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Re: China
« Responder #45 em: Julho 28, 2020, 01:02:03 am »

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Diplomatas norte-americanos abandonam consulado de Chengdu na China dois dias depois das forças de autoridades dos EUA terem encerrado o consulado chinês em Houston.
https://www.youtube.com/user/HSMW/videos

"Tudo pela Nação, nada contra a Nação."
 

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Daniel

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Re: China
« Responder #46 em: Setembro 22, 2020, 12:35:16 pm »
Crítico do Presidente chinês condenado a 18 anos de prisão
https://executivedigest.sapo.pt/critico-do-presidente-chines-condenado-a-18-anos-de-prisao/
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Um milionário que criticou diretamente o Presidente da China, Xi Jinping, pela forma como geriu a epidemia do novo coronavírus, foi hoje condenado a 18 anos de prisão, anunciou um tribunal do país asiático.

Ren Zhiqiang deixou de ser visto em público, em março, depois de ter publicado um ensaio na Internet, no qual se referiu ao chefe de Estado chinês e secretário geral do Partido Comunista da China (PCC) como um “palhaço que vai nu”, mas “determinado a passar por imperador”.

Sob a direção de Xi, o PCC voltou a penetrar na vida política, social e económica da China, enquanto o poder se centrou na sua figura, abdicando do processo de consulta coletiva estipulado por Deng Xiaoping, o arquiteto-chefe das reformas económicas que abriram a China ao mundo nos anos 1980.

Dezenas de jornalistas, defensores dos direitos humanos e laborais foram condenados à prisão, num esforço para reprimir a sociedade civil.

Ren, de 69 anos, foi condenado por corrupção, suborno, desvio de fundos públicos e abuso de poder, anunciou o Tribunal Popular Intermédio n.º 2 de Pequim, através da sua conta oficial nas redes sociais.

O milionário disse que não vai apelar da sentença, segundo o mesmo comunicado.

O ex-presidente do Huayuan Group, uma das maiores construtoras da China, foi expulso do Partido Comunista em julho.

Num comentário difundido ‘online’, antes de ser censurado, em fevereiro passado, Ren considerou que a crise de saúde pública constituiu uma “crise de governação” e criticou a falta de liberdade de imprensa e de expressão no país asiático.

Ren criticou a propaganda do regime, que retrata Xi Jinping e outros líderes como os salvadores da China, sem mencionar como o surto começou ou possíveis erros, incluindo a supressão de informação crucial no estágio inicial.

Ren teve um início de carreira nas forças armadas chinesas e os seus pais foram ambos altos quadros do Partido Comunista.

E assim se vive na China. ::)
 

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Lusitan

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Re: China
« Responder #47 em: Setembro 25, 2020, 01:27:47 pm »
CHINA’S GAMBIT IN TAJIKISTAN: PARTNER OR OVERLORD?

Recently, a Chinese diplomat stated that the Pamir mountains of Tajikistan belonged to China and always have. The region borders the Uighur Autonomous Region of Xinjiang and the city of Kashgar, where up to 17 Uighur concentration camps are located. Both the treatment of Uighur Muslims by the Chinese and their increasingly outspoken historical claims to the Pamirs have alarmed those in the region, as well as the governments of Tajikistan and its close ally, Russia.

The scenario raises a number of questions. What are China’s goals in the region? Do they really believe that Tajikistan belongs to them? Is their penetration into Pamiri territory along their borders an indication of a long-term strategy in the region and an action that underpins their recent assertions about the region?

As Eurasia specialist Paul Goble recently pointed out:

This past month, official outlets of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) repeatedly republished an article by Chinese historian Cho Yao Lu, who says that the entire Pamir region belonged to China at one time and consequently, he implies, Tajikistan should now or in the future return it to Beijing.

The territorial claim is based, at least in part, on a long history of Chinese presence in the region dating back to as early as the second century B.C. This previously unspoken belief of the Chinese government feeds into what many in Central Asia fear – namely that China’s strategy in the region is anything but transactional and utilitarian. Rather, they suspect that its goals are part of a larger strategy of neocolonial and imperialist ambitions based on geographic and historical claims.

Negative comments about Chinese presence and activity in the Pamirs that started in the region over a decade ago have turned into vitriolic rumors and claims of Chinese takeover of the border area. When the Tajik government gifted a piece of land in the province of Gorno-Badakhshan in the Pamiri district of Murghab, along the Chinese border, many in the region believed their worst nightmares about Chinese intentions were coming true.

