, 11:08:04 pm
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Não estou a discutir que a China não seria capaz de invadir Taiwan presentemente. Mas muitos dos problemas apontados à situação chinesa é que muito do seu armamento e doutrina não é adequado à tarefa. Se os chineses desenvolvessem mísseis mais precisos e as doutrinas para os usar, uma das premissas básicas do estudo (que seria impossível à China conseguir superioridade aérea sobre Taiwan) caía por terra. E Taiwan não tem muito como evitar que a China faça essas alterações.
Emarques, mas a questão é o tempo que demora a criar e a operacionalizar esses meios. Mesmo admitindo que eles criam esses meios, destruir totalmente a força aérea de Taiwan continua a não ser nada fácil (e basta que sobrevivam algumas aeronaves para causar muitos estragos nos navios anfíbios, sem uma escolta anti-aérea adequada). E mesmo que consigam a supremacia aérea (e essa não é uma das premissas básicas do estudo - ele sobrevaloriza os chineses...), isso não é suficiente para ganhar a batalha terrestre - cada dia que passasse, os chineses ficariam com uma desproporção de forças cada vez maior (só com os números dos reforços teríamos 8.000 vs 50.000 no 1º dia; 16.000 vs 100.000 no 2º dia, e por aí adiante), e nem a sua força aérea conseguiría fazer nada para mudar isto - é uma questão física - dificilmente nos próximos 10 anos a China conseguirá ter uma capacidade de projecção de forças para eficaz e efectivamente derrotar os Taiwaneses no solo...
Enviado por: Spectral em Maio 24, 2004, 11:30:01 pm
Por acaso até acho que é mais fácil no futuro a China ter capacidade de num futuro conflicto em Taiwan, adquirir uma superioridade aéra limitada sobre o campo de batalha, do que ser capaz de realizar um desembarque anfíbio em grande escala. Estamos a falar de algo muito perto da dimensão da Normandia ou de Okinawa...
Enviado por: JNSA em Maio 24, 2004, 11:35:31 pm
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JNSA, oa mísseis referidos são daqueles monstros para transportar ogivas nucleares, muito maiores e sofisticados que os Scuds. Lanaçando uns 10, eu diria que pelo menos 1 iria acertar em cheio numa base aérea de Taiwan, inutilizando-a por algum tempo ( dias no máximo).
Spectral, depende dos "monstros" a que se estiver a referir, mas na maior parte dos casos o CEP dos mísseis balisticos nucleares não será substancialmente melhor do que o de um Scud (talvez 200m - os ICBM's americanos e russos são melhores, mas têm décadas de tecnologia em cima :shock:
De qualquer modo, para quê usar armamento nuclear contra uma base aérea (e Taiwan tem dezenas - algumas delas enterradas em montanhas) se isso destruir o território que se pretende conquistar? E acha mesmo que os americanos e a comunidade internacional no seu conjunto ficariam impávidos e serenos enquanto a China mandava Taiwan de volta à idade da pedra? :wink:
Enviado por: JNSA em Maio 24, 2004, 11:39:11 pm
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Consider first a possible missile attack. As noted, the PRC has about 200 ballistic
missiles deployed near Taiwan today, and may double or even triple this package within five
years. From their current positions, the M-9 and M-11 missiles can reach Taiwan. But neither
possesses sufficient accuracy to strike ports, airfields, or ships to great effect using conventional
explosives. Indeed, as noted above, they would generally miss their targets by several football
fields and almost always by the length of at least a single field. If Beijing unleashed a salvo of
hundreds of missiles, it might indeed register a few hits or near hits against lucrative targets.
Commercial sea traffic might diminish drastically for a spell. But if China exhausted the bulk of
its missile inventory to sink a grand total of two or three cargo vessels, would that really be such
an intimidating use of force?
Used against civilian populations, each missile might kill anywhere from zero to a dozen
or more citizens, judging by the experiences of Operation Desert Storm and the Iran-Iraq “war of
the cities.”87 Such terror tactics would be tragic for the well-being of the Taiwanese—but limited
in overall magnitude, at least by the standards of war, and more likely to embitter and harden the
Taiwanese than coerce their capitulation, if past experience is any guide. In the end, using
missile attacks in this way would say more about Chinese weakness than anything else—just as
limited air and cruise missile attacks by the United States in recent years have often shown
irresoluteness rather than strength or staying power, and achieved correspondingly poor results.88
Mais uma parte do artigo, sobre os mísseis balísticos chineses
Enviado por: emarques em Maio 24, 2004, 11:39:44 pm
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(só com os números dos reforços teríamos 8.000 vs 50.000 no 1º dia; 16.000 vs 100.000 no 2º dia, e por aí adiante)
Segundo percebi, estes cálculos baseavam-se na tal premissa de que os chineses não tinham superioridade aérea, e portanto não conseguiam atrapalhar as movimentações dos taiwaneses, enquanto que estes sempre conseguiam chatear um bocado os transportes chineses (claro que não li o artigo, por isso posso estar completamente enganado).
