O que se passa na Alemanha?

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Re: O que se passa na Alemanha?
« Responder #15 em: Março 28, 2019, 11:50:14 am »
https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_negative_energy_berlins_trumpian_turn_on_nord_stream_2



Berlin's handling of the controversial Nord Stream 2 project reveals double standards and neglect of the pipeline's security repercussions.

Berlin has handled the dispute over the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline with unilateralism and clumsiness worthy of US President Donald Trump. On 8 February, the EU Committee of Permanent Representatives was to vote on a proposal to tighten the rules of the common energy market – which have thus far enabled states and companies, particularly Germany and Gazprom, to circumvent EU law. Paris signalled on 7 February that it would support the proposal, igniting debate among European policy analysts and prompting hasty diplomatic interventions from Berlin. Although this eventually led to a Franco-German compromise of sorts, the incident reflected Germany’s increasing isolation on the issue.

    While it loves to rant about Trump’s disruptive and confrontational behaviour, the German government hardly behaves any differently when its interests are at stake.

Paris has a direct interest in Nord Stream 2 through French firm Engie’s involvement in the project. Yet the French government appears to be less worried about commercial interests than the prospect that German insistence on completing Nord Stream 2 will drive other EU member states into the hands of the Trump administration. Portraying itself as a fearsome opponent of the project, the administration likely sees Poland and other opponents of Nord Stream 2 as potential allies in a coming trade war with the European Union. For Eurosceptic-led governments such as that in Italy, the debacle over the pipeline vindicates their view of the EU as a club whose rules twist to accommodate the tactical preferences of Berlin.
What happened to the proposal?

The proposal would probably not have prohibited the construction of the pipeline outright but rather made it more expensive and transparent. The proposal would also have given concerned EU countries a greater say in the project and the European Commission a pivotal role in supervising energy contracts, thereby diminishing Gazprom’s ability to distort the European gas market.

When it came out in support of the proposal, France did not perceive this as being an affront to Germany: the pipeline had drawn increasing criticism from across the EU and constant attacks from Trump. Greater EU oversight of the project would have allowed the German government to deflect much of this condemnation without giving in to Trump (which is widely seen as something close to domestic political suicide). By bridging the political divide, the proposal would not only have reduced Germany’s isolation but also reduced the risk that the United States would exploit disagreements over Nord Stream 2 to split the EU.

German Chancellor Angela Merkel has only added to the confusion with her inconsistency on the matter. She voted down the European Commission’s first attempt to change EU energy regulations in November 2017, but acknowledged the following spring that Germany needed to address the security concerns about Nord Stream 2 of Ukraine and other countries. Hence, many diplomats thought she would accept the proposal.
The EU’s reaction

Nonetheless, Berlin’s reaction was far from accepting. Merkel and President Frank-Walter Steinmeier immediately pressured Paris and, particularly, Bucharest (which currently holds the EU presidency) to water down the proposal. The resulting compromise denies other EU member states and the European Commission any influence on the process of commissioning the pipeline. Gazprom will still be forced to transfer operative ownership of the project to another company – most likely, a Gazprom subsidiary similar to the one that operates the European Gas Pipeline Link interconnector – and to allow other providers to access to the pipeline. Neither provision will change much: such a subsidiary would have the opportunity to hire loyal politicians as board members and thereby widen the Russian corruption network in Germany. And other, non-Russian suppliers cannot access the pipeline because it lies on the seabed. The decision of whether to involve other Russian companies in Nord Stream 2 rests with President Vladimir Putin. As such, the watered-down version of the proposal is only a compromise in the sense that it is better than nothing.

The German government’s handling of the project will cause lasting damage. Several of the arguments Berlin put forward in support of Nord Stream 2 have been revealed as lies:

    Nord Stream 2 is a commercial project.
    This argument holds that the pipeline will fit within the EU’s legal framework and that there are no grounds to interfere with business initiatives unless they violate existing rules. It is now clear that the German government actively intervenes to preserve a regulatory ecosystem in which the project can survive.
     
