Spain leads for $7bn navy contract
* Patrick Walters, National security editor
* March 01, 2007
SPAIN is poised to win the contest to design the navy's new air warfare destroyers, destined to be the biggest and most advanced warships in its fleet.
As the race to win the contract to design the three vessels enters its final weeks, state-owned Spanish naval builder Navantia is heading its US rival on price and delivery time.
The $7 billion program will be Australia's second-biggest defence project in the coming decade, after the $14 billion joint strike fighter for the air force.
Long regarded as simply a stalking horse for a new warship designed by US firm Gibbs and Cox based on the US Navy's Arleigh Burke class destroyers, Spain's modified F100 warship is now an even-money bet to win the contract.
The Spanish ship is much cheaper and would be delivered about two years earlier than the US design submitted by Gibbs and Cox.
Gibbs and Cox has been the Howard Government's preferred designer for the air warfare destroyers, but the firm's bigger and more capable warship exists only in its preliminary design phase.
And final target cost estimates due to be handed to the Defence Department tomorrow are expected to put the Spanish F100 warship ahead on price by more than $500 million, according to government and industry sources.
The Government has committed $450 million to the project's start-up, with the cabinet due to take the final decision on the winning design in July.
In August 2005, the Government announced that the Gibbs and Cox "evolved design" would compete with an "Australianised" version of the F100 for the right to be chosen as the navy's new frontline warship.
The new ships will be equipped with the US-made Aegis combat system, giving them the ability to track hostile aircraft and missiles at ranges beyond 150km.
Adelaide-based shipbuilder ASC has already been chosen to construct the vessels, while Raytheon will be the systems integrator, as part of a novel alliance with partners ASC and the Defence Materiel Organisation.
Spain's belated recognition that its F100 could be selected has resulted in a last-minute lobbying push by the Spanish Government.
The Spanish F100 air warfare destroyer Alvaro de Bazan arrives in Perth today at the start of a three-week visit designed to highlights the ship's advanced capabilities. Spain is also sending its naval chief and senior government officials to Australia this month in an effort to clinch the AWD contract.
The design offered by Gibbs and Cox is a more powerful warship than the Spanish F100 air warfare destroyer, and remains the navy's preferred choice.
Gibbs and Cox believes the heavily modified Arleigh Burke offers better all-round combat capability and better growth options for future technology upgrades than the F100.
But with four F100s already in service with the Spanish navy, Navantia argues that its destroyer offers a low-risk and highly capable solution for the Royal Australian Navy.
The first of the navy's new frontline destroyers is scheduled to be delivered in 2013, but the US design is not likely to be in service before 2015.
Pode ser que em compensação escolham o LHD da NAVANTIA.
Por el precio de tres buques , pueden tener cuatro y parece que lo estan pensando.¿Por el precio de 3 buques o de 3 Burkes?
Defence backs Spanish warship for $7bn deal
Patrick Walters, National security editor
April 25, 2007
SPAIN'S F100 air warfare destroyer will become Australia's new front-line warship if the Howard Government accepts the Defence Department's firm recommendation on the $7billion contract.
In backing the Spanish warship, Defence chiefs have rejected the navy's bid for a larger alternative based on the US Arleigh Burke class destroyer.
The Defence Capability and Investment Committee - the Defence Department's top policy advisory committee - met last week and endorsed the F100 design offered by Spanish government shipbuilder Navantia.
The design contest has seen the F100 finish more than $1billion cheaper than the US option and more than two years ahead on the delivery schedule for three warships.
Cabinet's National Security Committee will also consider retaining an option to buy a fourth F100 destroyer when it makes a final decision on a go-ahead for the project in June.
The decision to go for the smaller Spanish destroyer over an evolved design offered by Gibbs and Cox is a defeat for the navy chief, Vice-Admiral Russ Shalders, who made no secret of his preference for the larger US warship.
Admiral Shalders said last month that although the F100 was a good ship, hewas after "capability, capability andcapability".
The 8000-tonne Gibbs and Cox design offered the navy decisive combat advantages, including 64, rather than 48, vertical launch cells, longer range and the ability to take two helicopters.
Admiral Shalders failed to convince his colleagues in the DCIC in a debate one senior defence source described as a "complete whitewash".
Defence sources said the tender evaluation of the two bids submitted by Navantia and Gibbs and Cox had found conclusively in favour of the Spanish on all the key criteria.
Navantia has come from behind six months ago to win the backing of Defence chiefs.
It had long been regarded as simply a stalking horse for Gibbs and Cox, which the Government selected in 2005 as its preferred designer.
Defence sources said a key handicap for Gibbs and Cox was that its proposed warship existed only in its preliminary design phase, increasing the technical risk for a local builder.
The air warfare destroyers are due to enter service from 2013, and will be the biggest and most advanced warships in the RAN.
The $7billion program will be Australia's second-biggest defence project in the coming decade, after the $14billion joint strike fighter for the air force.
Isso seria um encaixe financeiro bestial para os estaleiros Espanhóis. Matavam dois coelhos com uma cajadada, ou seja, garantiam um contracto muito lucrativo e ganhavam ainda mais destaque e visibilidade no mercado internacional.
Australian submarine force ‘is in crisis’
Australia’s submarine force is reported to be in crisis through a lack of trained
submariners.
It is claimed that the number of submariners is only 60 per cent of the 270 establishment for
the sixboat force which has forced the Royal Australian Navy to cut the days at sea. An
improved pay and conditions package is being offered in an attempt to boost numbers
especially among electronic and sonar specialists, mechanical and electrical technicians.
Australian press reports suggest there is also a problem with the boats’ periscopes. It is
claimed they require more maintenance than originally envisaged.
However, it is hoped a new type of seawater hose will overcome a problem encountered
four years ago. A failed hose almost sank the submerged HMAS Dechaineux in 2003 and
led to diving depth restrictions which may be eased if the new hose proves successful.
Fragatas F-100 e Navios logísticos para a Austrália
Solução «espanhola» para o maior contrato na história da marinha australia
19.06.2007
(https://www.forumdefesa.com/forum/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fi33.photobucket.com%2Falbums%2Fd52%2Fareamilitar%2Fa_NAV%2FBazan_05.gif&hash=2663c35a8afc01986b65c462c7f58d59)
O Primeiro Ministro australiano John Howard, anunciou nesta Quarta Feira a aquisição por parte da Austrália de três fragatas do tipo F-100, projecto da empresa espanhola Navantia juntamente com dois navios logísticos anfíbios por cerca de 6.800 milhões de Euros.
Juntamente com a já esperada decisão de aquisição das três fragatas F-100 [1], fortemente baseadas na tecnologia de empresas americanas, o governo da Austrália anunciou ainda que a marinha daquele país, vai também adquirir à empresa espanhola dois navios de apoio logístico do tipo «BPE» com um deslocamento de 27.000 toneladas cada um.
O governo australiano, optou pelas fragatas F-100 por terem não só um preço inferior ao do projecto concorrente da americana Gibbs & Cox, como por se tratar de navios que já existem, ao contrário do projecto americano que é apenas um projecto de «papel» que embora de dimensões e características superiores ao navio espanhol, não conseguiu convencer a marinha australiana.
A opção pelas fragatas F-100 acabou por servir de argumento para que a marinha australiana optasse também por adquirir os navios de apoio logístico baseados no projecto «BPE», presentemente em construção para a marinha da Espanha.
Os navios do tipo F-100 serão todos construídos em estaleiros australianos e 55% dos custos com a construção dos navios[2] serão gastos no próprio país, sendo o restante gasto essencialmente com a importação dos sistemas electrónicos, canhões, mísseis[3], radares e outro tipo de sensores que serão de origem norte-americana.
Os navios de apoio logístico, serão construídos pela empresa TENIX, a mesma empresa que construiu as fragatas Anzac e serão os maiores navios armados operados pela marinha da Austrália, sendo mesmo maiores em termos de deslocamento que os porta-aviões britânicos adquiridos por empréstimo pela marinha daquele país nos anos 50 e 60.
Além de terem capacidade para transportar aeronaves, do tipo F-35B (de descolagem vertical) eles têm uma doca que permite operações anfíbias e o desembarque directo de veículos blindados de infantaria e mesmo carros de combate pesados.
[1] Pelas suas dimensões estes navios são na prática contratorpedeiros
[2] O custo total do projecto deverá rondar os 6.800 milhões de Euros (R$ 17.5 bilhões)
[3] As fragatas australianas utilizarão mísseis SM3.
