Citação de: "Yosy"Muito boa gente que a Guerra Fria de volta, quer os grandes contratos de armamento de volta; os generais querem outra vez os velhos exercícios NATO de promoção, etc.A vida na Guerra Fria era mais "fácil" para certas pessoas. Agora se querem mesmo avançar têm que trabalhar para isso.Onde é que o Yosy tem andado nos ultimos 20 anos?! :? Não precebi...
Muito boa gente que a Guerra Fria de volta, quer os grandes contratos de armamento de volta; os generais querem outra vez os velhos exercícios NATO de promoção, etc.A vida na Guerra Fria era mais "fácil" para certas pessoas. Agora se querem mesmo avançar têm que trabalhar para isso.
Quis dizer que as certas pessoas que menciona já andam a trabalhar nisso desde que lhes cheirou o fim da guerra fria.Cumptos
O Presidente da Rússia, Vladimir Putin, ameaçou hoje voltar a apontar mísseis para alvos na Europa se os Estados Unidos não desistirem do seu plano de instalar dez mísseis interceptores na Polónia e um radar de detecção na República Checa.Numa entrevista publicada no jornal italiano "Corriere della Sera", Putin admite que a resposta russa ao plano norte-americano poderia fazer renascer a corrida ao armamento, mas afirma que o seu país nunca poderá ser responsabilizado porque o primeiro passo está a ser dado pelos Estados Unidos.Questionado sobre se a Rússia admite voltar a apontar mísseis contra alvos na Europa se os Estados Unidos não abandonarem o seu projecto de defesa no continente, Putin respondeu: "Sim, naturalmente. Se a capacidade nuclear norte-americana se estender pelo território europeu, teremos que arranjar novos alvos na Europa".Os Estados Unidos afirmam que a construção de um escudo de protecção na Europa não tem como objectivo ameaçar a Rússia mas sim responder a um possível ataque lançado por um dos países que designa como Estados párias, como o Irão e a Coreia do Norte.Na opinião de Putin, esta justificação não tem credibilidade, já que o Irão não tem mísseis com capacidade para atingir os Estados Unidos. "Por isso, é óbvio que esta inovação é dirigida aos russos", afirmou Putin.Ontem, o Presidente russo já deixara claro que o escudo norte-americano pode transformar a Europa num "barril de pólvora".Rússia testou novo míssil balístico intercontinentalO discurso da Rússia em relação aos Estados Unidos subiu de tom na semana passada, depois de Valdimir Putin ter afirmado que a política externa norte-americana tem um cariz imperialista.Mas a Rússia não se deixou ficar apenas pela retórica. Um novo míssil balístico intercontinental testado na terça-feira passada com sucesso pelo país é capaz de "passar qualquer escudo de defesa que exista agora ou no futuro", asseverou o primeiro-ministro adjunto russo, Sergei Ivanov, à agência noticiosa Itar-Tass.Confiante nas capacidades da nova arma, com múltiplas cargas explosivas, Ivanov — um dos dois antecipados sucessores do Presidente Vladimir Putin — defendeu que, "sob o ponto de vista da defesa e da segurança, os russos podem sentir-se a salvo". "O míssil RS-24 vai fortalecer o poder nuclear dissuasor da Rússia", avançou ainda o comando das Forças Estratégicas russas, em comunicado.Este míssil está integrado na proclamada "resposta altamente eficaz" que Putin prometera dar, no início do ano, aos planos dos Estados Unidos de instalar parte do seu Sistema de Defesa Antimíssil (MDI) na Europa Central — um plano a que Moscovo se tem oposto ferozmente com o argumento de que o mesmo ameaça a sua segurança e que irá alterar o balanço estratégico em todo o continente.Publico
Podemos dizerObrigado Mister Bushpela desordem mundial instalado por esse pior presidente dos EUA.A historia julgara.
