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https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-53415693
Azerbaijan protesters demand war after Armenia clashes
Thousands have demonstrated in Azerbaijan calling for war after recent deadly clashes with neighbouring Armenia.
Protesters marched through the capital Baku demanding the government fully deploy the army, with some even entering the national parliament.
Security forces responded with water cannon and tear gas to disperse the crowds.
The recent border fighting has killed at least 16 people.
Both Armenia and Azerbaijan were part of the Soviet Union before its collapse in the 1990s.
Since then they have been stuck in an unresolved conflict over a piece of disputed territory called Nagorno-Karabakh, internationally recognised as part of Azerbaijan but controlled by ethnic Armenians.
The latest deadly flare up in fighting - far to the north of Nagorno-Karabakh - has prompted an international response.
Russia and the US have called for calm. On Wednesday, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said his country was "deeply concerned" by the violence and called for "immediate de-escalation" and a resumption of peace talks.
On Tuesday, Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said his country would not hesitate to defend Azerbaijan.
What happened in Baku?
Thousands gathered in Baku's Azadliq Square on Tuesday night waving the national flag and calling for the government to mobilise troops and retake Nagorno-Karabakh.
Demonstrators yelled "Karabakh is Azerbaijan!" and "Mobilisation!" as they marched through the city toward the national assembly. Some called for the head of the armed forces to resign.
A small group of protesters entered the building, reportedly smashing windows and chandeliers inside before they were removed by security forces. Police used water cannon and tear gas to disperse the crowds outside.
This was the largest public gathering in the country for years, with some media reports estimating up to 30,000 people taking part.
Officials condemned the protesters' actions. On Wednesday, the interior ministry said seven people had been arrested for "mass riots" and "resistance or use of force against a government official", and a full investigation is under way. Seven officers were injured, a statement said.
Mass gatherings are currently banned in Azerbaijan in a bid to control the spread of the coronavirus.
What's happening on the border?
Fighting broke out over the weekend involving tanks and artillery. On Wednesday, however, defence officials from both countries said there had been no fresh fighting overnight.
Both sides accuse each other of shelling civilian areas on the border between Tavush in north-eastern Armenia and the Tovuz district in Azerbaijan.
At least 11 Azeri soldiers and one Azeri civilian were killed, according to Azerbaijan. Armenia has reported that four of its soldiers have died, including two officers.
Azerbaijan's military said it had destroyed an Armenian fortification and artillery and had inflicted casualties on "hundreds" of Armenian troops. Armenia denied suffering any casualties on that scale.
Tensions last flared into conflict in 2016, with the countries clashing over the disputed territory for four days. The BBC reported from both sides of the fighting.
he Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has long been trying to mediate a settlement of the conflict, with diplomats from France, Russia and the US - making up the OSCE Minsk Group - trying to build on the ceasefire.
Mais um conflicto patrocinado por russos e turcos...
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Ameaça do Azerbeijão de atacar a central nuclear arménia em Metsamor
https://caucasus.liveuamap.com/en/2020/16-july-azerbaijan-defense-ministry--spokesperson-at-the
Azerbaijan Defense Ministry spokesperson: "At the same time, the Armenian side should not forget that the latest missile systems in the arsenal of our Army allows us to hit the Metsamor NPP with high accuracy, which could lead to a major disaster for Armenia."
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https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-54323553 (https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-54323553)
Nagorno-Karabakh: Armenia-Azerbaijan fighting rages in disputed region
Fierce fighting between Armenian and Azerbaijani forces is raging on in the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region, with each side claiming an upper hand.
The region is internationally recognised as part of Azerbaijan but is run by ethnic Armenians.
The separatist authorities there said 31 of its soldiers had now died, and some lost positions had been retaken.
Azerbaijan said 26 civilians had been injured in heavy Armenian shelling. It earlier reported at least five deaths.
Both Armenia and Azerbaijan have already declared general mobilisation and martial law in some areas.
The fighting is the heaviest seen in the long-running conflict since 2016, when at least 200 people were killed in clashes.
It has sparked international calls for diplomacy, amid fears that regional powers could be drawn into the conflict in the strategically important Caucasus region.
Turkey has already declared its support for Azerbaijan, while Russia - which has military bases in Armenia - called for an immediate ceasefire.
On Monday, authorities in Nagorno-Karabakh said another 15 of its soldiers had been killed. It had reported 16 fatalities among the military on Sunday.
More than 100 people have been wounded.
The self-proclaimed republic also said its forces had destroyed four Azeri helicopters, 36 tanks and armoured personnel vehicles, according to the Armenpress news agency.
It also said it had killed many Azerbaijani troops, but this could not be verified.
Azerbaijan's defence ministry confirmed the loss of one helicopter but said the crew had survived, and reported that 12 Armenian air defence systems had been destroyed. It denied other losses.
Azerbaijan said 26 civilians were injured in Armenian shelling, accusing Armenia of targeting densely populated areas.
On Sunday, Azerbaijan said five members of the same family had been killed by Armenian shelling.
In July, at least 16 people died in border clashes, prompting the largest demonstration in years in the Azerbaijani capital Baku, where there were calls for the region's recapture.
(https://ichef.bbci.co.uk/news/800/cpsprodpb/31A2/production/_114660721_tanksepa.jpg)
(https://ichef.bbci.co.uk/news/800/cpsprodpb/10596/production/_114666966_mediaitem114666965.jpg)
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E o LiveMap já está a fazer o mapa da situação.
https://caucasus.liveuamap.com/
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(https://www.militaryimages.net/attachments/84045_nagornokarabakhlatest_1595241372442-jpg.251264/)
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Arménia acusa Turquia de abater um avião militar, turcos negam
"Um avião SU-25 arménio foi abatido por um F-16 turco vindo do território do Azerbaijão", afirmou a porta-voz do Ministério da Defesa da Arménia. Turquia nega acusações.
(https://bordalo.observador.pt/1000x,q85/https://s3.observador.pt/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/29170535/GettyImages-953827220-scaled_770x433_acf_cropped.jpg)
A Arménia afirmou esta terça-feira que a Turquia abateu um dos seus aviões militares, acusação desmentida por Ancara, apesar das alegações de que os turcos têm apoiado o Azerbaijão no combate em curso com os separatistas pró-arménios em Nagorno-Karabakh.
“Um avião SU-25 arménio foi abatido por um F-16 turco vindo do território do Azerbaijão”, afirmou a porta-voz do Ministério da Defesa da Arménia, Chuchan Stepanian, numa mensagem através do Facebook, especificando que o piloto arménio do aparelho “morreu como um herói”.
