[NVF]

Ia dar no mesmo, já que o maior desafio não é a integração dos sistemas mas as alterações estruturais necessárias para aderir aos padrões do NAVSEA. Arriscaria até que as F100 necessitariam de maiores alterações estruturais que as FREMM, a avaliar pelo resultado do acidente com a Helge Ingstad -- acidente esse que, provavelmente, pesou bastante na escolha final da US Navy.

[Cabeça de Martelo]

Ia dar no mesmo, já que o maior desafio não é a integração dos sistemas mas as alterações estruturais necessárias para aderir aos padrões do NAVSEA. Arriscaria até que as F100 necessitariam de maiores alterações estruturais que as FREMM, a avaliar pelo resultado do acidente com a Helge Ingstad -- acidente esse que, provavelmente, pesou bastante na escolha final da US Navy.

Mas se os próprios dizem que a culpa foi humana...

The AIBN reports issued 15 recommendations relating to ship navigation and 28 recommendations relating to damage control and ship systems. Key findings were improvement in training and competence for bridge teams, that warships always activate AIS when navigating in confined waters with other vessels (something the RN does not do consistently). Unlike RN vessels, HING was not fitted with a Voyage Data Recorder (VDR) used for post-incident analysis and this should be remedied. The majority of recommendations to the navy related to training, especially damage control in complex situations, competence in shutting down and sealing compartments and understanding, operating and maintaining safety-critical systems, especially bilge pumps.

HING passed her final FOST inspection at Devonport in March 2018 but 37% of the crew had changed in the intervening 8 months before the incident. The crew all said they had benefited greatly from the FOST programme and their own exercises but they had not practised for anything resembling these circumstances. The simultaneous failure of several technical systems, time pressure, significant flooding, loss of communication and the fact that this took place in the early morning proved overwhelming. Lean-manned warships reliant on commercially-derived IPMS and automation perhaps lack the number of watchkeepers needed for effective damage control. The use of technology for decision support and remote control of key systems implies these tools need to be extremely robust and programmed to provide fast and simple advice for a very wide range of scenarios.

[Cabeça de Martelo]

[P44]

U.S. Navy Comments on FFG 62 Frigate’s Lack of Tracker Illuminator System and Design Changes

An April 2024 Congressional Research Service Report stated that the U.S. Navy’s new USS Constellation-class frigates do not have a tracker illuminator system to guide semiactive radar-homing missiles to their targets. Naval News asked the U.S. Navy to comment on this issue and what is causing frigate program delays.

https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2024/08/u-s-navy-comments-on-ffg-62-frigates-lack-of-tracker-illuminator-system-and-design-changes/

[goldfinger]

ZUMWALT DDG1000 at HII Ingalls Shipbuilding in Pascagoula MS on 30 Aug halfway through her 2-year modernization overhaul. Both 152mm guns have been removed, the forward location to be used for Conventional Prompt Strike hypersonic weapons. HARRISBURG LPD30 is at left in 3rd view