Citação de: "Miguel"Podemos dizerObrigado Mister Bushpela desordem mundial instalado por esse pior presidente dos EUA.A historia julgara.Se a alguem hai que botar a culpa de que os missiles rusos voltem a apontar a Europa Occidental sería a polacos e checos que son os que permitiron ós USA instalar parte do escudo anti-missiles USA nos seus territorios
Russia Hits the AcceleratorJune 17, 2007: Russia will now be replacing RS-18 (SS-19) and RS-20 (SS-18) ICBMs with the newer RS-24 (SS-27 Topol M), more rapidly than earlier planned. This is the result of more money being allocated to buying ICBMs, and more reliable new ICBMs becoming available. Russia continues to test launch RS-18 and RS-20 ICBMs. Russia still has 140 (out of a 1980s peak of 360) RS-18s in service, and expects to keep some of them active until 2010. The test firings for the last two years have been successful, and other quality-control tests have come back positive. The 106 ton, 76 foot long missile uses storable liquid fuel, meaning that the missile is inherently more complex than a solid fuel missile.Russia was late to perfecting solid fuel rocket technology. The RS-18 entered service in 1975, and it wasn't until the 1980s that Russia began producing reliable solid fuel rocket motors, large enough for ICBMs. The last RS-18s were manufactured in 1990, and Russia expects each of them to have a useful life of 30 years. Annual test launches insure reliability. The RS-18 was developed as a "light" ICBM, in effect, a competitor for the U.S. Minuteman series. The RS-18 was the first Russian ICBM to carry MIRV (Multiple, Independent Reentry Vehicles). That means each warhead had its own guidance system. The SS-19 carries six warheads, and has a range of 10,000 kilometers.The current plan is to take some, or all, of the retired RS-18s and convert them (by adding a third stage) to satellite launchers. This has already been done with a few missiles, and the converted missile can lift 1.8 tons into orbit. Current technology enables small satellites (as small as 200 pounds or less) to do useful work. The civilianized SS-19s are perfect for launching these military states.Russia is also extending the life of its heavier (217 ton) RS-20 ICBMs to 30 years. This missile carries ten warheads, and is also being converted to launch satellites. Max satellite payload for the RS-20 is nearly three tons. The SS-27 entered service in 1998, and is based on the lighter, mobile, Topol (SS-25) ICBM. This was the first successful Russian solid fuel ICBM. It is comparable to the 1960s era U.S. Minuteman ICBMs. Solid fuel is tricky to manufacture, and after many failed attempts to develop it, the Russians stuck with liquid fuel until the 1980s. They finally perfected their solid fuel technology, with the successful test launch of the 45 ton Topol in 1985. The 52 ton Topol-M followed ten years later. Both missiles have a range of 10,500 kilometers. The Topol-M is more reliable, especially compared to the mobile Topol, which often developed reliability problems when it was moved by truck or train, and then fired. The Topol-M also had reliability problems, but these appear to have been fixed, so the replacement of the older RS18 and RS20 missiles will occur sooner. Topol-Ms cost $52 million each.
Lituânia adere ao Sistema de Defesa Anti-míssilA Lituânia está pronta a acolher o sistema de defesa anti-míssil que a NATO quer implementar na Europa, tal como a Polónia e a República Checa, afirmou recentemente o ministro da Defesa lituano, Juozas Olekas. De acordo com Olekas, a Lituânia precisa das instalações do sistema de defesa anti-míssil, uma vez que o país pode ser alvo de ameaças por parte de alguns países considerados instáveis.
Moscovo admite instalar mísseis em KaliningradoO vice-primeiro-ministro russo, Serguei Ivanov, admitiu ontem que o seu país poderia vir a instalar mísseis no enclave de Kaliningrado, junto às fronteiras da Polónia e da Lituânia, se os Estados Unidos da América (EUA) avançarem com os seus planos de instalação de bases do sistema de defesa contra mísseis balísticos (NMD), nos países do leste da Europa. Referindo-se às recentes propostas apresentadas por Vladimir Putin a George W. Bush, na cimeira de Kennebunkport, Ivanov afirmou que "as propostas russas são realizáveis só no caso dos parceiros americanos considerarem que vale a pena estudá-las e aceitá-las", sublinhando que "se os planos de instalação de elementos do sistema NMD na Polónia e na República Checa se mantiverem em vigor, uma coisa não encaixa com a outra, ou encaixa mal, ou não encaixa de forma nenhuma"."Não sei o que é que a estação de radares na República Checa consegue ver do Irão, mas sei que da Rússia consegue ver tudo até aos montes Urais", justificou-se Ivanov, que se queixa da ausência de explicações adequadas da parte norte-americana.Segundo o vice-primeiro-ministro, se as propostas russas fossem aceites o seu país deixaria de sentir "a necessidade de instalar novos mísseis na parte europeia do país, incluindo a região de Kaliningrado, para fazer frente às ameaças que se irão criar no caso da instalação de elementos do NMD na República Checa e na Polónia."Nós podemos criar um grupo de estados que combate em conjunto a proliferação das ameaças de mísseis", declarou Ivanov, segundo o qual a estação de radares de que a Rússia dispõe em Gabala, no Azerbaijão, está nas condições ideais para "descobrir lançamentos não só de mísseis balísticos, mas também de mísseis alados, efectuados a sul do Azerbaijão, incluindo do Irão".Na opinião do governante russo, que é visto como um dos potenciais sucessores de Putin no Kremlin, se os EUA concordassem com a proposta de Moscovo, de criar um sistema de defesa conjunto, criar-se-ia "um novo campo de confiança, e as relações passariam para um carácter de parceria estratégica". "Depois disso, os jornalistas esquecer-se-iam da expressão 'guerra fria', esta simplesmente desapareceria", adiantou Ivanov. in Jornal de Notícias 5 de Julho de 2007
