[Cabeça de Martelo]

Alpha 5000 Combatant (left) and Tasman-class corvette (right)

Navantia Unveils Three New Warships Including Tier-2 Corvette
Tasman-class corvette to be offered to RAN for Tier 2-requirement in cooperation with Austal.
Alex Luck  08 Nov 2023

The corvette, dubbed “Tasman-class” is aiming for the Tier 2-requirement formulated to supplement the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) surface fleet with an affordable design still featuring substantial firepower. A larger proposal named “Alpha 5000 Combatant” offers frigate-sized capacity in armament and sensor capability. The third design, called “Flight III Combatant” aims to fill the perceived need for a Tier 1-design with substantial missile capacity and reserves to integrate future technologies including laser weapons and drones.


Paddy Gregg (Austal), Jim Fitzgerald (Civmec) and Israel Lozano (Navantia) at Indopacific 2023.

In a related announcement Navantia also revealed their intention to propose building six or more Tasman-class corvettes in cooperation with Austal for the RAN’s “urgent need for increased strike capability”. According to a Navantia-spokesperson both companies started collaborating on a detailed proposal in November 2022, in anticipation of the Defence Strategic Review released in April 2023. The Tasman-class corvette represents the final configuration now proposed for the RAN Tier 2-requirement and would be built at Austal’s shipyard in Henderson, Western Australia. Underscoring this decision, Austal CEO Paddy Gregg, Navantia Australia Managing Director Israel Lozano and Jim Fitzgerald, Executive Chairman of Henderson-based construction and engineering company Civmec also signed a cooperation agreement at the Navantia-booth on Tuesday.

Tasman-class corvette


Tasman-class corvette.

The Tasman-class corvette is a combatant measuring 109.6 metres in length, 15.35 metres beam and a displacement up to 3,600 tons depending on exact configuration. According to Navantia it is an Australianised version of the Alpha 3000-design built for Saudi-Arabia as the Avante-class, and as such promoted as a proven design. As armament and defensive equipment suite the ship features 16 configurable VLS-cells, four quadruple antiship-missile-launchers in slanted racks, a main gun in the 57 mm-category, two triple torpedo launchers, a lighter 30 mm or less Close In Weapon System (CIWS), two remote weapon stations (RWS) accommodating heavy machine guns, and dual decoy launchers. The corvette carries a version of CEA’s CEAFAR phased array radar and SEAMOUNT missile illuminator system. Finally the ship offers two RHIBs and features a hangar and helipad for a Seahawk-class helicopter, in addition to a mission bay below the landing pad accommodation RHIBs or USVs.

Alpha 5000 Combatant


Alpha 5000 Combatant

The larger Alpha 5000 Combatant is a frigate-sized concept coming in at 4,550 tons displacement., a length of 121 metres and beam of 16 metres. It distinguishes itself from the Tasman-class corvette by featuring an additional 16 VLS-cells amidships for a total count of 32 cells, reducing the antiship-missile count to 8 instead. Alpha 5000 also maintains the CIWS and torpedo launchers, but features a larger main gun of 76 mm calibre, and a more capable configuration of CEAFAR. Similar to the Tasman-class the frigate-design also includes a mission bay below the helicopter pad. Alpha 5000 can accommodate flexible mission-configurations including for ASW and mine-warfare, but also considering humanitarian roles.

Flight III Destroyer


Flight III Destroyer

The final proposal is aimed at the RAN-requirement for a large displacement combatant with deep magazine capacity, covering air warfare and strike-requirements dubbed “Flight III Destroyer”. The name is a reference to evolving the original Hobart-class design and following a separate design dubbed “Flight II”, effectively an Australianised F110 as built for the Spanish Navy, this concept proposes an effectively cruiser-sized vessel of 10,200 tons displacement at 165 metres length and a beam of 21 metres. Primary armament includes 128 VLS cells in two 64 cell-segments on the bow and amidships. As such it is a fully new design despite the “Flight”-reference. The ship also features a 127 mm-main gun and two gun-based CIWS of the Phalanx-type. Aside from the substantial missile armament a notable feature is a propulsion of the CODAG (combined diesel and gas turbine) electric-variety also supporting future integration of directed energy weapons. CEAFAR is featured again as radar suite.