Citação de: "Cabeça de Martelo"Isso seria um encaixe financeiro bestial para os estaleiros Espanhóis. Matavam dois coelhos com uma cajadada, ou seja, garantiam um contracto muito lucrativo e ganhavam ainda mais destaque e visibilidade no mercado internacional.
Eso no va a suceder.
USA no va a vender su Aegis a España para que esta luego le fabrique los barcos a Australia, de ningun modo.
El caso de Noruega fue diferente porque no entraba Gibbs and Cox compitiendo con Navantia.
En este caso ganaran los politicos, aunque a los almirantes no les guste. :wink:
Labor 'inherited Navy nightmare': Fitzgibbon
Not up to the job: Adelaide Class frigate HMAS Sydney (Department of Defence)
Defence Minister Joel Fitzgibbon says the previous federal government is to blame for serious problems with the Royal Australian Navy's frontline fighting ships.
It has been revealed the 1970s-built Adelaide Class guided missile frigates still cannot be sent into battle zones, despite a $1.5 billion upgrade.
A whistleblower has told News Limited newspapers the situation is so bad, sailors are quitting the Navy.
Mr Fitzgibbon says he is working to rectify the failings of the Howard Government.
"Trying to make a 21st Century warship out of such an old vessel always carried very significant risks," he said.
"The important thing is that we're determined to get value for taxpayers' money and we're determined to deliver the Navy and other services the capability they need.
"These are significant nightmares we've inherited, but we're determined to set them right."
Sailors quit as dud frigates unfit for battle
Article from:
By Ian McPhedran, Defence Writer
January 02, 2008 12:00am
AUSTRALIA'S naval defence is in tatters with claims that despite a $1.4 billion "upgrade", frontline fighting ships are unable to be sent into battle.
For the first time a navy insider close to the 4000-tonne Adelaide class guided missile frigates upgrade project has provided details of one of the biggest defence scandals in the nation's history. The whistleblower told The Daily Telegraph that the situation is so dire that sailors are quitting the navy because their ships can not be deployed to the Middle East or other conflict zones.
And senior officials now admit that the 1997 frigate upgrade project was a "debacle" created by the Howard government's decision to maximise the sale price of the Sydney-based contractor Australian Defence Industries when it was sold to French firm Thales.
The project is four years late, includes four ships - not the original six as commissioned - and they just don't work.
Late last year Chief of Navy Vice-Admiral Russ Shalders refused to accept HMAS Sydney, the first ship in the program, for "operational release" because its war fighting systems did not function properly.
The whistleblower said the ships' anti-missile and anti-torpedo systems could not be integrated and their electronic support measures - the ship's eyes and ears for detecting incoming airborne threats - were a joke.
"That means they would be going into a war zone virtually blind," the informant said.
In addition the ships are unable to link their helicopters to war fighting data or use long-range chaff which confuses enemy missiles and takes them away from the ship.
The ships are also unable to integrate towed and on-board sonars to detect enemy torpedoes.
Defence Minister Joel Fitzgibbon said the FFG upgrade was "another nightmare" that Labor had inherited and would have to manage as best as it could.
According to government auditors up to 98 per cent of the money has already been paid to Thales despite the fact the project is four years late and not one ship is operational.
jueves 27 de marzo de 2008
LA ARMADA DE AUSTRALIA Y SU "LISTA DE DESEOS"
La Armada de Australia ha escrito una especie de "lista de deseos" por valor de 4000 millones de dólares.
Principalmente, la Armada desea un tercer buque anfibio y un cuarto destructor antiaéreo como los que fabricará Navantia.
Además de los buques, la Armada quiere misiles Tomahawk para submarinos.
Estos requerimientos se entienden como una manera de presionar al Gobierno para que incluya estos medios en la edición del Libro Blanco de Defensa con los medios a adquirir para los próximos diez años. El Gobierno australiano ha decidido revisar los costes de Defensa para los próximos años, con la intención de recortar 1000 millones de dólares anuales del presupuesto.
Aircraft carrier on navy's secret $4bn wish list
By Ian McPhedran
March 25, 2008 01:08am
Article from: The Daily Telegraph
THE Royal Australian Navy has produced a secret $4 billion "wish list" that includes an aircraft carrier, an extra air warfare destroyer and long-range Tomahawk cruise missiles for its submarine fleet.
The RAN wants a third 26,000 tonne amphibious ship equipped with vertical take-off jet fighters, a fourth $2 billion air warfare destroyer and cruise missiles that could strike targets thousands of kilometres away.
The list comes at a time when the RAN can barely find enough sailors to crew its existing fleet.
It also coincides with a Federal Government push to save $1 billion a year in defence costs as well as a government-ordered White Paper which will set the spending priorities for the next two decades.
According to insiders, the Government was unimpressed by the RAN's push for more firepower at a time when the Government is aiming to slash spending.
"The navy is out of control," one defence source said.
It is understood that the wish list was the final straw in the tense relationship between the Government and Chief of Navy Vice-Admiral Russ Shalders - who will be replaced in July by Rear Admiral Russell Crane.
Admiral Shalders last year also pushed hard for an expensive US-designed destroyer, but lost out to the cheaper, Spanish option.
Taxpayers will spend more than $11 billion to provide the RAN with the two 26,000-tonne amphibious ships and three air-warfare destroyers equipped with 48 vertical launch missiles.
The two big ships, known as Landing Helicopter Docks, are designed for amphibious assaults and will be fitted with helicopters and be capable of carrying more than 1000 troops and heavy vehicles such as tanks and trucks.
The RAN wants a third ship to carry vertical take-off fighter jets.
Its last aircraft carrier, HMAS Melbourne, was decommissioned in 1982 before being sold for scrap.
The latest ships are 10m longer and 8m wider than the Melbourne and will be built in Spain and fitted out at the Tenix shipyard in Melbourne.
The Spanish navy will carry 30 Harrier jump jets aboard its similar ships.
They will each cost more than $1.7 billion. The fighters would cost about $100 million each. The destroyers will cost about $2 billion each, taking the total cost to more than $4 billion.
Tomahawk cruise missiles cost about $1 million each and can carry a 450kg conventional or 200 kiloton nuclear warhead more than 2500km.
In the past Australia has stayed away from long-range strike missiles for fear of triggering a regional arms race.
The wish list is what the RAN would like to see make up part of the White Paper process which will later this year provide a strategic blueprint for the defence of the nation for the next 20 years.
That process will direct new spending worth more than $50 billion over the next 10 years.
há uns tempos falou-se da possibilidade de um TERCEIRO BPE que teria mais funções de porta-aviões
24 July 2008
Australian submarine first to fire new heavyweight torpedo
The Minister for Defence, the Hon. Joel Fitzgibbon MP, today congratulated the crew of the Australian submarine, HMAS Waller, for being the first submarine to successfully fire a new heavyweight torpedo that has been jointly developed by Australia and the United States (US).
The firing occurred during the Rim of the Pacific 2008 (RIMPAC 08) exercise, involving multiple navies off the coast of Hawaii between June and July. This controlled exercise resulted in the planned sinking of a retired US warship.
“This represents the first new heavyweight torpedo warshot to be fired by either Navy. Just as significant is the fact that the warshot torpedo was assembled in Australia,” Mr Fitzgibbon said.
The MK 48 Mod 7 Common Broadband Advanced Sonar System (CBASS) torpedo is the latest enhancement for the MK 48.
Considered the world’s premier submarine-launched torpedo, the MK 48 Mod 7 represents a superior capability against both surface ships and submarines with sonar enhancements that make the torpedo an effective weapon in shallow water and in a countermeasure environment.
The development of the CBASS torpedo has been achieved under an Armaments Cooperative Program between the United States Navy (USN) and the Royal Australian Navy (RAN). This partnership has established common requirements, interfaces, configurations and maintenance standards enabling any Australian or US submarine to load torpedoes prepared by any Australian or US torpedo maintenance facility.
This submarine partnership has also led to co-development of a new replacement combat system, which is being progressively integrated into USN nuclear submarines and RAN diesel-electric submarines.
This successful live fire exercise underscores the maturity of the joint torpedo and submarine combat system programs for the RAN and USN.
“For Australia in particular, this exercise has been a successful demonstration of the ongoing capability of the Collins Class submarine,” Mr Fitzgibbon said.