Cold War Redux: China Responds to the Russo-American BMD DisputeBy Joseph E. Lin, Christopher Griffin As Chinese commentators criticize U.S. defense officials for their “Cold War mentality,” one need merely read the headlines to feel trapped in a bad rerun of the 1960s. Washington's attempts to meet asymmetric challenges at both ends of the conflict spectrum have kept its hands full. At the “low intensity” end, the U.S. military is enmeshed in a long, bloody insurgency in Iraq. Meanwhile, Washington and Moscow are engaged in a heated row over U.S. attempts to deploy a ballistic missile defense (BMD) system in Europe as each side demonstrates its prowess at “high intensity” warfare. China's growing fears that such a feat, if successfully accomplished in Europe, might be replicated in the Asia-Pacific, have resulted in a crescendo of criticism from Beijing. While certainly not the first time that China has condemned the deployment of a U.S. BMD system—as seen during the dispute prior to Washington's withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in 2002—China is now backing its words with deeds. Indeed, the January anti-satellite (ASAT) test and the expected deployment of the DF-31 road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) are indicative of a Chinese strategy to develop capabilities that would permit it to negate any military advantage the U.S. might obtain by deploying a similar BMD system in the Asia-Pacific.Watching from the SidelinesSince January, the United States and Russia have engaged in a verbal tit-for-tat over plans to expand the U.S. ballistic missile defense system into Europe by constructing a radar base in the Czech Republic and stationing mid-course interceptor missiles in Poland. This plan was always likely to earn Russian ire, as Moscow had long viewed the incorporation of former Warsaw Pact members into NATO as a direct affront to its dignity and security and only relented in the 1990s when it was implicitly guaranteed that U.S. and NATO troops would not be stationed on former Pact countries.At a February conference on international security in Munich, Russian President Vladimir Putin condemned the missile defense plan, stating that it would lead to an “inevitable arms race.” Since then, Russia has suspended its participation in the treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe and threatened to abrogate the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty that helped prevent a nuclear arms race in Europe at the height of the Cold War in the 1980s.Chinese media have followed the Russo-American spat over the missile defense system closely, focusing on Washington’s supposedly anti-Russian strategy and the destabilizing effects of missile defense. While the Chinese Foreign Ministry initially refrained, for the most part, from taking an explicit position on the Russo-American disagreement on missile defense, Beijing expressed its views by proxy; Chinese academics and state-owned media have adopted positions generally favorable to Moscow, thereby allowing Beijing to express its views without becoming directly involved. Indeed, when discussing the missile defense program in isolation, Chinese media reports in this earlier period tended to be matter-of-fact. For example, Ren Xiangqun, a researcher at the Chinese Military Science Academy, noted in a People's Daily editorial in late May that if “the United States can smoothly set up interception bases and radar bases in Poland and the Czech Republic, its missile defense system will basically create a global deployment structure with the U.S. homeland at the center and East Asia and Europe as its two flanks” (People’s Daily, May 23).When discussing the missile defense shield in light of Russia’s interests, however, Chinese media have championed the Russian position and criticized American justifications for the program. One characteristic report in this vein is an early May People’s Daily article that claims U.S. policy toward Russia is to “contain the nation to prevent it from rising again.” The article continues to observe that “Washington is no doubt targeting Russia” with the deployment of the missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic, and that the “world is perhaps on the brink of a new Cold War” (People’s Daily, May 11).An earlier People’s Daily piece attempts to place the broader set of Russo-American disputes over such issues as human rights, the rule of law and nuclear proliferation in Iran in context by summarizing the two sides’ respective strategies: “The paramount objective of the Putin administration is a Russian renaissance, which is the last thing Washington wants to see and will tolerate, since U.S. hegemony cannot be challenged. To prevent such a scenario, the U.S. has been trying every means possible to weaken and contain Russia since the end of the Cold War” (People’s Daily, May 3).Another article that attempted to explain Washington’s strategic logic toward Russia likewise points to the overall pattern of U.S. efforts on NATO expansion, democracy promotion in the Commonwealth of Independent States, and missile defense efforts as proof of Washington’s vindictive goals. The article concludes that the United States is “punishing the loser” of the Cold War by attempting to impose upon it “the reality that the U.S. will expand in a range as large as possible in a hope to build a permanent U.S.