No entanto, a Turquia respondeu de imediato negando ter abatido o avião.
“A alegação de que a Turquia abateu um caça arménio é absolutamente falsa”, afirmou o diretor de comunicações da Presidência turca, Fahrettin Altun.
Desde domingo passado que as forças do enclave separatista, apoiado politicamente, economicamente e militarmente pela Arménia, um país de religião cristã ortodoxa, e as do Azerbaijão se confrontam nos combates mais sangrentos desde 2016.
No centro das deterioradas relações entre Erevan e Baku encontra-se a região do Nagorno-Karabakh.
Integrada em 1921 no Azerbaijão pelas autoridades soviéticas, a região proclamou unilateralmente a independência em 1991, com o apoio da Arménia.
Na sequência da uma guerra que provocou 30.000 mortos e centenas de milhares de refugiados, foi assinado um cessar-fogo em 1994 e aceite uma mediação russo-norte-americana-francesa designada Grupo de Minsk. No entanto, as escaramuças armadas permaneceram frequentes.
Em julho deste ano, os dois países envolveram-se em confrontos a uma escala mais reduzida que provocaram cerca de 20 mortos.
Os combates recentes mais significativos remontam a abril de 2016, com um balanço de 110 mortos.
O regresso do conflito armado a esta região separatista arménia do Nagorno-Karabakh está a suscitar receios sobre uma guerra em larga escala entre a Arménia e o Azerbaijão no Cáucaso do sul, onde Ancara e Moscovo disputam zonas de influência.
O Conselho de Segurança da ONU tem prevista para esta terça-feira uma reunião de emergência à porta fechada sobre a situação.
https://observador.pt/2020/09/29/armenia-acusa-turquia-de-abater-um-aviao-militar-turcos-negam/
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Os sistemas SA-8 arménios não parecem muito eficientes contra os drones de fabrico turco do Azerbaijão.
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Os drones armados (e a defesa contra - sem ser SCAR´s do RAAA1) são algo a ser rapidamente considerado...
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Os drones armados (e a defesa contra - sem ser SCAR´s do RAAA1) são algo a ser rapidamente considerado...
Os azeris estão a usar "Loitering Munitions" em grande escala, especialmente os Harop israelitas. Têm sido bastante eficazes contra as defesas antiaéreas arménias.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IAI_Harop
Também supostamente usam os Bayraktar TB2 turcos. Mas como supostamente só assinaram o contrato de compra em finais de Junho, quase de certeza que são TB2 turcos operados pelos turcos. Dificilmente em tão pouco tempo tinham recebido todos os sistemas e treinado pilotos de UAV.
https://www.defensenews.com/unmanned/2020/06/25/azerbaijan-to-buy-armed-drones-from-turkey/
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Vídeo da frente de combate. Vêm-se militares a disparar em direcção a um UAV com as AK.
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Os drones armados (e a defesa contra - sem ser SCAR´s do RAAA1) são algo a ser rapidamente considerado...
Os azeris estão a usar "Loitering Munitions" em grande escala, especialmente os Harop israelitas. Têm sido bastante eficazes contra as defesas antiaéreas arménias.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IAI_Harop
Também supostamente usam os Bayraktar TB2 turcos. Mas como supostamente só assinaram o contrato de compra em finais de Junho, quase de certeza que são TB2 turcos operados pelos turcos. Dificilmente em tão pouco tempo tinham recebido todos os sistemas e treinado pilotos de UAV.
https://www.defensenews.com/unmanned/2020/06/25/azerbaijan-to-buy-armed-drones-from-turkey/
Off-topic, mais um sistema para adicionar à lista de compras, o IAI Harop.
Mais um conflito às portas da Europa...
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Que massacre! :o
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Que massacre! :o
Os sistemas de defesa aérea já foram todos, agora é tiro ao pato. Estão a destruir as linhas de logística dos arménios, drone a drone. Por este andar, mais cedo ou mais tarde a defesa dos arménios vai ceder.
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Este conflito - como na Líbia - tem demonstrado a importância desta nova arma... mas se a Rússia continuar a apoiar a Arménia pode reforçar a presença de muitos SA-22 Greyhound (Pantsir)...
E nós por cá continuamos a calmamente arrastar a compra de meia dúzia de ST5 "Jabalies" ou algo parecido... :bang:
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O mais chocante é o baixo custo destes sistemas, face à sua capacidade destrutiva. Uma força terrestre superior, acaba a ser dizimada por meios que custam uma fracção do preço.
Olhando para este conflito, será que as nossas chefias militares, as poucas que ainda se interessam, começaram a pensar num novo plano estratégico? Certamente alguém há-de perceber que apontar SCARs ao céu e tentar acertar em pequenos UAV "kamikaze" não é muito eficiente.
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Este conflito - como na Líbia - tem demonstrado a importância desta nova arma... mas se a Rússia continuar a apoiar a Arménia pode reforçar a presença de muitos SA-22 Greyhound (Pantsir)...
E nós por cá continuamos a calmamente arrastar a compra de meia dúzia de ST5 "Jabalies" ou algo parecido... :bang:
Ao contrário do que muita gente pensa, a Rússia não está a apoiar a Arménia. Os russos não gostam do actual governo arménio e estão a observar ao longe o evoluir da situação. Eles durante muitos anos jogaram uns contra os outros neste conflicto e não estão interessados quem nenhum deles saia por cima. Penso que talvez tenham sido apanhados de surpresa por esta ofensiva surpresa dos azeris durante os exercícios Kavkaz e ainda estejam a estudar a melhor estratégia para responder a esta investida turca na região que os russos consideram ser o seu quintal.
Penso que se os arménios começarem a perder muito terreno, os russo poderão ser forçados a intervir para manter o domínio da região.
Quem não está nada confortável também é o Irão, com a vitória no conflicto do Azerbaijão a minoria azeri (16% da população) pode sentir-se tentada a levantar-se contra o regime (há vídeos de azeris a cantar ofensas contra os persas, curdis e arménios nos últimos dias) e a juntar-se ao Azerbaijão. Além disso não me parece que o Irão permitirá ao Azerbeijão unir o seu enclave de Nakhchivan ao resto do território, uma vez que isso permitiria criar uma ligação directa dos turcos a Baku.
Por isso é importante estar atento nos próximos dias à evolução no terreno e às jogadas de bastidores na Rússia e Irão.