Tajikistan reportedly owes China US$1.2 billion, nearly half the country’s foreign debts of $2.9 billion. In order to pay off part of this debt, the government of Tajikistan in 2011 signed an agreement to give approximately 447 square miles (1158 square kilometers) of the Tajik Pamirs to China and in late 2019 gave China the rights to a potentially lucrative silver mine in the same region. Both are located near a new Chinese military base in Tajikistan, which, coupled with China’s land and resource grabs in Tajikistan, signals a marked uptick in Chinese military and security presence in the region.

At present, China is outpacing Russia, the United States and the European Union in development funding, economic investment, and security presence and partnerships in Tajikistan.

Russia is also watching carefully and none too happy about China’s encroachment on what it views as its traditional role of protector and security purveyor in the region. In fact, a Russian-influenced or supported social media campaign appears to be part of its strategy to highlight its disapproval of increased Chinese investment in the region, as well as debt trap lending practices, which have disproportionately affected the Pamirs.

In addition to China’s burgeoning security apparatus, Chinese trucks and trade flood the area and roads throughout the region. They have also installed traffic cameras, funded renovation and new construction of government buildings, and built numerous roads and tunnels in Tajikistan as part of their broader Belt and Road Initiative across the region. At approximately 25,000 square miles (65,000 square kilometers), the area is about the size of Sri Lanka, or six times the size of Lebanon, with a population of around 350,000 along both sides of the Tajik-Afghan border in Badakhshan, with only about 3 percent arable land. It is reputed to be rich in minerals and potential mines, however, and is already famous for its semiprecious and precious gemstones. It is reported that Tajikistan alone, according to the Chinese, has approximately 145 gold deposits.

At the same time, many in both Tajikistan’s Gorno-Badakhshan and Afghanistan’s neighboring Badakhshan province point out that Chinese support is welcome. The Chinese government provides scholarships to sons of local leaders, funds bases and development, and requires very little in return from the governments on either side of the border. Since 2015, China has developed secret bases in Tajikistan and Afghanistan (both eventually made public), conducted joint exercises along the border, engaged in intelligence sharing and joint surveillance operations, and sold or provided military and security equipment to domestic militaries and police.

The Russians are watching all of this carefully and playing both sides. On the one hand, they are engaging in active diplomacy and economic partnerships with China. At the same time, they are ramping up information campaigns in the region with local assets and spreading a message about the negative impact of Chinese presence and neocolonial ambitions, particularly in the Pamirs.

The Tajik government’s reaction to a more vocal and assertive China in the region also underpins both their unwillingness to genuflect to China as well as their alliance and deep ties with Russia. The increasing Chinese trade, development, and security agreements and partnerships with Tajikistan point to a willingness by the Tajik government to accept increased Chinese influence and control in the region through mining agreements and territorial gifts. At the same time, the Tajik government placates Russia with rhetoric on pushing back against Chinese encroachment on its territory, such as in the recent reaction by Tajik President Emomali Rahmon denouncing China’s claim to the northeastern part of Tajikistan.

It is likely Russia will pressure Rahmon to push back on China more than he is currently doing. This will put him in a bit of a pickle. The country’s many unpaid debts to the Chinese government for numerous projects in his country need to be paid somehow. At the same time, Tajikistan has a long history of placating Rahmon’s Russian security benefactor, Vladimir Putin. Rahmon has long played many sides as a means to his strategic ends, and quite successfully. This will likely be the case for the foreseeable future. In 2012, he offset his country’s debt by leasing land in Tajikistan’s agricultural heartland, in addition to giving a slice of the northeastern section of the Tajik Pamirs to the Chinese, as noted above. Shortly thereafter, he signed a security agreement for increased Russian military advisers and presence in the region. He then worked with the Chinese to allow them to build a base, engage in various other military exercises, and maintain a presence in the country.

This is all at the same time as Tajikistan partners with both the United States and European Union in various development, security, and military agreements.

At present, China is outpacing Russia, the United States and the European Union in development funding, economic investment, and security presence and partnerships in Tajikistan. What will change in the near future is the Russian-Chinese relationship and the use of tactics and messaging to discredit or undermine the influence of the other.

How this plays out and how much China and Russia either partner in the region as a means to counter the United States and European Union or begin to compete with each other will determine the course of events in the region for some time, and will go some way to answering questions of China’s intentions.
 