-led international pattern.” (People’s Daily, March 24).Such a supporting role was easy (and not costly) for China to play, expressing concerns about U.S. missile defense capabilities by criticizing developments in Europe without having to directly lead the charge in public. This approach was only possible, however, so long as Moscow kept up the pressure on Washington. Leading the Cheering Section At the early June Group of 8 meeting in Germany, Putin changed tack, offering to cooperate with the United States on missile defense by changing the location of the planned radar site to Azerbaijan, where a Soviet-era X-band radar facility is already established. When President George W. Bush and Putin met at the Bush family compound in Maine a month later, Putin expanded upon his earlier offer, stating that the Russians would be willing to either update the existing radar facility in Azerbaijan or replace it completely, provided that the Polish and Czech facilities were disbanded. As Putin cast aside the standard of opposition to missile defense at the G8 summit, Beijing—concerned that Russia might once again capitulate to Washington's will as it did regarding the ABM Treaty—has taken a more assertive course in the debate by releasing a series of press commentaries and public statements criticizing the U.S. missile defense effort. The first official Chinese Foreign Ministry statement on the issue of missile defense in Europe was released at the dawn of the summit, when Foreign Ministry spokesman Jiang Yu told the media that the U.S. plan for Europe has attracted “some concern” and that “missile defense systems negatively impact strategic balance and stability and are detrimental to mutual trust among major powers and regional security [and] will also probably trigger new proliferation issues” (Xinhua, June 5). A pair of articles since the G8 summit indicates the degree to which the Chinese media position has swung in support of the government’s openly critical line.First, on June 18, the People’s Liberation Army Daily published a scathing critique of the proposed U.S. system, stating that “vigorous U.S. development of antimissile defense systems is aimed at changing the ‘mutually assured destruction’ nuclear deterrent concept left over from the Cold War…by weakening the enemy’s nuclear missile deterrent, thus achieving ‘attack through defense.’” The article concludes that because U.S. efforts are pushing Russia to develop new offensive missile capabilities “that can pierce through any antimissile defense system,” U.S. efforts will ultimately be frustrated and “Europeans will become ‘hostages’ to the U.S. antimissile system.” The article concludes by predicting that the “summer breezes” at the then-upcoming Kennebunkport summit “will probably still be mixed with some whiffs of the Cold War” (Jiefangjun Bao, June 18).The source of China’s increasingly critical pronouncements on the missile defense system in Europe is the perceived threat from U.S. missile defense ambitions in the Asia-Pacific and the risk that Russia will no longer lead the international campaign against the BMD system if the Azerbaijan plan happens to go through.On June 21, the People’s Daily clearly laid out these concerns with an editorial headlined as “The Untimely Anti-Ballistic Missile System.” Observing that Washington’s plan in Europe has been matched by similar efforts in cooperation with Japan and Australia in Asia, the article observes that the ballistic missile defense also has “offensive” uses such as “accurately intercepting high-speed missiles attacking aircraft in flight and satellites in orbit.” The article argues that U.S. and allied efforts to build a missile defense system “simply reflects the U.S. mindset of intensifying the Cold War mentality” and “can neither help maintain regional security and stability nor enhance the mutual trust and cooperation between Asian-Pacific countries.” The article concludes on an ominous note, stating that missile defense “will intensify the distrust and feelings of alienation among countries and even pose a new issue of proliferation” (People’s Daily, June 21).Playing BallThe fairly sudden intensification in China’s rhetoric toward missile defense is explained in part by the understated decision that Beijing will be committed to space warfare and developing missile capabilities to leverage against U.S. and Taiwanese forces in the region for the foreseeable future.The decision to commit itself to bolstering its missile forces is implicit in China’s official statements and media commentaries on missile defense, where the warning that U.S. efforts will result in instability and proliferation may be read as a threat. Indeed, in the one instance where proliferation has arguably been tied to missile defense, Chinese