Possibilidade de *guerra nuclear* com a Rússia

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mafets

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Re: Possibilidade de *guerra nuclear* com a Rússia
« Responder #75 em: Maio 08, 2017, 10:41:26 am »
Parto-me a rir com as análises de muitos analistas e pseudo-analistas de quintal, pagos a peso de ouro, mas que depois derrapam a cada esquina (tipo Rogeiro e os seus "muchachos", desde os submarinos aos UAV),  alinhados por um clube de fans que mais parece a "brigada do tricote", alicerçados nuns jornalistas de trampa que nem a net sabem usar (muito menos um livro e então uma biblioteca...), e num rol de imbecis que continua a achar que a cada "sonoro" dos líderes espalhados por esse mundo fora, deve seguir de imediato uma diarreia de comentários a marcar a IV guerra mundial já para a semana, tipo Solnado.


Lamentavelmente e como não ganho nada com isto, tenho que dizer que  não vai haver guerra nenhuma, e assim as Tv's e jornais da "tretolândia" podem deixar em paz as interceptações marítimas e aéreas que as F.A. fazem desde a guerra fria (mas só descobertas agora...). e apenas fazer uma cobertura sensata e real, de forma a publicitar o que Marinha e Força Aérea realizam ao invés de alarmar as pessoas, que volta e meia, lá porque "gasto latim e tempo" a escrever umas básicas linhas sobre estes assuntos, me perguntam "quando é a guerra"? e se é "melhor começarem já a comprar conservas e pilhas"... ::)   
 

Além disso, e face aos interesses bélicos, geopolíticos e geoestratégicos já por aqui bem definidos, acrescento os económicos, já que a todos faz jeito o tio Kim na Coreia do Norte, inclusive aos "empresários" do sul que fartam-se de ganhar guito com a mão  de obra barata nos pólos industriais, (a pretexto de ajudar os "desgraçadinhos" e onde quem "verga a mola" são os norte-coreanos), passando por chineses que conseguem a preço de saldo por exemplo o carvão, continuando nos russos que vão vendendo umas "coisas" via antigas republicas (ver como ultimo material bélico foi conseguido, por exemplo pela KPAF, e recebendo outras "made in South Korea"), e acabando nos "states" que ao que parece só "descobriram" que 86  dos seus OH6 Cayuse ao 87 embarque, estavam a ir para a Coreia do Norte (O apoio militar a Iranianos e Iraquianos então é tabu, sendo apenas um de muitos que não passa na TV)...  :P

   


Já agora, embora a maior parte dos líderes mundiais actuais não seja muito dado à inteligência, e por azar se rodeiem de "assessores" que só defendem o tacho e gastam kgs de graxa para mandarem umas tretas para quem assessoriam e para os "média" de forma a manterem o bom emprego, anda percebem o suficiente (inclusive o "Fura-Casamentos Matis", pouco dado a essas tretas da sociologia e antropologia árabe...), para saber por exemplo que no caso de uma simples "escaramuça convencional", sobretudo mas não só na península Coreana, o sul não tem como anular por exemplo os milhões de peças de artilharia do norte, (antes de começaram no "fogo à peça") com Seul "ali ao virar da esquina". Que o "gordo" não têm "fuel", peças nem misseis suficientes para mais que "uns dias" de fiesta não chegando por isso para passar Janggok (a Coreia do Norte não é a Rússia), pelo que arriscar uma guerra era claramente lixar a imagem de uns perante os outros e principalmente perante o seu próprio povo, que do sul ao norte não ficariam nada contentes por verificar que os governos em si "afinal" não protegem nada de nada (já levam anos de famílias separadas por causa dos "outros" e da tachomania),  e querem apenas votos, poleiro e dinheiro (ainda os EUA eram corridos para casa face aos mortos e feridos, com a população nativa a lutar a sério pela unificação o que era chato para quase todos...).   

Por ultimo, armas nucleares servem para uma coisa: Criar equilíbrio estratégico. Doidos foi o que não faltou por esse mundo nuclear fora e a coisa ficou sempre em "banho Maria" (tirando o Truman que além de idiota, queria mandar outros avisos...), pelo menos nos últimos 70 anos, os quais passaram depressa com o "faz de conta" de que por exemplo o programa de misseis estratégicos e nuclear da Coreia do Norte, Irão e Iraque, nasceu da N.S. de Fátima, sem sequer os ICBM, a meu ver os mais perigosos, serem alvo de alguma importância (faz de conta que Coreia do Norte não os está a desenvolver...) . No caso Coreano, quando as mesmas existirem (não ogivas de fraca potência, misseis dados a cair no mar e ogivas tamanho de uma automotora...), bastam umas MIRV "made in USA" na Coreia e Japão para tudo ficar "on" (já que os Chineses não se calam com o THAAD...), até porque na terra da "yokohama" já por lá existe um Porta-Aviões e toda a sua escolta que certamente têm uns Subs com capacidade de meter o Tio Kim a dançar a Polca. E pronto. Análise feita, a qual certamente aqui ficará e não passará nos principais jornais e revistas cá do burgo.  :nice:   