A computer-generated animation has been released today which highlights the multi-mission capability of the three naval destroyers being built as part of the Air Warfare Destroyer Project. AWD Alliance CEO Rod Equid said the animation will increase understanding of the exceptional capabilities available in the Hobart Class and provide an insight into how the ships can be used in-service.
HMCS Toronto crew members are being hailed as heroes after rescuing people from a fire while on shore leave in Turkey.(https://www.forumdefesa.com/forum/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fstorage.torontosun.com%2Fv1%2Fdynamic_resize%2Fsws_path%2Fsuns-prod-images%2F1297630947656_ORIGINAL.jpg%3Fquality%3D80%26amp%3Bsize%3D420x&hash=8a1e398c2d0efbd3437fd54cf60a9838)
“Six members of the crew provided first response to a fire and assisted in the evacuation of the building, saving lives,” the Department of National Defence said.
It all happened in Antalya, Turkey, on Friday.
The crew were in a restaurant when a fire broke out. Trained in fire fighting and first responding, they went to work.
http://www.torontosun.com/2014/11/16/hmcs-toronto-members-fight-fire-while-on-shore-leave-in-turkeyCitarHMCS Toronto crew members are being hailed as heroes after rescuing people from a fire while on shore leave in Turkey.(https://www.forumdefesa.com/forum/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fstorage.torontosun.com%2Fv1%2Fdynamic_resize%2Fsws_path%2Fsuns-prod-images%2F1297630947656_ORIGINAL.jpg%3Fquality%3D80%26amp%3Bsize%3D420x&hash=8a1e398c2d0efbd3437fd54cf60a9838)
“Six members of the crew provided first response to a fire and assisted in the evacuation of the building, saving lives,” the Department of National Defence said.
It all happened in Antalya, Turkey, on Friday.
The crew were in a restaurant when a fire broke out. Trained in fire fighting and first responding, they went to work.
Cumprimentos
Citação de: "mafets"http://www.torontosun.com/2014/11/16/hmcs-toronto-members-fight-fire-while-on-shore-leave-in-turkey
Onde é que estão os Australianos?
LOL! HMCS-Her Majesty's Canadian Ship
(https://www.forumdefesa.com/forum/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fcdn2.shipspotting.com%2Fphotos%2Fmiddle%2F3%2F9%2F2%2F2246293.jpg&hash=d6cb6698ff60e4d67c0c145f435948e3)
http://www.shipspotting.com/gallery/pho ... id=2246293 (http://www.shipspotting.com/gallery/photo.php?lid=2246293)
(defensa.com) Este pasado sábado, 23 de mayo, tuvo lugar en Adelaide el acto de botadura del HMAS Hobart , el primero de los tres destructores del programa AWD (Air Warfare Destroyer) basados en el diseño de las fragatas F-100 que Navantia construyó para la Armada española. La ceremonia contó con la presencia del presidente del astillero español, José Manuel Revuelta. (..)
El programa de destructores antiaéreos clase Hobart, denominado Sea 4000 , comprende la fabricación en Australia de tres destructores AWD. Navantia forma parte, junto a Raytheon Australia, el Defence Materiel Organisation (DMO), y el astillero australiano ASC de AWD Alliance, el consorcio elegido para la fabricación de los tres destructores. Estos se basan en el diseño de las última de las fragatas F-100, la F-105 "Cristóbal Colón", que introdujo mejoras sobre las cuatro fragatas anteriores. (...)
Con un presupuesto de 8.000 millones de dólares, se trata del programa de defensa más amplio y complejo de la historia de Australia. Está dotado del sistema Aegis, de la norteamericana Lockheed-Martin, que es capaz de monitorizar hasta 100 objetivos aéreos a distancias de hasta 250 millas. (...)
The Royal Australian Navy (RAN) has commissioned its 725 Squadron as a training formation for the service's MH-60R Seahawk 'Romeo' anti-submarine warfare (ASW) helicopters.(https://www.forumdefesa.com/forum/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.janes.com%2Fimages%2Fassets%2F200%2F52200%2Fmain1_p1526589.jpg&hash=32a675379375d518dbffae4bc272ae19)
The squadron was commissioned by Defence Minister Kevin Andrews on 11 June at Naval Air Station HMAS Albatross in Nowra.
Australia has acquired 24 MH-60Rs under an AUD3.2 billion (USD2.5 billion) project to replace the RAN's 16 S-70B-2 Seahawks in ASW and anti-surface warfare roles. The RAN has so far accepted 11 aircraft into service.
"This is a significant increase in technology and capability for the navy and the helicopters are equipped with a sophisticated sensor suite, torpedoes, and air-to-surface missiles," said Andrews in a speech to mark the squadron's commissioning.
According to IHS Jane's Fighting Ships , the MH-60R has an operational speed of 180 kt and a service ceiling of 10,000 ft. The aircraft can attain a range of 450 n miles.
Operational support for aircraft, which are scheduled to achieve initial operating capability at sea in August, will be provided by 816 Squadron, which currently operates the navy's S-70B-2 helicopters.
The Royal Australian Navy's (RAN's) second Canberra-class landing helicopter dock (LHD) vessel, the future HMAS Adelaide , has left BAE Systems' shipyard in Williamstown to begin its first sea trials, a company official told IHS Jane's on 23 June.
The 230 m vessel left on the 17 June and is heading towards Sydney. During the trials process, it will conduct various tasks under a number of different ship configurations and scenarios, including at different water depths. " Adelaide will return to Williamstown in mid-July and conduct a second set of sea trials in August before we prepare it for a handover to the RAN in late 2015," said Kaye Noske, BAE Systems' senior communications manager.
RAN's second Canberra-class LHD sails for first sea trialsCitarThe Royal Australian Navy's (RAN's) second Canberra-class landing helicopter dock (LHD) vessel, the future HMAS Adelaide , has left BAE Systems' shipyard in Williamstown to begin its first sea trials, a company official told IHS Jane's on 23 June.
The 230 m vessel left on the 17 June and is heading towards Sydney. During the trials process, it will conduct various tasks under a number of different ship configurations and scenarios, including at different water depths. " Adelaide will return to Williamstown in mid-July and conduct a second set of sea trials in August before we prepare it for a handover to the RAN in late 2015," said Kaye Noske, BAE Systems' senior communications manager.
http://www.janes.com/article/52487/ran-s-second-canberra-class-lhd-sails-for-first-sea-trials
The Australian Defence Force (ADF) currently lacks the tradition, culture and organisational expertise needed to maintain and employ a world-class amphibious warfare capability, according to a new study by a leading think tank.
The paper, released by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) on 29 July, comes just nine months after the commissioning of the 27,800-tonne helicopter landing dock (LHD) HMAS Canberra, the Royal Australian Navy (RAN's] largest-ever ship, and a few months before the anticipated commissioning of Canberra's sister ship, HMAS Adelaide .
While acknowledging an impressive amount of work over several years by individuals and organisations across the ADF to facilitate institutional change, the Department of Defence (DoD) still faces critical gaps in the planning and personnel needed to fully exploit the ships' potential, the study said.
"Australia is a maritime country without a maritime culture, and the AD, in particular the army, doesn't have one either", the study says (....)
Lá chegaremos !!!
Cumprimentos
Key Points(https://www.forumdefesa.com/forum/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.janes.com%2Fimages%2Fassets%2F176%2F55176%2F1521710_-_main.jpg&hash=5bf3020625139278439f2f52bd8d42f7)
DSME and Navantia have released further details on their respective proposals for Australia's tanker replacement programme
The companies are competing to replace two RAN support ships
South Korean shipyard Daewoo Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering (DSME) and Spanish shipbuilder Navantia showcased their respective design proposals for the Royal Australian Navy's (RAN's) new afloat replenishment ships at the recent Pacific 2015 international maritime exposition and conference in Sydney.
In June 2014 the two companies were shortlisted to bid for Australia's Project SEA 1654 Phase 3, which seeks to replace the RAN supply ships HMAS Success (OR 304) and HMAS Sirius (O 266) with off-the-shelf acquisitions. In October 2014 both DSME and Navantia received parallel risk reduction contracts to complete their respective design baselines to meet the RAN's specific needs.
DSME's proposal is based on BMT Defence Services' Aegir 18A support ship design. A model of the proposal was revealed for the first time at Pacific 2015, following completion of the risk reduction studies, Wan-Ho Jo from DSME's naval and special ship marketing team told IHS Jane's .