commentators have been exuberant over the challenge posed to U.S. missile defense capabilities. After Russia test-fired the RS-24 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in June—a weapon capable of carrying up to ten independently targetable warheads and was designed to replace a missile that Cold War planners code-named “Satan”—the People’s Daily reported that the most dangerous nuclear missile had “destroyed the myth” of U.S. missile defense and restored “strategic balance” between the two powers (People’s Daily, June 12).Moreover, as Beijing has become vehemently critical of U.S. attempts to erect a missile defense system in Europe, it seems that China has also begun to make secondary, hardware preparations, should the United States either remain unconvinced about halting the deployment of the BMD system or decide to replicate a similar system in the Asia-Pacific. Western observers have noted that the technical parameters of China's January 11 ASAT missile test—the use of a phased array radar to guide a kinetic-kill vehicle toward a target traveling faster than an ICBM warhead during reentry—are similar to those of a ballistic missile intercept . While surprising, China's attainment of such a sophisticated technological capability was first hinted at in November 2006 by the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corp.'s display of a conceptual ballistic missile defense system at the Zhuhai Air Show (Wen Wei Po, November 10, 2006).Ashley Tellis, a scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, notes that Beijing has determined that a robust missile and anti-satellite capability is essential to “counter the overall military capability of the United States” and to disable the “complex, exposed network of command, control, communications, and computer-based systems that provide intelligence [and] reconnaissance” to U.S. forces . Tellis writes that because Chinese defense planners see the networked nature of American forces as their principle vulnerability, they are not likely to surrender their efforts to build stronger missile forces no matter what offers Washington makes to halt the weaponization of space. This logic has a corollary in the area of missile defense, where the ability to intercept Chinese missiles and protect critical U.S. and allied satellites and nodes is one of the greatest threats to China’s emerging military strategy.Having recently dissected a series of doctrinal textbooks on campaign strategy published by China's National Defense University and distributed to its military academies and war colleges, defense analyst and former U.S. defense attaché in Beijing Larry Wortzel finds that, much like Russia, China is taking steps to overwhelm any U.S. missile defense system. Wortzel cites a group of Chinese military officers from the Second Artillery Command Academy who recently wrote that “guided missile forces are the trump card (sa shou jian) in achieving victory in limited high technology war” . Another Chinese officer argues that in order for a guided missile attack to successfully destroy U.S. military capabilities, it is necessary to “neutralize enemy anti-missile systems and missile sensor systems,” leaving such critical assets as naval vessels and airfields vulnerable to attack .ConclusionWhile the Russo-American spat over missile defense has attracted the most attention in recent months, China has played a critical role in observing and attempting to undermine U.S. efforts in this field. Beijing’s effort to rapidly develop a broad range of theater missile strike capabilities that it will likely employ in a potential conflict—unlike Russia’s RS-24 Armageddon missile—certainly carries a tremendous risk of unintentionally escalating a Sino-American armed conflict to the level of nuclear war. As China develops its capabilities to blind U.S. surveillance, reconnaissance and intelligence assets with missile attacks, the temptation for the United States to respond in kind will increase, raising a new specter of conflict that is indeed reminiscent of the Cold War.Notes1. For an additional discussion of the technical aspects of the ASAT test and its similarities with a BMD system, see Ashley Tellis, “Punching the U.S. Military’s ‘Soft Ribs’: China’s Antisatellite Weapon Test in Strategic Perspective,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Policy Brief 51 (June 2007), 2-3 or Richard Fisher, Jr., "Two Cheers for the 2007 PLA Report," International Assessment and Strategy Center, June 20, 2007.2. Tellis, "Punching the U.S. Military’s ‘Soft Ribs'" 2-3.3. Ge Xinliu, Mao Guanghong, and Yu Bo, “Problems Faced by Guided Missile Forces in Information Warfare Conditions and Their Countermeasures,” (Xinxi zhan zhong daodan budui mianlin de wenti yu duici), in Military Science Editorial Group, Wo Jun Xixi Zhan Wenti Yanjiu, pp. 188-189 inLarry Wortzel, “China’s Nuclear Forces: Operations, Training Doctrine, Command, Control, and Campaign Planning,” Strategic Studies Institute (May 2007), 13.4. Nie Yubao, “Combat Methods for Electronic Warfare Attacks on Heavily Fortified Enemy Naval Formations” (Daji haishang di da jian jianting biandui de dianzi zhan zhanfa), in Military Science Editorial Group, Research on Questions about Information Warfare in the PLA (Wo Jun Xixi Zhan Wenti Yanjiu), Beijing: National Defense University Press, 1999, pp. 183-187 in Ibid., 12.