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« Última modificação: Maio 08, 2017, 11:28:27 am por mafets »
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Re: Possibilidade de *guerra nuclear* com a Rússia
« Responder #77 em: Julho 20, 2017, 02:11:36 am »

O sistema de defesa anti-missil russo.
https://www.youtube.com/user/HSMW/videos

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Re: Possibilidade de *guerra nuclear* com a Rússia
« Responder #78 em: Dezembro 04, 2017, 08:44:29 pm »
The Nuclear Threat - The Shadow Peace, Part 1
https://www.youtube.com/user/HSMW/videos

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Cabeça de Martelo

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Re: Possibilidade de *guerra nuclear* com a Rússia
« Responder #79 em: Dezembro 16, 2017, 12:06:26 pm »
General britânico alerta: os russos podem cortar a internet


Stuart Peach, chefe do Estado-Maior-General das Forças Armadas do Reino Unido


O chefe do Estado-Maior-General das Forças Armadas do Reino Unido diz que vasos de guerra russos tem sido localizados a navegar com regularidade sobre os cabos submarinos do Atlântico Norte

O alerta partiu do próprio chefe do Estado-Maior-General das Forças Armadas de sua majestade: os russos poderão cortar os cabos submarinos que ligam a América do Norte à Europa, por onde passam 97% das comunicações mundiais, incluindo muitos milhões de euros, todos os dias, em transações comerciais e financeiras, de acordo com o centro de reflexão Policy Exchange, citado pelo “The Guardian”.

“Há uma nova ameaça à nossa prosperidade e estilo de vida. A destruição dos cabos estendidos no fundo do mar irá de imediato – e de forma catastrófica –afetar o comércio internacional e a internet”, disse esta quarta-feira o general Stuart Peach durante o seu discurso anual no Royal United Services Institute, um centro de reflexão e debate sobre questões de segurança e defesa, com sede em Londres.

O militar que em setembro do próximo ano deverá assumir a chefia do comité militar da NATO, adiantou que vasos de guerra russos tem sido localizados a navegar com regularidade sobre os cabos do Atlântico Norte, e que a melhor forma de enfrentar essa ameaça é investir na modernização da armada britânica e dos seus aliados.

“Em resposta à ameaça colocada pela modernização da Marinha russa –nuclear e convencional, submarinos e navios de superfície – o Reino Unido e os seus aliados da NATO no Atlântico têm de dar prioridade às missões relacionadas com a proteção das linhas submarinas de comunicação”, disse Stuart Peach.

“Para além de novos navios e submarinos, a Rússia continua a aperfeiçoar capacidades e sistemas de informação de guerra não convencional. Portanto, temos de continuar a desenvolver as nossas forças navais com os aliados, para responder à modernização da frota russa”, insistiu o general Peach.

De acordo com o “The Guardian”, o alerta do homem que comanda as Forças Armadas do Reino Unido desde julho de 2016 surgiu numa altura em que se sabe que o Governo britânico deverá anunciar cortes na Defesa, no início do próximo ano. O jornal lembra ainda que os navios russos, tal como o fazem regularmente os britânicos e norte-americanos, poderão estar, tão-somente, a tentar intercetar comunicações para fornecer aos seus serviços de informações.

http://expresso.sapo.pt/internacional/2017-12-15-General-britanico-alerta-os-russos-podem-cortar-a-internet
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Re: Possibilidade de *guerra nuclear* com a Rússia
« Responder #80 em: Dezembro 21, 2017, 11:11:36 pm »
Putin's Zapad 2017 simulated a war against NATO

++ Intelligence sources reveal: in Russia’s large-scale September exercise, the capture of the Baltic States, bombings of Germany and other NATO members, as well as attacks on neutral countries were rehearsed ++

http://m.bild.de/politik/ausland/bild-international/zapad-2017-english-54233658,view=amp.bildMobile.html?__twitter_impression=true

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Since 2009, the Russian Federation’s General has been conducting the “Zapad” (“West”) exercise every four years (one was previously conducted in 1999). Its aim is to train the “defensive capacities” of the Russian Federation’s army in the Western Military Sector. Last September, the Russian army announced: “The Zapad 2017 anti-terror exercise is a purely defensive one.”

However, BILD recently spoke to two leading analysts from a western intelligence service who revealed that Zapad 2017 was neither an “anti-terror exercise” nor “purely defensive”, but a “dry run” for a “full-scale conventional war against NATO in Europe”. According to these sources, the drill rehearsed the capture of the Baltic states (and Belarus) as well as a “shock campaign” against Western European NATO nations such as Germany and the Netherlands, but also against Poland, Norway and the non-aligned states of Sweden and Finland.

According to the two sources, Kremlin forces rehearsed capturing NATO’s “region of vulnerability, according to the Russian view”, namely the three Baltic states. “To realize this, you would have to quickly do the Suwalki gap operation” in order to cut off Poland and NATO reinforcements from Lithuania. This is exactly what Russia did, creating the artificial state of “Veyshnoria” at the exact location of the 40-kilometre land bridge between Poland and Lithuania (carried out on Belarussian territory, however).