The design proposal features a length of 180 m, an overall beam of 26 m, a draught of 13 m, and a standard displacement of 25,800 tonnes, according to specifications provided by the company.
"The design is very similar to the logistics support vessel that is being built for the Royal Norwegian Navy," said Jo, who added that the proposal includes air-conditioning modifications to suit the climatic conditions in which the ships will be operating.
The Spanish Navy's auxiliary oiler replenishment vessel SPS Cantabria, pictured in Sydney Harbour, Australia. Cantabria previously has spent almost nine months operating with the Royal Australian Navy, and forms the basis for Navantia's design proposal under Australia's Project SEA 1654 Phase 3. Source: IHS/Russell Smith
Citação de: "tenente"
Lá chegaremos !!!
Cumprimentos
Caro tenente, levo eu a cadeira ou trazes tu?
NUSHIP ‘Hobart‘ – D 39 / VKLB e NUSHIP ‘Brisbane‘ – D 41 / VKLC, em fase de acabamento no cais do estaleiro ASC Pty td., Techport, Osborne, South Austrália, em imagem do dia 20/12/2016.(https://www.forumdefesa.com/forum/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.naval.com.br%2Fblog%2Fwp-content%2Fuploads%2F2016%2F12%2Fbrisbane-hobart-Techport-whar-Osborne-trevor-powell-20-12-16.jpg&hash=9852a56b552a45dfbabc7d872ec3c330)
Versão australiana da classe F 100 da Navantia espanhola, encomendada em 4 de outubro de 2007, com previsão de comissionamento da primeira unidade, futuro HMAS ‘Hobart‘ em junho de 2017.
A turnê promocional, que é apoiada pela Fincantieri, construtora do navio, incluirá escalas em Fremantle, Adelaide, Sydney e Melbourne, informaram oficiais da Marinha italiana em 16 de dezembro.(https://www.forumdefesa.com/forum/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.naval.com.br%2Fblog%2Fwp-content%2Fuploads%2F2017%2F01%2FFREMM-1024x1020.jpg&hash=c963c7e3ce2a7d15fe857c7ea7f4d107)
Em abril, a Austrália selecionou propostas da BAE Systems, Fincantieri e Navantia para o programa do país para a construção de nove novas fragatas.
A oferta da BAE baseia-se na fragata Tipo 26, enquanto a Navantia propõe uma versão redesenhada da sua fragata classe Álvaro de Bazán (F100).
A fragata FREMM que faz a viagem, a Carabiniere, é da versão de guerra antissubmarino ASW e foi entregue à Marinha Italiana em abril de 2015, o quinto de dez unidades a serem comissionadas. Na turnê o navio vai levar um helicóptero NH90 e realizar exercícios ASW com os australianos.
The Australian Army has begun flight trials of its Tiger Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter (ARH) onboard the Royal Australian Navy's (RAN's) first-of-class amphibious assault ship, HMAS Canberra (L 02).(https://www.forumdefesa.com/forum/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.janes.com%2Fimages%2Fassets%2F265%2F68265%2F1699151_-_main.jpg&hash=f6a1259af4f18af5cbc8d00bba98e436)
The trials, which are being conducted with two airframes since 23 February, are expected to continue over the next six weeks in Sydney, according to the Australian Department of Defence (DoD).
"We are doing a full ship helicopter operating limitation development on all six flight deck spots," said Lieutenant Grant Thaler, a flight test engineer from the RAN's aircraft maintenance and flight trials unit, in a report published by the service's official news site on 27 February.
The Tiger helicopters are expected to operate as forward scouting platforms, and as an escort to the country's MRH90 helicopters, when deployed from on board the amphibious assault ships, the report added.
According to Jane's World Armies, Australia currently operates a fleet of 22 Tiger ARH helicopters. The aircraft, which were delivered between 2004 and 2011, achieved full operational capability (FOC) with the Australian Army in mid-2016. The platform can each carry a combination of AGM-114M Hellfire air-to-ground missiles and 70 mm unguided rockets, in addition to a stabilised 30 mm automatic cannon.
HMAS Canberra conducting first-of-class flight trials with the Tiger armed reconnaissance helicopter (ARH). Source: Commonwealth of Australia
The Royal Australian Navy has conceded there might be design faults with its two largest ships which have been docked in Sydney since March undergoing urgent repair work.(https://www.forumdefesa.com/forum/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.abc.net.au%2Fnews%2Fimage%2F8533924-16x9-940x529.jpg&hash=d405840d2cd1c0ea2ad6cb49e0d3a370)
Engineers are still trying to identify what is causing problems with the "azimuth" propulsion system on board the $1.5 billion Landing Helicopter Docks (LHDs) HMAS Canberra and HMAS Adelaide.
"It may well be a design issue," conceded Rear Admiral Adam Grunsell, the head of maritime systems in Defence's Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group.This week, HMAS Adelaide was placed into dry dock at the Garden Island naval base so the ship's propulsion pods could be removed for a thorough examination.
The diesel-electric powered propellers which sit at the stern of the LHDs are known as "azi-pods" and are mounted on steerable pods that have a 360-degree rotation.
Preliminary samples taken from the propulsion pods on board HMAS Adelaide have identified metal fragments in lubricants, while faulty engine seals on HMAS Canberra are believed to be responsible for the "migration", or leaking, of various oil types into different engine areas.
Asked whether the problems could be due to a design fault or because the ships have been operating at sea for too many days, Chief of Navy Vice Admiral Tim Barrett said it was too early to say.
"I would not speculate on any of those outcomes, but clearly in a root cause analysis you have to consider all of those options," he said.
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-05-19/navy-cant-rule-out-design-faults-as-cause-of-ships-problems/8542382 (http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-05-19/navy-cant-rule-out-design-faults-as-cause-of-ships-problems/8542382)
Pessoalmente já considero as nossas Mekos umas patrulhas oceânicas mt bem armadas, passiveis de ser utilizadas em cenários de baixa intensidade ... vejo apenas das BD como os nossos navios de "1ª linha" (+ os submarinos) e mesmo estas necessitavam de um MLU (radar) mais completo.
Enfim, talvez o plano seja substituir as Meko a médio prazo por 2 fragatas de uma classe "nova" e o facto de não terem MLU ser para pressionar nessa direcção.
Pessoalmente já considero as nossas Mekos umas patrulhas oceânicas mt bem armadas, passiveis de ser utilizadas em cenários de baixa intensidade ... vejo apenas das BD como os nossos navios de "1ª linha" (+ os submarinos) e mesmo estas necessitavam de um MLU (radar) mais completo.
Enfim, talvez o plano seja substituir as Meko a médio prazo por 2 fragatas de uma classe "nova" e o facto de não terem MLU ser para pressionar nessa direcção.
É exactamente isso que se fala nos corredores das instalações da Marinha (3 por duas). Agora se é viável... ::) ;)
(https://www.janes.com/images/assets/456/79456/p1451358_-_main.jpg)
Saudações
Foi assinado nesta segunda-feira dia 11, um contrato entre os governos Australiano e Francês, na ordem de US$ 50 bilhões de dólares para a construção de 12 submarinos para a Marinha australiana, o que demonstra as ambições deste país no Pacífico. O primeiro-ministro australiano, Scott Morrison, elogiou um “plano muito ambicioso” em uma cerimônia que aconteceu em Camberra na presença da ministra francesa do Exército, Florence Parly, e lembrou que se tratava do “investimento mais importante da Austrália em matéria de defesa em tempos de paz”.
O Naval Group (ex-DCNS) foi escolhido em 2016 para projetar e construir 12 submarinos para a Marinha australiana, alcançando assim o “contrato do século” após anos de negociações. A empresa Naval Group, além de ser a responsável por projetar e construir os 12 submarinos, ela também irá montar o estaleiro para os submarinos. A construção do primeiro começará em 2020 e deverá de ser entregue em 2030. Críticos lamentaram que o contrato tenha demorado tanto a ser fechado, já que as águas ao norte e a leste da Austrália já sejam palco de uma dura batalha de influência entre Estados Unidos, China e as potências regionais.
