This startling conclusion is the culmination of several years of effort to find out why Australia has had disproportionate problems keeping our 22 Tiger Armed Reconnaissance Helicopters (ARH) and 47 Taipan Multi-Role Helicopters (MRH) flying. Other countries have nowhere near the same level of difficulty as has been experienced here.Just about all the blame has been heaped on the manufacturer Airbus Helicopters and both classes are being retired and replaced about 20 years ahead of schedule. All the helicopters have plenty of structural life remaining. Instead, we will spend an extra $10 billion dollars on 29 Apache AH-64E attack helicopters and 40 UH-60M Blackhawks. Added to this is mix are 12 MH-60R Seahawks to replace the RAN’s six MHRs at a cost of $1.4 billion.To put it more bluntly, all this might be based on an incorrect premise – namely that the ARH and MRH fleets are chronically unreliable because of spare parts shortages, and they therefore must be retired in the national interest. This is not correct, with the major culprit being the Defence / CASG support process – a major element of which is a software package called CAMM2. It looks as if this is at the heart of the problem and not the helicopters themselves.Many readers will be surprised because of the repeated vitriol directed at the MRH and ARH for more than a decade – some of it seemingly orchestrated – that has created the false impression that the helicopters are unreliable. Everyone has piled on – politicians of all backgrounds; large sections of the media; think tanks; and Defence itself. Airbus has not publicly defended itself – and wanted nothing to do with this article – which might be a combination of management fatigue battling the Australian system and having bigger fish to fry in the shape of bids such as JP 9102 for communications satellites.This article should have been written five years ago when it might have made a difference to the series of decisions leading to the recent Apache and Blackhawk purchases. However, getting detailed information from Defence has been impossible and events such as Senate Estimates have only provided fragments of disconnected data.Some retired Army staff who know what has been going on remain loyal to their former service and while confirming facts about CAMM2 will not go on the record. Additionally, few people are interested in the detail of Defence logistics when it is much easier to blame the French in general and Airbus Helicopters in particular.Today, both the ARH and MRH fleets have an availability rate of about 70%. This is likely to be better than most – if not all – RAAF platforms and for the future Apache and Blackhawk fleets. The 30% of time when they are unavailable is not necessarily because of a problem but instead they are offline for routine, preventative maintenance. This is standard on complex machines such as military aircraft – and it takes up an unavoidable chunk of time.However, getting to this 70% figure has involved a struggle going back at least a decade, much of which has involved discussions between the manufacturer and CASG about streamlining support processes. The reality is that there have always been plenty of spare parts available. What has stopped them getting from the warehouse to multiple workshops has been burdensome bureaucracy caused mainly by outdated Defence software.Consider the case of New Zealand. Their air force operates eight MRHs almost identical to Australia’s – and they could not be happier, flying a reliable modern helicopter with one of the highest usage rates of the global fleet. The contrast with Australia is stark and worth examining. How can one customer have no problems with maintenance – yet the other is retiring its fleet 20 years early?New Zealand has all their helicopters at one facility; Australia’s are scattered across five bases. They have a streamlined approach to logistics with a single point of contact and modern, interconnected data bases. The difference with Australia was illustrated during Talisman Sabre in 2019 when the Australian MRH fleet was grounded because of a tail rotor issue – but the New Zealanders were able to keep flying theirs because they had already installed the fix according to the OEM’s recommendations well in advance of the exercise.Instead, the Australian CAMM-2 (Computer Aided Maintenance Management) system was fielded in 2005 to address deficiencies in CAMM-1, which was an earlier attempt to digitise logistics. Very few organisations continue to use a logistics software package from 20 years ago – certainly none in the commercial world – and CAMM-2 has been described as labour intensive and costly to maintain.It was designed to support military aircraft – though it is not being universally applied, with exceptions including the RAAF C-17 fleet with software from the manufacturer, Boeing, via the USAF. The F-35s come with their own separate Automatic Logistics Information System (ALIS) supplied by Lockheed Martin that supports the global fleet of aircraft.[continua]
The MRFH (Multi-Role Frigate Helicopter) Sea Tiger was developed specifically to meet the needs of the German Navy with a mission system focused on anti-submarine and anti-surface warfare. On the path to entry into service in 2025, an important step has just been taken with a successful eight-week test campaign that took place from February to April 2024.All eyes are now on Nordholz, where a full demonstration of its operational capabilities will take place, the last major qualification step before deliveries begin in 2025.The aircraft will follow an operational flight profile from A to Z, with sonar activity and simulated torpedo and missile firings. This type of test has never before been carried out on a helicopter.
A classified interim report from the Austrlian Defence Flight Safety Bureau (DFSB) has shed new light on the tragic MRH-90 Taipan helicopter crash that claimed the lives of four Australian Army airmen near Hamilton Island in July 2023, ruling out mechanical failures and pointing to potential pilot disorientation as a key factor in the incident.The report, which has been selectively briefed to various stakeholders, indicates that just two minutes before the crash, there was a transfer of controls from Lieutenant Max Nugent to Captain Danniel Lyon, adding a crucial element to the timeline of events leading up to the disaster.Flight data analysis reveals that the aircraft, designated Bushman 83, abruptly climbed before plummeting into the sea at 130km/h, with only six seconds elapsing from the top of its climb to impact. The helicopter entered the water at a 140-degree angle, twisted 120 degrees to the left, while flight data suggests a desperate last-second attempt to gain altitude, as evidenced by the collective lift lever being adjusted from 18 to 56 degrees moments before impact.Investigators have effectively ruled out mechanical, engine, or airframe faults, instead focusing on the possibility of sudden and catastrophic pilot disorientation. Of particular concern are the TopOwl helmet-mounted navigation visors, which had been flagged in a 2019 Defence safety report as posing "a substantial risk of multiple deaths" due to ambiguous and inaccurate readings when pilots looked left or right. Testimony from another pilot in the formation corroborates these concerns, describing difficulties in discerning the horizon and unreliable symbology readings from the TopOwl system during the ill-fated flight.(...)The selective briefing of the DFSB interim report has sparked controversy within the ongoing inquiry, with legal representatives expressing frustration over unequal access to critical information. As the investigation continues, the focus remains on understanding the complex interplay of factors that led to this tragic loss of life and identifying measures to prevent similar incidents in the future.