At the same time, Russia rehearsed “neutralizing or taking under control air fields and harbours (in the Baltic states), so there are no reinforcements arriving from other NATO states there”. The sources emphasized that, in the case of an emergency, this would, in the first few days, be a purely military operation. “This does not mean that you have to occupy the countries and declare ‘Peoples’ Republics’ or something like that, but that you have to occupy the harbours, airports and so on”.

The sources revealed that “Russian air force strategic aviation, long-range aviation, took part in the exercise on two days and conducted simulation flights over the Baltic Sea and the North Sea. They exercised bombings of Western European targets, approaching the German and Dutch coast from the North Sea as well as Swedish, Finish and Polish mainland from the Baltic Sea. The drill included waves of Tu-95 strategic bombers as well as support aircraft like fighter jets and refuelling planes.”

These bombers rehearsed launching missiles and cruise missiles. They returned to their bases before reaching NATO shores. In a real-life situation, their targets would include “critical infrastructure, that is, air fields, harbours, energy supplies and so on, in order to shock the countries and make the populations demand from their governments that ‘we shouldn’t be involved here, we should go for peace instead”.

In war, another aim of these Russian activities would be “to prevent them (NATO armies) from taking military action, deploying troops and reversing Russian army gains in the Baltics”. Hence, German naval bases at the Baltic Sea and the North Sea would be prime targets for such aerial attacks. Although the sources did not know which German, and possibly Dutch, targets exactly the Tu-95 bombers were directed at, they stressed: “This was part of their exercise in September!”

The sources added that, “of course, in war time, Russian bombers would have approached from the East as well, but in ‘peace times’, this attack direction (towards Germany) along the Norwegian coast would make sense”. Russia could not practice strategic air attacks from the East due to the Belarussian and Ukrainian airspace between Russia and its potential targets. Moreover, the sources made it clear that strategic air raids would have been flanked by large-scale missile attacks on NATO targets, using Iskander tactical missiles in the Kaliningrad region for targeting NATO strategic assets in the Baltic Sea countries. It is “not clear, but likely” that such attacks were also rehearsed in the Zapad 2017 drills.

According to the sources, these risky manoeuvres (over the North Sea) could show that Russia has planned “show of force attacks” that deeply penetrate Western-dominated air space and a “surprise element”, as NATO missile defences are better prepared in the East of Europe than in NATO states like Norway, Denmark, the UK, and Germany.

In order to cripple NATO’s capacities in the event of a large-scale ground offensive against Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, the exercise involved “anti-submarine warfare and air-defence drills throughout the Baltic Sea”. The focus area was the eastern Gotland Basin.

Russian naval forces also rehearsed anti-aircraft and anti-ship operations in the area, as well as anti-combat-diver operations. The obvious aim of such exercises was the destruction of NATO forces in the Baltic Sea that might try to reach Baltic waters and ports in order to help NATO allies under attack there.

According to the interviewed Western intelligence sources, Sweden and Finland would come under attack in the case of a real war against NATO. These attacks were also rehearsed in September. “We know that, in case of a war with NATO, Russia would not expect Sweden and Finland to remain neutral, although they are not part of NATO. Stockholm and Helsinki would allow NATO aircraft to use their airfields and so on”. The source alleged that most Swedish and southern Finish air fields would therefore come under Iskander missile attacks.

The sources pointed towards the Murmansk region on the Kola peninsula, bordering on Finland and Norway. “There were very interesting activities here, which makes us think that they were practicing something for northern Finland, but unfortunately I cannot tell you more, as we are not the source of this information”. Pushed about the issue, the sources revealed that, during the Zapad 2017 exercise, “Russian army forces from other parts of the country were moved to Kola that do not belong there. This makes us think that they did not just play out the scenario on the map, but also in real life. The point of this operational direction is to defend against NATO air attacks. So we think that they planned to neutralize assets in the region as well”.

In October, a Norwegian magazine reported, referring to six Norwegian defence establishment sources, that Russia had practiced bombing and invading Svalbard, the Norwegian archipelago in the Barents Sea, during Zapad 2017. According to the report, two waves of Tu-95 and Tu-22m3 bombers rehearsed bombing runs on the strategic islands between Russia and the resource-rich Arctic Ocean. 50 vessels participated in the drill in the Barents Sea. This confirms with what BILD learnt from its two Western intelligence sources. From Russia’s strategic perspective, it would be necessary to carry out parallel attacks on Finish and Norwegian mainland targets.

One of the sources explained to BILD what a trigger for such events could be. “I am always asked, is this an offensive or a defensive operation? The answer is, it is an escalation operation”. So-called “coloured revolutions”, for example in Belarus or other post-Soviet states, could lead to the war that was trained in Zapad 2017. “Such a revolution, which would of course be ‘a plot by the CIA’, according to them, could get Russia involved. If the US or another NATO country then gets involved, this could be the starting point for the scenario they trained for in September”.

In general, a military operation against the Baltic states would be a “responsive operation”, meaning that “Putin would feel a real threat” to his interests. In other words, a military confrontation in Russia’s defined “sphere of national interest” would trigger the trained scenario. Examples would be Belarus, Ukraine, or Georgia. “We know that, in 2008, they had the contingency plan that if the US gets involved in guarding Georgia from their invasion, the Baltic states would have become a target”.

