A caça Bin Laden

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Ricardo Nunes

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A caça Bin Laden
« em: Maio 03, 2004, 09:40:23 pm »
Artigo bastante interessante. Vale a pena ler.

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The Hunt For Bin Laden
By Linda Robinson and Mark Mazzetti

The most wanted man in the world is living among Edwardes's storied enemies of the world, the hard men of wild beards and wicked daggers with a long history of hobbling armies of faraway empires. Osama bin Laden, senior military and intelligence officials say, has forsaken his Arab bodyguards and, when the need arises, travels with a small number of Pashtun tribesmen in Pakistan's untamed borderlands. Here the fertile floor of the subcontinent pushes relentlessly skyward toward the high wastes of Central Asia, but it is not a trackless land. If anything, there are far too many tracks--narrow goat paths and steep, rock-strewn ravines, through which a single man and a handful of bodyguards can pass virtually without notice. This, say several senior military officials assigned to find bin Laden and, if necessary, kill him, is where the al Qaeda leader and other members of his terrorist organization spend their days and nights. "Why would you be on the Afghan side of the border," asks a commander of U.S. troops in Afghanistan who deals regularly with the Pakistani military, "if you had good sanctuary on the Pakistani side, and all you had to do was pay the tribal leaders?"

Odd as it may seem, Pakistan's tribal lands are perhaps the safest place in the world for bin Laden today. The reason arises from a welter of history, culture, and politics that has made America's global war against terrorism an infinitely more complicated challenge than it was in the days following the September 11 attacks, and not just because of the escalating violence following the fall of Saddam Hussein. Military and intelligence officials are quick to tell you that the terrorist threat to America and its allies didn't begin with bin Laden and won't end with his death or capture.

But spend a little time with the American soldiers and special forces troops scouring the Afghan side of the border for evidence of bin Laden and his confederates, and there's no mistaking how much capturing or killing him would mean. Never mind what it would do for George W. Bush, who, during the weeks and months after the September 11 attacks, kept an al Qaeda organizational chart on his desk in the Oval Office, checking off a name each time a key member was arrested or killed.

Hammer and anvil. Getting bin Laden, or one of his key lieutenants, would be huge. Just a few weeks back, televisions around the globe ran and reran grainy images from the tribal region of Waziristan after a fierce firefight erupted there between elite Pakistani strike-force troops and heavily armed foreign fighters. Lt. Gen. Safdar Hussain, the commander of Pakistani forces in the border area, speculated that a senior al Qaeda member appeared to have been surrounded. Intelligence reports had placed bin Laden's second-in-command, Ayman al-Zawahiri, a radicalized Egyptian physician, in the area. Electronic eavesdropping equipment had intercepted a request for four men to carry an injured leader and 12 more to guard him. Before the fight was over, 46 Pakistani soldiers died, including eight hostages shot at point-blank range. Twenty militants were shot dead. No al Qaeda leader was found.

Those kinds of things don't exactly inspire confidence among the U.S. commanders responsible for directing operations in Afghanistan and coordinating with the Pakistani military. The strategy they've worked out is known as "hammer and anvil," but it relies on Pakistani troops--particularly the elite 88th Brigade, a mountain-trained strike force--to flush al Qaeda and Taliban remnants from the tribal areas toward the border.

Just on the other side, American troops have established advanced fire bases, and special forces A-teams have set up small "A camps" high in the mountains near key passes and crossing points. American commanders who have met with Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf profess unqualified admiration for his determination to press the military effort in the tribal lands, despite legal constraints on military operations there and, more important, intense local opposition by tribal elders. Some ascribe Musharraf's determination to the two assassination attempts by al Qaeda that he survived within the past year. "For us, al Qaeda trying to kill him is a good deal,"said a senior commander who has met several times with Musharraf. ". . . He finally said, 'That ain't going to happen; I'm coming after you.' And then he [got] the support of the military to do that."

Well, sort of. Family ties between members of the Pakistani 11th Corps, which has conducted some operations in the tribal areas, and Pashtuns who live in the areas resulted in advance warning of several early raids on sanctuaries in the borderlands, U.S. officials say. "Before, it was a week's warning before they were going to go in, then it was four days," says a senior U.S. official, "and the last [time] I think it was one day." After that fight, soldiers of the 88th Brigade discovered a mile-long tunnel leading to the Afghan border, the entrance to which was concealed in a high, mud-walled compound with dug-in fighting positions. U.S. soldiers have provided counterterrorist training to Pakistani and other troops in the region and some training in mountain warfare. They also hope to provide more night-vision goggles and special assault helicopters, but as one general said, "money's a problem."