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Daniel

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Re: China
« Responder #48 em: Outubro 07, 2020, 10:38:07 am »
Estudo mostra que opiniões negativas sobre a China aumentaram nos países democráticos
https://executivedigest.sapo.pt/estudo-mostra-que-opinioes-negativas-sobre-a-china-aumentaram-nos-paises-democraticos/

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Um inquérito, divulgado na terça-feira, mostrou um aumento acentuado de perceções negativas sobre a China em vários países democráticos, sobretudo na Austrália e no Reino Unido.

A pesquisa do Pew Research Centre foi realizada numa altura em que o país asiático está envolvido em várias disputas comerciais e diplomáticas, motivadas em parte por uma abordagem diplomática mais assertiva.

O inquérito, que abrangeu 14 países democráticos com economias desenvolvidas, mostrou que a maioria das pessoas tem uma visão desfavorável sobre a China.

A pesquisa foi realizada entre 10 de junho e 03 de agosto, por via telefónica, junto de 14.276 adultos.

Na Austrália, 81% das pessoas disseram ter uma visão desfavorável da China, segundo a pesquisa, um aumento de 24% em relação ao ano passado.

Este aumento corresponde à tensão nas relações bilaterais, depois de Camberra ter apelado para uma investigação internacional sobre as origens do novo coronavírus responsável pela covid-19.

A China retaliou com a suspensão das importações de carne bovina australiana, aumento das taxas alfandegárias sobre a cevada importada da Austrália e uma investigação ‘antidumping’ sobre as importações de vinho australiano.

Outros países mostraram uma tendência semelhante: no Reino Unido, 74% dos inquiridos têm uma visão desfavorável em relação à China, um aumento de 19%, em relação ao ano passado; 71% na Alemanha (mais 15%); e 73% nos Estados Unidos (mais 13%).

Os 14 países abrangidos pela pesquisa são Estados Unidos, Canadá, Bélgica, Dinamarca, França, Alemanha, Itália, Países Baixos, Espanha, Suécia, Reino Unido, Austrália, Japão e Coreia do Sul.

A margem de erro da pesquisa variou entre 3,1%, na Coreia do Sul, e 4,2% na Bélgica.

Na maioria dos países, a população com níveis de rendimentos mais elevados altos era tão propensa quanto aqueles com níveis de rendimento mais baixos a ter opiniões negativas sobre a China.

As opiniões negativas também ocorreram em todos os níveis de educação.

Em nove dos países pesquisados – Espanha, Alemanha, Canadá, Países Baixos, Estados Unidos, Reino Unido, Coreia do Sul, Suécia e Austrália – as opiniões negativas atingiram o nível mais alto em 12 ou mais anos, segundo a Pew Research Center.

Muitos países democráticos condenaram a China no início deste ano, quando Pequim aprovou uma nova lei de segurança nacional em Hong Kong que, segundo os críticos, infringe os direitos prometidos à antiga colónia britânica quando retornou à soberana chinesa.

Um dos fatores mais importantes em relação à reputação da China no exterior é o novo coronavírus.

O vírus surgiu no final do ano passado na cidade chinesa de Wuhan (centro) e desde então espalhou-se pelo mundo. A China foi criticada por não ter sido suficientemente rápida na resposta inicial e por tentar encobrir os primeiros relatos sobre a doença.

Uma média de 61% dos inquiridos nos 14 países tinha uma visão negativa sobre a forma como a China lidou com o coronavírus SARS-CoV-2.

Aqueles que disseram que a China não geriu bem a pandemia mostraram mais probabilidades de ver o país sob uma luz negativa.

Os cidadãos dos países pesquisados também indicaram não confiar no Presidente chinês, Xi Jinping: uma média de 78% disse não confiar nele na gestão de assuntos internacionais.

Abrir os olhos enquanto é tempo..
 
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Re: China
« Responder #49 em: Dezembro 09, 2020, 05:11:10 pm »
Huawei tested AI software that could recognize Uighur minorities and alert police, report says

An internal report claims the face-scanning system could trigger a ‘Uighur alarm,’ sparking concerns that the software could help fuel China’s crackdown on the mostly Muslim minority group

https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/12/08/huawei-tested-ai-software-that-could-recognize-uighur-minorities-alert-police-report-says/
"[Os portugueses são]um povo tão dócil e tão bem amestrado que até merecia estar no Jardim Zoológico"
-Dom Januário Torgal Ferreira, Bispo das Forças Armadas
 

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Re: China
« Responder #50 em: Dezembro 10, 2020, 05:07:14 pm »
7. Todos os animais são iguais mas alguns são mais iguais que os outros.