The source also mentioned events that would NOT trigger a war, such as the NATO accession of Sweden or Finland. “They threaten to take military actions if these two countries join NATO, but we don’t think this would be their red line”. Not even a direct military confrontation between the US and Russia in Syria would trigger a war against NATO, the source believes. “They would rather withdraw in the worst case, but this would not lead to a war in Europe”.

The sources pointed out that the scenario Russia trained for would be the last step before a nuclear war with the West and – ironically – Russia’s attempt at preventing such a war by simultaneously achieving a “quick victory” in the Baltics and conducting a successful “shock campaign” in Western Europe. “Of course, if all of this does not help, Russia would signal the West that, if it tries to reverse its military gains in the Baltic space”, the next step would be the use of tactical nuclear weapons, in all likelihood followed by the use of ICBM. However, the Kremlin would “try to avoid such a scenario”.

According to the two sources, 12.700 troops ((soldiers??))) participated in the Belarus drill (including 7.200 Belarusian soldiers). “The declared numbers here were correct, which makes sense, because you cannot force Belarus to give false numbers if they don’t want to.”

However, another 12.000 Russian ground troops ((soldiers??))) took part in the Leningrad and Pskov regions “near the Estonian borders” and almost 10.000 were involved on the Kola peninsula. Taken together with a high number of naval personnel, air force staff, and support forces, more than 100.000 Russian troops ((soldiers??))) participated in Zapad 2017, the sources said. Additionally, 20.000 Russian National Guard troops (soldiers) and further FSB units and Ministry of Emergency Situation personnel also participated, which makes the overall number even higher.

The sources pointed out that the sheer number of involved ground forces was “a violation of the Vienna document”. An exercise number of 13.000 or more participants requires observers. “And make no mistake. There was not a single observer, although this is what the Russians want to tell the public. There were ‘invited guests’ from NATO countries which were allowed to watch some bombings. Observers would have been allowed to go wherever they wanted and to talk to all involved units. This did not happen.”

While Russia announced several training grounds in Belarus, the Kaliningrad region, and Pskov as well as the Leningrad oblast, the real extent of the exercise was much larger. There were more training grounds within the announced areas. Moreover, and more importantly, the Murmansk oblast on the Kola peninsula also took part in the exercise. Naval force manoeuvres took place over a wide area in the Baltic Sea and Barents Sea. Aerial drills were carried out over the Baltic Sea, Barents Sea, and North Sea. There were also other military exercises happening simultaneously in the Black Sea region and on occupied Crimea, aimed at a potential NATO response from Bulgaria and Romania. 
Talent de ne rien faire
 
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Re: Possibilidade de *guerra nuclear* com a Rússia
« Responder #81 em: Dezembro 23, 2017, 04:26:46 pm »
Interessante artigo NVF!  :G-beer2:
https://www.youtube.com/user/HSMW/videos

"Tudo pela Nação, nada contra a Nação."
 
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typhonman

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Re: Possibilidade de *guerra nuclear* com a Rússia
« Responder #82 em: Dezembro 26, 2017, 06:33:37 pm »
Interessante artigo NVF!  :G-beer2:

Sim...

Por cá, continuamos a ter as bases aéreas por defender, contra misseis de cruzeiro ou outras ameaças.

As coisas estão a aquecer e por cá não de planeia nada..
 

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Re: Possibilidade de *guerra nuclear* com a Rússia
« Responder #83 em: Dezembro 27, 2017, 04:04:26 pm »
Marine Leaders Highlight Norway Unit's Role as Deterrent to Russia


U.S. Marines with Black Sea Rotational Force 17.1 prepare to board a bus after arriving in Vaernes, Norway, Jan. 16, 2017. (U.S. Marine Corps photo/Sgt. Erik Estrada)
By Hope Hodge Seck

VAERNES GARRISON, Norway -- The stated goals of the Marine Corps' newest rotational force in Norway are to enhance partnerships with European allies and improve the service's ability to fight in cold weather.

But on a brief visit to the 300-member unit ahead of Christmas, the commandant and the sergeant major of the Marine Corps both described the strategic role the small unit fills -- and the fact that a peacetime mission can be preface to combat if circumstances change.


The Norwegian Home Guard base near Trondheim that houses the Marine rotational force was the first stop on Gen. Robert Neller's annual Christmas tour.

The stop was a new one for the tour. The first Norway rotation, from 1st Battalion, 2nd Marines, deployed in January and was replaced by a new unit from 2nd Battalion, 2nd Marines, in late August.

Neller emphasized to the Marines that they should remain ready to fight at all times, predicting a "big-ass fight" on the horizon.

"I hope I'm wrong, but there's a war coming," Neller said. " ... You're in a fight here, an informational fight, a political fight, by your presence."

Neller later told the Marines that he expects the Pacific and Russia to be the service's operational points of focus as the nation looks beyond the fights in the Middle East that have stretched into the better part of two decades.

