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Spain: NATO’s Laggard

NATO requires members to spend at least 2% of GDP on defense. At 1.28%, Spain is dead last, and Madrid’s path to hitting the target is littered with obstacles.

Vladimir Putin’s aggression along NATO’s eastern border brutally highlighted the perennial failure of most alliance members to honor their commitment to the 2% threshold.

With the Russians on their doorstep, Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania spent the most on aid to Ukraine aid as a percentage of GDP from January 2022 to May 2023. At the NATO summit in Vilnius last year, Lithuania called out others’ lack of commitment, urging them to “spend like the Baltics.”

A total of 30 of NATO’s 32 members have increased their defense budgets since the full-scale invasion, including Spain, and NATO celebrated its 75th anniversary with 23 set to meet or exceed the 2% target, a significant improvement from only three in 2014.

Even so, at the 2024 NATO Summit in Washington DC, the Spanish delegation found itself deflecting criticism over Madrid’s lack of commitment. Despite its extra spending, Spain remains at the bottom at a time when Central and Eastern European leaders are pushing to expand the mandatory floor to at least 2.5%.

Madrid argues that numbers alone fail to capture the country’s broader contributions to the alliance, which it joined in 1982, and says it is increasing this year’s defense spending by 9.3% over the previous year. Given the low base, this is not an impressive number — Denmark raised military spending by 39% last year alone.

Defense has rarely been a priority for Spanish governments since the emergence of military dictatorship in 1975. They have instead favored boosting the welfare state, particularly the country’s social security system.

Unlike Greece, Spain does not have disputes with its neighbors and unlike France, it has limited interests in its post-colonial spaces. Unlike the Baltics or Poland, Russia does not represent an immediate threat to Spain’s territorial integrity.

While a poll in June 2022 found 52% of Spaniards identified Russia as the greatest threat to Spanish security, only 31% of those surveyed said their biggest concern over the war in Ukraine was the threat of Russian military action aimed at Spain, below the all-countries average.

Despite views of Russia deteriorating since 2022, the support of Spaniards for continuing the conflict is wavering. A Euroskopia study, carried out by Spanish research company Sigma Dos in 2023, revealed that half the Spanish populace would prefer an early peace, even with territorial sacrifices for Ukraine — a stance most prevalent among supporters of the ruling leftist coalition.

A pan-European poll conducted by the European Council of Foreign Relations in May 2022 found 51% of Spaniards were against their country spending more on defense, 47% believed their government was focusing too much on the war in Ukraine and not enough on the problems facing its own citizens.

Convincing a population wary of defense spending of the need to boost Spain’s military budget is politically fraught. The government has already been accused of hiding the real level of defense spending to avoid a backlash, and the Spanish public would likely object to the sacrifices necessary to reach the 2% threshold.

Spain is one of seven NATO allies spending more on interest payments on existing debt than defense and, with a deficit of 3.64% of GDP in 2023, borrowing to meet the 2% benchmark could worsen the fiscal strain.

There is also a deep-rooted anti-military sentiment attached to memories of Gen. Francisco Franco’s dictatorship, and an anti-war tone permeates Spain’s left-wing parties, undermining Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez’s commitment to meet the 2% target by 2029, a full 15 years after it was first made.

The lack of unity on the Spanish left was on show in April, when Sánchez announced an increase to the defense budget of over €1.1bn ($1.2bn) and faced harsh attacks from members of his governing coalition.

The far-left Podemos party also criticized the move, arguing that the funds could be better invested in improving Spain’s public healthcare system, where almost 850,000 people were on waiting lists for surgery.

None of Sánchez’s partners consider military spending a priority for the General States Budgets for 2025.

Despite Russia’s aggression in Georgia in 2008, and the illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, some in Europe, including Spain’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, continued to advocate for good relations with the Kremlin. Russia was viewed in Spain’s 2015 external action plan as a “strategic partner” with the “capacity to contribute in a positive manner to solving many international problems.”

The full-scale invasion of Ukraine shattered any remaining illusions about Putin’s intentions, making it clear his defiance of the international order will persist until his imperialist goals are achieved or he is defeated.

The defense of Europe depends on strong member states contributing to a robust foreign policy and fortifying the continent’s security. The urgency is amplified by discussions on raising the defense spending benchmark to 2.5% or even 3% amid uncertainties about future US commitments to Europe.

Spain’s strength is closely tied to the integration and unity of the EU, and meeting the 2% GDP threshold is indispensable if Madrid wants to lead in an increasingly uncertain and volatile international environment. Achieving this defense spending goal would strengthen its credibility in NATO and across the broader Western-led alliance.

It would solidify its position as a reliable ally of the US and a European nation prepared to navigate the complexities of the southern flank while firmly committing to defending the principles of democracy, freedom, and territorial sovereignty.

The clock is ticking.

Natalia Hidalgo Martínez is a Spanish-based freelance writer covering transatlantic relations between the US and Europe, European security, and geoeconomics.

Andrew R. Novo is a professor of strategic studies at the National Defense University in Washington, DC. The views expressed are entirely his and do not reflect the views of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the United States Government.

Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis.

Fonte: Center for European Policy Analysis