Pequim tem pretensões territoriais no Mar da China Meridional, uma zona de navegação vital para o comércio mundial. A Marinha chinesa pretende projetar a influência do país para além dessas águas, especialmente no Pacífico Sul e Oeste, onde a Austrália foi por muito tempo o ator dominante. As ilhas do Pacífico são pequenas e menos vitais para o frete marítimo do que o Mar da China Meridional, mas suas zonas econômicas marítimas abrigam grande parte dos recursos marítimos do mundo.
FONTE: https://www.defesa.tv.br/naval-group-ganha-contrato-da-marinha-australiana-no-valor-de-us-50-bilhoes-para-construcao-de-12-submarinos/?fbclid=IwAR0RC3DxGFXXQiSIBtiJdiCFQ5ZRTJl5L4zZefyjSeAcXBHJVsXmGryX9dM(https://www.defesa.tv.br/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/get_img.jpg)(Da Esquerda para Direita) Diretor Presidente do Grupo Naval da Austrália, Sr. John Davis; Diretor Presidente do Grupo Naval, Sr. Herve Guillou; Contra-Almirante Greg Sammut; Secretário Adjunto, Departamento de Defesa, Racheal Kuczma e o diretor executivo do Programa Australiano e presidente do conselho do Naval Group Australia, Jean-Michel Billig, assinam documentos do acordo de parceria estratégica para o programa do Futuro Submarino.(https://www.defesa.tv.br/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/images_cms-image-000015120.jpg)Ministro da Defesa, Hon Christopher Pyne, (à esquerda), Primeiro Ministro da Austrália, Hon Scott Morrison, (centro), e Ministro das Forças Armadas da França, Srª Florence Parly, assinam o Acordo de Parceria Estratégica para o Futuro Programa Submarino durante uma cerimônia realizada em Russell Offices, Canberra.
Estão tão satisfeitos com a Navantia que até já se fala em cancelar o contrato dos submarinos franceses e comprar os S-80, que tão bons resultados têm dado.
Nã, os nuestros hermanos podem ter mau temperamento mas o que têm a dizer dizem-no à frente de todos.
Mais uma vez, queria salientar que os orçamentos de aquisição de equipamento militar em países como a Austrália e o Canadá englobam o custo do programa ao longo da sua vida. Como estes países, normalmente, optam pela construção local, o custo da construção em si é mais elevado que o habitual, mas não é o que parece.
Mais uma vez, volto a dar os exemplos dos 12 Barracuda australianos (31,7 mil milhões de USD), das 09 Type 26 australianos (22,2 mil milhões de USD) e das 15 Type 26 canadianos (43 mil milhões de USD) -- todos os valores à cotação de hoje. Estes valores incluem, construção, manutenção, MLU's e armamento ao longo da vida do equipamento (tipicamente 30 anos). A não ser assim, os Barracuda convencionais australianos ficariam mais caros que os Barracuda nucleares franceses, ou as Type 26 ficariam mais caras que os AB Flight III, o que seria um absurdo.
Joint Military Police Station Sydney at Randwick Barracks - staffed by Navy, Army and Air Force members - is a clear example of a tri-service approach achieving the best collective outcome as part of the Joint Military Police Force.
The Joint Military Police Force (JMPF) is the primary contact for all Defence policing matters, providing general duties policing and investigative capability to the ADF.
Officer Commanding Joint Military Police Station Sydney, Lieutenant Commander Sean West Money, said integrating the three services into one unit had come at a challenging time, but his team had embraced opportunities to carry out joint military policing work.
“The biggest challenge has been taking responsibility for one of the busiest and largest ‘patches’ to police, with a force only established in January and, from the outset, supporting Operation BUSHFIRE ASSIST,” Lieutenant Commander West Money said.
“This has also meant the JMPF has been provided real opportunities to do the job that we signed up to do, and in return, our people have shown commitment which has enabled us to succeed and demonstrate immense value to Defence.”
As an Officer Commanding a tri-service unit, Lieutenant Commander West Money has sought to value the distinctions between and cultures of Navy, Army and Air Force.
“My second in command is an Army Captain who is getting an education in Navy-speak and she is teaching me about Battalions, Brigades and Divisions, while our Air Force Team Leaders at RAAF Richmond and RAAF Williamtown are teaching me Airside awareness.
“We are all learning from each other to get the best bits of how to carry out policing in the ADF,” Lieutenant Commander West Money said.
Petty Officer Naval Police Coxswain Jean Metcalf is one of the team at JMPS Sydney and has embraced the new tri-service work environment.
“At the start of the year, I was called out to assist with the Batemans Bay area bushfire assistance recovery, and I worked with three exceptional Army MPs,” Petty Officer Metcalf said.
“We were tasked with running the Command Bus for New South Wales Police to allow them to better serve the public and during this period I was able to learn how Army Military Police work on domestic activities.”
“Being part of the JMPU means I am able to further enhance my policing skills within Defence as we collectively move closer to align with state police forces.”
Naval Police Coxswain, Leading Seaman Kellie Nash has enjoyed the atmosphere of mutual learning that comes with policing alongside other services.
“I believe exposure to different services is instrumental to our development. It is always good to have an understanding of how Army and Air Force operate, so Navy can improve and streamline our procedures,” Leading Seaman Nash said.
“Integrating Army and Air Force practices and attitudes can prompt us to re-think how we do things, which I don’t think is a terrible thing.
“For example, Army have perfected a style of leadership which sees officers putting the team first in all things. Their officers eat, sleep and go home last; I really respect that,” she said.
While they are no longer part of the Command Naval Police Coxswain team at HMAS Kuttabul and have their own remit, the Navy members at JMPS Sydney share a good relationship with their Fleet-focussed counterparts.
“One of the larger changes for Navy has been adjusting to the differences between how the JMPF and Command Naval Police Coxswains operate, but ultimately it’s about being problem solvers and ensuring the safety of Defence members rather than arrests,” Lieutenant Commander West Money said.
“Whether they are posted to a Navy ship or establishment in a Naval Police role, or in a Military Police role in the JMPF, our people are all sailors wanting to protect and serve their peers.”
Imagery is available on the Navy Image Gallery: https://images.navy.gov.au/S20201679 (https://images.navy.gov.au/S20201679).
A heresia! Como é possível tal promiscuidade? Só mesmo em países de segunda categoria e com poucos recursos.
https://news.navy.gov.au/en/May2020/Fleet/5859/From-Fleet-beat-to-Joint-Police.htm#.XsNjZy-cbow (https://news.navy.gov.au/en/May2020/Fleet/5859/From-Fleet-beat-to-Joint-Police.htm#.XsNjZy-cbow)
https://news.navy.gov.au/en/Jun2020/Fleet/5886#.Xt80D_nOV7k
https://news.navy.gov.au/en/Jun2020/Fleet/5886#.Xt80D_nOV7k
uma excelente opção de navios em 2ª Mão, para substituir as nossas VdG, mas só se chegassem até 2026/7, o que eu não acredito, porque, depois da RAN estar agora a efectuar estes upgrades ás ANZAC, claro que as vai manter ao serviço, e por mais de uma década.
Abraços
On july 22nd.1969 HMAS Brisbane II (41) suffered an exploding shell in her fwd 5 inch gun. Only one injury, LS Benfield was returned to Australia, and Brisbane was removed from the gunline in Vietnam to have her gun turret replaced in Subic Bay.
The Royal Australian Navy’s 808SQN based at HMAS Albatross near Nowra will soon replace its Airbus MRH 90 helicopters with a new utility helicopter.
As forecast in the Government’s 2020 Force Structure Plan and accompanying Defence Strategic Update released on July 1, the new utility helicopter will be acquired in the 2025 timeframe, although this may need to be brought forward in order to maximise commonality with existing capabilities.
The Force Structure Plan offers little detail, saying only that the RAN will, ‘Expand and rationalise the support and logistics helicopter fleet consistent with the expectations for larger naval operations.’ An accompanying timeline chart shows a project for a ‘Logistics Helicopter’ running from 2025 to 2031, and is valued at $1bn to $1.5bn.
ADBR understands the new capability will replace the small fleet of six MRH 90s taken on by Navy to replace its Westland Sea King Mk50/A in 2011 under Project AIR 9000 Phase 6. Industry sources claim the small fleet of MRH 90 helicopters – despite being identical to the 41 machines operated by the Australian Army – is difficult to sustain, especially when embarked at sea, and that these machines will be absorbed by Army.
After suffering multiple delays with its own AIR 9000 Phases 2/4 project milestones since the MRH 90 was introduced in 2006, Army has had improved sustainment success with and availability of its MRH 90s in recent years due to having a greater mass of machines and a joint industry and uniformed maintenance team in Townsville, north Queensland.
