[Ricardo Nunes]

Este é sem dúvida um dos "conflitos", por enquanto diplomático, mais preocupante do nosso tempo.
Como não existia nenhum tópico dedicado a este conflito em particular, aqui fica um espaço de discussão.  

Estejam à vontade para comentar as possíveis abordagens chinesas, as expectativa da formosa, e qual o papel que os Estados Unidos teriam e têm em todo este jogo diplomático.

Para começar aqui fica uma notícia:

China Says Pay Any Price to Stop Taiwan Statehood
Mon May 24, 2004 05:54 AM ET

But China's leaders have not relented in their war of words against Chen since the speech, deriding him as a slippery politician in state media editorials.
"We noticed that although under great pressure from all sides Chen did not give a timetable for constitutional revisions, he did use some vague phrases about territory and sovereignty in his speech which carry a foreshadowing of Taiwan independence later," Zhang said in the first official reaction on Monday.

Beijing would protect its territorial unity above all else, including the Olympic Games which it hosts in 2008, he said.

"If Chen Shui-bian dares to challenge the people of the world...we will safeguard our sovereignty and territorial integrity at any cost," he said when asked if China would be willing to risk the Olympics over Taiwan.

The United States last week welcomed Chen's speech as "responsible and constructive" for avoiding an immediate showdown with China and added it created an opportunity for the two rivals to resume dialogue.

But China told Washington not to be deceived.

After the independence-leaning Chen's first inauguration in 2000, Beijing said it would listen to his words and watch his actions.

Four years on, China made a pre-emptive declaration ahead of the inauguration, threatening to crush any moves toward independence.

But there was no sign that Chen was willing to alter course, Zhang said.

"For such a faithless man, we do not care what he says. The key is what he does, which road he would choose," he said. "He is riding near the edge of the cliff, and there is no sign that he is going to rein in his horse."

© Reuters 2004. All Rights Reserved.

[komet]

Pergunto-me qual seria o potencial em números, de infantaria que a China conseguiria reunir neste momento, no máximo.

Sugestões? 50 milhões?

[JNSA]

Pergunto-me qual seria o potencial em números, de infantaria que a China conseguiria reunir neste momento, no máximo.

Sugestões? 50 milhões?

Duvido muito, Komet...

[JNSA]

Já agora, o número de 10 milhões que eu sugeri é apenas uma aproximação...

Claro que se fosse preciso os Chineses poderiam distribuir armas a todos os homens dos 16 aos 65 (por armas, eu quero dizer tudo desde AK-47's, Simonovs, Mausers, mosquetes, arcabuzes, mocas, etc...  

[JNSA]

O artigo de que eu falava é do Prof. Michael O'Hanlon e foi escrito em 2000; aqui vão algumas das partes mais relevantes... Entretanto vou procurando o link...

