Retired Admiral Igor Kasatonov revealed details of the 2014 Crimean operation and gave insight into his role in the history of the Russian Black Sea Fleet.Read more: http://sputniknews.com/russia/20150313/ ... z3UOERJwaj— Igor Vladimirovich, how did it happen that the powerful Black Sea Fleet of the USSR was effectively ruined?The most important goal for our adversaries in 1991 was to ruin the army. The strategic defense belt was indeed ruined, seven military districts, three force groups, and three strategic commands disappeared. For instance, the Turkestan military district amounted to 400 thousand people, the group in Ukraine – more than 700 thousand people, the group in the Baltic – more than 350 thousand people.The Soviet Army during the period of 1991 was 3.5 million strong. A 2 million group disappeared. The south-west direction became wide open. All force groups that remained on the territory of the new states transferred to these republics. This way the Black Sea Fleet ended up in the independent Ukraine. The Russian government exhibited unreasonable generosity and political shortsightedness back then. All of this could have ended tragically for the fleet, if not for the consciousness of the Black Sea Fleet sailors, their discontent, and the will of the commander, and the fact that the sailors didn't accept a new pledge of allegiance. This was a form of protest, even a mutiny, if you'd like. And not so much against Ukraine, but rather against Russia.— You became the commander of the Black Sea Fleet at exactly that time?Yes, in eight months we managed to turn the situation around, the leaders sat down to the table, the negotiations started. However we were surprised by the fact that Russia, despite being effectively a creditor of the Ukraine, was acting as an intercessor of sorts. Even though we could and should have been more stringent. Because after the 3rd of August of 1992 the negotiating process led to catastrophic consequences: the Black Sea Fleet had to leave from everywhere except Crimea – from Nikolayev, Kherson, Odessa. Only Sevastopol, Feodossia, and the Gvardeyskoye airport near Simferopol were left. These were huge mistakes. Up to 25 percent of the Ukrainian population lived in these focal points, 10 million people. That is, they were within Russia's informational sphere of influence.— When you were the commander, what was the size of the group?An unprecedented reduction of the Crimean group started. I, being a commander, had a group of 70 thousand service-members and 80 thousand employees (civilian). Until the 16th of March 2014 the fleet size was 12 thousand people instead of the 25 thousand by the agreement with Ukraine about the partition of the fleet. Naturally, the operational zone and the responsibility zone — all of that was minimized.— Nevertheless, the fleet stayed in Crimea. And it was exactly this circumstance that significantly helped to increase the army group in 2014?The fact that the Black Sea Fleet was there and stayed there became the foundation for the actions that followed after the 23rd of February of the last year. One may say that the Black Sea Fleet laid the foundation, the officers knew what is going on around them, where the Ukrainian units are located, the scenarios of the events were rehearsed on the maps. That is, the Black Sea Fleet accomplished its tasks — "the polite people" were brought it, the Crimean Supreme Council was captured between February 27 and 28.— And in the end, "the polite people" — who are they?"The polite people" are the army spetsnaz.— Can you lift the secrecy veil and tell us about the operation for blocking the Ukrainian units?I can cite the Col. General Volkov – "a brilliant concentration of the means and special forces in Crimea was performed with the use of camouflaging measures, which were unexpected for the Ukrainians, also there was a wide variety of measures on the advance misinformation of the enemy".The NATO intelligence missed everything it could and couldn't in Crimea. The reasons have to do with strict radio silence regime during the period of concentrating the group and also with skilled use of the Sevastopol base, the means of military transport, which deployed the armed forces into Crimea.— Where were the ships coming from?They were coming from Novorossiysk; the forces were also deployed by air. Everything could be expected. Crimea was saturated with the Ukrainian military. They didn't go anywhere — just surrendered. Some of them still had weapons, but without ammunition, because this was the first thing that "the polite people" took away from them.