But none of the 47 MRH 90s in Army and Navy service are marinised, so sustained operations as sea from the RAN’s Canberra class LHDs and other vessels require an inordinate amount of preventative maintenance and washing after each flight to mitigate corrosion.
Instead, sources tell ADBR that the RAN is instead considering a new helicopter type with greater commonality to its Sikorsky MH-60R ‘Romeo’ Seahawk combat helicopter, of which it has 24 in service. This really leaves just two possibilities – the MH-60S ‘Sierra’ Nighthawk, or additional MH-60Rs.
On paper, the MH-60S makes more sense from a utility point of view, as it has a larger cab based on the Black Hawk airframe with double doors on both sides of the cab, seating for up to 12 passengers, and more internal space for cargo. The MH-60S also shares its cockpit, engines, and dynamic components with the MH-60R, and crews can be dual-qualified.
The MH-60S can also perform combat search & rescue, mine-countermeasures, can employ Hellfire and APKWS air-to-surface missiles, and can conduct special forces combat support missions.
But with the US Navy having fulfilled its requirement for 275 aircraft and another eight aircraft for Thailand by 2016, the MH-60S is no longer in production, and it is unclear if production could be restarted on the existing line.
The missionised MH-60R has a much smaller cab than the Sierra, with space for just a couple of seats. The dipping sonar, sonar buoy tubes, and sensor operator station can be removed to increase cargo and seating area, but this is a time-consuming and difficult task to perform at sea. Despite carrying all of the above equipment, RAN Romeos currently conduct logistics operations when embarked using an external cargo hook.
And while the US Navy has fulfilled its requirement for 291 MH-60Rs and has completed orders for South Korea and Denmark, the aircraft remains in low-rate production for orders from India and Saudi Arabia.
With the RAN’s surface combatant fleet scheduled to grow over the next two decades as the Arafura class OPVs are introduced and the Hunter class frigates begin to enter service, it is likely more than 24 combat helicopters will be required to fulfill the RAN’s combat helicopter and associated training requirement.
For its fleet of 24 Romeos, the RAN bases its current rate of effort on eight 816SQN aircraft being embarked at sea at any one time, eight being used for training with 725SQN, and eight in maintenance or being prepared for deployment.
The Romeo and Sierra are built by Lockheed Martin subsidiary Sikorsky at Hartford in Connecticut, and are then flown to Owego in neighbouring New York state for the integration of their mission and combat systems.
Reportedly Defence could not get these ships put under one of the Class Societies due to issues with longitudinal strength. This has also meant there is no TH118 which certifies structure and seaworthyness. Can they not be fitted with additional keel and sheerstrake doublers to address these, similar to the progressive increases in displacement of the FFGs? Light scantlings are reportedly also in the LHDs which require additional consideration for drydocking. Is this a Navantia-wide issue, and what about the new replenishment ships?
Lá estás tu com a má-língua habitual.
Votos de mar chão, beijinhos e abraços. :mrgreen:
Resumindo, a Europa cada mais isolada e afastada dos EUA (independentemente de serem presidentes republicanos ou democratas no poder) e aliados mais próximos (RU, Autrália......) e um fortíssimo abalo para a França!!!!
Segue-se a Roménia?
https://mobile.twitter.com/D__Mitch/status/1438772500415004676
Australia will acquire greater long-range strike capability across the air, land and maritime domains, including Tomahawk cruise missiles for Royal Australian Navy's Hobart class destroyers, to "enhance Australia's ability to deter and respond to potential security challenges".
Announced this week as part of the AUKUS trilateral security agreement, the systems and activities will include:
* Tomahawk Cruise Missiles, to be fielded on Hobart class destroyers, enabling Australia’s maritime assets to strike land targets at greater distances, with better precision.
*Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles (Extended Range), to enable Royal Australian Air Force F/A-18 Hornets and in future, the F-35A Lightning II, to hit targets at a range of 900km.
*Long-Range Anti-Ship Missiles (Extended Range) (LRASM) for the F/A-18 Super Hornet.
*Continuing collaboration with the United States to develop hypersonic missiles for air capabilities.
*Precision strike guided missiles for Australia’s land forces, capable of destroying, neutralising and supressing diverse targets from over 400km.
*Accelerating $1 billion for a sovereign guided weapons manufacturing enterprise, to enable creation of Australian weapons in country.
The management of this transition, and other capability acquisition options that will meet Australia’s strategic requirements, will be at the forefront of consultations through AUKUS over the next 18 months.
Back in March 2021, the Australian Government announced it would accelerate the creation of a $1 billion Sovereign Guided Weapons Enterprise, boosting skilled jobs and helping secure Australia’s sovereign defence capabilities.
Para já, o que se sabe é que os franceses estavam a cumprir com o que estava acordado, e que esta decisão é, aparentemente, mais relacionada com a nova reorganização estratégica do eixo anglo americano, no qual os australianos, e compreensivelmente, querem estar incluídos.
Não é propriamente um caso de falhanço da indústria francesa mas mais do bloco europeu, com quem ninguém conta, caso o verniz venha a estalar com os chineses.
Cumprimentos
... mesmo que o "bloco UE / França" fosse muito mais eficaz
The F-35B and Australia’s Canberra-class: Still a Chance?
Does the F-35B still have a fighting chance to make it onto Australia’s Canberra-class warships?
Além dos problemas com os Tiger, os aussies também tido imensos problemas com os NH90.
Os aussies querem construir em casa e manter a sua indústria militar. Dado os números de helis envolvidos serem relativamente baixos, os americanos não foram na conversa da produção local, no entanto, os europeus (liderados pela França) não se fizeram rogados, obtendo assim ambos os contratos.
Para já, o que se sabe é que os franceses estavam a cumprir com o que estava acordado, e que esta decisão é, aparentemente, mais relacionada com a nova reorganização estratégica do eixo anglo americano, no qual os australianos, e compreensivelmente, querem estar incluídos.
Não é propriamente um caso de falhanço da indústria francesa mas mais do bloco europeu, com quem ninguém conta, caso o verniz venha a estalar com os chineses.
Cumprimentos
At least the plan to develop 12 Attack class submarines with French technology – as flawed as it was – had some chance of delivering a capability to the RAN around 2032. The idea of now completely switching direction and aiming for nuclear propulsion supplied by either the US or the UK has set that back by 10 years. As more details become known – or rather as the lack of detail becomes increasingly apparent – this deal is looking more like a back of a beer coaster list of ideas compiled by some senior political advisors rather than a coherent plan.
With a startling change of direction, Australia has managed to enrage France, with unknown long term diplomatic and trade repercussions. This goes on top of earlier efforts that similarly enraged Japan when then Prime Minister Tony Abbott assured his counterpart in 2014 that they had the future submarine project in the bag. At least the Japanese were put out of their misery in about one year, unlike the five years of effort put in by Paris and Cherbourg. Having said that, Naval Group has been paid a lot of money – with even more to come – so their hurt feelings have already been generously compensated for by rivers of Australian cash.
To the list of countries offended by Australia regarding submarines, Sweden can be added to the list. As the designer of the Collins class and shareholder in the Australian Submarine Corporation, the Swedes were mightily annoyed in the year 2000 when Defence nationalised the company, kicking them out with the message that they were no longer welcome and that the US would step in and fix all remaining technical problems. Of course, that never happened – and then in 2014 to add insult to injury a New Generation Collins class was absurdly excluded from the mix, mainly because a few senior bureaucrats had developed a personal dislike of dealing with Sweden.
To be in this position of changing direction again and “stabbing in the back” the French, after already doing so to the Japanese and the Swedes is a collective display of incompetence by successive governments, the Defence bureaucracy and the RAN. If it were not so serious, this lack of process and the squandering of billions of dollars resembles a family of orangutans trying to water a garden with a high-pressure hose.
To the extent that a justification has been provided, it is that strategic circumstances have deteriorated to such an extent that nuclear powered submarines are needed to secure Australia’s security. This is fine, with such submarines having several advantages over conventional diesel-electric boats, including range, speed and endurance. However, the time frame for their introduction is laughable, with best case estimates being at the end of next decade. In the meantime, Australia will only have six Collins submarines, the life extension program of which is only scheduled to begin in 2026, rather than immediately.