Rússia e EUA em exercícios militares na AlemanhaA Rússia e os EUA vão realizar exercícios militares conjuntos na Alemanha, ainda este ano, apesar das fricções existentes entre os dois governos, em relação à instalação do escudo anti-míssil na Europa de Leste pelos norte-americanos, anunciou recentemente o chefe do departamento de acordos internacionais do Ministério de Defesa da Rússia. “Os exercícios Torgau 2007 vão realizar-se mas numa versão simplificada”, afirmou Yevgeny Buzhinsky. Estes exercícios foram adiados o ano passado devido a desentendimentos entre os dois países quanto à organização do evento. Os últimos exercícios militares conjuntos tiveram lugar em 2005 e envolveram cerca de 160 militares.2007/07/31
Putin's Muscle Flexing: Bluff or Cold War Challenge?By David Eshel No matter what experts may say, Russia's growing assertiveness is already causing jitters in the West. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), consisting of Russia, China and four Central Asian republics (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan), held its "Peace Mission 2007" joint war exercises in August, starting in the Chinese western province of Xinjiang and continuing it in Russia’s Ural region of Chelyabinsk. The military exercise, which followed the SCO’s annual summit in Kyrgyzstan earlier this month, represents a clear demonstration of the rising power tensions over the energy-rich Central Asian region. If not enough to poke a finger in US President George Walker Bush's eye, Russian president Vladimir Putin took the opportunity to formally announce that Russia was restoring the ancient Cold War practice of long-range patrolling by nuclear-capable strategic bombers around the world. In fact, with Russia's nuclear bombers are now permanently airborne again and President Vladimir Putin loses no opportunity to strut the world stage and flex his country's military muscles. While the bombers did not pose any acute danger, Russian planes are old and perhaps not sufficiently maintained for prolonged operational sorties. Their crews, both pilots and ground crews are not as well trained and professionally proficient as in Soviet times. This creates a distinct possibility that before long there will be dangerous accidents.Yet all the sound and fury can hardly disguise an essential fact: that far from being a rising power like China or India, Russia is already locked in a long-term decline. While at present, the high global oil prices give Russia's economy a temporary upsurge, with which Mr Putin can afford the necessary cash to display his military prowess- this may rapidly change, once oil prices decline again.The age-old Achilles Heel is in Russia's national economy. Its near total dependence on oil and natural gas, is both dangerous and prone to political adventurism. To illustrate this, Russia's official GDP is approximately a mere$1.723 trillion compared to the huge US- $13 trillion! ( 2006 estimates). Moreover, While Mr Putin's sabre rattling raises new memories of the Cold War, today's overall strategic military situation does not even compare in the slightest with the Iron Curtain era.In those days, until the late Eighties, Central Europe was a Russian fiefdom with Kremlin deploying no less than 18 armored divisions in the East Germany, projecting its military power toward the geographical centre of Europe. But today, by contrast, the former Soviet satellite states are fully independent and far from friendly to their former Kremlin mentors. Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania, once republics of the Soviet Union, are members of both the EU and NATO, which eastern border is now only a short drive from St Petersburg, one of Russia's most prestigious strongholds. These fundamental realities vividly betray Russia's essential strategic weakness.Thus, Kremlin is trying to create a new strategic entity in Central Asia, where it believes that the United States, still embroiled in its Iraqi quagmire, is losing its former influence. The August military exercises are primarily meant to establish this image, but does it really impress those at which it is intended? It seems logical that the powers at be in Beijing will hardly throw in their lot with Putin's dangerous ambitions, which will certainly place them at loggerheads with Bush's strategic interests in South East Asia, before China becomes a real strategic regional power by itself.But meanwhile the Russian military are not losing time to announce their new toys. Admiral Vladimir Masorin commander of the Russian Navy since 2005, said recently that Russia would resume building aircraft carriers in order to become a first-class naval power with a powerful ocean-going navy. But even Russian military analysts are refuting this kind of swaggering talk. Russian admirals have been pointing to a renewal of Moscow's naval presence in the Mediterranean Sea, dominated by the US Sixth Fleet and NATO (CINCUSNAVEUR) since the cold war era. Unofficial Russian sourced estimates speak of one carrier, five cruisers (two nuclear-powered), nine destroyers, and 12 ocean-going frigates which are considered to be operational, but naval experts estimate even these figures over optimistic. With such a small force already dispersed among four different naval commands, (Black, North, Baltic Sea and the Pacific Ocean fleets), it will be far from easy "to restore" a combat effective