Israel Vs Siria

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typhonman

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Israel Vs Siria
« em: Janeiro 13, 2005, 10:21:49 pm »
 

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« Responder #1 em: Novembro 23, 2005, 03:40:53 am »
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Secretário-geral da ONU apela à calma na fronteira israelo-libanesa

22.11.2005 - 23h40   AFP
 
O secretário-geral da ONU, Kofi Annan, lamentou hoje os confrontos na fronteira israelo-libanesa e apelou à calma. Ontem e hoje, quatro combatentes da milícia xiita libanesa Hezbollah morreram e onze israelitas ficaram feridos nos mais graves confrontos desde a retirada militar israelita em 2000.

Esta tarde, o secretário-geral adjunto da ONU para as questões políticas, Ibrahim Gambari, manifestou a sua “profunda preocupação” face a estes confrontos.

Dois helicópteros israelitas sobrevoaram hoje a fronteira israelo-libanesa.

Ontem, aparelhos israelitas lançaram mísseis sobre uma posição do Hezbollah xiita libanês, perto de Naqoura. Este ataque surgiu depois de violentos confrontos entre os combatentes xiitas e o Exército israelita, os mais intensos desde a retirada militar israelita do Sul do Líbano em 2000, ao fim de 22 anos de ocupação.

O Hezbollah registou quatro mortos e uma dezena de soldados e civis israelitas ficaram feridos por obuses lançados pelo Hezbollah.


O Hezbollah dá sinais de vida. Os "cães" do Ayatollah saíram da casota...
"If you don't have losses, you're not doing enough" - Rear Admiral Richard K. Turner
 

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typhonman

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« Responder #2 em: Novembro 23, 2005, 06:24:15 pm »
Gostei de ver os SPIKE a atingir os tanques libaneses. :P
 

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« Responder #3 em: Dezembro 28, 2005, 04:39:05 pm »
Na Faixa de Gaza, recentemente evacuada de colonatos e tropas israelitas, a Autoridade Nacional Palestiniana, presidida por Mahmoud Abbas, demonstra a cada dia a sua falta de pulso para instaurar a ordem e a segurança e tranquilidade públicas. As milícias e os grupos armados tomaram conta das ruas (ainda hoje 3 britânicos foram raptados); a polícia da ANP revela-se totalmente impotente; a corrupção grassa a todos os níveis (há milhões de euros da UE a encher os bolsos de meia dúzia de chupistas); as negociações para a composição de listas eleitorais da Fatah (partido de Arafat e, agora, de Abbas) não se faz à mesa das negociações, mas sim através de ataques armados a instalações da Comissão Eleitoral Palestiniana, em que se vandalizam uns escritórios e se partem umas cabeças; o norte da Faixa de Gaza continua a ser usado para o lançamento de foguetes artesanais contra território israelita; face ao desprestigio e à incompetência da ANP, face à pobreza e ao desemprego, o comum dos palestinianos vira-se para os extremistas do Hamas (financiado pela diáspora palestiniana e por governos muçulmanos), que se apresenta como partido favorito à vitória nas eleições legislativas de Janeiro, apesar de não reconhecer o estado de Israel e advogar a sua destruição.
"If you don't have losses, you're not doing enough" - Rear Admiral Richard K. Turner
 

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Quarteto rejeita presença de grupos armados no Governo pales
« Responder #4 em: Dezembro 29, 2005, 03:01:08 am »
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Movimentos acusados de se oporem à paz com Israel
Quarteto rejeita presença de grupos armados no Governo palestiniano


Publico
28.12.2005 - 22h14   AFP
 
O Quarteto para o Médio Oriente (Estados Unidos, Rússia e ONU e União Europeia) pronunciou-se hoje contra a presença de grupos armados no Governo palestiniano que será eleito nas legislativas previstas para 25 de Janeiro, considerando que esses movimentos se põem à paz com Israel.

“O Quarteto considera que um futuro Governo da Autoridade Palestiniana não deverá contar com membros que não estarão empenhados em respeitar o princípio do direito de Israel em existir em paz e segurança e que não renunciaram explicitamente à violência e ao terrorismo”, sustenta um comunicado divulgado em Washington.

O Quarteto, que foi o autor do “roteiro de paz”, um plano que prevê a criação de um Estado palestiniano na Cisjordânia e na Faixa de Gaza, apela, por outro lado, à Autoridade Palestiniana, presidida por Mahmoud Abbas, a impedir os ataques contra Israel perpetrados por grupos opositores ao processo de paz, como o Hamas e a Jihad Islâmica. A Autoridade Palestiniana deve “tomar medidas imediatas para assegurar a lei e a ordem, prevenir atentados e desmantelar as infra-estruturas do terrorismo”, continua o comunicado.

O grupo internacional encara as próximas eleições legislativas palestinianas como um “avanço positivo no caminho da consolidação da democracia palestiniana e no objectivo de uma solução para o conflito israelo-palestiniano”, apelando ainda às autoridades palestinianas que garantam um escrutínio “livre, justo e aberto”.

Fica a saudação à Autoridade Palestiniana por ter convidado observadores internacionais para acompanharem as eleições e encorajado as negociações interpalestinianas para a definição de um “código de conduta” para a participação no escrutínio.

Porém, sublinha o Quarteto, os candidatos “não se devem comprometer com grupos armados ou milícias porque existe uma contradição fundamental entre as suas actividades e a criação de um Estado democrático”. Nesse sentido, o Quarteto apela a todos os participantes que renunciem à violência, reconheçam o direito de Israel a existir e a desarmar”.