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As perdas confirmadas do lado arménio:
- 23 T-72/A/AV/B MBT (18 destroyed, 1 abandoned, 3 damaged).
- 1 unidentified armored car (destroyed).
- 8 BMP-1/2 IFV (5 destroyed, 3 abandoned)
- 5 D30 howitzer (destroyed)
- 1 D20 howitzer (destroyed)
- 1 2S3 Akatsia SPG (destroyed)
- 11 BM21 Grad MRLS (destroyed)
- 4 Strela 10 SAM (destroyed).
- 10 SAM "Osa" (destroyed).
- 1 battery of S300V (destroyed)
- 1 complex of electronic warfare "Repellent-1" (destroyed).
- 2 GAZ-452 (damaged).
- 1 GAZ-3308 (damaged).
- 1 ZIL-131 (destroyed).
- 16 Ural-4320 (11 destroyed, 5 abandoned).
- 4 Ural-43206 (damaged).
- 1 UAZ-469 (damaged).
- 4 unidentified trucks (destroyed).
- 1 Su-25 (destroyed).
- 9 defensive poistions with soldiers (Destroyed)
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As perdas confirmadas do lado arménio:
- 23 T-72/A/AV/B MBT (18 destroyed, 1 abandoned, 3 damaged).
- 1 unidentified armored car (destroyed).
- 8 BMP-1/2 IFV (5 destroyed, 3 abandoned)
- 5 D30 howitzer (destroyed)
- 1 D20 howitzer (destroyed)
- 1 2S3 Akatsia SPG (destroyed)
- 11 BM21 Grad MRLS (destroyed)
- 4 Strela 10 SAM (destroyed).
- 10 SAM "Osa" (destroyed).
- 1 battery of S300V (destroyed)
- 1 complex of electronic warfare "Repellent-1" (destroyed).
- 2 GAZ-452 (damaged).
- 1 GAZ-3308 (damaged).
- 1 ZIL-131 (destroyed).
- 16 Ural-4320 (11 destroyed, 5 abandoned).
- 4 Ural-43206 (damaged).
- 1 UAZ-469 (damaged).
- 4 unidentified trucks (destroyed).
- 1 Su-25 (destroyed).
- 9 defensive poistions with soldiers (Destroyed)
Cuidado que em alguns vídeos que pareciam mostrar destruição de material arménio, depois de uma visualização mais atenta dos vídeos se chegou à conclusão que algum do material atingido eram simplesmente "decoys" (não consigo traduzir isto).
https://southfront.org/azerbaijan-targeted-armenian-air-defense-decoys-with-loitering-munitions-video/
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Tal como este An-2 versão drone do Azerbaijão.
E mais 50 nesta imagem.
(https://defence-blog.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/5427897_900.jpg)
(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/EjSzgQvVoAA1o9S?format=jpg&name=medium)
https://defence-blog.com/news/azerbaijani-military-turns-soviet-biplane-aircraft-into-drones.html
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Cuidado que em alguns vídeos que pareciam mostrar destruição de material arménio, depois de uma visualização mais atenta dos vídeos se chegou à conclusão que algum do material atingido eram simplesmente "decoys" (não consigo traduzir isto).
https://southfront.org/azerbaijan-targeted-armenian-air-defense-decoys-with-loitering-munitions-video/
Decoys são engodos.
E já agora fica a lista completa de perdas de ambos os países
https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2020/09/the-fight-for-nagorno-karabakh.html
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Já viram o teledisco dos azerbeijanos? :mrgreen:
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Cuidado que em alguns vídeos que pareciam mostrar destruição de material arménio, depois de uma visualização mais atenta dos vídeos se chegou à conclusão que algum do material atingido eram simplesmente "decoys" (não consigo traduzir isto).
https://southfront.org/azerbaijan-targeted-armenian-air-defense-decoys-with-loitering-munitions-video/
Decoys são engodos.
E já agora fica a lista completa de perdas de ambos os países
https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2020/09/the-fight-for-nagorno-karabakh.html
Estranho que o gajo não tenha colocado um BMP-3 azeri que se vê atirado para o lado da berma da estrada num vídeo. Talvez considere que por estar numa zona azeri tenha reparação...
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Neste caso são apenas versão drone para fazer denunciar as defesas anti-aéreas, e que se diz baseada num projeto chinês.
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https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1312320457941626887
Soldado arménio acorrentado nos pés para não abandonar a posição?! :o
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Referiram, que os sistemas "conter UAV" têm nos conflitos mais recentes tido um crescendo de relevância .... o problema é que a oferta destes sistemas é tão vasta, que eu pelo menos não sei quais são os sistemas mais "consistentes" que actualmente estão no mercado quer de detecção / quer de soft kill / quer de hard kill ? Quais são as vossas escolhas?
Já em termos de ameaça, o UAV / lotering munitions acho muito interessante é esta oferta polaca:
WARMATE
https://www.wbgroup.pl/en/produkt/warmate-loitering-munnitions/ (https://www.wbgroup.pl/en/produkt/warmate-loitering-munnitions/)
Para mim, sem dúvida os Israelitas, em uso pelo Azerbeijão, o IAI Harop.
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Já à uns tempos que o Azerbaijão andava a puxar pelo patriotismo militar, isto tem dois anos. Até o Presidente tem direito a aparecer.
Este é mais recente, tem dias, gostam de meter mulheres bonitas fardadas...
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O chefe da diplomacia turca viajou até Baku, onde apelou à comunidade internacional a ficar do lado azerbaijano no conflito de Nagorno-Karabakh.
::)
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The Key to Armenia’s Tank Losses: The Sensors, Not the Shooters (https://rusi.org/publication/rusi-defence-systems/key-armenia-tank-losses-sensors-not-shooters)
Amid a lively debate about the viability of the UK’s heavy armour, the loss of over 42 Armenian T-72s to Azerbaijani forces in Nagorno-Karabakh requires further analysis.
Despite the heavy Armenian armoured losses, the key lessons from the videos Azerbaijan has published online are not about armour. Rather, they reflect how the density of sensors on the modern battlefield is changing the balance in combined arms warfare.
Before tackling this, some myths need to be challenged. There is a tendency for Western soldiers to dismiss what can be learned from these incidents because the videos show limited tactical proficiency being displayed by Armenian troops. This is misguided for several reasons. The snippet videos usually show armour manoeuvring, when camouflage is hard to maintain, and which Western forces would equally have to do if they were to affect the outcome of battle. The videos have also been selected as examples of Azerbaijani successes. However, there is actually a lot of evidence of Armenian forces digging in, concealing positions, and deploying decoys, of which at least two were struck by Azerbaijani forces.