task force in the Mediterranean on "a permanent basis."In the communist era Russia had built five aircraft carriers, all constructed at a shipyard in Nikolayev, Ukraine This shipyard is today politically unavailable to Russia and another option seems not in sight at the moment for the monumental task, which Admiral Masorin insinuates. According to naval experts, Russia simply cannot build a carrier, since it does not have a shipyard with a dock that can construct ships of such size. Moreover, of the five carriers in Soviet era arsenals, three of them have already been sold abroad as scrap. The only one retained by the Russian Navy, the Admiral Kuznetsov, which has turned out to be an inoperable wreck. Another embarrassing story concerns the fate of Russia's attempt to modernize the Class (Type 1143.5) Heavy Aircraft Carrying Cruiser Gorshkov. The $1.5 billion contract to modernize the Class (Type 1143.5) Heavy Aircraft Carrying Cruiser Gorshkov was signed in 2004, and the Indian Navy was hoping to get a fully operational carrier in 2008, complete with an air wing of MiG-29K jet fighters. In August this year, it was reported that the Sevmash Shipyards at Severodvinsk, in northern Russia, was unable to complete the Gorshkov on time and construction will not conclude before 2011! Sevmash Director General Vladimir Pastukhov was fired by the Kremlin for this debacle. New and powerful missiles are part of a significant plan beefing up most of Russia's decadent weapons systems. The Bulava missile system will become a flagship project that Russian President Vladimir Putin has claimed piercing any Western missile shield. The decision to go ahead with production despite several test failures comes in the wake of a US-Russia concern over American plans to base 10 missile interceptors in Poland and radar installations in the Czech Republic, which the Russian president regards as a personal affront.But that is not all. Russia's former pride in its fleet of missile submarines, has been reduced to a mere nine vessels. Although the first Russian fourth-generation strategic nuclear submarine the Project 955 or Borey -class Yury Dolgoruky, was launched during a special ceremony at a shipbuilding yard in northern Russia last April, the Navy has still not quite overcome the highly publicized and painful loss of the K-141 Kursk in August 2000. According to Alexander Buturin, a presidential advisor on military-technical policy, Russia will invest about 170 billion rubles ($6,5bln) in the next eight to 10 years, in modernization of its shipyards. But while quite impressive, under present Russian economic conditions, this somewhat meager funding in global comparisons, would be totally insufficient to create a naval force of size and power, capable in confronting modern western naval forces already in service. In fact, with the bulk of the money, some 13 billion rubles, already earmarked for the construction of three Project 955 submarines would leave little or nothing for the Russian Navy's urgent technical equipment program modernization.According to intelligence reports, the Russian strategic bomber fleet currently has operational aircraft stationed only at two major airbases, and the absence of an effective modern early warning system leaves the Russian aircraft almost completely vulnerable to a surprise attack. The same applies to the mobile launchers for Topol-M intercontinental ballistic missiles, which now hardly ever leave their hangars -- hangars which the Americans have constantly in their sights. In comparison, as of the beginning of the year, Russia had only 79 strategic bombers, according to data exchanged with the United States under the START I arms control treaty. At the peak of the Cold War, the Soviet long-range bomber fleet numbered several hundred. Even under the most optimistic conditions, money being no object, it might well take years until such a level of operational bomber fleet will become a real threat to western strategic air domination.As for Russia's defense industry, the situation is not much better, if one glimpses behind the bombastic public relations stunts in air-and defense shows. None other than Lieutenant General Sergey Chemezov, head of Rosoboronexport, the Russian state defense export agency, recently painted a dramatic picture of the dismal state of his country's weapons industry. The majority of weapons manufacturers, says Chemezov, a close confidante of President Putin, are in a "difficult situation," with 75 percent of their production facilities obsolete. According to one study, one-third of Russia's arms manufacturers are "virtually bankrupt."According to analysts in the know, although the Russian defense budget has almost quadrupled to its current level of $31 billion in the last six years, Kremlin uses its military spending "very ineffectively" when it comes to upgrading its equipment, says arms expert Ruslan Puchov. And, based on a study by GRU, the Russian military intelligence agency, about one-third of the country's military budget ends up lining the pockets of high-ranking officers and party bosses.In comparison, US military spending is in a different league altogether. Since taking office in January 2001, US President George W. Bush has almost doubled the Pentagon budget. Russian Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov complained that the US defense budget is "25 times as large as Russia's." Just