Distinct characteristics are “drone swarm” and “anti drone swarm”-launchers port and starboard of the helicopter landing pad complementing a “UUV zone” below the helo pad. Flight deck and hangar support a Seahawk-class helicopter similar to the other two Navantia-proposals.

A decision by the Australian government following the recommendations of the Surface Combatant Review regarding the future force mix for RAN will be revealed in 2024.

https://www.navalnews.com/event-news/indo-pacific-2023/2023/11/navantia-shows-tasman-corvette-and-destroyer-aimed-at-ran/#prettyPhoto

[Cabeça de Martelo]

[Lusitano89]

[P44]

HMAS Stalwart refuels HMAS Brisbane and Toowoomba in the East Philippines Sea.

[P44]

https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-11-13/defence-admits-hunter-class-frigates-poor-process/103098592

[Cabeça de Martelo]

Unsafe and unprofessional interaction with PLA-N

Media release

Related ministers and contacts
The Hon Richard Marles MP
Deputy Prime Minister

Minister for Defence

Media contact
dpm.media@defence.gov.au

02 6277 7800

Release content
18 NOVEMBER 2023

The Australian Government has expressed its serious concerns to the Chinese Government following an unsafe and unprofessional interaction with a People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLA-N) destroyer.

On Tuesday 14 November 2023, HMAS Toowoomba was in international waters inside of Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone enroute to commence a scheduled port visit.

HMAS Toowoomba had been in the region conducting operations in support of United Nations sanctions enforcement. It had stopped to conduct diving operations in order to clear fishing nets that had become entangled around its propellers.

At all times, HMAS Toowoomba communicated its intention to conduct diving operations on normal maritime channels, and using internationally recognised signals.

While diving operations were underway a PLA-N destroyer (DDG-139) operating in the vicinity closed towards HMAS Toowoomba. Toowoomba again advised the PLA-N destroyer that diving operations were being conducted and requested the ship keep clear.

Despite acknowledging Toowoomba’s communications, the Chinese vessel approached at a closer range. Soon after, it was detected operating its hull-mounted sonar in a manner that posed a risk to the safety of the Australian divers who were forced to exit the water.

This is unsafe and unprofessional conduct.

Medical assessments conducted after the divers exited the water identified they had sustained minor injuries likely due to being subjected to the sonar pulses from the Chinese destroyer.

The safety and wellbeing of our ADF personnel continues to be of our utmost priority.

Australia expects all countries, including China, to operate their militaries in a professional and safe manner.

Defence has for decades undertaken maritime surveillance activities in the region and does so in accordance with international law, exercising the right to freedom of navigation and overflight in international waters and airspace.

  https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/media-releases/2023-11-18/unsafe-and-unprofessional-interaction-pla-n

[Cabeça de Martelo]

US approves transfer of 3 Virginia class submarines to Australia

Naval News December 2023 Navy Forces Maritime Defense Industry
POSTED ON WEDNESDAY, 20 DECEMBER 2023 16:13

On December 13, 2023, the U.S. Senate took a significant step by adopting the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for the fiscal year 2024. This act, with a budget of $874.2 billion, marks a key milestone in the implementation of the AUKUS agreement between the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia. The centerpiece of this legislation is the authorization of the transfer of three Virginia-class attack submarines to Australia, planned for the 2030s.


The Virginia-class attack submarine Pre-Commissioning Unit Mississippi (SSN 782) conducts alpha trials in the Atlantic Ocean. (Picture source: US DoD)

The U.S. Senate has passed the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for the fiscal year 2024. A key provision of the NDAA is the authorization to transfer three Virginia-class submarines to Australia, a move planned for the 2030s.