No comunicado é deixado ainda o pedido ao Governo de Israel e à Autoridade Palestiniana que reatem “imediatamente” o diálogo para coordenar os preparativos para as eleições. “As duas partes devem abrir caminho a um mecanismo que permita aos palestinianos que residem em Jerusalém exercer os seus direitos democráticos legítimos”, concluiu a nota.
"If you don't have losses, you're not doing enough" - Rear Admiral Richard K. Turner
 

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Jorge Pereira

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« Responder #5 em: Setembro 19, 2007, 06:46:09 pm »
Não sei se viram na SIC Notícias a reportagem na íntegra do Henrique Cymerman daquele que foi um episódio pouco divulgado e comentado.

Fantástico o trabalho do Henrique Cymerman. Infelizmente, o vídeo ainda não está disponível.

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Israel quer dialogar com Síria

SIC obteve detalhes de operação para destruir central nuclear

Nem Israel nem a Síria confirmam oficialmente, mas o correspondente da SIC na região obteve os detalhes sobre uma operação militar inédita. Há 12 dias, um raide israelita em território sírio levou à destruição de uma central nuclear. Entretanto, os dois governos dizem que a tensão acalmou e que poderá haver lugar a diálogo.

Henrique Cymerman
Correspondente SIC em Israel

Quase duas semanas depois da operação que tanto Israel como a Síria teimam em não confirmar oficialmente, o Presidente israelita diz que a situação está mais calma entre os dois países. "Tal como o primeiro-ministro Ehud Olmert disse, de forma séria e sincera, estamos prontos para negociar directamente com a Síria para chegar à paz. Por isso, porquê voltar a rumores e especulações?", disse Shimon Peres, hoje, numa conferência de imprensa com jornalistas estrangeiros.

"Tenho muito respeito pelo líder sírio e pela política síria. Eles têm problemas internos, mas não temos nenhuma razão para deixar de dialogar com a síria", disse o chefe do Governo, Ehud Olmert, ao jornal Haaretz.

No passado dia 6 de Setembro, a Síria disse que a sua defesa anti-área disparou contra aviões israelitas que penetraram no território; mas não deu pormenores sobre os objectivos e consequências do raide.

Mantém-se assim, a parede de silêncio sobre a operação militar cujos detalhes o correspondente da SIC, Henrique Cymerman, teve acesso junto de um piloto israelita que já havia chefiado um ataque contra a central nuclear do Iraque, em 1981.

O Governo de Telavive lançou um ataque aéreo e terrestre com forças especiais, para destruir uma central nuclear que estava ser construída no norte da Síria, com a colaboração da Coreia do Norte. Três dias antes da operação militar cirúrgica, tinha chegado a um porto sírio um carregamento secreto de plutónio. Foi a partir daí que o Governo israelita deu luz verde para o ataque, que teve a aprovação norte-americana.
Um dos primeiros erros do mundo moderno é presumir, profunda e tacitamente, que as coisas passadas se tornaram impossíveis.

Gilbert Chesterton, in 'O Que Há de Errado com o Mundo'






Cumprimentos
 

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JoseMFernandes

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« Responder #6 em: Setembro 20, 2007, 01:48:43 pm »
Extracto do editorial no jornal PÚBLICO de 20/9/2007 com titulo " O que é que aconteceu na SÍRIA no passado dia 6 de Setembro ?" e cujo subtítulo é a frase por mim sublinhada no fim.

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(...Quem alguma vez esteve nos territórios palestinianos sentiu a revolta de quem é pobre e se sente espoliado - tal como entende que o radicalismo e o fundamentalismo são mais responsáveis pela desgraça dos territórios do que o vizinho israelita. E quem alguma vez esteve em Israel percebe que o "complexo de cerco" de que se queixam os palestinianos - com razão, só que estão também sitiados pelos seus irmãos árabes - é omnipresente no discurso judeu. Pelo seu passado e pela noção que, se perderem uma guerra, perdem todas e podem ser varridos do mapa.
Por isso, quando em Israel se fala da ameaça síria ou iraniana não se fala de algo distante e hipotético: fala-se antes de uma realidade indesmentível, pois para aniquilar aquele pequeno território bastariam duas ou três bombas nucleares. Ou mesmo uma só. Daí que o crescendo de tensão na região - de que damos hoje conta nas nossas páginas - não deva ser dissociado daquilo que não pode ser noticiado e sobre o qual pouco ou nada sabemos. Como, por exemplo, o que é que aconteceu a 6 de Setembro passado, quando caças israelitas realizaram, na Síria, a designada "Operação Orquídea".
Um texto de Bret Stephens, ex-director do Jerusalem Post, publicado terça-feira no The Wall Street Journal, ajuda-nos contudo a perceber o que se pode estar a passar na mais perigosa região do globo sem que a tal estejamos atentos.