to name a single item, the US Navy plans to commission its 13th aircraft carrier very shortly! And even for a limited and still highly controversial ad-hoc project like MRAP, the Pentagon received immediate funding for over $ 20 billion, without a blink of the eye from Congress. Under such circumstances it seems highly unlikely that Moscow could, in the foreseen future, catch up with the United States technologically. Instead, the purpose of the planned modernization effort is probably aimed to polish the image of the Russian state and its decrepit military, not just domestically but mainly among allies and potential clients in the Middle East.Moscow simply lacks the financial means to effectively challenge the Americans. "Russia's gross domestic product is only one-thirteenth of that of the United States," says Vladimir Ryzhkov, a member of the opposition in Russia's parliament, who regards Putin's aggressive rhetoric as an effort to impress Russian voters leading up to oncoming December parliamentary elections. The latest publicity stunt by Moscow in its dramatic submarine dive to plant the Russian flag on the seabed at the North Pole last week may have rattled Canadian politics and underscored the growing stakes as the ice cap melts in the oil-rich Arctic, but was primarily intended for local consumption. Sending some of its strategic bomber fleet flying above the North Pole only enhanced Putin's display of Russia's military muscle to the media.Taking at its facts, there is no doubt Putin’s Russia has come a long way from the remnants of a crumbling empire that Yeltsin inherited and ran into the ground. And the timing of the renaissance – when superpower concerns are drowning in self-created war-against-terrorism quagmires – has been near perfect. Indeed, Putin’s Cold War reminiscent response to America’s missile defence system in Europe exposes the West’s growing limits and frustration at a come-again Russia. oscow's decision to resume Cold War-style strategic bomber patrols confirms it has revived the political will and economic means to challenge US global dominance and NATO expansion with more than just rhetoric. Wether this strategy succeeds remains highly doubtful, however.Indeed, Putin's gambit may well backfire on his strategic ambitions. With next year's US presidential elections looming near, the Republicans, based on present lack of public support, may lose, which will enter a Democratic president into the White House. But if Putin's provocations persist and emerge into a real cold war scenario arms race, it will not only jeopardize the democrat chances, but most probably retain a hard-line republican like John McCain, to "save America" from the "Bad Russian Bear". Vladimir Putin has already been regarded as Washington's "bad guy". Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has never trusted Putin, being a former KGB agent, and influential Senator McCain has been persistently calling for a tougher stance on Moscow for years. Moreover, the US economy will surely benefit and flourish further, when its heavy industry once again receives top national priorities to win another inter-global arms race. This can hardly be Putin's aim, but perhaps the clocks in Moscow go different than in Washington?
Azerbaijão, EUA e Rússia discutirão uso do radar de Gabalá31/08 - 11:26 - EFEBaku, 31 ago (EFE) - Analistas de Azerbaijão, Rússia e Estados Unidos se reunirão no dia 15, em Baku, para discutir a utilização conjunta da estação de radar de Gabalá, situada perto da fronteira do Irã, anunciou hoje o vice-primeiro-ministro russo, Serguei Naryshkin."Especialistas dos três países se reunirão em 15 de setembro, em Baku, e este trabalho comum deverá esclarecer as perspectivas do uso conjunto da estação de Gabalá, e, em geral, do desenvolvimento da defesa antimísseis", afirmou Naryshkin na capital azerbaijana.Naryshkin disse à imprensa que havia discutido o assunto com o presidente do Azerbaijão, Ilham Aliyev, e agradeceu a posição de Baku, que aluga o radar para a Rússia e que aceitou seu uso conjunto com os Estados Unidos.Em junho, o presidente russo, Vladimir Putin, propôs aos EUA usar de forma conjunta o radar de Gabalá, para superar as divergências surgidas entre os dois países devido aos planos americanos de instalar componentes do sistema de Defesa Nacional contra Mísseis americano no Leste Europeu, perto das fronteiras russas.Os Estados Unidos ainda não responderam à proposta russa de usar de maneira conjunta o radar de Gabalá e outro que está sendo construído pela Rússia em Arzamas, ao lado do Mar Negro, mas as duas partes conversaram em julho, em Washington, e realizarão outra rodada de discussões em setembro, em Moscou.Washington não descarta o uso conjunto de Gabalá, mas nega que esta seja uma alternativa a seu plano de instalar um radar em Praga e foguetes interceptores no território polonês para se defender de possíveis ataques com mísseis de países como o Irã.O radar permite detectar e calcular a trajetória e os alvos de mísseis provenientes do Irã ou do Iraque, assim como mísseis balísticos e de cruzeiro lançados de bombardeiros, navios e submarinos americanos.A estação de radares de Gabalá foi colocada em serviço em 1985, e suas capacidades técnicas permitem controlar praticamente todo o hemisfério sul, já que seu alcance é de 6 mil quilômetros, mas não serve para guiar foguetes interceptores. EFE fg-si db/dgr