Under the AUKUS agreement, the U.S. Navy will sell to Australia Virginia-class Block IV submarines in 2032 and 2035, and a Block VII submarine in 2038. The Block IV submarines, equipped with advanced sonar systems and Tomahawk cruise missiles, have significant operational experience. The Block VII submarine, featuring enhanced technologies, will bring extended strategic deterrence capabilities to the Australian navy.

The AUKUS agreement, aimed at strengthening defense and security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region, is here translated into a tangible commitment by the United States. The transfer of these submarines, considered among the most advanced in the world, represents a leap in Australian defense capabilities, in a context of increasing geopolitical tensions in the region.

Besides the transfer of equipment, the NDAA also includes measures to consolidate the U.S. submarine industrial base, with a financial contribution of $3 billion from Australia. This measure was designed to alleviate concerns about the U.S. submarine production capacity, notably raised by Senator Roger Wicker of Mississippi.

The NDAA also foresees enhanced collaboration in defense technology and production, by allowing Australian and British companies to be eligible for U.S. federal grants under the defense production act. This should facilitate the allies' participation in joint technological development programs, especially in the fields of hypersonic weapons, artificial intelligence, and quantum computing.

This decision by the United States, while strengthening the AUKUS alliance, aims to maintain a balance of power in a crucial region for international security interests. It also symbolizes American commitment to its allies and underscores the importance of the Indo-Pacific as a key theater in global defense policy.

https://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php/naval-news/naval-news-archive/2023/december/13898-united-states-approves-transfer-of-3-submarines-to-australia.html?utm_content=cmp-true
 

   

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https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2024/02/28/australia-to-more-than-double-naval-surface-fleet-grow-defense-budget/

[Lusitano89]

Australia solicita información a Navantia sobre su propuesta de construcción de 11 nuevas fragatas

[P44]

Hanwha Shows New Frigate Design With Australian Radar At ADAS 2024

Australian radar suite reflects Hanwha's possible refined offer for Australian SEA 3000 requirement for producing up to eleven new frigates.



https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2024/09/hanwha-shows-frigate-with-australian-radar/

[Cabeça de Martelo]

Essa Fragata parece-me uma excelente opção.

[Lusitano89]

[NVF]

AUKUS risks are piling up. Australia must prepare to build French SSNs instead

Australia should start planning for acquisition of at least 12 submarines of the French Suffren design. The current AUKUS plan for eight nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) has always been flawed, and now its risks are piling up.

We should go ahead with naval-operational aspects of the AUKUS SSN plan, such as supporting US and British submarines when they come to Australia. But for the acquisition effort, we should be ready to drop the plan to buy eight SSNs under AUKUS—three from the US that Washington is increasingly unlikely to supply, and five that are supposed to be built to an oversized British design and probably can’t arrive on time.

Instead, we would commence a joint Franco-Australian construction program for a greater number of submarines of the Suffren class, a design that is already in service with the French navy.

To ensure deliveries could begin as early as 2038, the Australian government that’s elected next year should commit to deciding in 2026 whether to switch to the French design.

Even if the AUKUS acquisition plan succeeds, it will deliver a questionable capability. The submarines’ designs would be a mix of two blocks of Virginia-class submarines, more than 14 years apart in design, and yet-to-be-designed SSN-AUKUS using Britain’s yet-to-be-tested PWR3 reactor. Moreover, SSN-AUKUS would be partly built by the underperforming British submarine enterprise that’s under great pressure to deliver the Royal Navy’s next class of ballistic missile submarines.

Displacing more than 10,000 tonnes, SSN-AUKUS submarines will be too big for Australia’s needs. Their size will increase their detectability, cost and crews. (The large size appears to be driven by the dimensions of the reactor.)