The United States' position that Russia presents a major threat was re-emphasized in the new National Security Strategy released Monday. The document discusses Russia's practice of "using information tools" to interfere with other nations' democracies and militant aggression that crosses borders.

"With its invasions of Georgia and Ukraine, Russia demonstrates its willingness to violate the sovereignty of states in the region," the strategy states.

Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps Ronald Green put the Marines' role starkly.

"Just remember why you're here," he said. "They're watching. Just like you watch them, they watch you. We've got 300 Marines up here; we could go from 300 to 3,000 overnight. We could raise the bar."

The rotational force itself is much more circumspect about its role in the region. On a visit to the unit in May, Military.com found troops assigned to the unit had even been instructed not to use the word "Russia" in interviews with the media.

In large part, this is due to regional sensitivities.

The rotational unit is in Norway at the invitation of the Norwegian government, which maintains an economic relationship with Russia and shares a 120-mile border on its northeastern edge with the country.

While Norwegian feedback on the Marines' presence has been generally positive -- then-Norwegian Defense Minister Ina Eriksen Søreide announced in June that the rotation had been extended for a year, until 2018 -- others have cited misgivings.

In October, Norway opposition leaders asked Prime Minister Erna Solberg to explain exactly what the American troops are doing in the country.

Russian officials, for their part, have been outspoken in opposing the presence of Marines in Norway and warning of diplomatic repercussions.

Though Green did not name Russia, he referred to its displeasure at the Marines' presence nearby.

"They don't like the fact that we oppose them, and we like the fact that they don't like the fact that we oppose them," Green said. "Three hundred of us, surrounded by them, we've got them right where we wanted, right? We've done this before."

-- Hope Hodge Seck can be reached at hope.seck@military.com
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Re: Possibilidade de *guerra nuclear* com a Rússia
« Responder #84 em: Janeiro 20, 2018, 12:16:15 am »
NATO intensifica testes militares no Mar do Norte
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mafets

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Re: Possibilidade de *guerra nuclear* com a Rússia
« Responder #85 em: Janeiro 25, 2018, 10:31:17 am »
https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/15882-2/?utm_source=FB&utm_medium=UKDJPage&utm_campaign=social
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General Carter said that Russia could ‘initiate hostilities sooner than we expect’ and warned of their information warfare capabilities.

Recently we reported that Russia appears to be at the forefront of information warfare in the modern age, utilising an array of organisations and strategies to spread disinformation to further national strategy but how are they doing it?

Every now and then we come across a report from one of the many Russian state broadcasters that have more than remarkable headlines revolving around military equipment and it seems fairly obvious that the piece has a clear agenda but why is this being done? They were false but the rumours had begun spilling into conventional news media. Numerous analysts and experts in intelligence point to Russia as the prime suspect, noting that preventing NATO expansion is a centrepiece of the foreign policy of the nation.

Even the UK Defence Journal has been contacted by various Russian based ‘news organisations’ looking for soundbites whenever we publish a story about an MoD blunder or questionable government decision.

“Now, the other part of the threat is how one assesses intent. Now I am not in any way going to suggest that Russia wants to go to war in the traditional definition of the term, but there are factors that bear on the question of intent and one needs to understand Russian psyche, their culture and their philosophy of pre-emption.

Russia, I think, could initiate hostilities sooner than we expect, and a lot earlier than we would in similar circumstances. Most likely they will use nefarious sub-NATO Article 5 Treaty actions to erode the capability of NATO and threaten the very structure that provides our own defence and security. This is the divide and rule which the international order is designed to prevent.”

General Carter also said when it comes to threats, it is important to recognise that “readiness is about speed of recognition, speed of decision-making and speed of assembly.”

He said the Army is testing the ability to deploy over land by using road and rail, but that it is “also important to stress the need for a forward mounting base.”

“Therefore we are actively examining the retention of our infrastructure in Germany, where we store our vehicles in Ayrshire Barracks in Rheindahlen, and our training facilities in Sennelager, as well as our heavy equipment transporters that are based there, and our stockpiling and ammunition storage,” he revealed.





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Re: Possibilidade de *guerra nuclear* com a Rússia
« Responder #86 em: Março 11, 2018, 05:49:50 pm »
Moscovo anuncia ter testado com sucesso novo míssil hipersónico
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Re: Possibilidade de *guerra nuclear* com a Rússia
« Responder #87 em: Março 29, 2018, 03:46:41 pm »
Russia’s new weapons, nuclear parity and arms race: What’s going on?
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Re: Possibilidade de *guerra nuclear* com a Rússia
« Responder #88 em: Abril 07, 2018, 04:59:21 pm »
The Pentagon Plans for a Perpetual Three-Front ‘Long War’ Against China and Russia

Could the Cold War come back?

Think of it as the most momentous military planning on Earth right now. Who’s even paying attention, given the eternal changing of the guard at the White House, as well as the latest in tweets, sexual revelations and investigations of every sort? And yet it increasingly looks as if, thanks to current Pentagon planning, a twenty-first-century version of the Cold War — with dangerous new twists — has begun and hardly anyone has even noticed.