 

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Lusitano89

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Re: China
« Responder #51 em: Janeiro 21, 2021, 06:07:33 pm »
 

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Lusitano89

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Re: China
« Responder #52 em: Janeiro 23, 2021, 05:30:03 pm »
 

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Lusitan

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Re: China
« Responder #53 em: Janeiro 28, 2021, 10:04:02 am »
https://warontherocks.com/2021/01/a-world-divided-the-conflict-with-chinese-techno-nationalism-isnt-coming-its-already-here/
A WORLD DIVIDED: THE CONFLICT WITH CHINESE TECHNO-NATIONALISM ISN’T COMING – IT’S ALREADY HERE

Four years ago, Chinese President Xi Jinping told an elite audience at the World Economic Forum at Davos that “integration into the global economy is a historical trend,” asserting that “[a]ny attempt to cut off the flow of capital, technologies, products, industries and people between economies … runs counter to the historical trend.” This year at Davos, speaking via video-teleconference because of the novel coronavirus outbreak, Xi was calling a very different tune, warning that other countries should not try to “start a new Cold War, to reject, threaten or intimidate others, to willfully impose decoupling, supply disruption or sanctions, and to create isolation or estrangement [which] will only push the world into division and even confrontation.”

President Joe Biden’s incoming trade and national security teams will face a number of urgent choices as they sift through the wreckage of the Trump administration, and few are more important than deciding which — if any — of the previous administration’s China-focused trade and export control policies should continue into the new term. Although the early signs are that Biden’s China team is bringing a deep bench of talented and experienced public servants, in the realm of technology policy, they will be inheriting a geopolitical landscape that has transformed dramatically since the last Democratic administration four years ago. Understanding what has changed will be key to ensuring that the United States remains a global technology leader so it can both “build back better” its domestic industries and counter Beijing’s problematic behavior.

The last Democratic administration held power during an era of technological globalism, marked by the fluid movement of supply chains and unfettered information flows. While global supply chains remain critically important, especially given record trade deficits, the renewed techno-nationalism by Beijing and a bruising trade war mean the landscape has been permanently altered. It is now a complex world of rampant cyber and technology espionage, “splinternets,” and national barriers to data flows. The emerging world is increasingly divided between rival technology spheres of information and communications technology ranging from hardware and software to banking and payment systems that form the superstructure of both core institutions and individual daily lives. One ecosystem, dominated by China, features Chinese firms that are either implicitly or explicitly controlled by the state, creating technology for both a protected domestic market and for international export. On the other side, by contrast, is a more amorphous technology environment. It stretches across the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development countries and is dominated largely by Western equivalents (with some limited Chinese penetration), though its regulations and norms remain in flux as various countries and political movements debate how the social contract should change to accommodate modern information technology.

The edges where these two spheres meet are now a persistent site of conflict, with the demands of global interconnectivity and supply chains chafing against a range of trade and export security concerns. For the U.S. government, this world presents new and difficult challenges, especially regarding how to promote growth and trade while at the same time protecting American technology from illegal export and theft. While it may have diagnosed critical structural problems correctly, the Trump administration did many things wrong in strategy and execution. It didn’t work with allies and overreached in many areas. But the Biden team can’t just go back to the way things were done before or simply implement what industry would prefer. It needs to chart out its own independent course that considers the national interest and the interests of the people, not just those of corporate America. What’s good for Silicon Valley or Wall Street’s quarterly numbers is no longer necessarily what is good for America’s long-term technological or industrial interests.

The bottom line is that long-term competition with China is here to stay and the best defense is a good offense. Of course, the United States needs to invest in innovation, workforce, and supply chains, and the Biden administration’s “Build Back Better” innovation plans are an excellent move in that direction. But no team can win on offensive prowess alone. It needs defense, too. The United States needs to protect its innovation base from China and cannot blindly allow its technological advantage to be acquired by China’s state-owned enterprises and “national champions.” The incoming Commerce Department leadership, for example, needs to use export controls to carefully restrict critical technology from Beijing and to shape behavior. Yet, export controls are not always the best tool. Sometimes the best tools will be economic sanctions, reviews by the Committee for Foreign Investment in the United States, or domestic R&D investments. The incoming administration needs to carefully assess when export controls are the right tool and when it needs to use other, more effective regulatory tools or elements of national power.