Oque é que esse texto recorda? Primeiro, que apesar de ninguém o assumir oficialmente, os israelitas adaptaram os seus submarinos comprados à Alemanha para que estes possam transportar mísseis nucleares. Segundo, que o silêncio de Jerusalém e Damasco sobre o raide de 6 de Setembro pode significar que aquilo que se passou nesse dia não é confessável, neste momento, por nenhum dos dois governos - o que é muito significativo.
Na verdade, se a explicação oficiosa fosse verdadeira - tratar-se de uma acção preventiva contra o rearmamento pela Síria do Hezbollah, Christiane Amanpour dixit -, então o Governo israelita festejaria se tivesse resultado num triunfo, ou Damasco exultaria se tivesse ocorrido um fracasso. Como isso não aconteceu, o que se passou a 6 de Setembro foi algo de que não interessa a nenhum dos governos falar. Ou assumir.
A hipótese de Bret Stephens é que, nesse dia, Israel procedeu a um raide semelhante ao que levou a cabo contra o reactor nuclear de Osirak, no Iraque de Saddam Hussein. O alvo não seria uma instalação semelhante, mas qualquer coisa (um depósito? Um laboratório?) em que estariam envolvidos norte-coreanos, isto é, em que poderia existir tecnologia norte-coreana para fabricar uma bomba nuclear ou, no limite, um ou mais engenhos totalmente desenvolvidos. A hipótese não é surreal, pois é conhecido que a Coreia do Norte já tentou transferir para países da região a tecnologia que já terá desenvolvido.
Estaríamos assim perante uma operação secreta, mas destinada a enviar uma mensagem clara: mesmo que a comunidade internacional, via Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas, não consiga fazer parar as ambições nucleares do Irão, há um pequeno país cujo povo se sente ameaçado e que não hesitará em recorrer às acções mais arrojadas para garantir a sua sobrevivência. Isto é, que esse mesmo pequeno país não espera que as potências se entendam para recordar ao mundo que nenhuma acção diplomática contra um Estado agressivo e hostil é eficaz, se não for acompanhada por uma ameaça credível.
Esse raide de 6 de Setembro associado aos desenvolvimentos dos últimos dias - em especial a contínua interferência da Síria no Líbano e as declarações - que não foram uma gaffe, bem pelo contrário - de Bernard Kouchner, o ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros francês, sobre a necessidade de estarmos preparados para uma guerra com o Irão são sinais de que a reunião de amanhã do Conselho de Segurança decorrerá no ambiente próprio de quem anda no fio da navalha. Saiba quem pode evitar que um dia não recordemos o 6 de Setembro de 2007 como o início de um conflito de proporções inimagináveis.
 

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Upham

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Re: Israel Vs Siria
« Responder #7 em: Setembro 20, 2007, 03:35:56 pm »
Citação de: "Typhonman"

http://www.correiomanha.pt/noticia.asp? ... al=21&p=94

Mais lenha pa fogueira.. :roll:



Boa tarde!

Acho pouco provavel. A desproporção (de qualidade) de forças com vantagem para Israel é ainda maior hoje em dia do que o era no tempo da guerra do Yom Kipur nos anos 70.
A não ser claro que o presidente Hassad (filho) e os dirigentes do partido Baas seja acometidos de um ataque de loucura.

Cumprimentos!
"Nos confins da Ibéria, vive um povo que não se governa, nem se deixa governar."

Frase atribuida a Caio Julio César.
 

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Luso

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« Responder #8 em: Setembro 21, 2007, 11:53:52 pm »
http://www.defensetech.org/
What Actually Happened in the Syrian Desert?

One of the stories that’s been intriguing the heck out of me over the past couple of weeks is that Israeli air strike into Syria.

Just today, the most solid facts of the strike have leaked out, but Bush administration officials are still publicly mum on the aerial attack that reportedly took out a nascent nuke capability deep in northern Syria.

The reports show that a North Korean ship docked at a Syrian port just a few days before the strike loaded with a shipment of “cement” (ya, right...). Here’s what the reports are saying:

Unlike its destruction of an Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981, Israel made no announcement of the recent raid and imposed strict censorship on reporting by the Israeli media. Syria made only muted protests, and Arab leaders have remained silent. As a result, a daring and apparently successful attack to eliminate a potential nuclear threat has been shrouded in mystery.

"There is no question it was a major raid. It was an extremely important target," said Bruce Riedel, a former intelligence officer at Brookings Institution's Saban Center for Middle East Policy. "It came at a time the Israelis were very concerned about war with Syria and wanted to dampen down the prospects of war. The decision was taken despite their concerns it could produce a war. That decision reflects how important this target was to Israeli military planners."

Israel has long known about Syria's interest in chemical and even biological weapons, but "if Syria decided to go beyond that, Israel would think that was a real red line," Riedel said.

And something else...

Some current and former American officials, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because information about the raid remained classified, said they believed that the site was involved in Syria’s missile program. They said that Israeli intelligence officials believed that they had evidence that the activity at the site involved North Korean engineers believed to work in the nuclear program.

So far, several current and former American officials who have been involved in evaluating the Israeli claims say they are not yet convinced of a nuclear connection. Yet the enormous secrecy around the findings, both here and in Israel, suggests that the activity that prompted the Israeli attack involved “more than a run-of-the-mill missile transaction,” one official said, noting that the Israelis took considerable risks in carrying out the attack.

Actually, I also wonder whether the Syrians would take such a huge risk, though pressure from their Iranian task masters could have outweighed the suicidal nature of this potential program.

But what’s most intriguing about the strike is what it says about Syria’s air defense system. Some claim that the Syrians have one of the most advanced SAM and radar-tracking architectures manufactured in Russia – the same one used to protect Tehran – called the Pantsyr. Apparently the unstealthy F-15I Israeli aircraft were able to make it into Syria without being shot out of the sky, and some reports indicate that they snuck their way out through Turkey either with permission or without.

I’ve heard that the jamming of the Syrian air defenses was so severe that it shut down civilian comms inside Lebanon for the better part of a day. Pretty impressive; and that could be why Iran has been largely silent on the matter – it would tip their hand that they are as vulnerable as the Syrians.
Ai de ti Lusitânia, que dominarás em todas as nações...
 