To carry out a successful surprise attack against key Taiwanese assets, China could not start loading and sailing most of its ships toward Taiwan until after the missile and air strikes began.
In fact, the PRC would do extremely well simply to prepare its air and missile forces for the attack without having those preparations noticed by Taiwanese and U.S. intelligence.
Consider first China’s large ballistic missile force. These missiles are numerous, perhaps now totaling 200 in southeastern China near Taiwan, with the PRC adding an estimated 50 missiles a year there, according to U.S. Pacific Comdr. Adm. Dennis Blair.19 (China is also reportedly modernizing its air defenses in that vicinity and elsewhere, replacing SA-2 surface-toair missile systems with the SA-10, also known as the S-300.20) China’s ballistic missiles are inaccurate, however.21 They might achieve an occasional hit on a runway, but the missiles’ accuracy—typically no better than 300 meters—would be too poor to make that happen more than every tenth shot or so.22 And runways can absorb a number of hits before being incapacitated; up to 100 properly distributed craters could be needed to shut down operations at a single runway.23 China presently lacks advanced submunitions that could reduce the number of missiles required per base.24 To shut down a runway even temporarily using conventional munitions, therefore, literally hundreds of ballistic missiles might be required—virtually the entire PRC inventory.
Chinese attack aircraft could probably do better. If China could get several hundred of its 800 to 1,000 attack aircraft through to runways, it could render some of them unusable at least temporarily, and perhaps destroy part of the Taiwanese combat air fleet on the ground as well.25
But it is not clear that all or even most of China’s attack planes would be available against airfields. Moving the bulk of them to bases near Taiwan could tip Taipei and Washington off about a pending military action, allowing Taiwanese air defenses to be alerted, mines to be laid, and reservists to be mobilized. Even if China could move most attack aircraft within combat range of Taiwan clandestinely, it might have to use substantial numbers against Taiwan’s air defenses and command-and-control assets, as well as Taiwan’s 37 surface combatants and 59 smaller coastal combatants that carry antiship missiles. China has a large number of submarines that it could try to use against these ships, but most are in poor condition, and surging them to sea could tip off Taiwanese authorities about a pending attack. Finally, China has never
demonstrated the capacity to orchestrate more than a few hundred air sorties a day.26 Assume nonetheless for the sake of conservatism that China could use the majority of its entire attack plane inventory against Taiwan’s air bases. Most PRC attack aircraft could carry only a few unguided bombs (China’s cruise-missile and precision-strike capabilities are quite limited and rudimentary).27 Making very favorable assumptions about the accuracy and effectiveness of the Chinese munitions, it is likely that at least three dozen planes would be needed to shut down a given runway—meaning that about fifty planes might have to be dedicated to each location (allowing for aircraft breakdowns, attrition, poor aiming, and other problems).28
Theoretically, the entire PRC air armada might thus incapacitate Taiwan’s best dozen or so airfields. More likely, it might shut down operations at the three or four bases where Taiwan keeps its most advanced fighters. But Taiwan would immediately begin to repair its airfields.
China could undertake subsequent attack sorties, but Taiwan’s antiaircraft artillery and SAMs would then be on a high state of vigilance. Because Chinese planes do not carry precision munitions as a rule, they would have to fly low; China could easily lose 10 percent of its planes on each subsequent sortie. Also, given their poor state of repair, and their lack of night-flying capabilities, it is implausible that most PLAAF (People’s Liberation Army Air Force) and PLAN (People’s Liberation Army Navy) aircraft could fly more than two sorties before darkness or maintenance requirements grounded them. PRC aircraft rarely fly more than one sortie every two to three days; their mission-capable rates are poor, and repairs are frequent as well as timeconsuming.
29 Given that most PRC amphibious ships would need more than a day to reach Taiwan (most are not based near the strait in peacetime, and moving them there as well as loading them prior to an attack would alert Taiwan), Taiwan could use the night to repair many runways. PRC attacks on subsequent days would be much less effective.30 They would become
particularly ineffective if the weather turned cloudy, since Chinese pilots generally require visual identification of targets to attack them.31
China could try to directly attack Taiwanese aircraft, as well as early warning and command-and-control installations, on the ground. Taiwan does not do enough to protect such assets at present.32 Carrying out such attacks is difficult, however, for aircraft lacking precisionguided