More importantly, this dismissal of evidence suggests a lack of appreciation of just how naked the modern battlefield has become. Against a peer adversary it is entirely reasonable to expect the battlefield to be swept by ground-moving target indicator (GMTI) radars, with tactical units able to scan terrain out to 150 km. Night or day, unusual cross-terrain movements, coordinated spacing, and lack of adherence to civilian roads, all make military vehicles highly distinct to trained operators.
A further layer of scrutiny will come from electronic warfare units. Dependency upon radio in Western operations is a hard habit to kick, especially given the stringent safety standards in exercises. Western forces tend to leave a tell-tale map of electronic signatures for an adversary to analyse. Even platoon infantry attacks tend to see a lot of exchanges on the company net. For a competent adversary these signatures offer another potent tool to map Western forces’ movements.
Such stand-off ISTAR techniques are unlikely to provide track-quality targeting solutions, unless the adversary intends to saturate a large area. It is the threat of area targeting that has driven the UK to experiment with dispersed manoeuvre with its STRIKE concept, rendering long-range area saturation uneconomical. But these techniques will be quite capable of identifying areas of interest to prioritise the allocation of UAVs and other electrooptical sensor bearers.
The hope that camouflage will conceal vehicles from observation is highly optimistic. The proliferation of infrared and thermal imaging cameras makes concealment harder – by night or day – and even vehicles under thermal screens can often be given away by personnel leaving those screens to urinate or similar, all too human, needs. More importantly, some traces are hard to cover. The best evidence that armour will be unable to hide is that Western tracked vehicles struggle to avoid observation by friendly UAVs on exercise, which can quickly follow track marks on the ground to the woodblock where a vehicle is hiding.
To conclude from this that the tank’s days are numbered, however, is a serious error. From the videos in Nagorno-Karabakh it is evident that unarmoured vehicles and dismounted infantry are faring no better, even those dug into positions with camouflage screens. Indeed, the lack of protection means they will likely fare worse since there are more kinds of munitions that are lighter and easier to employ that can kill them.
Besides the vulnerability of other kinds of vehicle, the ability to inflict persistent attrition upon an adversary at reach does not change the fact that land warfare is about taking and holding ground, and the ground will still ultimately need to be assaulted. Once committed to an assault on defended positions, armour remains critical to rapid success with acceptable losses. The challenge is to get a combined arms formation within striking distance without it having suffered heavy losses before entering the direct fire zone. Armenia, for instance, has lost the equivalent number of tanks to more than a third of the UK’s heavy armour inventory.
The lessons are far reaching. Heavy formations must likely disperse to avoid being engaged by area-of-effect munitions at reach. This makes protecting them from UAVs and air attack more challenging, requiring the integration of short-ranged air defences (SHORAD) across tactical units, along with EW – specifically electronic attack – capabilities. This means a move away from camouflage towards hard protection, able to sanitise areas of the battlefield of enemy ISTAR assets. This does not prevent detection, however, since finding UAVs and engaging them will require radar – especially at night – which implies the need for emissions detectable by enemy EW.
Therefore, a broader shift in mindset is required as to how combined arms manoeuvre functions. Infliction of attrition against enemy ISTAR must be prioritised to degrade the enemy’s sensor picture to a point where they will struggle to distinguish decoys from real targets. Deception, saturating the electromagnetic spectrum, and other active rather than passive means will be needed to protect the force as it moves into direct contact. Once in contact many traditional tactics and capabilities will remain relevant.
A critical challenge to be worked out is how to transition from a dispersed approach to a concentrated attack, since at the forming-up point there will be a significant vulnerability to artillery, anti-tank guided weapons and other threats. This is a key area of focus in developing robust tactics.
Challenges like this transition – ultimately resolvable through tactics and the employment of systems of technologies – highlight how the debate over future capabilities needs to shift. The challenge is not whether tanks are obsolete, but how a system of capabilities can be fielded and trained that gets the force to where it needs to be, with enough combat power to achieve the desired result. It is the system, not the platforms, and the balance within that system that we need to get right.
That new system of fighting – understanding the balance of capabilities critical to the future of combined arms operations – must also go further than articulating how to blind the enemy’s sensors. It must also outline how to reverse the calculus and impose comparable challenges on the enemy. Here there are more difficult structural questions to be resolved. The British Army had intended to disband 32 Regiment Royal Artillery, responsible for employing tactical UAVs, because it felt that UAVs should become organic across the force. There is a risk, however, that this would leave UAVs as an enabler to augment what regiments do already. The absence of a community of excellence to challenge thinking, develop new tactics and inform other units about the implications, is a problem, which has led to the regiment ultimately being retained. At the same time, keeping UAVs as a capability integrated throughout the force promises to encourage combined arms employment. Similar challenges might be asked about counter-UAV and EW systems. Should they be grouped at echelon, or attached organically to manoeuvre elements? If the latter is pursued, how can British forces avoid fratricide in the electromagnetic spectrum?
The answers to these questions can only be found through experimentation. In that sense while the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh highlights some key deficiencies in British forces – SHORAD, EW, UAVs – the answer cannot be a series of binary trade-offs between platforms. Instead, it cuts to the heart of what the Chief of the General Staff, General Sir Mark Carleton-Smith, highlighted in his recent address on the Integrated Review: the British Army should build a force fit for a new age of warfare.
Jack Watling is Research Fellow for Land Warfare in the Military Sciences team at RUSI.
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(https://www.militaryimages.net/attachments/8ku6benodlr51-jpg.253237/)
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The Key to Armenia’s Tank Losses: The Sensors, Not the Shooters (https://rusi.org/publication/rusi-defence-systems/key-armenia-tank-losses-sensors-not-shooters)
Amid a lively debate about the viability of the UK’s heavy armour, the loss of over 42 Armenian T-72s to Azerbaijani forces in Nagorno-Karabakh requires further analysis.
Despite the heavy Armenian armoured losses, the key lessons from the videos Azerbaijan has published online are not about armour. Rather, they reflect how the density of sensors on the modern battlefield is changing the balance in combined arms warfare.
Before tackling this, some myths need to be challenged. There is a tendency for Western soldiers to dismiss what can be learned from these incidents because the videos show limited tactical proficiency being displayed by Armenian troops. This is misguided for several reasons. The snippet videos usually show armour manoeuvring, when camouflage is hard to maintain, and which Western forces would equally have to do if they were to affect the outcome of battle. The videos have also been selected as examples of Azerbaijani successes. However, there is actually a lot of evidence of Armenian forces digging in, concealing positions, and deploying decoys, of which at least two were struck by Azerbaijani forces.