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JoseMFernandes

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« Responder #9 em: Setembro 22, 2007, 10:32:55 am »
No jornal PUBLICO (22/9/07):

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Como Israel entrou, atacou e saiu da Síria
22.09.2007


A 3 de Setembro, um navio norte-coreano terá atracado no porto sírio de Tartus onde deixou um carregamento catalogado como "cimento". Para Israel, que recebera inquietantes dados dos seus espiões da Mossad, a carga era outra: equipamento nuclear. Três dias depois, lançava uma das mais arrojadas e secretas operações militares - por terra e ar -, para neutralizar a "devastadora surpresa" que Damasco estaria a preparar.
Os pilotos da força atacante terão recebido apenas escassas informações sobre o que deveriam atingir - e só depois de já estarem a bordo dos seus caças F-15. Quanto ao comando terrestre Shaldag, que terá chegado um dia antes do raide, não fazia, aparentemente, a mínima ideia sobre a natureza do que iria ser bombardeado. Posicionadas próximo de um "depósito subterrâneo", as tropas teriam como missão "dirigir raios laser" para guiar os aviões até ao alvo.
Não há versão oficial destes acontecimentos, apenas histórias - não desmentidas - contadas pelo Sunday Times, Washington Post e por todos os jornais hebraicos que, citaram os media estrangeiros, para contornar a censura militar israelita. Já era madrugada do dia 6, quando os F15 da 69.ª esquadra israelita atravessaram a linha costeira síria para atacar uma instalação junto à fronteira com o Iraque (Sunday Times) ou com a Turquia (WPost).
O alvo foi identificado como sendo "um centro de investigação agrícola", nas margens do rio Eufrates, suspeito de servir para a "extracção de urânio a partir de fosfatos". De modo a localizá-lo com precisão, os israelitas desviaram do Irão para a Síria o novo satélite Ofek 7, que, a cada 90 minutos, enviava "imagens de alta qualidade" sobre a instalação vigiada. Antes de dar luz verde ao ataque, o Estado judaico procedeu a uma manobra de diversão, reduzindo o número das suas forças nos Montes Golã, conquistados à Síria na guerra de 1967. Esta decisão fez com que Damasco "baixasse a guarda", observou o Sunday Times.
Foi nessa altura que o Governo de Ehud Olmert decidiu avançar. Além do primeiro-ministro israelita, só dois outros titulares - os da Defesa, Ehud Barak, e dos Negócios Estrangeiros, Tzipi Lvni - estariam a par de todos os detalhes.
Na quinta-feira, o líder do partido Likud, na oposição, Benjanin Netanyahu, revelou que também ele foi previamente avisado da "operação estratégica" - uma inconfidência que o deixou sob críticas cerradas do establishment político no país.
Como seria de esperar, a Administração de George W. Bush também teve conhecimento de todos os preparativos, desde o início, tendo ambos os países partilhado dados de espionagem recolhidos.
Segundo responsáveis citados pelo Sunday Times, a Força Aérea Israelita recebeu também da sua congénere norte-americana, através de um adido militar em Washington, os códigos necessários para que os F-15 israelitas envolvidos na operação não atacassem, por engano, os F-15 dos EUA.
Israel impôs o que o diário britânico considerou um silêncio draconiano e o ataque só foi conhecido dez dias depois de ter sido desencadeado, quando os sírios se queixaram da violação do seu espaço aéreo, alegando que accionou defesas e forçou os aparelhos invasores a "largar os tanques de combustível para se tornarem mais leves e mais facilmente escaparem".
O receio dos israelitas era o de que o alegado equipamento nuclear norte-coreano poderia vir a ser instalado nos cerca de "60 a 120" mísseis Scud-C que Damasco terá comprado a Pyongyang nos últimos 15 anos e que estarão a ser melhorados para ter um alcance de 300 milhas.
Para Israel, salientou ontem o Washington Post, se a Síria "fosse para além do seu interesse em adquirir armas químicas e biológicas (...), teria ultrapassado uma verdadeira linha vermelha". M.S.L.



Aumentam as suspeitas de cooperação nuclear Damasco-Pyongyang
22.09.2007, Margarida Santos Lopes

EUA e Israel trocaram informações de espionagem sobre alegado fornecimento de equipamento norte-
-coreano à Síria. Estado judaico está em alerta