How the United States Got Here

It wasn’t so long ago that technological globalism dominated the international landscape, particularly among the “Davos set.” Futurists of the “Fourth Industrial Revolution” predicted that borders and national sovereignty would become less relevant, supplanted by international communities united around transnational social media platforms and supply chains. Large technology corporations were becoming “multinational” in every sense of the word, moving their headquarters to whichever nation offered the most advantageous tax code and resisting national efforts to regulate their conduct. The “globalized” supply chain for information technology was in fact heavily reliant on specific choke points, including component assembly in the People’s Republic of China and semiconductor manufacturing in Taiwan.

Although the cracks in this global system are now visible for all to see, the first fissures became visible much earlier in China. Its Great Firewall has morphed over time from a clunky anachronism into a startlingly efficient surveillance model for “digital authoritarianism” around the world. When the 2008 financial crisis shook global confidence in the U.S. financial system, China seized the initiative to push for alternatives to U.S.-led global institutions, launching frameworks such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Belt and Road Initiative. Before long, these “Chinese alternatives” intertwined with China’s broader push for cyber sovereignty. In 2013, the revelations of Edward Snowden raised serious questions for governments across the globe about the risks associated with the national origins of hardware and software, shattering global confidence in the international ICT standards regime and driving a major shifts toward the pursuit of domestic supply chain security, data localization, and privacy regimes (such as the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation, or GDPR). During the Trump era, China was frankly able to capitalize on global loss of confidence in U.S. leadership to push an alternate, fragmented vision of the digital commons.

In the United States (and increasingly in many other Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development nations), meanwhile, China’s planetary-scale cyber espionage campaign and rampant theft of U.S. trade secrets reached such a crescendo that they could no longer be ignored. Even the once China-friendly U.S. business community began raising serious questions about why U.S. ICT manufacturing was so over-centralized within the borders of a country long known to be a major strategic competitor and cyber threat to the United States. These trends culminated in a series of U.S. government policy moves that began with the Obama administration’s executive order on cyber sanctions and soon expanded to include the Office of the United State Trade Representative’s Section 301 investigation into China’s forced technology transfer practices and follow-on tariffs; the Department of Justice’s “China Initiative” against economic espionage and trade secrets theft; the Department of Defense’s secure supply chain efforts on semiconductors; and the National Institutes of Health’s and National Science Foundation’s investigations and sanctions against unreported researcher income from Chinese “talent programs.” For its part, the Commerce Department undertook long-overdue regulatory moves to modernize the process of adding state-linked Chinese firms to the Entity List, modify regulations surrounding “military end use,” and use the Foreign Direct Product Rule to address concerns about Huawei. During this period, Congress also moved aggressively to update foreign investment screening through the Foreign Investment Risk and Review Modernization Act and the U.S. export control regime through the Export Control Reform Act. Non-Chinese companies have naturally reacted to these actions by seeking to diversify their supply chains, and in rare cases have tried to “de-couple” from the China market.

China has flexed its own muscles in return, responding to these U.S. measures with a renewed emphasis on technology independence. In public, the key elements of its response include massive subsidies for the development of domestic technologies and support for “national champion” firms designed to both meet China’s domestic technology needs and erode the global market share of Western multinationals. Quietly, China has invested immense sums of money in Silicon Valley firms with technology relevant to national security, drafting behind Pentagon investments and offering follow-on rounds of investments, in order to bring their innovations into China’s industrial ecosystem. And in secrecy, China has ramped up cyber and technology espionage and extended its regulatory tentacles far deeper into private Chinese enterprises to ensure that they will function as arms of the state when national security is at stake.

The Rise of China’s Technology Sphere

The United States and its partners now face an emerging world whose citizens live in one of these entirely different technology ecosystems. The residents of China’s technology sphere live in cities connected by Huawei and ZTE devices and in micro-economies run through Chinese mobile payment systems like Alipay, all under the watchful eye of dense, overlapping surveillance that includes layers of CCTV, facial recognition, and big data predictive policing, though much of their tech is dependent on Western components and patents. The residents of the developed world, by contrast, live in an environment managed via Apple, Google, Cisco, Nokia, and Ericsson hardware, most of which is currently made in China, and on the large social media platforms (Facebook, Twitter, Netflix, etc.), with limited amounts of Chinese hardware and software sometimes tossed into the mix for reasons of cost and expediency.