E claro que durante o período em que andassem a preparar meios aéreos para atacar Taiwan os chineses também aumentavam a capacidade de transporte de tropas, afinal o plano era mesmo esse. ;))
Enviado por: JNSA em Maio 24, 2004, 11:40:49 pm
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There are certainly important areas in which China could drastically improve its
capabilities for attacking Taiwanese forces and infrastructure. For example, by improving the
accuracy of missiles with global positioning system (GPS) guidance, and developing
submunitions that could be dispersed by cruise or ballistic missile, China could acquire the
capacity to destroy exposed aircraft on most of Taiwan’s airfields with as few as about 100
cruise missiles or 10 ballistic missiles. It could target ports and other key military and
commercial infrastructure as well, trying to strangle Taiwan’s economy.
However, Taiwan would have responses to any such steps, many of them straightforward
and relatively inexpensive. Building more hardened shelters for aircraft could deprive China of
an area-effect attack capability against exposed fighters. Deploying jammers and missile
defenses around airfields could degrade the accuracy of incoming missiles and reduce the
number getting through. Taiwan could also consider operating more aircraft off highways and
otherwise dispersing them, albeit at some cost in the efficiency of aircraft operations and
maintenance.113
Enviado por: Spectral em Maio 24, 2004, 11:45:15 pm
)O objectivo é lançar a máxima confusão possível nas bases de comando e controlo de Taiwan, de modo a dificultar o seu controlo da batalha aérea nas 1as fases da guerra aérea. Além de que vai criar todo o tipo de problemas como aviões que têm que ser desviados para bases secundárias, aviões que não podem levantar voo... E porque não, causar medo em toda a população de Taiwan.
Respondendo ao komet, mísseis anti-radar não lhes faltam, com todo o arsenal que os russos lhes vendem . Também têm ( principalmente no Su-30MKK) uma variedade razoável de mísseis de "cruzeiro" ( a maior parte de guiamento óptico/TV) com alcances entre 50-100 km.
E acho que é melhor neste pequeno exercíco deixar os EUA de fora, senão as probabilidades chinesas seriam ainda menores ( é óbvio).
Enviado por: Ricardo Nunes em Maio 25, 2004, 08:58:44 am
Não tenho dúvida que Taiwan se conseguiria defender, mas também não tenho dúvidas que, se a China assim o entendesse, Taiwan seria conquistada mas por com um número enormíssimo de baixas - homens e material.
Em termos de superioridade aérea não tenho dúvidas que a maior força aérea do mundo - a chinesa - a conseguisse facilmente. Isto devido a 2 factores:
- O facto de o armamento em si de Taiwan ser escasso ( os F-16s de Taiwan são de facto Block10/15/20 com algumas adpatações interessantes ). Isto deixaria apenas os CHin Kwo ( que são caças ligeiros ) e os Mirage 2000 ( estes sim capazes de intercepções eficazes ). O mais importante para Taiwan seria um bom pré-aviso.
- A concentração de forças. O território de Taiwan é tão reduzido que, 3 ou 4 ataques certeiros inutilizariam qualquer capacidade de reacção da força aérea ( partimos aqui do pressuposto que, de momento, os pilotos da força aérea da formosa não estão treinados a descolar de estradas ).
Agora, em termos navais a conversa já é outra, e a marinha taiwanesa tinha, e tem, capacidades bastante relevantes num qualquer conflito.
Acabei de ler o artigo que o JNSA entregou ( ou melhor, quase todo confesso ) e achei-o bastante interessante se bem que um pouco desfocado da realidade actual - o que é natural num artigo destes visto que as variáveis presentes num conflito são muitas.
Numa coisa estamos de acordo - considerando a proporção de forças de ambos os países, Taiwan saíria deste conflito com um desempenho notável qualquer que fosse o desfecho.
Enviado por: JNSA em Maio 25, 2004, 12:28:58 pm
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Em termos de superioridade aérea não tenho dúvidas que a maior força aérea do mundo - a chinesa - a conseguisse facilmente. Isto devido a 2 factores:
- O facto de o armamento em si de Taiwan ser escasso ( os F-16s de Taiwan são de facto Block10/15/20 com algumas adpatações interessantes ). Isto deixaria apenas os CHin Kwo ( que são caças ligeiros ) e os Mirage 2000 ( estes sim capazes de intercepções eficazes ). O mais importante para Taiwan seria um bom pré-aviso.