bombs, for pilots receiving only limited training in low-altitude flight, and against air defenses like those Taiwan deploys at its airfields and other critical infrastructure. Even if China could destroy some planes on the ground, Taiwan already has hardened shelters for many of its
fighters and should soon be able to provide 60 percent of them with protection against anything but laser-guided bombs.33 The costs of doing so are not insignificant—perhaps $4 million per plane—but are far less than the purchase costs of the aircraft themselves.34
The Desert Storm experience is instructive here as an analogy. Coalition aircraft averaged dozens of strike sorties daily against Iraqi airfields during the war’s first week, yet did not stop the Iraqi air force from flying about forty sorties a day.35 The attacks included British planes dropping advanced runway-penetrating weapons known as the JP-233, and doing so precisely and from low altitude. Yet Iraqi airplanes continued to fly. So would Taiwanese planes, despite China’s best efforts to stop them.
There are caveats to these generally optimistic conclusions. Shelters will probably not be constructed for larger planes, such as airborne warning and control aircraft, given the difficulty of doing so. For the sake of conservative planning, it should probably be assumed that Taiwan
would not have such aircraft available for combat, having lost them to preemptive PRC attacks. In addition, China could use chemical weapons against Taiwanese airfields, drastically complicating air operations. The standard assumption is that operating in a chemical environment would reduce a military’s flight operations in half, such that an air force that would otherwise fly two sorties per aircraft per day might manage only one if personnel needed to wear protective gear and frequently decontaminate equipment. China would need to weigh the potential benefits of attacking Taiwanese military infrastructure with chemical weapons against the risks that doing so would only steel Taipei’s resolve and convince the United States to come to Taiwan’s military aid regardless of which side was viewed by Washington as having provoked
the conflict. In the end, however, it must be acknowledged that China’s precise assessment of the pros and cons of such an attack cannot be predicted, and there is some chance it would use chemical weapons.36 (It seems highly unlikely that China would use nuclear weapons against the
island; it has stated that it would not do so, and the political repercussions would surely be enormous.37)
Even if runways were badly damaged and airfields were contaminated with chemical weapons, Taiwan would be able to keep aircraft in the air. It might use some highways for limited flight operations by fixed-wing aircraft, once it repaired runways sufficiently to move planes off airfields and onto secondary sites.38 (Taiwan would also probably retain most of its 20 armed maritime helicopters.)
What about attacks by China’s special forces against Taiwanese airfields and aircraft, which are less well-protected than they should be?39 Clandestinely infiltrating enough personnel into Taiwan to launch attacks on airfields would be a challenge, though it is possible that China already has several thousand agents ashore in Taiwan.40 Even if that is true, however, actually conducting the attacks would be far from trivial. For example, the United States and its allies lost fewer than 400 aircraft (fixed-wing planes and helicopters) this way in Vietnam—a conflict that
lasted many years and involved tens of thousands of airplanes, many of which could not be placed in hardened facilities given their sheer numbers and locations. Chinese special forces might be able to avail themselves of improved equipment, such as long-range sniper rifles and precision mortar shells, not available in earlier conflicts. But most of the tactics of attacking aircraft and their fuel supplies and support facilities with special forces remain similar to what they were previously. Even in a worst case, Chinese special forces would be unlikely to destroy more than a couple dozen Taiwanese planes.41 All told, of Taiwan’s 600 or so combat aircraft, at least half would likely survive even a well-coordinated, large-scale Chinese preemptive attack that caught them by surprise. Most of
Taipei’s airborne control aircraft might be lost, and remaining combat jets might be reduced to flying only a sortie a day, at least in the war’s first day or two, given damage to runways and the possible use of chemical weapons by the PRC. But Taiwan’s remaining capability would be
quite substantial. The ability of Taiwan’s ships and key command-and-control assets to survive a Chinese preemptive attack is more difficult to assess quantitatively, based on publicly available information. It is likely that the Taiwanese armed forces should make greater efforts to protect
them, notably by hardening key fixed infrastructure. But China’s limited capacity for large-scale precision strike casts doubt on its ability to conduct a successful surprise attack against these assets as well.