In 2006, when the Department of Defense spelled out its future security role, it saw only one overriding mission — its “Long War” against international terrorism. “With its allies and partners, the United States must be prepared to wage this war in many locations simultaneously and for some years to come,” the Pentagon’s Quadrennial Defense Review explained that year.

Twelve years later, the Pentagon has officially announced that that long war is drawing to a close — even though at least seven counterinsurgency conflicts still rage across the Greater Middle East and Africa — and a new long war has begun, a permanent campaign to contain China and Russia in Eurasia.

“Great power competition, not terrorism, has emerged as the central challenge to U.S. security and prosperity,” claimed Pentagon comptroller David Norquist while releasing the Pentagon’s $686 billion budget request in January. “It is increasingly apparent that China and Russia want to shape a world consistent with their authoritarian values and, in the process, replace the free and open order that has enabled global security and prosperity since World War II.”

Of course, just how committed Pres. Donald Trump is to the preservation of that “free and open order” remains questionable given his determination to scuttle international treaties and ignite a global trade war. Similarly, whether China and Russia truly seek to undermine the existing world order or simply make it less America-centric is a question that deserves close attention, just not today.

The reason is simple enough. The screaming headline you should have seen in any paper — but haven’t — is this. The U.S. military has made up its mind about the future. It has committed itself and the nation to a three-front geopolitical struggle to resist Chinese and Russian advances in Asia, Europe and the Middle East.

Important as this strategic shift may be, you won’t hear about it from the president, a man lacking the attention span necessary for such long-range strategic thinking and one who views Russia’s Vladimir Putin and China’s Xi Jinping as “frenemies” rather than die-hard adversaries. To fully appreciate the momentous changes occurring in U.S. military planning, it’s necessary to take a deep dive into the world of Pentagon scripture: budget documents and the annual “posture statements” of regional commanders already overseeing the implementation of that just-born three-front strategy.

The new geopolitical chessboard

This renewed emphasis on China and Russia in U.S. military planning reflects the way top military officials are now reassessing the global strategic equation, a process that began long before Trump entered the White House. Although after 9/11, senior commanders fully embraced the “long war against terror” approach to the world, their enthusiasm for endless counterterror operations leading essentially nowhere in remote and sometimes strategically unimportant places began to wane in recent years as they watched China and Russia modernizing their military forces and using them to intimidate neighbors.

While the long war against terror did fuel a vast, ongoing expansion of the Pentagon’s Special Operations Forces — now a secretive army of 70,000 nestled inside the larger military establishment — it provided surprisingly little purpose or real work for the military’s “heavy metal” units. The Army’s tank brigades, the Navy’s carrier battle groups, the Air Force’s bomber squadrons and so forth.

Yes, the Air Force in particular has played a major supporting role in recent operations in Iraq and Syria, but the regular military has largely been sidelined there and elsewhere by lightly equipped SOF forces and drones. Planning for a “real war” against a “peer competitor” — one with forces and weaponry resembling our own — was until recently given far lower priority than the country’s never-ending conflicts across the Greater Middle East and Africa. This alarmed and even angered those in the regular military whose moment, it seems, has now finally arrived.

“Today, we are emerging from a period of strategic atrophy, aware that our competitive military advantage has been eroding,” the Pentagon’s new National Defense Strategy declares. “We are facing increased global disorder, characterized by decline in the long-standing rules-based international order” — a decline officially attributed for the first time not to Al Qaeda and ISIS, but to the aggressive behavior of China and Russia. Iran and North Korea are also identified as major threats, but of a distinctly secondary nature compared to the menace posed by the two great-power competitors.

Unsurprisingly enough, this shift will require not only greater spending on costly, high-tech military hardware but also a redrawing of the global strategic map to favor the regular military. During the long war on terror, geography and boundaries appeared less important, given that terrorist cells seemed capable of operating anyplace where order was breaking down. The U.S. military, convinced that it had to be equally agile, readied itself to deploy — often Special Operations forces — to remote battlefields across the planet, borders be damned.

On the new geopolitical map, however, America faces well-armed adversaries with every intention of protecting their borders, so U.S. forces are now being arrayed along an updated version of an older, more familiar three-front line of confrontation. In Asia, the U.S. and its key allies — South Korea, Japan, The Philippines and Australia — are to face China across a line extending from the Korean peninsula to the waters of the East and South China Seas and the Indian Ocean.

In Europe, the United States and its NATO allies will do the same for Russia on a front extending from Scandinavia and the Baltic Republics south to Romania and then east across the Black Sea to the Caucasus. Between these two theaters of contention lies the ever-turbulent Greater Middle East, with the United States and its two crucial allies there, Israel and Saudi Arabia, facing a Russian foothold in Syria and an increasingly assertive Iran, itself drawing closer to China and Russia.

From the Pentagon’s perspective, this is to be the defining strategic global map for the foreseeable future. Expect most upcoming major military investments and initiatives to focus on bolstering U.S. naval, air and ground strength on its side of these lines, as well as on targeting Sino-Russian vulnerabilities across them.