- A concentração de forças. O território de Taiwan é tão reduzido que, 3 ou 4 ataques certeiros inutilizariam qualquer capacidade de reacção da força aérea ( partimos aqui do pressuposto que, de momento, os pilotos da força aérea da formosa não estão treinados a descolar de estradas ).
Ainda não me convenceste, Ricardo
Ora vamos lá ver - segundo alguns dados que encontrei, Taiwan tem:
-130 Ching-Kuo
-145 F-16 A/B
-60 Mirage 2000-5
-82 F-5E/F Tiger II (destes, não sei quantos estão ao serviço)
Agora vendo a força aérea chinesa (que de facto é a maior força aérea do mundo - mas os números só por si não chegam...):
-desconta os aviões não operacionais (que são em número muito maior do que os de Taiwan - quer pelos modelos mais antigos, quer pela pior qualidade das tripulações de terra)
-desconta os aviões que têm que ficar nas suas bases, uma vez que a China não pode desguarnecer as suas fronteiras (e tem que estar prevenida contra um contra-ataque americano)
-desconta os aviões que não podem realizar missões de ataque de precisão, ou nocturno (pelo menos só poderiam operar de dia)
Depois disto, tens que ver que a China conseguiria um número de saídas por dia, por avião, muito menor do que o de Taiwan - têm que percorrer um espaço maior até chegar à zona de combate, e as suas tripulações de terra são inferiores. Durante a noite a maior parte das suas aeronaves não poderiam voar, o que dá tempo a Taiwan para recuperar.
E contabiliza ainda as centenas de mísseis anti-aéreos que Taiwan tem... Já para não falar dos navios que também podem fazer defesa anti-aérea.
O que interessa, Ricardo, não são os números per se - é a quantidade e qualidade de aviões que eles conseguem reunir na zona de combate
Agora, em relação à capacidade da China de destruir as pistas de Taiwan:
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Taiwan is reported to have a total of 36 airfields with paved runways, and of these at least 26 have runways longer than the minimum of about 5,000 feet that would be required to support combat aircraft. Of these, five are highway strips longer than 8,000 feet, that could be used as expedient dispersal airstrips. Although there is no single open source profile of Taiwan's airfield infrastructure, it is possible to replicate these estimates. Various open source authorities attest to somewhat over 40 airfields and kindred aviation related facilities, although it is almost certainly the case that at least some of these entities are navigation beacons with no associated runway.
Runways are attractive targets for enemy aircraft to take out. A bomb is dropped on a runway, which creates a large crater putting the runway out of commission. If aircraft can't get off the ground, then they can't fight. Rapid runway repair is a long, tedious process that is vital to success on the battlefield and in the skies. The main focus in airfield repair is the Minimum Operating Strip (MOS), which the United States doctrinally defines as 15 by 1,525 square meters for fighter aircraft and 26 by 2,134 square meters for cargo aircraft.
Coalition attacks on runways complicated Iraqi air base operations, but there is little evidence that they hampered sortie rates. Iraqi runways were reportedly repaired in as little as four to six hours. Under ideal conditions with a motivated crew, the rapid runway repair task would take a minimum of about four hours. If reasonable allowances are made for the cold weather impacts on both the soldiers and equipment used for a snowy, windy 20°F day, the time is increased to about seven hours. In the Arab-Israeli war of October 1973, Arab repair teams typically restored damaged runways in nine to twelve hours. [source]
Taiwan's Ministry of Defense estimates that a Chinese M-family missile with a 500-kg warhead would create a crater 10 meters in depth and 20 meters in width after hitting the ground, and that it could take as many as 50 missiles to destroy a military airport. According to a RAND Corporation analysis, a 500-kg M-9 ballistic-missile warhead covers almost eight times the area when using a submunition warhead than when using a unitary warhead. The combination of increased accuracy from GPS guidance and increased warhead efficiency decreases the number of missiles required to attack airbases from hundreds to dozens.
Although more detailed modeling might produce somewhat different results, these rough order of magnitude estimates suggest that China's existing inventory of a few hundred M-9 and M-11 missiles could inflict only modest damage on Taiwan's Air Force, if steps were taken to disperse aircraft prior to an attack. It is reported that China is expected to field as many as 600 M-9 and M-11 missiles by the year 2005, roughly triple the year 2000 force. Even this substantially augmented missile arsenal would appear inadequate to the task of gaining decisive air superiority through airfield attacks.