So, it seems, is morale, at least among some of Musharraf's troops. "I'm not real certain that the Pakistani Army is really shot in the ass with doing some of the really difficult kind of fighting and stuff that's up there," this commander said. "And I'm not sure they're acclimated to that, and I'm sure they don't like it very much." Just a few days ago, General Hussain signed a lenient truce with a tribal leader in Waziristan whose pro-al Qaeda fighters killed about 80 Pakistani troops. Pakistani officials nevertheless insist that they are determined to succeed in the tribal lands. "I admit that we have conceded heavy losses in encounters with the terrorists," says a senior official, "but this is part of the game. Still, we are committed to clean this area. Now it is better for the terrorists to surrender, or get ready to die."

Complicating the challenge for President Musharraf is not just the fierceness of the Pashtuns, who also inhabit much of southern and eastern Afghanistan, but the implacable tribal laws by which they govern themselves. The four key laws are known, collectively, as the Pashtunwali.The first is the law of the jirga, submission to the rule of a summoned council. The second, and perhaps most important in the current situation, is melmastia. This is the rule of hospitality, which forbids harming or dishonoring a guest. Tor demands extreme physical punishment for violations of a woman's chastity, and badal is the obligation of revenge, which can be--and often is--handed down from one generation to another. U.S. intelligence officials believe there are between 400 and 600 al Qaeda, Taliban, and other foreign fighters in the tribal lands. Pakistani officials place the number slightly higher but say many have fled to Afghanistan and Iran.

Whatever their number, some are clearly of Arab descent, but many others are Chechens and Uzbeks, fighters who moved to the area from Afghanistan after the Soviet defeat there, married, and started families. All, theoretically, could fall under the laws of melmastia and badal . Matiullah, a Pashtun who lives in the city of Wana, in Waziristan, wears a traditional pagri, a kind of woven cloth cap. He has a Yemeni son-in-law, he says, and there are no circumstances under which he would consider turning the man over to the authorities. "How can I surrender a piece of my heart?"Matiullah asks. "This is not only fatherly sentiments, but it is also a matter of tribal tradition. . . . If it [the government] has some compulsions, then I, too, have some compulsions. Pakistan's compulsion is America, and my compulsion is my tribal traditions."

More difficult still is Musharraf's delicate political situation. The day after it was revealed that the eight Pakistani troops had been executed at point-blank range, there were demonstrations across Pakistan, and most of Parliament walked out. A three-day jirga of tribal elders in Peshawar concluded that it would oppose any further military operations in their territories. Part of the reason for the opposition is the historic independence of the tribal lands. British colonial mapmakers deliberately left them as buffer zones between the British and Russian empires, with only the loosest governing authority by Pakistan. Under Pakistani law, the tribal lands, which stretch for 1,000 miles along the border of Pakistan and Afghanistan and hold some 6 million people, are roughly equivalent to American Indian reservations, where federal intervention is legally permissible but only under certain circumstances.

For these and other reasons, Musharraf has felt that he cannot allow any American presence in these areas, at least officially, and Pentagon officials emphasize that they are observing his wishes. "I'm not sure anybody else can hold it together," a senior U.S. commander says. ". . . There's probably no more critical ally to us in the global war on terrorism than Pakistan." Adds another: "We've hooked our wagon to Musharraf because he's our only hope."

Still, Pentagon officials say, their troops have been frustrated. On several occasions in Afghanistan, after picking up what they believed to be the trail of senior al Qaeda members--at least once including bin Laden--U.S. forces had to halt their pursuit after the men they were chasing vanished across the border into Pakistan. "We've been on what we thought was the tail of senior leaders only to lose them in some part of the game," a senior commander said, "and they, you know, skirted across the border." One instance prompted Pentagon brass to offer Musharraf an AC-130 Spectre gunship and crew. The AC-130 is one of the most lethal weapons in the U.S. arsenal, a heavily armed, low-flying attack plane fitted out with 25-, 40-, and 105-millimeter guns and advanced, forward-looking infrared radar. Musharraf was intrigued, but when it was explained that the AC-130 functioned most effectively with a forward air controller on the ground, calling in the plane's withering sheets of fire, he declined. No American boots on Pakistani soil.