Os israelitas duvidam que Bashar Al-Assad tenha a mesma "sensibilidade para não pisar
o risco" que tinha o seu pai
a A Coreia do Norte e a Síria reuniram-se ontem, ao mais alto nível, em Pyongyang, para discutir "formas de reforçar a amizade e a cooperação", noticiou o jornal Ha"aretz, referindo um aumento das suspeitas de que os dois países estarão a colaborar num programa de armas nucleares. Israel, por seu turno, elevou o nível de alerta na fronteira com o seu hostil vizinho, segundo o Jerusalem Post.
Nas conversações participaram Choe Tae Bok, secretário do comité central do Partido dos Trabalhadores da Coreia do Norte, e Said Eleia Dawood, director do Departamento de Organização do Partido Árabe Baas Socialista, da Síria.
Não foram dados mais pormenores sobre este encontro, que se segue a uma revelação do Washington Post de que antes de decidir atacar a Síria - o raide terá ocorrido a 6 deste mês -, Israel partilhou informações dos serviços secretos com os Estados Unidos, provando que as dinastias republicanas de Bashar al-Assad e de Kim Jong-il estão a colaborar num projecto atómico.
O Presidente George W. Bush terá ficado extremamente preocupado com os relatórios dos espiões da Mossad, e mostrou-se relutante em aceitar uma "imediata" operação israelita, semelhante à que, em 1981, destruiu o reactor iraquiano de Osirak. Bush receava pôr em perigo as bem encaminhadas negociações multilaterais para cessar as actividades nucleares da Coreia do Norte. No final, porém, os dois aliados acabaram por "corroborar a intelligence original", que incluía imagens de satélite, abrindo caminho a um "ataque na calada da noite, para minimizar possíveis baixas", segundo o WPost.
Sírios e norte-coreanos desmentem vigorosamente qualquer colaboração a nível nuclear. Quanto ao alegado ataque, Damasco apenas se queixou de que o seu espaço aéreo foi violado e que accionou baterias de defesa para repelir os aparelhos invasores, mas não forneceu pormenores.
Israel manteve um mutismo quase absoluto. O mesmo aconteceu com os países árabes. E Bush recusou também responder a quaisquer perguntas sobre esta questão. Recomendou apenas aos norte-coreanos que "honrem os compromissos de eliminar as suas armas" e de não ajudar outros países a obter tecnologia que "contribua para a proliferação".
Risco de guerra
"Não há dúvida que foi lançado um grande raide", asseverou ao WPost Bruce Radel, antigo agente secreto e agora investigador no Saban Center for Middle East Policy da Brookings Institution. "Foi lançado numa altura em que os israelitas estavam muito preocupados com uma guerra com a Síria e quiseram diminuir as perspectivas de guerra. A decisão foi tomada apesar de recearem que poderiam iniciar uma guerra. Essa decisão reflecte o quão importante era este alvo para os estrategas militares de Israel."
Edward Djerejian, ex-embaixador dos EUA na Síria e fundador do Baker Institute for Public Policy, da Rice University, estava em Israel no Verão e constatou "grande inquietação nos círculos oficiais israelitas sobre a situação no Norte". Interrogavam-se, disse ele ao WPost, sobre se o jovem Bashar "teria a mesma sensibilidade em não pisar o risco como tinha o seu pai", o defunto Hafez al-Assad.
O ataque israelita foi lançado três dias depois de um navio norte-coreano ter chegado ao porto sírio de Tartus com uma carga classificada como "cimento". O que o navio realmente transportava permanece, porém, um mistério. Responsáveis israelitas não identificados garantem que era equipamento nuclear. Outras fontes falam em "componentes de mísseis".
Outros referem que o raide e a chegada do navio foram "mera coincidência". Outros ainda levantam a possibilidade de a Coreia do Norte estar apenas a desfazer-se de material de que já não necessitava. E outros alvitraram que a acção israelita foi precipitada pelo temor de uma fuga para os media sobre o que a espionagem tinha recolhido.
O que realmente se passou no deserto da Síria, na madrugada de 6 de Setembro, ainda é e deverá permanecer durante algum tempo um segredo de vários Estados.


 

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« Responder #10 em: Outubro 01, 2007, 10:52:18 pm »
Síria acusa fontes dos EUA de boato sobre operação israelense

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NAÇÕES UNIDAS (Reuters) - A Síria acusou fontes não-especificadas nos Estados Unidos de espalhar "notícias fabricadas" sobre uma ofensiva aérea israelense em território sírio no mês passado.

Algumas autoridades norte-americanas ligaram a operação de 6 de setembro a aparentes suspeitas israelenses de cooperação nuclear entre a Síria e a Coréia do Norte. A Síria não disse qual era o alvo da operação, e o governo israelense não quis fazer comentários sobre o assunto.

O ministro das Relações Exteriores da Síria, Walid al-Moualem, disse à Assembléia Geral da ONU que a operação foi "o mais recente ato de agressão israelense contra a Síria" e que foi "prova do desejo de Israel de aumentar a escala da tensão".

"Algumas fontes nos EUA espalharam boatos e notícias fabricadas para justificar esse ato de agressão", disse Moualem. "Ao distorcer os fatos, tornaram-se cúmplices de Israel." O governo sírio tinha dito que o ataque atingiu uma área deserta, depois que sistemas de defesa aéreo enfrentaram a aeronave.

"A não-condenação pela comunidade internacional, incluindo o Conselho de Segurança (da ONU), desse ato de agressão incentivaria Israel a persistir nessa atitude hostil, e levaria à exacerbação das tensões na região", disse Moualem.

A Síria fez uma reclamação no dia 11 de setembro ao Conselho de Segurança e ao secretário-geral da ONU, Ban Ki-moon, mas não requisitou nenhuma ação específica por parte da organização.

Diplomatas de Damasco afirmam que pelo menos quatro aviões israelenses entraram em território sírio na operação. Sugeriram que o alvo pudesse envolver o fornecimento de mísseis pela Coréia do Norte, mas minimizaram afirmações sobre uma ligação nuclear.

Síria e Israel estão oficialmente em guerra. As negociações de paz fracassaram em 2000 por causa da questão da desocupação das colinas do Golã, tomadas por Israel da Síria durante a Guerra dos Seis Dias, em 1967.

 

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« Responder #11 em: Outubro 01, 2007, 11:24:40 pm »
Pelos vistos, as operações especiais actuaram também no ataque, não se sabendo ao certo que acção desempenharam.
Ai de ti Lusitânia, que dominarás em todas as nações...
 

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« Responder #12 em: Outubro 02, 2007, 05:33:37 pm »
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Israel, Syria and the Glaring Secret

By George Friedman    
   
What happened in the Middle East on Sept. 6?

The first reports came from the Syrians, who said their air defenses fired at an Israeli warplane that had penetrated Syrian airspace and dropped some ordnance on the country's North. The plane then fled toward the Mediterranean at supersonic speeds, the Syrians said, noting that sonic booms had been heard.

A Syrian delegation was meeting Turkish officials about the same time, and the Turks announced that two Israeli fuel tanks had been dropped inside of Turkish territory, one in Gaziantep province and the other in Hatay province. That would mean the aircraft did come under some sort of fire and dropped fuel tanks to increase speed and maneuverability. It also would mean the plane was flying close to Turkish territory or over Turkish territory, at the northwestern tip of Syria.

The Israelis said nothing. It appeared at first glance that an Israeli reconnaissance flight had attracted Syrian attention and got out of there fast, though even that was puzzling. The Israelis monitor Syria carefully, but they have close relations with the Turkish military, which also watches Syria carefully. We would assume they have intelligence-sharing programs and that reconnaissance in this area could have been done by the Turks or, more likely, by Israeli reconnaissance satellites. Yet, an Israeli reconnaissance flight seemed like the only coherent explanation.