The Royal Australian Navy is already unable to crew its ships and grow to meet future demands. It will have great difficulty in crewing Virginias, which need 132 people each, and SSN-AUKUS boats, too, if their crews equal the 100-odd needed for the current British Astute class.

We have yet to see a schedule for the British design process, nor does a joint design team   seem to have been established. In the absence of news that milestones have been achieved or even set, it is highly likely that the SSN-AUKUS program, like the Astute program, will run late and deliver a first-of-class boat with many problems. Knowing that Britain’s Strategic Defence Review is grappling with serious funding shortfalls hardly instils confidence.

Also, eight SSNs will be enough to maintain deployment of only one or two at any time, not enough for an effective deterrent. The difficulty in training crews and building up experience in three designs of submarines would add to the obvious supply chain challenges in achieving an operational force.

Achieving even this inadequate capability is growing less likely. Reports at the recent US Navy Submarine League Symposium reveal continuing US failure to increase submarine building rates. By now an additional submarine should have been ordered to cover the transfer of an existing Block IV Virginia to Australia in eight years, but no contract has been placed. Worse, Virginia production at both US submarine shipbuilders is actually slowing due to supply chain delays. The US’s top priority shipbuilding program, for Columbia class ballistic-missile submarines, continues to suffer delays. In late November, the White House requested emergency funding from Congress for the Virginia and Columbia programs.

This situation flags an increasing likelihood that, despite its best efforts, the US Navy will be unable to spare any Virginias for sale to Australia. The president of the day probably will be unable, as legislation requires, to certify 270 days before the transfer it will not degrade US undersea capabilities.

Meanwhile, Britain’s submarine support establishment is having difficulties in getting SSNs to sea. A recent fire affecting the delivery of the final Astute class SSN can only add to these woes.

The French Suffren SSN class was the reference design for the diesel Attack class that Australia intended to buy before switching to SSNs. It offers the solution to our AUKUS problems. It is in production by Naval Group, with three of the planned six submarines commissioned in the French navy.

At 5300 tonnes and with a 70-day endurance, capacity for 24 torpedoes or missiles, four torpedo tubes and a crew of 60, it would be cheaper to build, own and crew than the AUKUS boats. The design is flexible—optimised for anti-submarine warfare but with a good anti-surface ship capability from dual-purpose torpedoes and anti-ship cruise missiles. It can also carry land-attack cruise missiles, mines and special forces.

The Suffren class uses low-enriched uranium fuel and needs refuelling every 10 years, whereas the US and British designs, with highly enriched uranium, are intended never to be refuelled. But the Suffren reactor is designed to simplify refuelling, which could be completed during a scheduled refit in Australia. Used fuel can be reprocessed, simplifying decommissioning at the end of life.

True, the Suffren design does not have the weapon load, vertical launch missile tubes or 90-day endurance of the Virginia and, presumably, SSN-AUKUS. However, as a nuclear-powered relative of the Attack class it is much closer to the original Australian requirement for a replacement for the Collins class than SSN-AUKUS is shaping up to be. The design offers adequate capability for Australia’s needs in a package we can afford to own. We could operate 12 Suffrens and still need fewer crew members than we would under the AUKUS plan.

If we shifted to the Suffren design, we should nonetheless stick with the SSN training programs we’ve arranged with the US Navy and Royal Navy. We should also go ahead with establishing an intermediate repair facility that would support their SSNs as well as ours and with rotating them through Western Australia.

As for the AUKUS acquisition plan, we need to begin preparations now for jointly building Suffrens with France. Australia cannot wait for the US to finally say Virginias will be unavailable.

To the extent that design needs changing, we can go back to the work done for the Attack class, particularly incorporation of a US combat system and Australian standards.

Difficult, challenging and politically courageous? Surely. But not nearly as improbable getting SSNs under AUKUS on time.

https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/aukus-risks-are-piling-up-australia-must-prepare-to-build-french-ssns-instead/