More importantly, this dismissal of evidence suggests a lack of appreciation of just how naked the modern battlefield has become. Against a peer adversary it is entirely reasonable to expect the battlefield to be swept by ground-moving target indicator (GMTI) radars, with tactical units able to scan terrain out to 150 km. Night or day, unusual cross-terrain movements, coordinated spacing, and lack of adherence to civilian roads, all make military vehicles highly distinct to trained operators.
A further layer of scrutiny will come from electronic warfare units. Dependency upon radio in Western operations is a hard habit to kick, especially given the stringent safety standards in exercises. Western forces tend to leave a tell-tale map of electronic signatures for an adversary to analyse. Even platoon infantry attacks tend to see a lot of exchanges on the company net. For a competent adversary these signatures offer another potent tool to map Western forces’ movements.
Such stand-off ISTAR techniques are unlikely to provide track-quality targeting solutions, unless the adversary intends to saturate a large area. It is the threat of area targeting that has driven the UK to experiment with dispersed manoeuvre with its STRIKE concept, rendering long-range area saturation uneconomical. But these techniques will be quite capable of identifying areas of interest to prioritise the allocation of UAVs and other electrooptical sensor bearers.
The hope that camouflage will conceal vehicles from observation is highly optimistic. The proliferation of infrared and thermal imaging cameras makes concealment harder – by night or day – and even vehicles under thermal screens can often be given away by personnel leaving those screens to urinate or similar, all too human, needs. More importantly, some traces are hard to cover. The best evidence that armour will be unable to hide is that Western tracked vehicles struggle to avoid observation by friendly UAVs on exercise, which can quickly follow track marks on the ground to the woodblock where a vehicle is hiding.
To conclude from this that the tank’s days are numbered, however, is a serious error. From the videos in Nagorno-Karabakh it is evident that unarmoured vehicles and dismounted infantry are faring no better, even those dug into positions with camouflage screens. Indeed, the lack of protection means they will likely fare worse since there are more kinds of munitions that are lighter and easier to employ that can kill them.
Besides the vulnerability of other kinds of vehicle, the ability to inflict persistent attrition upon an adversary at reach does not change the fact that land warfare is about taking and holding ground, and the ground will still ultimately need to be assaulted. Once committed to an assault on defended positions, armour remains critical to rapid success with acceptable losses. The challenge is to get a combined arms formation within striking distance without it having suffered heavy losses before entering the direct fire zone. Armenia, for instance, has lost the equivalent number of tanks to more than a third of the UK’s heavy armour inventory.
The lessons are far reaching. Heavy formations must likely disperse to avoid being engaged by area-of-effect munitions at reach. This makes protecting them from UAVs and air attack more challenging, requiring the integration of short-ranged air defences (SHORAD) across tactical units, along with EW – specifically electronic attack – capabilities. This means a move away from camouflage towards hard protection, able to sanitise areas of the battlefield of enemy ISTAR assets. This does not prevent detection, however, since finding UAVs and engaging them will require radar – especially at night – which implies the need for emissions detectable by enemy EW.
Therefore, a broader shift in mindset is required as to how combined arms manoeuvre functions. Infliction of attrition against enemy ISTAR must be prioritised to degrade the enemy’s sensor picture to a point where they will struggle to distinguish decoys from real targets. Deception, saturating the electromagnetic spectrum, and other active rather than passive means will be needed to protect the force as it moves into direct contact. Once in contact many traditional tactics and capabilities will remain relevant.
A critical challenge to be worked out is how to transition from a dispersed approach to a concentrated attack, since at the forming-up point there will be a significant vulnerability to artillery, anti-tank guided weapons and other threats. This is a key area of focus in developing robust tactics.
Challenges like this transition – ultimately resolvable through tactics and the employment of systems of technologies – highlight how the debate over future capabilities needs to shift. The challenge is not whether tanks are obsolete, but how a system of capabilities can be fielded and trained that gets the force to where it needs to be, with enough combat power to achieve the desired result. It is the system, not the platforms, and the balance within that system that we need to get right.
That new system of fighting – understanding the balance of capabilities critical to the future of combined arms operations – must also go further than articulating how to blind the enemy’s sensors. It must also outline how to reverse the calculus and impose comparable challenges on the enemy. Here there are more difficult structural questions to be resolved. The British Army had intended to disband 32 Regiment Royal Artillery, responsible for employing tactical UAVs, because it felt that UAVs should become organic across the force. There is a risk, however, that this would leave UAVs as an enabler to augment what regiments do already. The absence of a community of excellence to challenge thinking, develop new tactics and inform other units about the implications, is a problem, which has led to the regiment ultimately being retained. At the same time, keeping UAVs as a capability integrated throughout the force promises to encourage combined arms employment. Similar challenges might be asked about counter-UAV and EW systems. Should they be grouped at echelon, or attached organically to manoeuvre elements? If the latter is pursued, how can British forces avoid fratricide in the electromagnetic spectrum?
The answers to these questions can only be found through experimentation. In that sense while the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh highlights some key deficiencies in British forces – SHORAD, EW, UAVs – the answer cannot be a series of binary trade-offs between platforms. Instead, it cuts to the heart of what the Chief of the General Staff, General Sir Mark Carleton-Smith, highlighted in his recent address on the Integrated Review: the British Army should build a force fit for a new age of warfare.
Jack Watling is Research Fellow for Land Warfare in the Military Sciences team at RUSI.
Ensinamentos para o Exército Portugûes, "armour" sem proteção anti-aérea, não serve de muito, os UAV e UAV suicidas rebentam com eles.
Cumprimentos,
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Nada se perde, tudo se transforma.
É pintado mesmo por cima da ferrugem! :mrgreen:
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Os S-300 também já estão a levar... :o
https://defence-blog.com/news/army/aliyev-claims-azerbaijans-troops-destroy-two-armenian-s-300-air-defense-systems.html
https://twitter.com/oryxspioenkop/status/1315740521638301698
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The Armenian-Azerbaijani war, which started on September 27, continues in the contested Nagorno-Karabakh region despite international diplomatic efforts to de-escalate the conflict. Offensive operations of Azerbaijani forces continue at the same time as the Azerbaijani government claims that it is committed to the ceasefire regime.