The anvil side of the strategy, happily, offers some better news. For American commanders in Afghanistan, the crumbled remains of the Bala Hissar fortress in Kabul, the scene of an 1879 massacre of British officials, offers a sobering reminder of the lessons of insurgency. One of the most important: He who has the people on his side and controls the territory will win. Lt. Gen. David Barno, an Army Ranger who fought in Grenada and Panama, has overhauled the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan since arriving last winter, calling his "a more nuanced approach for a counterinsurgency operation." It relies, he says, on "working, essentially, tribal intelligence networks and tribal enforcement mechanisms"and a new strategy "of having our units out there for extended periods of time." Last year, for the first time, special forces in Afghanistan's rugged Kunar province hiked into the mountains and remained there, despite the bitter cold and heavy snow, through the winter.

Snowmelt. There has been much talk lately about a so-called spring offensive against al Qaeda and Taliban fighters, but throughout Afghanistan's long, torturous history, military activity has always picked up when the snows begin to melt from the high mountain passes. This year is no exception, but don't look for the kinds of massed battles that characterized the American-led rout of the Taliban after the 9/11 attacks. With luck, more aggressive probing of the tribal areas by Pakistani troops could send small groups of al Qaeda and Taliban fleeing toward the border. Even with the increased number of forward American bases on the border, however, it's impossible to cover anything like the entire length of it. Overhead surveillance helps. The Pentagon and the CIA are using their full range of assets, from U-2 spy planes high overhead to armed Predator drones that can swoop in low and fire missiles.

The border area, however, is honeycombed with caves, many impossible to see from the air, some elaborately tricked out to allow fugitives to hide for long periods of time. One cave complex U.S. troops discovered recently near the border had 32 rooms, many of its walls lined with carefully laid mud bricks. Enough pressure by the Pakistanis could drive al Qaeda and Taliban members toward such hiding places just across the border into Afghanistan, but so far it hasn't happened.

Even so, U.S. commanders say, they'reoptimistic. Barno, it seems, has taken a page from the playbook of Robert Thompson, who led Britain's successful counterinsurgency in Malaysia in the 1950s, then went on to advise American forces in Vietnam a decade later. Reduced to its simplest terms, the Thompson strategy is to deny insurgents, to the extent possible, the support of the population and the use of the territory. With the recent arrival of 2,000 marines from the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit, the number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan is now at a temporary high of 20,000, more than at any time since the post-9/11 invasion. An additional 2,000 troops from friendly countries and the increasing deployments of Afghan National Army and special forces units brings the number higher still, meaning not just more boots on the ground but more schmoozing with locals and, the expectation is, more actionable intelligence.
It was that kind of patient, focused effort that led to the capture of Saddam Hussein, and Barno and his commanders are hoping for the same results in Afghanistan. One reason is the Pentagon's "warlord strategy," begun last fall. Corrupt and powerful warlords control vast swaths of territory outside the capital, some maintaining armed militias of several thousand men. Following the Pentagon's lead, Afghan President Hamid Karzai has offered several warlords token jobs in Kabul, pulling them away from their men and their weapons and planting them behind a desk. Gul Aga Sherzi, who controls the southern province of Kandahar, for example, was named by Karzai as Afghanistan's new minister of urban planning, despite the fact that he is unable to read.

Another reason for hope, commanders say, is the deployment of "provincial reconstruction teams" to far corners of Afghanistan to dig wells and build schools. The teams not only do the hearts-and-minds stuff; they're also able to keep a better finger on the pulse of the population. This Barno calls "owning chunks of territory." Afghan Deputy Defense Minister Rahim Wardak applauds the change in the U.S. approach since Barno arrived: "I'm glad they have finally realized the importance of winning the support of the population in the south and east. "

Black and white. Perhaps the most promising area the commanders see is the increased border patrols. Barno has upped the number to about 50 a day, conducted by a mix of conventional troops and Afghan troops and militia and special forces. These are the so-called white special operations forces, trained to develop sources and cultivate informants much the way FBI agents work organized-crime and drug cases. The white special forces are different from the black, the door kickers and parachute artists who (along with CIA paramilitary operatives) are assigned to go after "high-value targets" like bin Laden and Zawahiri. Slowly but surely, despite Afghanistan's vast size and inhospitable terrain, Barno's troops are extending their reach. In Kunar province, Green Berets have moved in after sweeps by conventional forces, establishing far-flung bases where not even the Soviets, in 10 years of occupation, ever got to. "The Soviets never made it down here; the Taliban never established control,"says a special forces team sergeant named Randy. "And now we're here."