    German energy supply is separate from German foreign policy.
    German pipelines only come about due to the heavy political support they receive. This erodes the trust placed in Germany to uphold EU sanctions, for two reasons. Firstly, because the Yamal gas field – which feeds the Nord Stream pipelines – is difficult to exploit, the project will only be a long-term commercial success if the EU lifts its sanctions on the Russian energy sector. Secondly, if many smaller states are prevented from conducting business with Russia but Berlin provides political cover to deals with the country it sees as strategically important, the European sanctions debate will descend into cynicism.
     
    The Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Social Democratic Party (SPD) have substantively different views of Nord Stream 2.
    In the past, SPD cadres led the way in openly advocating for the pipeline project, while the chancellery remained silent on the issue. Many of Germany’s European allies hoped a new German government would take a different approach to Nord Stream 2 or that Merkel and other key figures would prove trustworthy because they had no personal involvement in pushing for the project. But Merkel has now personally defended the project, citing the usual arguments of lobbyists for Nord Stream 2 and thereby toxifying her and the CDU on the European stage. Indeed, many European opponents of the project now see Germany as a whole as the problem.
     
    The German government is a multilateralist protector of the rules-based order.
    Germany’s behaviour shows that it only accepts the rules when convenient, and otherwise uses unilateral bullying tactics to preserve regulatory loopholes that favour German interests. While it loves to rant about Trump’s disruptive and confrontational behaviour, the German government hardly behaves any differently when its interests are at stake.
     
    The EU is a rules-based organisation in which all member-states have equal rights.
    While this is the case on paper, the Nord Stream 2 case is widely perceived as one more example of double standards that favour Germany. The EU has prevented Italy, Bulgaria, Hungary, Greece, and Slovakia from engaging in bilateral pipeline projects with Russia under its Third Energy Package. Yet Germany has used a loophole in European regulations to launch the kind of project that others have been denied, and to strengthen its position in the European gas market. Having seen another major European power become increasingly willing to bend and break the rules, Italy is now more likely than ever to demand exemptions from the Stability and Growth Pact.

Security concerns

While southern EU member states perceive Nord Stream 2 as further proof of unjust German economic hegemony in Europe, eastern and northern European states will probably adopt an ever more sceptical, if not hostile, attitude towards Berlin on security issues. Germany’s role as an advocate for Gazprom in Europe, combined with its failure to live up to its commitments on defence, reinforces fears that the Russo-German cosiness of the Schröder era is now a permanent feature of Berlin’s strategy. Efforts to hedge against German influence will become all the more essential in post-Brexit Europe (although they may take more a polite form in Stockholm than in Warsaw). Poland may recognise that siding with the US in a trade war against Germany will have negative economic side-effects, but its security fears are likely to come before economics.

Meanwhile, Belarus and Ukraine will experience most of the negative consequences of the Russian-German energy partnership. Nord Stream 2 will make pipelines that pass through Ukraine and Belarus redundant. And it is not just the loss in transit money that worries these countries. The Russian regime relies on exports of oil and gas. And dependence on access to pipelines in Belarus and Ukraine currently constrains Russian military activity in these countries. For example, in 2014 Moscow refrained from providing military support to pro-Russian separatist groups in Kharkiv due to the presence of important installations on the gas transit line in the north and northwest of the city. Yet, after initiating the Nord Stream 2 project, Russia started to militarise the Belgorod-Kursk border region, deploying the 20th Guards Army just across the frontier. Under growing pressure to cede its sovereignty to Russia, Belarus may accept an increased Russian troop presence in its territory and subordinate its armed forces to the Russian general staff. This would drastically change the security situation in Poland, Ukraine, and Lithuania.

Thus, there is little sense to Berlin’s argument that Russia was a reliable supplier of gas to Germany even during the cold war. In that era, the Russian gas-delivery system had no effect on the military security or sovereignty of other neutral and non-allied states – thereby allowing for the separation of energy policy and security policy. This is no longer the case. However, because it does not see Russia as a direct threat, the German political establishment tends to ignore the security implications of Nord Stream 2.