What was most striking from the beginning was the relative silence on all sides. The Israelis remained mum, not even bothering to leak a misleading but plausible story. The Syrians, after threatening to take the issue to the U.N. Security Council, have been less vociferous than one would expect. The United States had nothing official to say, but U.S. sources leaked a series of incompatible explanations. The Turks, after requesting an explanation for the fuel tanks, dropped the matter.

The leaks, which seemed to be coming from the Americans, raised the scope of the operation from a reconnaissance to something more. It was U.S. sources who said up to eight aircraft were involved in the operation. Early on, a leak originating in the United States implied that there might have been Israeli commandos involved as well. U.S. leaks also mentioned that a shipment of cement had been delivered to Syria from North Korea a few days before the incident and implied that this shipment might have contained nuclear equipment of some sort that was the real target of the attack. All three countries were silent officially on the intent of the attack, but the Americans were filling in some blanks with unofficial hints.

The media also were filled with a range of contradictory speculation. One story said this was a dry run for an Israeli air attack against Iran. Another said the Israelis were demonstrating their ability -- and hence the U.S. ability -- to neutralize Syrian air defenses as a signal to Iran that it, too, is vulnerable. Some stories also claimed that new missiles, not nuclear materials, were being shipped to Syria. There were many other explanations, but these were either pure speculation or were deliberately being fed to the media in order to confuse the issue.

Officials finally started to go public last week. Israeli opposition leader and former Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said he was consulted in advance and supported Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's action in Syria. U.S. President George W. Bush went out of his way -- commenting directly and through his press secretary -- to make it understood that he also knew a raid had been carried out, but had absolutely nothing to say about it. That drew attention to two things. First, the United States knew what was going on. Second, the United States was going to keep the secret -- and the secret was an important one. Between Netanyahu and Bush, the reconnaissance theory was dead. An important operation occurred Sept. 6. It remains absolutely unclear what it was about.

Another leak appeared via the Sunday Times, this time with enough granularity to consider it a genuine leak. According to that report, the operation was carried out by Israeli commandos supported by Israeli aircraft, under the direct management of Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak. It had been planned since June, just after Barak took office, and had been approved by the United States after some hesitation. The target was in fact nuclear "material" provided by North Korea, according to that leak.

All of this makes perfect sense, save one thing. Why the secrecy? If the Syrians have nuclear facilities, the Israelis should be delighted to make it public. Frankly, so should the United States, since the Bush administration has always argued that nuclear proliferation to rogue states, including Syria, is one of the key problems in the world. The Syrians should be spinning the story like crazy as well, denying the nuclear program but screaming about unprovoked Israeli-U.S. aggression. The silence from one or two parties makes sense. The silence from all parties makes little sense.

Looked at differently, Israel and the United States both have gone out of their way to draw attention to the fact that a highly significant military operation took place in Northern Syria, and compounded the attention by making no attempt to provide a plausible cover story. They have done everything possible to draw attention to the affair without revealing what the affair was about. Israel and the United States have a lot of ways to minimize the importance of the operation. By the way they have handled it, however, each has chosen to maximize its importance.

Whoever they are keeping the secret from, it is not the Syrians. They know precisely what was attacked and why. The secret is not being kept from the Iranians either. The Syrians talk to them all the time. It is hard to imagine any government of importance and involvement that has not been briefed by someone. And by now, the public perception has been shaped as well. So, why the dramatic secrecy designed to draw everyone's attention to the secret and the leaks that seem to explain it?

Let us assume that the Sunday Times report is correct. According to the Times, Barak focused on the material as soon as he became defense minister in June. That would mean the material had reached Syria prior to that date. Obviously, the material was not a bomb, or Israel would not have waited until September to act. So it was, at most, some precursor nuclear material or equipment.

However, an intervening event occurred this summer that should be factored in here. North Korea publicly shifted its position on its nuclear program, agreeing to abandon it and allow inspections of its facilities. It also was asked to provide information on the countries it sold any nuclear technology to, though North Korea has publicly denied any proliferation. This was, in the context of the six-party negotiations surrounding North Korea, a major breakthrough.

Any agreement with North Korea is, by definition, unstable. North Korea many times has backed off of agreements that seemed cast in stone. In particular, North Korea wants to be seen as a significant power and treated with all due respect. It does not intend to be treated as an outlaw nation subject to interrogation and accusations. Its self-image is an important part of its domestic strategy and, internally, it can position its shift in its nuclear stance as North Korea making a strategic deal with other major powers. If North Korea is pressed publicly, its willingness to implement its agreements can very quickly erode. That is not something the United States and other powers want to see happen.

Whether the Israelis found out about the material through their own intelligence sources or North Korea provided a list of recipients of nuclear technology to the United States is unclear. The Israelis have made every effort to make it appear that they knew about this independently. They also have tried to make it appear that they notified the United States, rather than the other way around. But whether the intelligence came from North Korea or was obtained independently, Washington wants to be very careful in its handling of Pyongyang right now.

The result is the glaring secrecy of the last few weeks. Certainly, Israel and the United States wanted it known that Syria had nuclear material, and that it was attacked. This served as a warning to other recipients of North Korean nuclear technology -- most especially Iran. At the same time, the United States did not want to publicly embarrass North Korea, out of fear that the North Koreans would simply chuck the disarmament talks. Moreover, Damascus had no interest in publicizing that it had thoughts of a nuclear program, so it quieted down.