There’s no better way to appreciate the dynamics of this altered strategic outlook than to dip into the annual “posture statements” of the heads of the Pentagon’s “unified combatant commands,” or combined Army/Navy/Air Force/Marine Corps headquarters, covering the territories surrounding China and Russia. Pacific Command, with responsibility for all U.S. forces in Asia. European Command, covering U.S. forces from Scandinavia to the Caucasus. And Central Command, which oversees the Middle East and Central Asia where so many of the country’s counterterror wars are still underway.

The senior commanders of these meta-organizations are the most powerful U.S. officials in their “areas of responsibility,” exercising far more clout than any American ambassador stationed in the region — and often local heads of state as well. That makes their statements and the shopping lists of weaponry that invariably go with them of real significance for anyone who wants to grasp the Pentagon’s vision of America’s global military future.

The Indo-Pacific front

Commanding PACOM is Adm. Harry Harris, Jr., a long-time naval aviator. In his annual posture statement, delivered to the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 15, 2018. Harris painted a grim picture of America’s strategic position in the Asia-Pacific region. In addition to the dangers posed by a nuclear-armed North Korea, he argued, China was emerging as a formidable threat to America’s vital interests.

“The People’s Liberation Army’s rapid evolution into a modern, high-tech fighting force continues to be both impressive and concerning,” he asserted. “PLA capabilities are progressing faster than any other nation in the world, benefiting from robust resourcing and prioritization.”

Most threatening, in his view, is Chinese progress in developing intermediate-range ballistic missiles and advanced warships. Such missiles, he explained, could strike U.S. bases in Japan or on the island of Guam, while the expanding Chinese navy could challenge the U.S. Navy in seas off China’s coast and someday perhaps America’s command of the western Pacific. “If this [shipbuilding] program continues,” he said, “China will surpass Russia as the world’s second largest navy by 2020, when measured in terms of submarines and frigate-class ships or larger.”

To counter such developments and contain Chinese influence requires, of course, spending yet more taxpayer dollars on advanced weapons systems, especially precision-guided missiles. Harris called for vastly increasing investment in such weaponry in order to overpower current and future Chinese capabilities and ensure U.S. military dominance of China’s air and sea space. “In order to deter potential adversaries in the Indo-Pacific,” he declared, “we must build a more lethal force by investing in critical capabilities and harnessing innovation.”

His budgetary wish list was impressive. Above all, he spoke with great enthusiasm about new generations of aircraft and missiles — what are called, in Pentagonese, “anti-access/area-denial” systems — capable of striking Chinese IRBM batteries and other weapons systems intended to keep American forces safely away from Chinese territory.

He also hinted that he wouldn’t mind having new nuclear-armed missiles for this purpose — missiles, he suggested, that could be launched from ships and planes and so would skirt the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, to which the United States is a signatory and which bans land-based intermediate-range nuclear missiles.

To give you a feel for the arcane language of Pentagon nuclear cognoscenti, here’s how he put it. “We must continue to expand Intermediate Nuclear Force Treaty-compliant theater strike capabilities to effectively counter adversary anti-access/area-denial [A2/AD] capabilities and force preservation tactics.”

Finally, to further strengthen the U.S. defense line in the region, Harris called for enhanced military ties with various allies and partners, including Japan, South Korea, The Philippines and Australia. PACOM’s goal, he stated, is to “maintain a network of like-minded allies and partners to cultivate principled security networks, which reinforce the free and open international order.” Ideally, he added, this network will eventually encompass India, further extending the encirclement of China.

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Re: Possibilidade de *guerra nuclear* com a Rússia
« Responder #89 em: Abril 07, 2018, 04:59:43 pm »
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The European theater

A similarly embattled future, even if populated by different actors in a different landscape, was offered by Army general Curtis Scaparrotti, commander of EUCOM, in testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services on March 8, 2018. For him, Russia is the other China.

As he put it in a bone-chilling description, “Russia seeks to change the international order, fracture NATO and undermine U.S. leadership in order to protect its regime, reassert dominance over its neighbors, and achieve greater influence around the globe … Russia has demonstrated its willingness and capability to intervene in countries along its periphery and to project power — especially in the Middle East.”

This, needless to say, is not the outlook we’re hearing from Trump, who has long appeared reluctant to criticize Putin or paint Russia as a full-fledged adversary. For American military and intelligence officials, however, Russia unquestionably poses the preeminent threat to U.S. security interests in Europe.  It is now being spoken of in a fashion that should bring back memories of the Cold War era.

“Our highest strategic priority,” Scaparrotti insisted, “is to deter Russia from engaging in further aggression and exercising malign influence over our allies and partners. [To this end,] we are … updating our operational plans to provide military response options to defend our European allies against Russian aggression.”

The cutting edge of EUCOM’s anti-Russian drive is the European Deterrence Initiative, a project President Obama initiated in 2014 following the Russian seizure of Crimea. Originally known as the European Reassurance Initiative, the EDI is intended to bolster U.S. and NATO forces deployed in the “front-line states” — Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland — facing Russia on NATO’s “Eastern Front.” According to the Pentagon wish list submitted in February, some $6.5 billion are to be allocated to the EDI in 2019.