Germany has no capacity or domestic mandate to deal with the geopolitical fallout of its choices on Nord Stream 2. It cannot prevent Russia from absorbing Belarus, nor from escalating the war in Ukraine. In environmental and climate politics, German leaders often emphasise that one should not commit to policies whose ramifications one cannot control. But, in a mirror image of Trump’s approach to climate policy, Merkel simply bows to ideological stubbornness and the lobbying efforts of domestic industry and special interest groups.
 

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Re: O que se passa na Alemanha?
« Responder #16 em: Abril 08, 2019, 09:38:06 pm »
https://www.unian.info/politics/10508358-germany-seeks-to-lift-russian-sanctions-in-council-of-europe-media.html

Germany seeks to lift Russian sanctions in Council of Europe – media

German diplomats are unprecedentedly active in negotiating with representatives of other states about the return of Russians to PACE without sanctions.

German diplomats and deputies are openly taking active steps to lift the sanctions pressure from Russia in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and plan to do this at the current PACE session. The representatives of Germany have never concealed the fact they prefer a "dialogue" with the Russian Federation even if this requires moving away from putting pressure on it, the Ukrainian media outlet European Pravda reported on April 8, referring to several Western diplomats, as well as representatives of the expert community.

But the data available to the media outlet suggest that now this refers to a coordinated campaign that has grown considerably in the run-up to the PACE spring session. "It is noteworthy that this activity is non-partisan: it covers representatives of both key forces of the government coalition – [the Christian Democrats] CDU/[the Christian Social Union in Bavaria] CSU and the Social Democrats. Recently, the deputies from the CDU and [the Social Democratic Party of Germany] SPD sent a letter to the PACE president to revise the sanctions rules, removing the Assembly's right to impose sanctions on delegations from violating states when approving their powers," the publication wrote.

At the same time, German deputies are conducting explanatory work in PACE, persuading other parliamentarians that the struggle between Ukraine and Russia is an "election technology" and Europe should not support it, the European Pravda said. Parliamentarians also claim Angela Merkel personally supports the idea of forgiveness of Russia. However, the chancellor has not yet made public her position on this issue. But German diplomats are also unprecedentedly active in negotiating with representatives of other states about the return of Russians to PACE without sanctions, according to the publication. Official Berlin insists this will allow "saving Russia's membership in the Council of Europe," although their opponents question this logic. According to sources, the acceleration of the plan is among the options with the de facto liquidation of sanctions mechanism at the PASE session in April. UK Permanent Representative to the Council of Europe Christopher Yvon reported on unprecedented activity in this regard, although without indicating the state involved in this. "I was told today by a close follower of the work of the Council of Europe that this week it was doing self chemical castration. Surely we don't want that," he wrote on Twitter on Sunday, April 7. In his previous tweets, the British diplomat said he insisted on punishing Russia for violating the principles of the Council of Europe. As UNIAN reported earlier, Council of Europe Secretary General Thorbjorn Jagland proposed that the rules of the Council of Europe be changed to return the Russian delegation to PACE. At the PACE session in January, Jagland officially initiated work on amendments to the Statute of the Council of Europe to solve the crisis with Russia's participation in the work of the Council of Europe and with the Russian non-payments.
 

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Re: O que se passa na Alemanha?
« Responder #17 em: Março 03, 2021, 05:20:15 pm »
Alternativa para Alemanha (AFD) na mira dos serviços secretos internos


 

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Re: O que se passa na Alemanha?
« Responder #18 em: Março 05, 2021, 06:50:09 pm »
Justiça alemã suspende vigilância à AfD


 

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Re: O que se passa na Alemanha?
« Responder #19 em: Março 07, 2021, 04:50:06 pm »
Escândalo de corrupção abala CDU de Angela Merkel


 

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Re: O que se passa na Alemanha?
« Responder #20 em: Março 18, 2021, 11:37:42 pm »
in Sapo março/2021
Dezoito companhias renunciaram a contratos de negócio relacionados com o Nord Stream 2, projeto de gasoduto russo que liga Rússia e Alemanha através de mais de 1200 quilómetros de pipelines para transporte de combustível (GNL).