[komet]

Já agora, o número de 10 milhões que eu sugeri é apenas uma aproximação...

Claro que se fosse preciso os Chineses poderiam distribuir armas a todos os homens dos 16 aos 65 (por armas, eu quero dizer tudo desde AK-47's, Simonovs, Mausers, mosquetes, arcabuzes, mocas, etc...  ), mas duvido que isso constituísse uma força de combate realmente eficaz...

Era esse o tipo de forças que me referia lol
Mas claro, que se os EUA ou quem sabe mais se metessem ao barulho, seriam carne pa canhão (o que, apesar de tudo, não deixa de ter a sua eficácia, veja-se as guerrilhas somalis, ou iraquianas).

[JNSA]

Mais um bocadito...

A PRC Amphibious Assault China would face several daunting constraints and challenges if it attempted to invade Taiwan by sea. Few PRC troops could deploy over water, given China’s very limited amounts of military sealift. Its 70 or so amphibious ships could move no more than 10,000 to 15,000 troops with their equipment, including some 400 armored vehicles (airlift could move another 6,000 troops, or perhaps somewhat more counting helicopter transport).42 These shortfalls would be magnified by China’s other military weaknesses. Although Chinese military personnel are generally competent at basic infantry skills, the armed forces do not tend to attract China’s best, nepotism is prevalent, party loyalty is of paramount importance, most soldiers are semiliterate peasants serving short tours of duty, and a strong professional noncommissioned officer corps is lacking. Combined-arms training, while somewhat enhanced of late for elite rapid reaction forces, is infrequent. To quote the Pentagon, “China probably has never conducted a large-scale amphibious exercise which has been fully coordinated with air support and airborne operations.”43
Taiwan of course has weaknesses of its own, above and beyond those cited above. It fails to foster cooperation and joint training between the different arms of its military; it also has not integrated communications systems to make systematic use of early-warning data and other key
information.44 Among its other, generic military shortcomings, Taiwan continues to rely on conscription to fill out its force structure; thus, turnover in the ranks is high, and the quality of the force is limited.45
Most of Taiwan’s weaknesses are not, however, as severe as China’s. Moreover, the basic numbers work strongly in Taiwan’s favor. It has a large military of 240,000 active-duty ground troops and 1.5 million more ground-force reservists. With a coastal perimeter of about 1,500 kilometers, it could deploy roughly 1,000 defenders per kilometer of coastline along all of its shores if it wished. So over any given stretch of 10 to 15 kilometers, a fully mobilized Taiwanese defense force could station as many troops as China could deploy there with all of its amphibious fleet. (An attacker would need to seize a shoreline of roughly that length, to create areas safe from enemy artillery.46)
The above presupposes no advance knowledge by Taiwan about where the PRC intended to come ashore. In reality, unless completely blinded and paralyzed by China’s preemptive attacks—a most unlikely proposition—Taiwan would see where ships sailed and be able to react
with at least some notice. (It is also likely that, if necessary, the United States would provide Taiwan with satellite or aircraft intelligence about the objective of China’s attack, even if U.S. forces stayed out of combat operations.) Although the strait is typically only 100 miles wide, Taiwan itself is about 300 miles long, so ships traveling 20 knots would need more than half a day to sail its full length, and could not credibly threaten all parts of the island at once. In addition, amphibious assault troops cannot come ashore just anywhere. Only about 20 percent of the world’s coastlines are suitable for amphibious assault; on Taiwan’s shores, the percentage is even less, given the prevalence of mud flats on the west coast and cliffs on the east. As a practical matter, then, Taiwan would not need to mobilize all of its reservists to achieve force parity in places most likely to suffer the initial PRC attack. If it could mobilize even 20 percent of its reservists in the twenty-four to forty-eight hours that China would require, at a bare minimum, to assemble and load its amphibious armada and then cross the strait, it could achieve force parity along key beachlines while maintaining thinner defenses elsewhere.47
Taiwan also has two airborne brigades that it could use for rapid reaction to any point experiencing amphibious or paratroop attack (and is developing an airborne cavalry brigade equipped with helicopters for that purpose as well).48 So China would be unlikely to establish even a local, temporary advantage along the section of beach where it elected to try coming ashore—meaning it lacks the second element of most successful amphibious attacks shown in Table 1.