It is tempting to generalize this as a conflict between symmetrical Chinese and Western technology spheres. But the reality is more amorphous. The United States and the European Union are deeply divided over fundamental issues related to hate speech, data privacy, and surveillance that have yet to be resolved, and relationships with key countries like Germany, Japan and South Korea need serious mending. Nevertheless, the differences between U.S. and European Union policies pale in comparison to the ways in which the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development as a whole is at loggerheads with the Chinese approach. And so, these two spheres will continue to chafe against one another, repelling intrusions into their territory and seeking to contest unclaimed domains as new technologies such as 5G and quantum computing reach maturity. At the same time, the populations within the two spheres will still need to communicate and do business with one another. This is not a second Cold War, and even a “post-decoupling” Sino-American relationship will be deeply economically interconnected by historical standards. The result will be continued awkward negotiations on interconnectivity at the boundaries, as well as opportunities for intelligence services to leverage that interconnectivity for all manner of espionage activities.

The Challenges for the U.S. Government

In this divided world, the U.S. government faces a range of new and difficult challenges in economic, trade, human rights, social, political, military, and diplomatic domains. Rather than overly focus on tariffs and other punitive actions, the incoming administration must strike a delicate balance, pursuing aggressive investment and, in some cases, rebuilding the United States research and technology and industrial base, while also pursuing foreign policies that seek to promote trade that is marked by mutual benefit and reciprocity. The Commerce Department will be critical to this effort, promoting U.S. opportunities in overseas markets while also protecting American technology from illegal export and theft. Key elements of a successful strategy will include:

Refocus the Bureau of Industry and Security’s security mandate to reflect a rapidly changing world in which national security, foreign policy, and ideological challenges with China are rapidly outpacing diminishing, positive-sum commercial opportunities related to China’s indigenous innovation, import substitution, and “dual-circulation” strategies. As a core mission, the bureau should begin by placing the interests of the United States, its long-term economic vitality, and its people ahead of the near-term financial interests of Silicon Valley, Wall Street, and other multinationals, which are not always aligned with U.S. interests.

Integrate the export control agenda into the domestic “build back better” agenda of revitalizing the American economy and industrial base. The old view of export controls as solely designed to address narrow counter-proliferation goals does not match the current global or technology environment.

Exercise U.S. leadership to ensure a more agile approach among small, allied groups outside of the Wassenaar Arrangement to address export control challenges focused on the areas of emerging technology, select foundational technologies (e.g. semiconductors), and human rights.

Prioritize meaningful action on export controls vis-à-vis China at the top of the diplomatic agenda early in the Biden administration to include use of “sharp carrots” to both incentivize harmonized approaches and coordinated actions and to deter self-interested, free-riding behavior by certain allies.

Upgrade the law governing the Committee for Foreign Investment in the United States to include scrutiny of joint ventures and increase its budget and manpower to deal with the greatly expanded caseload associated with unilateral initiation of investigations.

Use the full range of regulatory mechanisms, including the Entity List and the Foreign Direct Product Rule. Huawei’s entity listing, coupled with the Foreign Direct Product Rule, and the entity listing of Fujian Jinhua are a clear demonstration that when certain conditions are met, export controls are an effective tool against illicit Chinese behavior that threatens the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States and its allies.

Develop an integrated data governance framework that protects the integrity of U.S. networks and data, advances privacy, and ensures reciprocity for U.S. companies in the areas of cloud and value-added telecom platforms.

If implemented, these measures will help the new Biden administration adapt to the significant changes in the trade and security environment over the last four years and ensure its ability to achieve simultaneous goals: strengthening the American economy, accelerating the domestic innovation and job growth, deepening cooperative relationships with like-minded countries, bolstering U.S. military capabilities, and protecting critical intellectual property and core technologies of the future from wholesale technology and cyber theft.
 
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Re: China
« Responder #54 em: Fevereiro 02, 2021, 09:57:01 am »
25 JANUARY 2021

China passes law authorising China Coast Guard's use of firepower against foreign vessels

by Gabriel Dominguez


Amid heightened tensions over maritime and territorial disputes in the South China Sea (SCS) Beijing has passed a law authorising the China Coast Guard’s (CCG’s) use of firepower – under certain circumstances – against foreign vessels in waters “under China’s jurisdiction”.