Em resultado do desligamento progressivo do projeto – que o atual Presidente norte-americano considera, há muito, ser um “mau acordo para a Europa” -, diversas seguradoras deverão escapar à aplicação de sanções de Washington.

Citado na edição eletrónica do jornal Les Echos, Thomas Buberl, CEO da AXA, comentou: “Estávamos no projeto com um seguro muito pequeno, mas é evidente que a nossa presença global sempre nos confronta com tensões regionais. Dado que queremos continuar a desenvolver-nos em todos os países, temos de evitar exposições de natureza geopolítica que seriam negativas para nós.”

Grupo Zurich vai abandonar projeto Nord Stream 2

Segundo documentação consultada pela agência Reuters, a administração liderada pelo Presidente Joe Biden enviou, na semana passada, ao Congresso dos Estados Unidos, uma lista de companhias (de vários setores) que estão sob escrutínio do Departamento de Estado, potencialmente em risco de enfrentarem sanções, por estarem de alguma forma ligadas ao projeto liderado pela russa Gazprom.

Com base nessa informação, a imprensa internacional adianta que além da AXA, Zurich e Munich Re, várias outras seguradoras (ou entidades suas subsidiárias) decidiram, progressivamente, retirar-se do projeto ou já reduziram as participações que detinham em contratos relacionados com o gasoduto. No que concerne à indústria seguradora são referenciadas ainda a Aegis, Arch, Beazley Furlonge, Chubb, Markel, MS Amlin, Tokio Marine Kiln e a Travelers.

O Nord Stream 2 foi iniciado em 2015, representa um investimento global superior a 9 mil milhões de euros, priva a Ucrânia de receitas da exportação russa para a Europa e, quando estiver concluído, significará a duplicação do volume de gás natural liquefeito (GNL) exportado através da Alemanha.

Além da pressão geopolítica dos EUA, o projeto tem motivado a oposição de alguns Estados da UE por significar um acréscimo da dependência europeia face ao gás russo.


https://eco.sapo.pt/2
 

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Re: O que se passa na Alemanha?
« Responder #21 em: Agosto 15, 2021, 07:43:57 pm »
Alemanha tarda na resposta às vítimas das inundações


 

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Re: O que se passa na Alemanha?
« Responder #22 em: Setembro 10, 2021, 11:50:13 pm »
Gazprom anuncia conclusão do gasoduto Nord Stream 2


 

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Re: O que se passa na Alemanha?
« Responder #23 em: Setembro 27, 2021, 10:35:09 am »
CDU de Angela Merkel derrotada


 

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Re: O que se passa na Alemanha?
« Responder #24 em: Setembro 27, 2021, 03:42:43 pm »
Alemanha prepara novo governo


 

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Re: O que se passa na Alemanha?
« Responder #25 em: Outubro 06, 2021, 03:23:35 pm »
Coligação "semáforo" mais próxima do Governo da Alemanha


 

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Re: O que se passa na Alemanha?
« Responder #26 em: Outubro 10, 2021, 04:30:05 pm »
Segurança de Israel é prioridade para a Alemanha


 

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Re: O que se passa na Alemanha?
« Responder #27 em: Outubro 17, 2021, 09:50:23 pm »
Verdes alemães dizem sim ao "semáforo"


 

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Re: O que se passa na Alemanha?
« Responder #28 em: Outubro 19, 2021, 11:33:17 am »
China quer manter mesma relação com a Alemanha pós-Merkel


 

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Re: O que se passa na Alemanha?
« Responder #29 em: Novembro 16, 2021, 04:50:25 pm »
Nord Stream 2 suspenso pelo regulador alemão