Nor could China subsequently build up its initial force as quickly as Taiwan could strengthen local defenses at the point of attack. In other words, China also lacks the third crucial element of most successful invasions identified above. Whatever happened during the first day of conflict, Taiwan could almost surely deploy large numbers of reinforcements by road on the first night of the war and thereafter. The Chinese air force has limited capacity for finding and attacking mobile ground targets, and limited capacity to operate at night, so it could not seriously slow such reinforcements.49
China’s naval gunfire would not be particularly effective either. Its ship-based guns are relatively small and few. In previous experience using guns of comparable size and ordnance in the Korean War, for example, such weapons were generally mediocre at destroying land targets
or impeding enemy reinforcements.50 China also does not have nearly enough guns to cover a tactical battlefield of several miles on a dimension. Maintaining enough naval gunfire to make it difficult for defending troops to approach and enter a zone under attack might require 25 fiveinch rounds per minute for every zone of 100 yards on a side, according to U.S. Navy estimates.
Given that China’s entire surface fleet has only about 100 guns, firing 25 to 30 rounds per minute, China could not maintain the requisite fire over more than a square mile of land.51
China’s inability to stop Taiwanese road traffic would have dire consequences for the PRC. Countries on the tactical offensive on foreign soil often attain movement rates of twenty to thirty kilometers every twenty-four hours.52 Faced with nothing more than Chinese aerial
harassment, most of it only during daylight hours, Taiwan could certainly move reinforcements at least 50 kilometers per day. That would make more than 100,000 troops available within fortyeight hours on most parts of the island.53
Taiwan would not have this same buildup capacity everywhere. Near major military bases and cities, its capacities would tend to be greater, whereas in some rural areas they would be less. But that would not constitute a major vulnerability. For one thing, if China wished to
attack a port and airfield (see below), it would need to do so near a city. In addition, even if China chose a spot for amphibious assault where Taiwan’s initial reinforcement capacity was limited, Taiwan could bring overwhelming firepower to bear within a couple days, having used air-mobile and local forces in an initial defense.
If it somehow established an initial lodgment ashore, China could try to reinforce it using its small amphibious fleet. But it would probably need at least two days for each round trip of its ships, and even that schedule would be highly contingent on encountering good seas in the notoriously foul-weathered Taiwan Strait.54 Moreover, returning ships would need to resupply troops already ashore, limiting their ability to deliver reinforcements. After forty-eight hours, therefore, Taiwan would likely have more than 100,000 troops facing the PRC’s total of perhaps
20,000 at Beijing’s chosen point of attack—and the situation would continue to deteriorate from there for China.
The above analysis has ignored attrition to PRC forces as they approach land and come ashore. In reality, such losses would be enormous. Mounting an amphibious assault against prepared defenses is extremely difficult and bloody. For example, during the D-Day assault of 1944, the United States lost roughly 10 percent of its forces as they tried to reach land. Comparable loss rates characterized other invasions, such as the 1943 assault on Betio Island in the Battle of Tarawa, in which attackers had to directly overrun prepared defenses to get ashore, just as China would have to do here.55 The PRC, not enjoying the air dominance or battleship firepower that U.S. forces possessed in World War II, would surely lose an even higher proportion of its assaulting forces in this way.56
China would also have to deal with precision-guided munitions fired from shore batteries, airplanes, and any surviving Taiwanese ships. As one way of getting a very rough bound on the problem, consider that the British lost 5 ships to missiles and aircraft and had another 12 damaged, out of a 100-ship task force, in the Falklands War—and that they did not generally have to approach any closer than 400 miles from the Argentine mainland during the war. That amounts to an effective attrition rate of 5 to 15 percent—against an outclassed Argentine military that only owned about 250 aircraft, and that was not capable of conducting effective low-altitude bombing runs (among other problems, many of its bombs were not fused to detonate quickly, meaning that many hit and passed through British ships before they could explode).57 PRC losses would surely be greater against a foe whose airfields it would have to approach directly, whose air forces would likely retain at least 300 planes even after a highly effective Chinese preemptive attack (see above), and whose antiship missile capabilities substantially exceed Argentina’s in 1982. Taiwan possesses significant numbers of antiship missiles such as Harpoon and its own Hsiung Feng.58 Nor would China’s underdeveloped ship defenses save the day.59