The first humanitarian ceasefire entered force in Karabakh on October 10 and collapsed on the next day, while the second one started on October 18 with the same result.
The Armenian side also insists that it is committed to the ceasefire while simultaneously conducting counter-attacks against the advancing Azerbaijani forces.
For the Armenian side, the situation is further complicated by the fact that the current Armenian leadership is not ready to (or does not want to) employ all of its means and forces to fight back the Azerbaijani advance.
Instead of this, Armenian forces involved in the conflict are limited to those of the Nagorno-Karakbah Republic.
The government of Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has so far limited its support to Karabakh to supplying weapons, sending volunteers (instead of regular forces), complaining in the media and calling on other countries to recognize the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic as an independent state, while Armenia itself has made no steps in this direction.
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Ultima hipótese para os arménios mudarem o rumo deste conflito.
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(https://www.militaryimages.net/attachments/ekh4v70xeaacwxj-jpg.254351/)
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Aparentemente os russos abateram 9 drones turcos Bayraktar TB-2 nos últimos dias e que voavam perto da sua base na Arménia usando o seu sistema de guerra eletrónica Krasukha.
(https://avia.pro/sites/default/files/images/1_183.jpg?s161312d1603227533)
(https://avia.pro/sites/default/files/images/2_153.jpg?s158721d1603227582)
(https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/50/Krasukha-2_%28%D0%9A%D1%80%D0%B0%D1%81%D1%83%D1%85%D0%B0-2%29_Unloaded.jpg)
Fontes: https://avia.pro/news/no-fly-zone-rossiyskoe-superoruzhie-unichtozhilo-uzhe-9-tureckih-bespilotnikov-vsego-lish-za-48 (https://avia.pro/news/no-fly-zone-rossiyskoe-superoruzhie-unichtozhilo-uzhe-9-tureckih-bespilotnikov-vsego-lish-za-48)
https://bulgarianmilitary.com/2020/10/21/russia-shot-down-9-bayraktar-drones-near-its-gyumri-military-base-armenia/ (https://bulgarianmilitary.com/2020/10/21/russia-shot-down-9-bayraktar-drones-near-its-gyumri-military-base-armenia/)
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Armenia Launches Ballistic Missiles On Azerbaijan Amid Retreat In Nagorno-Karabakh Region
Os misseis balísticos utilizados pela Arménia.
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Ensinamentos para o Exército Portugûes, "armour" sem proteção anti-aérea, não serve de muito, os UAV e UAV suicidas rebentam com eles.
Cumprimentos,
Negativo, eles falavam nisto (IAI Elta Systems Drone-Guard multi-layered counter-UAS system):
(https://defense-update.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Droneguard_with_PM_OPV.jpg)
https://defense-update.com/20191025_repmus19.html
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The Nagorno-Karabakh war has apparently been developing in the favor of the Turkish-Azerbaijani bloc.
On the evening of October 29, the Armenian side confirmed that Azerbaijani troops have almost reached the second largest town in Nagorno-Karabakh – Shusha, which is located just a few km from the capital of the self-proclaimed republic – Stepanakert. Arayik Harutyunyan, the president of the republic, called on Armenians to take arms to defend their homeland.
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https://www.kaotic.com/video/703fd55b_20201101051222_t
Militares arménios a serem torturados por militares do Azerbaijão.
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Para quem quiser acompanhar a evolução no terreno diariamente .
Um abraço .
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Battles for Shushi | November 6th 2020 | Nagorno-Karabakh
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E o grande vencedor do conflicto é... (rufar de tambores)... A RÚSSIA!!!!!
Viu-se livre do Pashinian na Arménia. Coloca forças russas em Karabakh durante pelo menos 5 anos (que podem ser prolongados... o que acontece sempre). Evita o colapso da Arménia. Impede a vitória total do Azerbeijão. Não permite que Erdogan se sente à mesa das negociações. Permite uma ligação terrestre a atravessar a Arménia entre o Azerbeijão e a região de Nakhchivan, mas sob controlo de forças de segurança russas, basicamente impedindo o sonho dos defensores do panturquismo.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pan-Turkism#:~:text=Pan%2DTurkism%20is%20a%20political,unification%20of%20all%20Turkic%20peoples.
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Os sistemas SA-8 arménios não parecem muito eficientes contra os drones de fabrico turco do Azerbaijão.
O SA8 já tem uns bons anos e por muitas atualizações que tenham não foram feitos para essa missão. O sistema já era em "kafundo do judas" vulnerável a ECM (como o Zhitel R-330Zh usado pelos ucranianos) e a diversos tipos de armas quanto mais agora (mesmo que tenham sido atualizados). O SAMAN é anti drone mas trata se de um sistema de treino. Nos últimos anos tenho ideia que só um heli foi abatido por este sistema e na Guerra Civil Síria (entretanto o sistema foi destruído por um ataque dos Su34 russos).
(https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/7/70/ParkPatriot2015part8-28.jpg/1024px-ParkPatriot2015part8-28.jpg)
(https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/5/59/B8fnRA7c8Go.jpg/1024px-B8fnRA7c8Go.jpg)
Armenian 9K33 Osa missile during a military parade in Yerevan
(https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/7/7b/%D0%A238_%C2%AB%D0%A1%D1%82%D0%B8%D0%BB%D0%B5%D1%82%C2%BB.JPG/800px-%D0%A238_%C2%AB%D0%A1%D1%82%D0%B8%D0%BB%D0%B5%D1%82%C2%BB.JPG)
T38 Stilet
Saudações
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Azerbaijão abateu Mi-24 Russo.
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-54874162
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Está feito...
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(https://scontent.flis8-2.fna.fbcdn.net/v/t1.0-9/124567073_223993479146422_8063530392516283331_o.jpg?_nc_cat=101&ccb=2&_nc_sid=730e14&_nc_ohc=XIVP1oc2Z8YAX-_UWSJ&_nc_ht=scontent.flis8-2.fna&oh=8ccc439cc524464f1495fe1e749a3ad4&oe=5FCF991B)
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(https://www.militaryimages.net/attachments/map_2020-11-09-jpg.258016/)
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(https://www.militaryimages.net/attachments/map_2020-11-09-jpg.258016/)
Isto tem tudo para ser um novo tratado de Versailles. Os arménios ficam com a ideia de que foram traídos pelos políticos. Os azeris impõem condições draconianas aos arménios e a besta do Aliyev faz declarações humilhantes para os arménios. Mais uma ou duas décadas e isto explode outra vez.