— Didn't Ukrainians know something?Of course they knew something. I was told that the Ukrainians received information that three helicopters were supposed to land in Kacha in February, but six of them actually landed. The landing of one Il-76 was ordered in Gvardeysky, but three landed, 500 people. These were diversionary units, spotters, guides, who acted together with the fleet group. Naturally, the marines also received combat orders.— Is there any danger in Crimea now?We are somewhat concerned by the north-west of Crimea, there is nobody there, the land is uninhabited. Now, however, we placed an observation post there. This is a dangerous zone. The Ukrainian group on the opposite shore, in the area of Ochakov is getting reinforcements. On high-speed cutters it is possible to pass this distance between the two shores in 45 minutes.— And are there S-300 in Crimea?The Ukrainian S-300 are obsolete complexes, they were all put out of order. The newest Russian anti-aircraft systems of S-300 type are currently deployed. With our crews. The Ukrainian junk remained in Belbek. We were ready to pass it to them, just like the ships, but when the military action in the south-east of Ukraine started, we completely suspended the process of returning materiel.— But are we going to return it?We will return it, but not tomorrow, not the day after, and not in a week, Until the nature of Kiev's behavior changes, we won't do it. The problem is not just in the ships, but in the huge mass of obsolete weapons, Soviet weapons.— Will the Black Sea Fleet ships continue to be based in Novorossiysk?Submarines will be based there, there will be the guarding system and defense system, the coastal guard brigade, some land units, the rear system.— And in Balaklava?There will be nothing in Balaklava.— The "Mistral" is planned to be deployed in Sevastopol?Of course, the question of deploying the "Mistral" type ship in Sevastopol was considered. We were preparing for this. The first ship should've gone to Vladivostok, the second ship — to Sevastopol. We were preparing in both places. It has a high draught. For example, we reinforced the pier and deepened the bottom in the Kurinaya bay.— Can we build this kind of helicopter carrier, like "Mistral"?Such ships in such time frames we cannot build at the moment. All of this is gone. A miser pays twice, and the inept pay three times. Who needs a ship that is built in 6-7 years. We can't even deploy the cruiser "Admiral Gorshkov" until now, and it was laid down in 2006, i.e., nine years ago. The cruiser "Admiral Kasatonov" was deployed in 60 months, that is in five years. During Soviet times the ships of such displacements, e.g., project 61 in Nikolayev, were ready in 12-14 months....Colonel Cassad's comment: "PS. I can add that the role of the fleet was indeed very high. During those days one just couldn't miss the major activity of the Large Landing Craft, which cruised between Sevastopol and Novorossiysk, providing the covert deployment of special force units that accomplished the crucial stages of the operation. During those times we received information from the locals that the LLC arrived during evenings, fully loaded with people and vehicles (I personally learned about the military concentration in Novorossiysk on February 24-25), unloaded at night, and later departed for another tour".
Documentary Project "Novorossiya: Weapons of victory
The 9S35 Fire Dome provides a limited search and acquisition capability, a tracking capability and CW illumination for terminal guidance of the semi-active homing SAM seekers. It incorporates an IFF interrogator, optical tracker, datalink, and is powered by the TELAR's gas turbine generator. A shared antenna is employed for two X-band transmit/receive channels. These respectively provide a pulsed mode for search and track functions, with linear chirp for compression, and a CW mode for illumination. Monopulse angle tracking is employed for jam resistance. For target tracking the antenna and feed system provide a mainlobe with 2.5° width in azimuth and 1.3° in elevation. For CW illumination the antenna and feed system provide a mainlobe with 1.4° width in azimuth and 2.65° in elevation.Operating autonomously, the 9S35 will take 4 seconds to sweep a 120° sector, with an elevation of 6° to 7°. When cued to acquire and track, with will take 2 seconds to sweep a 10° x 7° az/elev solid angle. Average power output in pulsed tracking modes varies between 0.5 and 1 kiloWatt, with CW illumination at 2 kiloWatts. The search and monopulse angle tracking receivers are both rated at a Noise Figure of NF=10 dB. The range error is cited at 175 metres, the angular error at less than 1°. The radar can switch from standby mode to combat operation in twenty seconds.