In conducting such operations, Taiwan would lose airplanes to Chinese fighters, but only gradually, given the poor quality of those PRC aircraft and their command-and-control support.60
Because Taiwan’s attack aircraft could fly low and concentrate their efforts near Taiwan’s coasts, China’s ground radars and control centers would contribute little to the battle. Thus many Taiwanese aircraft would sneak through PRC fighter cover and carry out attacks, using antiship
missiles or even dumb bombs against the poorly defended Chinese ships. They could similarly use air-to-air missiles against transport aircraft.61 They would probably suffer no more than 5 percent attrition per sortie, meaning that a given plane could fly many missions before being shot
down.62
China could face other problems too. Taiwan reportedly does not have a large number of shallow-water mines, but even a mediocre mine capability could be effective; in 1991, Iraq damaged two U.S. ships and frustrated Pentagon aspirations to mount an amphibious assault with
just 1,300 sea mines. Sweeping against mines in shallow waters is very difficult. In fact, given the lack of good technology, the U.S. armed forces continue to depend on divers and dolphins in such waters.63
Adding these loss rates together suggests that the PRC would likely lose at least 20 percent of its forces just in approaching Taiwan’s coasts and fighting its way onto land.64 It would continue to suffer high attrition rates during subsequent efforts to reinforce troops already ashore. On average, China could not hope to add more than about 5,000 troops per day to its
initial beachhead—assuming that the beachhead could be established in the first place (see Table 2 for estimates of reinforcement rates, which are further discussed below). [insert table] More likely, given expected attrition, the PRC would do well to deploy 3,000 to 4,000 amphibious
troops daily after its initial assault. What if the PRC used chemical weapons in this part of its attack? If it could fire chemical
munitions from its ship-based guns, it might be able to deliver enough ordnance to cover a battlefield several kilometers on a dimension within several minutes. China would presumably want to use nonpersistent agent, like sarin, so that its troops could occupy the area within a short
time without having to wear protective gear. The effects of the weapons on Taiwan’s defenders would depend heavily on whether they had gas masks handy, the accuracy of Chinese naval gunfire, weather conditions, and the speed with which Taiwan could threaten the PRC ships
doing the damage.65 Historical experiences with chemical weapons suggest, however, that China should not expect these weapons to radically change the course of battle. Even in World War I, when protective gear was rudimentary, chemical weapons caused less than 10 percent of all deaths; in the Iran-Iraq War, the figure was probably less than 5 percent.66 China would need to worry that, if its timing and delivery were not good, its own exposed troops could suffer larger
numbers of casualties than the dug-in defenders, either from its own chemical weapons or from Taiwan’s.67 All told, this approach would slightly improve China’s odds of getting an initial foothold on Taiwan, but it would not change the fact that Taiwan could build up reinforcements
far faster than the PRC. Could the PRC use its fishing fleet to put tens if not hundreds of thousands of troops quickly ashore on Taiwan? That is extremely unlikely. First, the ships could not carry heavy equipment. Second, shore-based coastal defense guns and artillery, as well as Taiwanese aircraft, small coastal patrol craft, and mines, would be highly lethal against the unarmored ships as they approached shore.68 Third, the fishing ships could not carry landing craft, leaving soldiers
completely defenseless after they disembarked from the ships and trudged through mudflats or swam in the face of Taiwanese fire.69
In summary, China would probably not be able to get enough troops ashore to establish even the rudiments of an initial beachhead. Even if it somehow could, Taiwan could send forces to the chosen point of attack more than five times faster than China could, assuring that PRC
forces would be promptly overrun.