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Tenho uma sensação "guerra civil de Espanha" neste conflito.
Serviu para testar novas armas, técnicas, etc, vamos ver como será um próximo conflito em maior escala.
Vimos que as defesas aéreas tradicionais são muito vulneráveis.
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Tenho uma sensação "guerra civil de Espanha" neste conflito.
Serviu para testar novas armas, técnicas, etc, vamos ver como será um próximo conflito em maior escala.
Vimos que as defesas aéreas tradicionais são muito vulneráveis.
O que vimos foi como as defesas aéreas desenhadas no tempo da URSS não estão preparadas para o campo de batalha de hoje. Não foram desenhadas a pensar nas ameaças actuais.
Também ficou patente que quem coordenou tudo e mesmo apoiou com meios técnicos e militares no terreno foram os turcos. Um jornal russo fala em cerca de 600 militares turcos presentes no Azerbaijão, entre eles operadores de drones, pilotos e caças, forças especiais e militares nos quartéis-generais a coordenar o ataque.
Além disso foram usados E-7T junto à fronteira turca com a Arménia e outro meios de vigilância para controlar a movimentação das tropas arménias.
https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/4537733#id1962787
A mim sempre me pareceu estranho que alguém que comprou os TB-2 em Junho/Julho, já tivesse tantos drones activos e já fosse tão eficiente a utilizar os mesmos.
Também ficou patente que o sistema de vigilância e defesa aérea arménio tiveram falhas de coordenação, já para não falar na total incapacidade de improvisação e flexibilização da estratégia. Vimos como por várias vezes os azeris usaram An-2 como engodo para fazer activar as defesas aéreas arménias, para depois serem destruídas por UAVs. E vimos como após semanas de ataques, os arménio continuaram a manter as suas forças em campo aberto, expondo-se a ataques de drones para tentar manter pedaços de terra muitas vezes sem grande valor estratégico.
https://www.overtdefense.com/2020/10/05/azerbaijan-reportedly-convert-ancient-an-2-biplanes-into-drones/
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E no fim disto tudo quem ganhou e quem perdeu?
Dos dois beligerantes o Azerbaijão ganhou e a Arménia perdeu, e a tal Republica independentista é a que deve ter tido as maiores baixas.
Dos grandes "players" a Rússia ganhou, meteu 2000 tropas na região, descredibilizou o líder da Arménia que era pró-ocidental, mas segurou a Arménia (talvez volte a tender para a Russia), é sempre vantajoso ter um potencial aliado na região.
A Turquia anda a armar-se em grande,, a meter-se em confusão em todo o lado que pode,
Depois há uma relação que ainda não entendi muito bem que é, o Irão apoia a Arménia e Israel apoia o Azerbaijão.
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E no fim disto tudo quem ganhou e quem perdeu?
Dos dois beligerantes o Azerbaijão ganhou e a Arménia perdeu, e a tal Republica independentista é a que deve ter tido as maiores baixas.
Dos grandes "players" a Rússia ganhou, meteu 2000 tropas na região, descredibilizou o líder da Arménia que era pró-ocidental, mas segurou a Arménia (talvez volte a tender para a Russia), é sempre vantajoso ter um potencial aliado na região.
A Turquia anda a armar-se em grande,, a meter-se em confusão em todo o lado que pode,
Depois há uma relação que ainda não entendi muito bem que é, o Irão apoia a Arménia e Israel apoia o Azerbaijão.
A relação do Irão com estes dois países é mais subtil que isso. O Irão não apoia a Arménia. O Irão não quer é que o Azerbaijão e a Turquia tomem conta do Caúcaso destruindo a Turquia.
A minoria azeri no Irão representa quase 1/4 da população iraniana e vive predomiantemente na região adjacente ao Azerbaijão. Ora o Irão teme que esta minoria decida juntar-se ao Azerbaijão levando à perda de uma parte significativa do seu território, incluindo cidades como Tabriz.
(https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/48/Azeri_language.png)
Ora a Arménia serve como tampão entre o Azerbaijão e a Turquia, o que o Irão entende como uma forma de controlar os movimentos panturquistas.
Israel vê o Azerbeijão como uma fonte de receita fácil, mas também utiliza as suas ligações com os azeris para conseguir obter informação secreta sobre o Irão. Além disso, um Azerbeijão forte é uma forma de garantir que os iranianos têm de continuar a usar meios e recursos financeiros para controlar a minoria azeri, limitando os recursos que podem utilizar contra Israel.
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Arménia entrega parte de Nagorno-Karabakh
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Os arménios estão a pegar fogo às casas que tem de abandonar.
As igrejas cristãs devem ter a mesma sorte quando forem ocupadas pelo Azerbaijão...
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Amnistia Internacional denuncia crimes de guerra em Nagorno-Karabakh
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Rússia e Turquia monitorizam cessar-fogo em Nagorno-Karabakh
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Anna news Agency filmed the last battle of Shusha from Armenian side
A ANNA News tem os melhores correspondentes de guerra de sempre.
Os trabalhos a acompanhar os conflitos da Síria, Ucrânia e neste vídeo na arménia em que o jornalista teve uma enorme sorte em conseguir sair do local que estava a ser batido pelo fogo, mostram isso.
Mais reconhecimento haveria se não fossem constantemente banidos do youtube.
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https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-59308602
Armenian troops killed in Azerbaijan border clash
A number of Armenian soldiers have been killed and captured in a flare-up of violence on the border with Azerbaijan, Armenian officials say.
Armenia said some of its troops had been killed and two combat positions had been lost, while Azerbaijan said two of its soldiers were injured.
Later on Tuesday, both sides reportedly agreed to a Russian-brokered ceasefire.
More than 6,000 lives were lost in last year's war over the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh.
Azerbaijani forces, backed by Turkey, managed to recapture large swathes of the region of what is internationally regarded as part of Azerbaijan.
On Tuesday, Armenia asked Russia, a key security ally with long-standing ties to the former Soviet republic, to help defend its territorial sovereignty against Azerbaijan.
Both the Armenian and the Russian defence ministries later said that the Russian-backed truce was agreed.
Azerbaijan has not publicly commented on the issue.
Earlier, Armenia blamed Azerbaijani troops for the latest outbreak of fighting and said 12 soldiers had been captured.
It did not immediately confirm details of casualties - but the head of parliament's foreign relations committee, Eduard Aghajanyan, said as many as 15 soldiers may have died.