If the government is actually serious about having nuclear powered submarines, why not have structured a FAUSUK treaty – France, Australia, US and UK – that could have produced a nuclear powered Attack class and taken advantage of all the work done for the last five years rather than throwing everything in the rubbish bin? In one of many ironies, the parent Barracuda class is indeed a nuclear-powered attack submarine – and an extremely good one of that, being more stealthy than counterparts from the US and UK. Redesigning it as a conventionally powered boat was always problematic, to put it mildly.
The Attack class were already a hybrid US-French product with the combat system to be supplied by Lockheed Martin. At its heart is the AN-BYG1 tactical data handling system that equips Virginia class attack submarines – and a great deal of work has already taken place Australianising that system, which is already also in the Collins class. Why not extend this principle of cooperation to the submarine’s power source and replace a French nuclear reactor in the Barracuda/Attack class with one from the US or the UK?
The importance of doing so is that French naval reactors use relatively low-grade commercial uranium fuel. This design choice means that they need to be refuelled about every ten years – a hazardous process that can only take place with the assistance of the country’s commercial nuclear industry, which does not exist in Australia. US and UK reactors use much higher-grade fuel and have enough energy to last for the lifetime of the submarine itself – in excess of 30 years – so no refuelling is required, negating the need for local support.
One can be almost certain that this rather obvious avenue has never been explored with the French. Ultimately France might have said no to such an arrangement – though it seems to have benefits for everyone – at which point Australia would have been perfectly entitled to have gone down the AUKUS path. However, what has taken place is a highly secret deal designed to exclude the French and, in the process, write off more than $4 billion – and counting.
The reason why this looks like a political backroom deal is that the way forward will be studied by the bureaucracy for the next 18 months. Here’s a strange thought: why not study the idea first before announcing it? What happens if the study concludes that Australia does not have the infrastructure to build nuclear submarines? Or that the timetable and the level of risk are unacceptable? If Labor is in power then, what will they do?
We were all told repeatedly that the deal with France was not about buying submarines, it was developing a sovereign industrial capability that would make Australia independent forever. This huge effort costing billions was to replace the sovereign capability built up in the late 1980s and 90s to build and support the Collins fleet. All of that has now been ditched and by the look of it we will try for a third time with input from the US and the UK – both countries that are extremely protectionist when it comes to their own defence sectors – to again recreate an industry. This is beyond ridiculous.
There seems to be something particularly cursed about Australia’s floundering attempts to replace Collins. It’s actually fairly straightforward – most other countries manage it in a smooth, transparent and seamless way. Here we have had six years of unconscionable neglect by the Rudd-Gillard governments, followed multiple changes of direction, damage to Australia’s reputation, huge financial losses – and still no new submarines even remotely on the acquisition horizon.
This is what happens when Defence policy – particularly for submarines – becomes politicised. If only work on a Nextgen Collins had started in 2010 when it should have the first of a new class of ultra-modern conventional submarines would be going into the water now, massively boosting our deterrent capabilities. Australia would have had the design expertise to be working on our own nuclear submarines that, in conjunction with the US, UK and even France, could start to enter service at the start of the next decade rather than at the end of it.
Because of this mess either this government or the next one will have to look at interim solutions. Is it possible that the US would lease two or three Virginia class to us as gap fillers? The RN only has three Astute class out of a maximum of seven to be built, so the chances of getting any of them seem less than zero.
A case can be made for a gap-filler to be provided with the purchase of German or Swedish conventional submarines given that France is now unlikely to want to have anything more to do with Australia, even if we begged. A more imaginative approach would be to speak with South Korea about their KSS-III batch 2 submarines. These are about the right size for Australia at 4,000 tonnes and as well as torpedo tubes have a 6-cell vertical launch missile system, making them arguably the most potent diesel-electric submarines in the world.
South Korea is also considering building nuclear submarines and discussing a way forward with them might be very worthwhile. However, given the lack of imagination, direction, and leadership that has become the norm in Australia, don’t expect anything to happen while we thrash around trying to figure out what to do.
O mais engraçado é que a energia nuclear está proibida na Austrália
Estou curioso para saber em qual ambiente /ecossistema os australianos vão recrutar seus engenheiros e especialistas em caldeiras nucleares, sendo o país alérgico a essa ciência.
Fora os custos por oito SSN construídos no país, ou seja, as cifras pela transferências de tecnologia e o estabelecimento de uma ferramenta industrial dedicada, bem como de instalações específicas. Serão custos nada módicos tal como estavam previstos os 12 SSK da Naval Group.
Por vinte anos, portanto, a Marinha Real Australiana terá que lidar com seus seis submarinos Collins ... Ao mesmo tempo, terá que treinar tripulações para implementar seu futuro SSN. Isso levanta, novamente, a questão dos recursos humanos.
Estou curioso para saber em qual ambiente /ecossistema os australianos vão recrutar seus engenheiros e especialistas em caldeiras nucleares, sendo o país alérgico a essa ciência.
Essa parte será feita pelos Ingleses.
Fora os custos por oito SSN construídos no país, ou seja, as cifras pela transferências de tecnologia e o estabelecimento de uma ferramenta industrial dedicada, bem como de instalações específicas. Serão custos nada módicos tal como estavam previstos os 12 SSK da Naval Group.
Não vai haver transferência de tecnologia. Os equipamentos serão enviados como peças de lego. É só montar sobe supervisão.
Por vinte anos, portanto, a Marinha Real Australiana terá que lidar com seus seis submarinos Collins ... Ao mesmo tempo, terá que treinar tripulações para implementar seu futuro SSN. Isso levanta, novamente, a questão dos recursos humanos.
Eles serão treinados a bordo dos subs Americanos e Britânicos. Os países envolvidos são todos de culturas que sabem quantificar o conhecimento. Os processos são muito simplificados e testados.
Estou curioso para saber em qual ambiente /ecossistema os australianos vão recrutar seus engenheiros e especialistas em caldeiras nucleares, sendo o país alérgico a essa ciência.
Essa parte será feita pelos Ingleses.
Fora os custos por oito SSN construídos no país, ou seja, as cifras pela transferências de tecnologia e o estabelecimento de uma ferramenta industrial dedicada, bem como de instalações específicas. Serão custos nada módicos tal como estavam previstos os 12 SSK da Naval Group.
Não vai haver transferência de tecnologia. Os equipamentos serão enviados como peças de lego. É só montar sobe supervisão.
Por vinte anos, portanto, a Marinha Real Australiana terá que lidar com seus seis submarinos Collins ... Ao mesmo tempo, terá que treinar tripulações para implementar seu futuro SSN. Isso levanta, novamente, a questão dos recursos humanos.
Eles serão treinados a bordo dos subs Americanos e Britânicos. Os países envolvidos são todos de culturas que sabem quantificar o conhecimento. Os processos são muito simplificados e testados.
Submarinos nucleares é do mais simples e fácil de construir que há, faz mesmo lembrar os legos.
Os ingleses demoraram 20 anos para ter 4 Astute class operacionais, mas vão ser mais rápidos para ajudar os primos..
Estou curioso para saber em qual ambiente /ecossistema os australianos vão recrutar seus engenheiros e especialistas em caldeiras nucleares, sendo o país alérgico a essa ciência.
Essa parte será feita pelos Ingleses.
Fora os custos por oito SSN construídos no país, ou seja, as cifras pela transferências de tecnologia e o estabelecimento de uma ferramenta industrial dedicada, bem como de instalações específicas. Serão custos nada módicos tal como estavam previstos os 12 SSK da Naval Group.
Não vai haver transferência de tecnologia. Os equipamentos serão enviados como peças de lego. É só montar sobe supervisão.
Por vinte anos, portanto, a Marinha Real Australiana terá que lidar com seus seis submarinos Collins ... Ao mesmo tempo, terá que treinar tripulações para implementar seu futuro SSN. Isso levanta, novamente, a questão dos recursos humanos.
Eles serão treinados a bordo dos subs Americanos e Britânicos. Os países envolvidos são todos de culturas que sabem quantificar o conhecimento. Os processos são muito simplificados e testados.
Submarinos nucleares é do mais simples e fácil de construir que há, faz mesmo lembrar os legos.
Os ingleses demoraram 20 anos para ter 4 Astute class operacionais, mas vão ser mais rápidos para ajudar os primos..