[JNSA]

Já encontrei o link    Vão a este site http://www.brookings.edu/dybdocroot/views/articles/ohanlon/2000fall_IS.htm e procurem quase no fundo da página onde diz - "Download the entire article". Garanto-vos que vale a pena.  

[komet]

Pergunto-me com todo o potencial industrial chinês que a todos é conhecido, não poderão eles desenvolver armamento mais avançado (aviões, mesmo que baseados em material russo) ou que comprem material directamente à Russia ou mercado negro (vai quase dar ao mesmo    )? Fala-se aí que um dos pontos fracos da aviação Chinesa é falta de munições de precisão e anti-SAM, penso que estes países orientais teem grande poder de inovação, improvisação e cientistas experientes não devem faltar para desenvolver este género de material através de modelos ocidentais ou russos ou retro-engenharia...

[JNSA]

Pergunto-me com todo o potencial industrial chinês que a todos é conhecido, não poderão eles desenvolver armamento mais avançado (aviões, mesmo que baseados em material russo) ou que comprem material directamente à Russia ou mercado negro (vai quase dar ao mesmo  )? Fala-se aí que um dos pontos fracos da aviação Chinesa é falta de munições de precisão e anti-SAM, penso que estes países orientais teem grande poder de inovação, improvisação e cientistas experientes não devem faltar para desenvolver este género de material através de modelos ocidentais ou russos ou retro-engenharia...

O problema Komet, é que essas capacidades demoram anos a adquirir (e Taiwan não vai ficar quieta enquanto os chineses se armam    ). Mas a principal questão não é só obter as armas inteligentes - é treinar pessoal para as utilizar e criar uma estrutura de comando e controlo que os possa dirigir num dos cenários mais exigentes que pode existir (basta ver as forças que os EUA tiveram que juntar para atacar o Iraque em 91 ou o Kosovo)

[Spectral]

A invasão de Taiwan pela China era até à bem pouco tempo descrita como " o mergulho dos 500 mil homens"  :lol:

Isto porque a capacidade anfíbia chinesa era ( e é) praticamente inexistente.

No entanto, nos últimos anos, a diferença tecnológica ( principalmente a nível da Força Aérea e da Marinha) tem diminuído consideravelmente, e hoje em dia a China é capaz de causar estragos gravíssimos em Taiwan.

Agora invádi-la continua a ser outra questão, para a qual a china continua a não ter meios.

( Isto tudo sem contar com uma intervenção directa americana)

Cumptos

[emarques]

Se a China decidisse fazê-lo, o que é que Taiwan faria? Protestos diplomáticos? Ataques preventivos? Não me parece que qualquer das duas hipóteses desse resultados por aí além. Quanto a tentar armar-se acima das capacidades chinesas, também não acho que Taiwan pudesse competir com a China numa verdadeira corrida aos armamentos.

[Spectral]

Claro, mas Taiwan já está a perder a corrida aos armamentos. Basta comparar o melhor equipamento chinês contra o melhor equipamento de Taiwan, e a China ganha em praticamente todas as aéreas!!

Além de que a China já tem a vantagem de ser uma potência nuclear. Realmente, a única coisa que safa Taiwan é a sua aliança com os EUA e a sua insularidade...

Cumptos

[Ricardo Nunes]

Se a China decidisse fazê-lo, o que é que Taiwan faria? Protestos diplomáticos? Ataques preventivos? Não me parece que qualquer das duas hipóteses desse resultados por aí além. Quanto a tentar armar-se acima das capacidades chinesas, também não acho que Taiwan pudesse competir com a China numa verdadeira corrida aos armamentos.

emarques, mas isso é óbvio. O objectivo de Taiwan nunca seria tentar superiorizar-se tecnologicamente e militarmente face à China. O seu pressuposto de defesa passa simplesmente pelo facto de se armar de tal forma que a invasão por parte da china continental seria insuportavelmente cara e dispendiosa.

Uma invasão de Taiwan saíria tão cara à China ( em qualquer das suas variáveis ) que a torna quase inviável.
Agora claro, a questão que se coloca é: será que a China está disposta a tantos sacrifícios apenas por um pedaço de terra, no meio de um oceano, que deveria ser unificado segundo uma ideologia que a maior parte dos chineses já desconhece?

Nem na mais remota hipótesse se coloca aqui o uso de armas de caracter nuclear, pois se tais fossem usadas aí o melhor que tinhamos a fazer era rezarmos todos pois estaríamos na primeira guerra nuclear ( EUA - China ).

[emarques]

Eu estava a responder ao JNSA, quando ele dizia que "Taiwan não ficaria parado enquanto a China criasse uma capacidade tecnológica." O Spectral é que meteu um post de permeio.