According to the new ‘Maritime Police Law of the People’s Republic of China’, which was adopted on 22 January by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, the CCG is now authorised to take “all necessary measures, including the use of weapons, when national sovereignty, sovereign rights, and jurisdiction are being illegally infringed upon by foreign organisations and individuals at sea, or are facing an imminent danger of illegal infringement”.

The new law also authorises the CCG to demolish “buildings, structures, and various fixed or floating devices” from foreign organisations and individuals located “in the sea areas and islands under our jurisdiction”, if they have been built or set up without Beijing’s permission.


Haijing 3901 , one of the 10,000 tonne Zhaotou-class cutters operated by the CCG. On 22 January China passed a law allowing the CCG to use firepower – under certain circumstances – against foreign vessels in waters “under China’s jurisdiction”. (Via http://military.cnr.cn)

Beijing regards its jurisdiction to encompass the area of the SCS within its ‘nine-dash line’, as well as waters in the East China Sea around the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, which are controlled by Japan but claimed by China.

China claims most of the SCS on the grounds that it is asserting 'historic rights' to maritime resources in the area. This has prompted territorial disputes with neighbouring countries such as Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam, which stake competing claims.

https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/china-passes-law-authorising-china-coast-guards-use-of-firepower-against-foreign-vessels
"[Os portugueses são]um povo tão dócil e tão bem amestrado que até merecia estar no Jardim Zoológico"
-Dom Januário Torgal Ferreira, Bispo das Forças Armadas
 

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Daniel

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Re: China
« Responder #55 em: Fevereiro 26, 2021, 10:54:58 am »
China vai reforçar o orçamento da Defesa
https://multinews.sapo.pt/sapo-atualidade/china-vai-reforcar-o-orcamento-da-defesa/?doing_wp_cron=1614336571.8077299594879150390625
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A China prepara-se para reforçar o orçamento para a Defesa e deve anunciar esta medida a 5 de março, durante a tradicional abertura anual dos trabalhos parlamentares, segundo revelam especialistas em assuntos miliares, em declarações à Reuters.

“A China está a enfrentar uma situação em matéria de segurança externa que é a mais grave desde a Guerra da Coreia”, disse Ni Lexiong, professor aposentado da Universidade de Xangai.

O apoio e a venda de armas entre os EUA e Taiwan, a presença regular de porta-aviões da frota norte-americana no Pacífico ao largo da costa da China e a recente presença de um navio de guerra francês no Mar da China Meridional são as razões apresentadas pelos politólogos para este passo orçamental.

Ross Babbage, um membro não residente do Centro de Avaliações Estratégicas e Orçamentais com sede em Washington e ex-funcionário da Defesa australiana, foi ainda mais concreto e afirmou esperar um aumento de cerca de 7%. “Isso é menos do que algumas pessoas poderiam esperar e a razão é que a economia chinesa ainda não está em grande forma”, explicou Babbage à Reuters.

Apesar de a economia chinesa “ter sido a única a não sofrer contração com a pandemia e inclusive ter registado um crescimento de 2,1%”, de acordo com o Financial Times, tal aumento fica bem distante dos 8,4% esperados para o próximo resultado anual, de acordo com o Wall Street Journal.

Pequim ocupou no ano passado o terceiro lugar na lista dos países com maior poder militar, logo a seguir aos EUA.

Segundo uma pesquisa  desenvolvida pela plataforma Global Fire Power, Pequim tem 1.200 aeronaves de combate, 327 helicópteros e 79 submarinos, superando o Kremlin no capítulo do combate terrestre com 35.000 veículos blindados. Na tabela de investimento, a China é o número dois com 178.200.000.000 dólares (146.853.996.300€) destinados à Defesa, um aumento de investimento de 6,6% face ao ano anterior e a pior taxa de aumento em 30 anos de história militar chinesa, como refere a Bloomberg.
 

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Lusitano89

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Re: China
« Responder #56 em: Março 12, 2021, 04:52:19 pm »
 

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Lusitano89

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Re: China
« Responder #57 em: Março 26, 2021, 04:15:54 pm »
China decreta sanções contra deputados e outros cidadãos britânicos


 

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Lusitano89

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Re: China
« Responder #58 em: Março 29, 2021, 11:16:31 am »
China boicota marcas que boicotam algodão de Xinjiang


 

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Lusitano89

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Re: China
« Responder #59 em: Março 30, 2021, 06:55:28 pm »
Pequim reforça poder eleitoral sobre Hong Kong