The Air Force will begin construction work on a base which will house a long-range early warning radar system in 2004 worth US$44 million
fonte: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/taiwan/ab-overview.htm
E em http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/taiwan/cha-shan.htm podes encontrar algumas informações sobre a base de Cha Shan, que está construída sob uma montanha (ao abrigo da maioria dos ataques chineses) e que pode albergar 100 aviões de combate...
Enviado por: JNSA em Maio 25, 2004, 12:46:55 pm
Para além disso, Taiwan tem melhores capacidades BVR (os IDF com os Tien Chien-II, os F-16 com os Sparrow, e os Mirage com os MICA), para além de que possui aviões AEW Hawkeye, o que ajuda a coordenar as suas forças.
A China emprega tácticas semelhantes às da ex-URSS, em que os aviões têm muito pouca autonomia face aos controladores de terra, o que é muito difícil de coordenar, especialmente em operações aéreas ofensivas, com muitas aeronaves, e em algumas zonas, fora do alcance de radar...
A verdade é que, num cenário absurdo, a China até poderia ganhar a supremacia marítima e aérea (é impossível, mas vamos admitir isto, como hipótese de trabalho), mas nunca, conseguiria ganhar a batalha terrestre - Taiwan tem um exército de 270.000 homens (sem contar com as reservas) com:
-centenas de M-60, CM-11/12 (M-48 convertidos) e M-41
-peças autopropulsadas M110A2 e M109A5
-MLRS LT-2000
-mísseis anti-aéreos Tien Kung I/II, Patriot PAC 2, RIM-7M Sparrow, Hawk, Avenger e Antelope
-helicópteros AH-1W Cobra, OH-58D, Boeing Model 234 e UH-1H
Explica-me como é que, mesmo sem ter um único avião abatido ou um único avião afundado, é que a China conseguiria derrotar este exército, com, na melhor das hipóteses, 10.000 homens por dia (duvido que consiga, mas estou propositadamente a exagerar os números...), sobretudo equipados com armamento ligeiro (se levarem MBT's e APC's, não podem levar tantas tropas, demoram mais tempo a embarcar e desembarcar, e precisam de mais combustível)?
Enviado por: Fábio G. em Maio 25, 2004, 01:21:04 pm
http://www.shaps.hawaii.edu/security/tw ... 61999.html (http://www.shaps.hawaii.edu/security/twstrait_02261999.html)
Enviado por: Spectral em Maio 25, 2004, 05:22:46 pm
Os Ching-Kuo além da capacidade BVR, tem uma capacidade anti-navio bastante interessante com mísseis locais, sendo uma ameaça a qualquer frota de invasão.
E como já disse, a China não tem nem frota nem capacidade de organização de assaltos anfíbios para atacar Taiwan com tropas terrestres nos próximos tempos...
Enviado por: Ricardo Nunes em Maio 25, 2004, 05:24:42 pm
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O que interessa, Ricardo, não são os números per se - é a quantidade e qualidade de aviões que eles conseguem reunir na zona de combate
Oh João, isto é a mesma coisa do que ensinares a missa ao padre.
Em termos de combate aéreo, e deverias ter lido os 2 pontos que postei e não só o primeiro, não tenho dúvidas que, embora a um custo elevado a China conseguiria essa superioridade.
O que é importante reteres aqui é que não tem qualquer importância e influência conseguires meter no ar as aeronaves mais rapidamente se pura e simplesmente estas não têm de onde descolar. O grande problema da Formosa em relação à Força Aérea é o facto de ter os meios tão concentrados que, se de facto ocorresse um ataque bem coordenado a 4 ou 5 pontos fulcrais, mais de 80% desta ficaria em terra. Esta é uma questão interessante que tive o prazer de discutir com um cadete da academia militar de taiwan.
Se bem que a primeira "vaga" de aeronaves chinesas fosse repelida com algum sucesso, as sucessivas ondas de aeronaves chinesas - isto supondo que existira uma pré-fase com misseis de cruzeiro - conseguiriam obter a superioridade aérea, com algum esforço é certo. Pouco referido mas bastante importante para esta questão é o facto de a China já possuir capacidade AWACs, baseada no A-50 Mainstay russo ( se bem que tenha um apoio para o radar triangular muito pouco comum ). Tecnologia desenvolvida, dizem, com apoio isrealita. A primeira foto foi revelada há cerca de um mês.
Enviado por: Fábio G. em Junho 01, 2004, 11:45:26 am
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Pequim analisou capacidade dos EUA
A China está a repensar a forma como poderia neutralizar o exército norte-americano no caso de um conflito em torno de Taiwan, na sequência do que assistiu durante a invasão do Iraque, anunciou o Pentágono.