Most of those funds will be used to stockpile munitions in the front-line states, enhance Air Force basing infrastructure, conduct increased joint military exercises with allied forces, and rotate additional U.S.-based forces into the region. In addition, some $200 million will be devoted to a Pentagon “advise, train and equip” mission in Ukraine.

Like his counterpart in the Pacific theater, Scaparrotti also turns out to have an expensive wish list of future weaponry, including advanced planes, missiles, and other high-tech weapons that, he claims, will counter modernizing Russian forces. In addition, recognizing Russia’s proficiency in cyberwarfare, he’s calling for a substantial investment in cyber technology and, like Admiral Harris, he cryptically hinted at the need for increased investment in nuclear forces of a sort that might be “usable” on a future European battlefield.

Between East and West

Overseeing a startling range of war-on-terror conflicts in the vast, increasingly unstable region stretching from PACOM’s western boundary to EUCOM’s eastern one is the U.S. Central Command. For most of its modern history, CENTCOM has been focused on counterterrorism and the wars in Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan in particular. Now, however, even as the previous long war continues, the Command is already beginning to position itself for a new Cold War-revisited version of perpetual struggle, a plan — to resurrect a dated term — to contain both China and Russia in the Greater Middle East.

In recent testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, CENTCOM commander Army general Joseph Votel concentrated on the status of U.S. operations against ISIS in Syria and against the Taliban in Afghanistan, but he also affirmed that the containment of China and Russia has become an integral part of CENTCOM’s future strategic mission. “The recently published National Defense Strategy rightly identifies the resurgence of great power competition as our principal national security challenge and we see the effects of that competition throughout the region.”

Through its support of the Syrian regime of Bashar Al Assad and its efforts to gain influence with other key actors in the region, Russia, Votel claimed, is playing an increasingly conspicuous role in CENTCOM’s AOR. China is also seeking to enhance its geopolitical clout both economically and through a small but growing military presence.

Of particular concern, Votel asserted, is the Chinese-managed port at Gwadar in Pakistan on the Indian Ocean and a new Chinese base in Djibouti on the Red Sea, across from Yemen and Saudi Arabia. Such facilities, he claimed, contribute to China’s “military posture and force projection” in CENTCOM’s AOR and are signals of a challenging future for the U.S. military.

Under such circumstances, Votel testified, it is incumbent upon CENTCOM to join PACOM and EUCOM in resisting Chinese and Russian assertiveness. “We have to be prepared to address these threats, not just in the areas in which they reside, but the areas in which they have influence.” Without providing any details, he went on to say, “We have developed … very good plans and processes for how we will do that.”

What that means is unclear at best, but despite Trump’s campaign talk about a U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria once ISIS and the Taliban are defeated, it seems increasingly clear that the U.S. military is preparing to station its forces in those (and possibly other) countries across CENTCOM’s region of responsibility indefinitely, fighting terrorism, of course, but also ensuring that there will be a permanent U.S. military presence in areas that could see intensifying geopolitical competition among the major powers.

An invitation to disaster

In relatively swift fashion, American military leaders have followed up their claim that the U.S. is in a new long war by sketching the outlines of a containment line that would stretch from the Korean Peninsula around Asia across the Middle East into parts of the former Soviet Union in Eastern Europe and finally to the Scandinavian countries.

Under their plan, American military forces — reinforced by the armies of trusted allies — should garrison every segment of this line, a grandiose scheme to block hypothetical advances of Chinese and Russian influence that, in its global reach, should stagger the imagination. Much of future history could be shaped by such an out-size effort.

Questions for the future include whether this is either a sound strategic policy or truly sustainable. Attempting to contain China and Russia in such a manner will undoubtedly provoke countermoves, some undoubtedly difficult to resist, including cyber attacks and various kinds of economic warfare. And if you imagined that a war on terror across huge swaths of the planet represented a significant global overreach for a single power, just wait.

Maintaining large and heavily-equipped forces on three extended fronts will also prove exceedingly costly and will certainly conflict with domestic spending priorities and possibly provoke a divisive debate over the reinstatement of the draft.

However, the real question — unasked in Washington at the moment — is. Why pursue such a policy in the first place? Are there not other ways to manage the rise of China and Russia’s provocative behavior? What appears particularly worrisome about this three-front strategy is its immense capacity for confrontation, miscalculation, escalation and finally actual war rather than simply grandiose war planning.

At multiple points along this globe-spanning line — the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, Syria, the South China Sea and the East China Sea, to name just a few — forces from the United States and China or Russia are already in significant contact, often jostling for position in a potentially hostile manner. At any moment, one of these encounters could provoke a firefight leading to unintended escalation and, in the end, possibly all-out combat.

From there, almost anything could happen, even the use of nuclear weapons. Clearly, officials in Washington should be thinking hard before committing Americans to a strategy that will make this increasingly likely and could turn what is still long-war planning into an actual long war with deadly consequences.

Michael Klare is a professor of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College and the author, most recently, of The Race For What’s Left. Follow him on Twitter at @mklare1. He is currently completing work on a new book, All Hell Breaking Loose, on climate change and American national security.
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