We should note that if this theory is true, and the United States and Israel discovered the existence of a Syrian nuclear program only from North Korean information, this would represent one of the most massive intelligence failures imaginable by both Israel and the United States. Essentially, it would mean that, unless this was the first shipment of material to Syria, Israel and the United States failed to detect a Syrian nuclear program on their own. That is possible, but not likely.

It is a neat theory. It might even be a true theory. But it has problems. The biggest problem is why Syria would be trying to obtain nuclear technology. Sandwiched between Israel and Turkey -- a country that has not had great relations with Syria in the past -- and constantly watched by the United States, the probability of it developing a nuclear capability undetected is infinitesimal, and the probability of Israel not taking it out is nonexistent. Moreover, Syria is not Iran. It is poorer, has less scientific and other resources and lacks the capability to mount a decadelong development effort. Syria actually plays a fairly conservative game, taking its risks in Lebanese politics and allowing jihadists to transit through the country on their way to Iraq. Trying to take on Israel or the United States in a nuclear gambit is not the Syrians' style. But certainly they were caught doing something, or they would be screaming to high heaven.

There has been persistent discussion of nuclear material in Syria, which, if we took the words seriously, would tend to indicate that something radioactive, such as enriched uranium or plutonium, was present. If what was delivered was not equipment but radioactive material, the threat might not have been a Syrian nuclear program, but some sort of radioactive device -- a dirty bomb -- that might be handed off to Hezbollah. The head of Israel's military intelligence was quoted as saying something about the attack having re-established Israel's deterrence power after its failures in the 2006 conflict with Hezbollah. Perhaps the problem was that the material was being transferred from North Korea to Syria on its way to Lebanon, possibly to use against Israel.

That would explain Syria's relative silence. Concern that the deal with North Korea will fall apart might keep the United States quiet. But a Syrian transfer of such material to Hezbollah normally would set Israel to raging at the Syrians. The Americans might have kept quiet, but the Israelis would have leaked much earlier than this. Israel would want to use the threat as a tool in its public relations war.

Another reason for the silence could be psychological warfare against Iran. The speculation above might be true in some variant, but by remaining ominously silent, the Israelis and Americans might be trying to shake Iran's nerve, by demonstrating their intelligence capability, their special operations ability and the reach of their air power. With the Israelis having carried out this attack, this very visible secrecy might be designed to make Iran wonder whether it is next, and from what direction an attack might come.

Normally such international game-playing would not interest us. The propensity of governments to create secrets out of the obvious is one of the more tedious aspects of international relations. But this secret is not obvious, and it is not trivial. Though it is true that something is finally being leaked three weeks after the attack, what is being leaked is neither complete nor reliable. It seems to make sense, but you really have to work hard at it.

At a time when the United States is signaling hostile intentions toward Iran, the events in Syria need to be understood, and the fact that they remain opaque is revealing. The secrecy is designed to make a lot of people nervous. Interestingly, the Israelis threw a change-up pitch the week after the attack, signaling once again that they wanted to open talks with the Syrians -- a move the Syrians quickly rebuffed.

When events get so strange that interpretation is a challenge, it usually indicates it was intended that way, that the events are significant and that they could point to further instability. We do not know whether that is true, but Israel and the United States have certainly worked hard to create a riddle wrapped in a mystery.
 

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« Responder #13 em: Outubro 04, 2007, 04:19:48 am »
Da gosto ver estes judeus em accao!
 

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« Responder #14 em: Outubro 15, 2007, 09:54:31 am »
The New York Times- 14/10/2007

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October 14, 2007
Israel Struck Syrian Nuclear Project, Analysts Say
 
By DAVID E. SANGER and MARK MAZZETTI

WASHINGTON,  — Israel’s air attack on Syria last month was directed against a site that Israeli and American intelligence analysts judged was a partly constructed nuclear reactor, apparently modeled on one North Korea has used to create its stockpile of nuclear weapons fuel, according to American and foreign officials with access to the intelligence reports.

The description of the target addresses one of the central mysteries surrounding the Sept. 6 attack, and suggests that Israel carried out the raid to demonstrate its determination to snuff out even a nascent nuclear project in a neighboring state. The Bush administration was divided at the time about the wisdom of Israel’s strike, American officials said, and some senior policy makers still regard the attack as premature.

The attack on the reactor project has echoes of an Israeli raid more than a quarter century ago, in 1981, when Israel destroyed the Osirak nuclear reactor in Iraq shortly before it was to have begun operating. That attack was officially condemned by the Reagan administration, though Israelis consider it among their military’s finest moments. In the weeks before the Iraq war, Bush administration officials said they believed that the attack set back Iraq’s nuclear ambitions by many years.

By contrast, the facility that the Israelis struck in Syria appears to have been much further from completion, the American and foreign officials said. They said it would have been years before the Syrians could have used the reactor to produce the spent nuclear fuel that could, through a series of additional steps, be reprocessed into bomb-grade plutonium.

Many details remain unclear, most notably how much progress the Syrians had made in construction before the Israelis struck, the role of any assistance provided by North Korea, and whether the Syrians could make a plausible case that the reactor was intended to produce electricity. In Washington and Israel, information about the raid has been wrapped in extraordinary secrecy and restricted to just a handful of officials, while the Israeli press has been prohibited from publishing information about the attack.

The New York Times reported this week that a debate had begun within the Bush administration about whether the information secretly cited by Israel to justify its attack should be interpreted by the United States as reason to toughen its approach to Syria and North Korea. In later interviews, officials made clear that the disagreements within the administration began this summer, as a debate about whether an Israeli attack on the incomplete reactor was warranted then.

The officials did not say that the administration had ultimately opposed the Israeli strike, but that Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates were particularly concerned about the ramifications of a pre-emptive strike in the absence of an urgent threat.