Dirigentes chineses testemunharam a rapidez com que forças terrestres norte-americanas capturaram Bagdade e o papel que os comandos de operações especiais dos EUA desempenham no Iraque.
No relatório anual sobre avanços militares chineses preparado para o Congresso, o Departamento de Estado da Defesa norte-americano referiu que a China está a repensar o conceito de que o poder aéreo dos EUA é suficiente para prevalecer num conflito - conceito demonstrado em 1999 na guerra aérea no Kosovo, que não incluiu forças terrestres.
"A velocidade a que avançaram as forças terrestres da coligação e o papel desempenhado pelas forças especiais no Iraque levaram os teóricos do Exército de Libertação do Povo a repensar as suas assumpções sobre o valor de ataques de precisão de longo alcance, independentes de forças terrestres, no caso de um cenário de conflito em torno de Taiwan", refere o relatório.
Outros aspectos da guerra do Iraque reforçaram a ideia da China de que a estratégia dos Estados Unidos, a longo prazo, é dominar a Ásia, ao conter o desenvolvimento do Poder chinês, segundo o relatório.
Entre esses aspectos constam as decisões do Pentágono de usar a ilha de Guam, no Pacífico, para colocar bombardeiros de longo alcance, mísseis de cruzeiro e submarinos de ataque nuclear. Decisões em parte relacionadas com o conflito no Iraque.
Enviado por: Rui Elias em Junho 07, 2004, 01:06:44 pm
Claro que isto só seria exequível se um dia os EUA deixarem "cair" a Formosa, e em nome da Real Politik, já se viu muito na história.
Os aliados também consegiram desembarcar na Normandia há 60 anos, e o êxito dependeu de conseguirem uma testa de ponte.
A China terá capacidade para isso dentro de uns anos.
Agora não, porque o seu conceito militar sempre foi defensivo, e muito virado para um ataque vindo da extinta URSS, para além do apoio que actualmente os EUA dão a Taiwan.
Mas a paciência chinesa é grande e poderão esperar que a melhor oportunidade surja, mesmo que a Taiwan esteja reservada uma solução à Hong Kong, ou seja, "um país, dois sistemas".
Enviado por: Spectral em Junho 07, 2004, 01:25:45 pm
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Os aliados também consegiram desembarcar na Normandia há 60 anos, e o êxito dependeu de conseguirem uma testa de ponte.
A China terá capacidade para isso dentro de uns anos
E como eu já lhe respondi no FA ( sou o Espectre por lá...) as coisas não são assim tão simples. É preciso um controlo absoluto do céu e do mar, uma marinha capaz de transportar as tropas, e mais importante do que tudo abastecê-las nas fases seguintes, e acima de tudo experiência, muita expereiência neste teipo de operações. Os aliados já a tinham adquirido dolorosamente em Dieppe, Anzio, "Husky", "Anvil", etc.
Além que a situação hoje em dia é muito pior. Um grupo de soldados com mísseis AT escondidos pode ir destruindo as lanchas de desenbarque uma a uma. E a artilharia está muito mais avançada e precisa, tornando os desembarques em massa numa praia algo de assustador...
Hoje em dia os Marines admitem que não conseguiriam desembarcar numa costa defendida. Como seria então com os chineses?
Cumptos
Enviado por: Rui Elias em Junho 07, 2004, 01:58:49 pm
Quanto à China continental, claro que antes de lançar o ataque, bastaria lançar uma chuva de mísseis balísticos para a ilha, apontados às bases aéreas e a certos pontos defensivos nas costas.
Depois, um bloqueio naval trataria de privar Taiwan de reabastecimentos e munições (claro que se os EUA deixassem Taiwan à sua sorte).
Depois, grupos de operações especiais entrariam em determinados pontos da costa, em simultâneo com forças especiais aerotransportadas, para neutralizarem os centros de comando e de comunicações (penso que os chineses de Pequim devem ter tudo cartografado).
E finalmente o desembarque em grande.
Claro que haveriam baixas de vulto, porque as FA de Taiwan são fortes, mas em poucos meses Taiwan cairia (penso eu de que
).
Enviado por: Spectral em Junho 08, 2004, 03:05:58 pm
Agora um assalto anfíbio seria outra coisa...
Enviado por: Rui Elias em Junho 08, 2004, 03:14:34 pm
Está a ver como eu sei dar cabo de Taiwan? :lol: :lol:
Vou ser o Nuno Rogeiro lá do sítio.