Azerbaijan's defence ministry accused Armenia of "large-scale provocations against Azerbaijan in the Kalbajar and Lachin regions of the state border".
It said Armenia "launched a sudden military operation" to "take more advantageous positions" - but that the attack had failed.
But according to Armenia's foreign ministry, Azerbaijani forces attacked the eastern border as part of a policy that began in May aimed at infiltrating two Armenian areas - Syunik in the south-east and Gegharkunik in the east.
Responding to Tuesday's border clashes, European Council President Charles Michel urged the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan to negotiate a "full ceasefire".
Mr Michel said he called for an "urgent de-escalation" in discussions with President Aliyev and Armenia's Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan.
A Russian-brokered peace deal was reached in November 2020. Some 2,000 Russian peacekeepers were deployed to patrol the area in and around Nagorno-Karabakh.
During the dying years of the USSR, Armenia was drawn into a bloody conflict with Azerbaijan over the mainly ethnic-Armenian Nagorno-Karabakh region.
Armenia is majority Christian while Azerbaijan is majority Muslim. Turkey has close ties to Azerbaijan, while Russia is allied with Armenia.
What's sparked the flare-up?
By Konul Khalilova, Editor, BBC Azerbaijani
A year after they fought a 44-day war, these latest tensions are threatening the peace deal between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
The single biggest issue is that Azerbaijan wants to have a corridor running through to its exclave Nakhichevan - and ultimately to its ally Turkey. This so-called Zangazur corridor would have to pass through Armenian territory, but Armenia will not accept having a road on its land under Azerbaijan's control.
Politically it is important for Azerbaijan's leader, Ilham Aliyev, who pledged earlier this year that he would "force" Armenia to concessions regarding the corridor.
Neither country appears committed to the peace deal and both are increasing their military budgets. However for the moment at least, diplomatic contacts between them have not broken down.
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Arménia e Azerbaijão aceitam delimitar fronteira perante Putin
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Tribunal Penal Internacional apela ao fim do ódio racial sobre Nagorno-Karabakh
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Tensão em Nagorno-Karabakh
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Arménia e Azerbaijão prontos para conversar sobre Nagorno-Karabakh
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Pelo menos 49 mortos em confrontos entre a Arménia e o Azerbaijão
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Dear foreign reporters, clashes are currently taking place on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border, not in Nagorno-Karabakh.
If you need any help with checking information or contacts in Armenia/NK, just drop a comment under this post, and I'll contact you.
(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/Fci8VcJWYAEQ1uU?format=jpg&name=small)
https://mobile.twitter.com/aghavalyan/status/1569712890906558468
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Video footage published by the Armenian Ministry of Defense on Twitter today shows a large number of Azerbaijani soldiers as they attempted to advance on foot in to Armenian held territory.
From the footage that shows the men moving through a vast open terrain it appears that this particular attempt failed.
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Combat position of the Armenian Armed Forces targeted by an Azerbaijani Bayraktar TB2 strike
https://twitter.com/Caucasuswar/status/1569764578136842241?t=0xfybWe69ykNepmfT3TRdA&s=19
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Comunidade internacional apela ao diálogo entre Arménia e Azerbaijão
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Armenian PM Pashinyan says Armenia has invoked article 4 of the CSTO charter, the alliance's mutual defence clause, in order to evict Azeri troops from Armenia's territory and restore territorial integrity. First time CSTO article 4 has been invoked
https://news.am/arm/news/720173.html
Sera interssante ver comp responde a russia e Bielorrússia....
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Armenian PM Pashinyan says Armenia has invoked article 4 of the CSTO charter, the alliance's mutual defence clause, in order to evict Azeri troops from Armenia's territory and restore territorial integrity. First time CSTO article 4 has been invoked
https://news.am/arm/news/720173.html
Sera interssante ver comp responde a russia e Bielorrússia....
Se já está dificil numa frente imagino com duas :mrgreen:
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Com três frentes.
Na Síria ainda existe um contingente russo considerável.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_military_intervention_in_the_Syrian_civil_war
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Cessar-fogo entre Arménia e Azerbaijão
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Nancy Pelosi foi manifestar apoio à Arménia
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Pelosi condena "ataques ilegais" do Azerbaijão
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Presidente da Turquia no Azerbaijão para a inauguração do novo aeroporto de Zangilan
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Lachin: Cidade devastada pela guerra no Cáucaso está em reconstrução
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Líderes do Azerbaijão e da Arménia em entrevista exclusiva à Euronews
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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r2Kk2hUWyG0&t=316s (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r2Kk2hUWyG0&t=316s)
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https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/9/19/azerbaijan-forces-attack-nagorno-karabakh-as-threat-of-new-war-looms (https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/9/19/azerbaijan-forces-attack-nagorno-karabakh-as-threat-of-new-war-looms)
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Azerbaijan Takes Nagorno-Karabakh.
Next Target - Zangezur Corridor?
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População foge e governo separatista anuncia dissolução
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ONU envia missão para o Nagorno-Karabakh
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Refugiados de Nagorno-Karabakh na Arménia enfrentam necessidades urgentes
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Presidente de Moçambique revela pedido de ajuda do Azerbaijão para paz em Nagorno-Karabakh
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Segundo os americanos, existe a possibilidade de a curto prazo o Azerbeijão atacar a Arménia.
A ser verdade, tempos duros...
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Segundo os americanos, existe a possibilidade de a curto prazo o Azerbeijão atacar a Arménia.
A ser verdade, tempos duros...
Vai ser invasão !
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Especula-se que tentarão criar uma ligação por terra entre os dois territórios do Azerbaijão. Mas isto ainda é "peixe miúdo", existindo ainda outros potenciais focos de conflito, com implicações ainda mais graves.
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Especula-se que tentarão criar uma ligação por terra entre os dois territórios do Azerbaijão. Mas isto ainda é "peixe miúdo", existindo ainda outros potenciais focos de conflito, com implicações ainda mais graves.
Pois também creio que a acontecer este será o objectivo.
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https://x.com/Caucasuswar/status/1714727426675163614?s=20 (https://x.com/Caucasuswar/status/1714727426675163614?s=20)
Pode estar iminente.
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https://www.reuters.com/world/russias-lavrov-visit-tehran-monday-ria-2023-10-22/ (https://www.reuters.com/world/russias-lavrov-visit-tehran-monday-ria-2023-10-22/)
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Azerbaijão e Arménia reafirmam a intenção de chegar a um tratado de paz
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(https://images4.imagebam.com/59/8d/39/MES14AW_o.jpg)