“There wasn’t a lot of debate about the evidence,” said one American official familiar with the intense discussions over the summer between Washington and the government of Prime Minister Ehud Olmert of Israel. “There was a lot of debate about how to respond to it.”

Even though it has signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, Syria would not have been obligated to declare the existence of a reactor during the early phases of construction. It would have also had the legal right to complete construction of the reactor, as long as its purpose was to generate electricity.

In his only public comment on the raid, Syria’s president, Bashar al-Assad, acknowledged this month that Israeli jets dropped bombs on a building that he said was “related to the military” but which he insisted was “not used.”

A senior Israeli official, while declining to speak about the specific nature of the target, said the strike was intended to “re-establish the credibility of our deterrent power,” signaling that Israel meant to send a message to the Syrians that even the potential for a nuclear weapons program would not be permitted. But several American officials said the strike may also have been intended by Israel as a signal to Iran and its nuclear aspirations. Neither Iran nor any Arab government except for Syria has criticized the Israeli raid, suggesting that Israel is not the only country that would be disturbed by a nuclear Syria. North Korea did issue a protest.

The target of the Israeli raid and the American debate about the Syrian project were described by government officials and nongovernment experts interviewed in recent weeks in the United States and the Middle East. All insisted on anonymity because of rules that prohibit discussing classified information. The officials who described the target of the attack included some on each side of the debate about whether a partly constructed Syrian nuclear reactor should be seen as an urgent concern, as well as some who described themselves as neutral on the question.

The White House press secretary, Dana Perino, said Saturday that the administration would have no comment on the intelligence issues surrounding the Israeli strike. Israel has also refused to comment.

Nuclear reactors can be used for both peaceful and non-peaceful purposes. A reactor’s spent fuel can be reprocessed to extract plutonium, one of two paths to building a nuclear weapon. The other path — enriching uranium in centrifuges — is the method that Iran is accused of pursuing with an intent to build a weapon of its own.

Syria is known to have only one nuclear reactor, a small one built for research purposes. But in the past decade, Syria has several times sought unsuccessfully to buy one, first from Argentina, then from Russia. On those occasions, Israel reacted strongly but did not threaten military action. Earlier this year, Mr. Assad spoke publicly in general terms about Syria’s desire to develop nuclear power, but his government did not announce a plan to build a new reactor.

The Gulf Cooperation Council, a group of Persian Gulf states, has also called for an expansion of nuclear power in the Middle East for energy purposes, but many experts have interpreted that statement as a response to Iran’s nuclear program. They have warned that the region may be poised for a wave of proliferation. Israel is believed to be the only nuclear-armed nation in the region.

The partly constructed Syrian reactor was detected earlier this year by satellite photographs, according to American officials. They suggested that the facility had been brought to American attention by the Israelis, but would not discuss why American spy agencies seemed to have missed the early phases of construction.

North Korea has long provided assistance to Syria on a ballistic missile program, but any assistance toward the construction of the reactor would have been the first clear evidence of ties between the two countries on a nuclear program. North Korea has successfully used its five-megawatt reactor at the Yongbyon nuclear complex to reprocess nuclear fuel into bomb-grade material, a model that some American and Israeli officials believe Syria may have been trying to replicate.

The North conducted a partly successful test of a nuclear device a year ago, prompting renewed fears that the desperately poor country might seek to sell its nuclear technology. President Bush issued a specific warning to the North on Oct. 9, 2006, just hours after the test, noting that it was “leading proliferator of missile technology, including transfers to Iran and Syria.” He went on to warn that “the transfer of nuclear weapons or material by North Korea to states or non-state entities would be considered a grave threat to the United States, and we would hold North Korea fully accountable.”

While Bush administration officials have made clear in recent weeks that the target of the Israeli raid was linked to North Korea in some way, Mr. Bush has not repeated his warning since the attack. In fact, the administration has said very little about the country’s suspected role in the Syria case, apparently for fear of upending negotiations now under way in which North Korea has pledged to begin disabling its nuclear facilities.

While the partly constructed Syrian reactor appears to be based on North Korea’s design, the American and foreign officials would not say whether they believed the North Koreans sold or gave the plans to the Syrians, or whether the North’s own experts were there at the time of the attack. It is possible, some officials said, that the transfer of the technology occurred several years ago.

According to two senior administration officials, the subject was raised when the United States, North Korea and four other nations met in Beijing earlier this month.

Behind closed doors, however, Vice President Dick Cheney and other hawkish members of the administration have made the case that the same intelligence that prompted Israel to attack should lead the United States to reconsider delicate negotiations with North Korea over ending its nuclear program, as well as America’s diplomatic strategy toward Syria, which has been invited to join Middle East peace talks in Annapolis, Md., next month.

Mr. Cheney in particular, officials say, has also cited the indications that North Korea aided Syria to question the Bush administration’s agreement to supply the North with large amounts of fuel oil. During Mr. Bush’s first term, Mr. Cheney was among the advocates of a strategy to squeeze the North Korean government in hopes that it would collapse, and the administration cut off oil shipments set up under an agreement between North Korea and the Clinton administration, saying the North had cheated on that accord.

The new shipments, agreed to last February, are linked to North Korea’s carrying through on its pledge to disable its nuclear facilities by the end of the year. Nonetheless, Mr. Bush has approved going ahead with that agreement, even after he was aware of the Syrian program.

Nuclear experts say that North Korea’s main reactor, while small by international standards, is big enough to produce roughly one bomb’s worth of plutonium a year.

In an interview, Dr. Siegfried S. Hecker of Stanford University, a former director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, said building a reactor based on North Korea’s design might take from three to six years.

Reporting was contributed by William J. Broad in New York, Helene Cooper in Washington and Steven Erlanger in Jerusalem.