Este foi o míssil que matou 298 inocentes a bordo do voo MH-17Investigadores do Escritório do Procurador Nacional da Holanda completaram a primeira fase do trabalho que tinha como objetivo apurar as causas da explosão, a 17 de julho de 2014, do jato Boeing 777 da Malaysian Airlines que cumpria o voo MH-17, com destino a Kuala Lampur, e foi destroçado no ar quando se encontrava no espaço aéreo da Ucrânia.Entre tripulantes e passageiros morreram 298 pessoas, a maior parte delas cidadãos de nacionalidade holandesa.A apuração concluiu que, conforme se suspeitava desde a época da tragédia, a aeronave foi destruída pela explosão de um míssil do sistema antiaéreo autopropulsado de médio alcance Buk-M1-2, pertencente ao Exército russo – e, mais importante, que essa arma, por sua complexidade técnica, só poderia ter sido operada por militares russos.A força terrestre da Rússia possui mais de uma centena de sistemas Buk. Eles operam a partir de uma viatura blindada 9k38, de tração 6×6. A bateria antiaérea que se encontrava no lado oriental do território ucraniano, reforçava a defesa dos rebeldes separatistas pró-Rússia que controlam a região.Alcance - O Buk foi projetado e desenvolvido na década de 1970, com a missão de substituir o míssil Vympel 2K12 Kub, designado SA-16 pela Otan (Organização do Tratado do Atlântico Norte), nos anos de 1960.A versão M1-2 do Buk – que os especialistas ocidentais da Aliança Atlântica redesignaram SA-17 Grizzly – incorporou um míssil 9M317, de 40 cm de diâmetro, capaz de cortar o espaço impulsionado por propelente sólido, à velocidade de 1.230 metros por segundo. Orientando-se por radar semi-ativo, esse vetor mostrou-se apto a alcançar alvos a distâncias de até 45.000 metros.A reputação do sistema russo cruzou fronteiras. No segundo semestre de 2012, um grupo de sete militares venezuelanos viajou à cidade de Ulyanovsk, na região central da Rússia, para ser treinado na operação de um sistema Buk M2E (nomenclatura do equipamento destinado à exportação).A arma russa chegou ao território venezuelano no primeiro trimestre de 2013, montada sobre uma viatura MZKT-69221 – de maior porte e mobilidade que a usada pelo governo de Moscou em apoio aos separatistas ucranianos.Evidências – Reunidos em uma base aérea holandesa, investigadores, especialistas em acidentes aeronáuticos e militares qualificados em defesa antiaérea que trabalharam na primeira fase de diligências, examinaram mais de um milhão de evidências – destroços do avião, fotografias e videos, bem como testemunhos orais e escritos, acerca da tragédia com o Boeing malaio.De acordo com o apurado, a bateria antiaérea empregada para derrubar a aeronave havia sido levada para território ucraniano pouco antes de ser usada.Na segunda fase dos trabalhos, o Escritório do Procurador holandês pretende identificar os responsáveis pela derrubada da aeronave, fato que teria acontecido devido a uma análise tragicamente equivocada acerca do tipo de alvo que sobrevoava a fronteira da Ucrânia com a Rússia no dia 17 de julho do ano passado.Essas diligências vão querer respostas para as seguintes perguntas:A) Que pessoas operavam a bateria antiaérea responsável pela ação contra o voo MH-17 ?;B) Quem, no território ucraniano, detectou o tráfego do Boeing malaio e concluiu (erradamente) que se tratava de um avião militar ucraniano, ordenando, em consequência disso, o disparo do míssil?C) Quais autoridades do Exército russo aprovaram e ordenaram o envio da bateria antiaérea para a Ucrânia?D) Quem, no governo de Moscou, respaldou, aquela época, a intervenção do Exército no conflito interno da Ucrânia?Há muitas perguntas que ainda estão sem resposta. Entre elas: como era feita a localização e identificação dos alvos aéreos dos separatistas ucranianos? Os investigadores ocidentais acreditam que, sozinhos, os rebeldes pró-Rússia não teriam qualificação técnica para monitorar o tráfego em altitudes elevadas.De qualquer forma, as conclusões da primeira fase da investigação – cujo destino final é a apresentação perante a Corte Internacional de Haia – claramente envolvem o governo do presidente Vladimir Putin na morte das 298 pessoas que viajavam no voo MH-17.