Não foi isso que quis dizer. O que quis dizer é que os australianos não vão gastar em investigação como o Brasil. Os subs serão montados sob supervisão ou melhor será o RU e EUA a irem montar os mesmos na Austrália.
É impressão minha ou há demasiada choradeira e um alarido pouco usual na nossa comunicação social sobre este assunto?
É que normalmente estão-se borrifando para os temas de defesa, principalmente sobre as forças armadas nacionais.
Mas os submarinos australianos até são tema abordado no telejornal, como se não tivéssemos problemas cá!!!
Pressão/influência chinesa?
Talvez seja só impressão minha...
Fala-se nisto na nossa CS?
Hunting the hunter. The frigate HMAS Anzac (FFH-150) and its embarked MH-60R Seahawk helicopter from 816 Squadron was hunted as part of the Submarine Warfare Officer's Course. Students tracked HMAS Anzac through the periscope from the submarine HMAS Rankin (SSG-78) during an anti-submarine warfare training activity conducted as part of Exercise Zeehond in the Western Australian Exercise area, December 2021.
(RAN Photo © Commonwealth of Australia 2021)
This is the Royal Australian Navy Destroyer HMAS Perth a US Built Adam's Class DDG. This happened in Hobart Tasmania but no date given
This is the caption: PERTH's revenge on Hobart. This picture is of PERTH when she rammed the wharf when coming to berth in Hobart. It happened just alongside of Constitution Dock, and I also have a photograph of the patched-up wharf taken in 1998. The Port Control staff in the office must have gotten quite a shock to see a Destroyer "destroying" their office.
La flota de 59 helicópteros de desarrollo europeo que las fuerzas armadas australianas han decidido retirar mucho antes de concluir su vida útil no presentaba los problemas de disponibilidad que se les ha atribuido. Los 22 Tigre ARH y 47 MRH90 Taipan que Canberra ha optado sustituir por 29 Apache AH-64E, para el primer caso, y 40 Blak Hawk y 12 MH-60R Seahawk para el segundo, son más fiables de lo que se ha dado a entender en los últimos años. Los problemas que han sufrido están más relacionados con la logística de defensa con la que se les ha dado soporte que con los propios aparatos.Fonte: https://www.infodefensa.com/texto-diario/mostrar/4205202/mala-logistica-australia-causante-retirada-helicopteros-tigre-nh-90 (https://www.infodefensa.com/texto-diario/mostrar/4205202/mala-logistica-australia-causante-retirada-helicopteros-tigre-nh-90)
Estas conclusiones se extraen del extenso artículo que el portal australiano especializado APDR (Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter) ha dedicado a este asunto, titulado: Helicópteros: Los Tigre y Taipan no tienen nada de malo: el problema es la logística de defensa (https://asiapacificdefencereporter.com/helicopters-there-is-nothing-wrong-with-tiger-and-taipan-the-problem-is-defence-logistics/). "El principal culpable es el proceso de soporte de Defence/CASG", explica, en alusión al Grupo de Adquisición y Mantenimiento de Capacidades, que es la entidad del Ministerio de Defensa australiano encargada de cumplir con los requisitos y equipos militares de las fuerzas armadas. El texto afina más al citar al denominado CAMM2 (siglas en inglés de administración de mantenimiento asistido por computadora 2), un paquete de software que supone uno de los principales elementos de ese soporte. "Parece que este es el meollo del problema y no los propios helicópteros", concreta, y afirma que miembros ya retirados del Ejército australiano lo confirman, si bien prefieren no aparecer por seguir siendo leales a su antiguo servicio. "Además, pocas personas están interesadas en los detalles de la logística de Defensa cuando es mucho más fácil culpar a los franceses en general y a Airbus Helicopters [fabricante de las aeronaves] en particular", añade.
La fuente habla de "constantes críticas dirigidas contra el MRH y el ARH durante más de una década (algunas aparentemente orquestadas) que han creado la falsa impresión de que los helicópteros no son fiables". Y cita a políticos de todas las corrientes, grandes medios de comunicación, expertos e incluso al Ministerio como propagadores de esa mala evaluación. Sobre Airbus, el medio recoge que no ha querido dar su visión en su extenso artículo, y lo atribuye a una posible combinación de fatiga, frente a cómo han tenido lugar los acontecimientos por el sistema australiano, y un intento de no quedar mal ante la posibilidad de obtener contratos más jugosos en el país, y cita el programa JP 9102 sobre comunicaciones, que es el mayor programa del sector espacial que ha lanzado nunca el país.
[continua]
Pois... lá é cada uma:
La mala logística en Australia fue la causante de la retirada de sus helicópteros Tigre y NH-90
(9 de Março de 2023)Citação de: Ginés SorianoLa flota de 59 helicópteros de desarrollo europeo que las fuerzas armadas australianas han decidido retirar mucho antes de concluir su vida útil no presentaba los problemas de disponibilidad que se les ha atribuido. Los 22 Tigre ARH y 47 MRH90 Taipan que Canberra ha optado sustituir por 29 Apache AH-64E, para el primer caso, y 40 Blak Hawk y 12 MH-60R Seahawk para el segundo, son más fiables de lo que se ha dado a entender en los últimos años. Los problemas que han sufrido están más relacionados con la logística de defensa con la que se les ha dado soporte que con los propios aparatos.Fonte: https://www.infodefensa.com/texto-diario/mostrar/4205202/mala-logistica-australia-causante-retirada-helicopteros-tigre-nh-90 (https://www.infodefensa.com/texto-diario/mostrar/4205202/mala-logistica-australia-causante-retirada-helicopteros-tigre-nh-90)
Estas conclusiones se extraen del extenso artículo que el portal australiano especializado APDR (Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter) ha dedicado a este asunto, titulado: Helicópteros: Los Tigre y Taipan no tienen nada de malo: el problema es la logística de defensa (https://asiapacificdefencereporter.com/helicopters-there-is-nothing-wrong-with-tiger-and-taipan-the-problem-is-defence-logistics/). "El principal culpable es el proceso de soporte de Defence/CASG", explica, en alusión al Grupo de Adquisición y Mantenimiento de Capacidades, que es la entidad del Ministerio de Defensa australiano encargada de cumplir con los requisitos y equipos militares de las fuerzas armadas. El texto afina más al citar al denominado CAMM2 (siglas en inglés de administración de mantenimiento asistido por computadora 2), un paquete de software que supone uno de los principales elementos de ese soporte. "Parece que este es el meollo del problema y no los propios helicópteros", concreta, y afirma que miembros ya retirados del Ejército australiano lo confirman, si bien prefieren no aparecer por seguir siendo leales a su antiguo servicio. "Además, pocas personas están interesadas en los detalles de la logística de Defensa cuando es mucho más fácil culpar a los franceses en general y a Airbus Helicopters [fabricante de las aeronaves] en particular", añade.
La fuente habla de "constantes críticas dirigidas contra el MRH y el ARH durante más de una década (algunas aparentemente orquestadas) que han creado la falsa impresión de que los helicópteros no son fiables". Y cita a políticos de todas las corrientes, grandes medios de comunicación, expertos e incluso al Ministerio como propagadores de esa mala evaluación. Sobre Airbus, el medio recoge que no ha querido dar su visión en su extenso artículo, y lo atribuye a una posible combinación de fatiga, frente a cómo han tenido lugar los acontecimientos por el sistema australiano, y un intento de no quedar mal ante la posibilidad de obtener contratos más jugosos en el país, y cita el programa JP 9102 sobre comunicaciones, que es el mayor programa del sector espacial que ha lanzado nunca el país.
[continua]
Cumprimentos,
HMAS Toowoomba (FFH-156) at Changi Naval Base, Singapore on May 4~5th, 2023 during IMDEX2023.
HMAS Toowoomba has received AMCAP (ANZAC Mid-life Capability Assurance Programme) upgrade, which replaced original AN/SPS-49V( 8 ) long range radar with CEAFAR2-L L band AESA. Its mast contains three types of AESA antennas including CEAFAR2-L(long range surveillance), CEAFAR-S band(surveillance and tracking) and CEAMOUNT-X band(tracking and fire control) .
I described this iconic mast as "pineapple", but the crew on HMAS Toowoomba said they called it "golf"... sense making.
Recently, at the end of September, the RAN decommissioned two Armidale ships – the seven-year-old vessel HMAS Larrakia II and the 15-year-old HMAS Maryborough II – with the intention of inducting the next-generation Arafura vessels.