It's a simple question of priorities--there isn't likely to be much productive hunting without some successful gathering first. Already, despite the paucity of "leakers" across the border from Pakistan, the intelligence-gathering efforts are leading to some productive hunts, with raiding parties breaking down doors to interrupt what the soldiers call "Taliban pajama parties.""A lot of what we do," says a special forces lieutenant colonel in Kunar province, "is more like police work than military work."

But will it be enough in the end? By the old counterinsurgency ratio of 10 troops to one insurgent, the number of troops should be enough, if used correctly. But the Soviets dispatched 175,000 troops to Afghanistan, and they left with their tail between their legs. "We've gone to school on the Soviet experience," says a Bush administration official. Some battalion commanders have even been reading dog-eared copies of The Bear Went Over the Mountain, a critique of Soviet military tactics in Afghanistan.

Pentagon planners refer to the relatively small military footprint as an "economy of force." But others note that Afghanistan's southern border with Pakistan remains largely unguarded, providing what some commanders fear may be a swift highway for Islamic radicals from the teeming madrasahs, or religious schools, in Quetta. "We talk about economy of force," one officer grumbled, "when we don't have enough guys to do what we need to do."

For all the progress, and despite the problems in Afghanistan, getting bin Laden may finally come down to what the Pakistanis do or don't do in their tribal areas. "That's the problem we had in Vietnam," says a senior commander. "It's the problem anytime you're trying to [deal with] an insurgency. You can't allow them to have a sanctuary. And Pakistan [has] provided that sanctuary."
Ricardo Nunes
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filcharana

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« Responder #1 em: Maio 04, 2004, 02:41:24 am »
Excelente descrição do ponto da situação na Guerra contra o Terrorismo.
Muito obrigado, Ricardo.


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Jorge Pereira

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Ayman al-Zawahiri
« Responder #2 em: Maio 09, 2004, 12:56:35 pm »
Ayman al-Zawahiri o homem que os serviços secretos ocidentais (ao contrario do que a maioria das pessoas pensam) consideram o verdadeiro cérebro da Al Qaeda, o estratega e executante das acções da organização.

Correio da Manhã 2004/05/02

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Criado num bairro chique do Egipto, ele passava as férias de Verão com a família nas praias de Alexandria. Hoje, Ayman al-Zawahiri é um dos terroristas mais procurados em todo o Mundo.  
 
Duas semanas depois dos atentados terroristas do dia 11 de Março em Madrid, o Presidente paquistanês, Pervez Musharraf, lançou uma operação contra a Al-Qaeda nas zonas de fronteira com o Afeganistão. Por momentos especulou-se que o egípcio Ayman al-Zawahiri, o braço direito de Osama bin Laden e um dos mentores dos atentados do 11 de Setembro, tinha sido cercado por forças militares.

O clima gerado pela suposta captura de al-Zawahiri chegou a proporcionar a recuperação do dólar face ao euro. Os ganhos esfumaram-se depois das autoridades de Islamabad terem descoberto um túnel de dois quilómetros na aldeia onde se entrincheiraram os combatentes islâmicos que estariam a proteger o número dois da Al-Qaeda. O médico egípcio conseguira escapulir-se – pela segunda vez.

Já em Dezembro de 2001, meses depois dos atentados às Torres Gémeas, os Estados Unidos atingiram altos responsáveis da organização no Leste do Afeganistão. Horas mais tarde, o chefe antitaliban na província de Nangahar, Mohammad Zaman, apressou-se a confirmar que al-Zawahiri e o responsável financeiro de Osama bin Laden, Ali Mahmud, estavam entre as vítimas do ataque. Falso alarme.

Descrito pelos serviços secretos israelitas como o “cérebro operacional principal” da Al-Qaeda, o médico e conselheiro de bin Laden abandonou a carreira como cirurgião clínico para se tornar num dos fundadores da organização terrorista Jihad Islâmica Egípcia.

A 6 de Outubro de 1981, al-Zawahiri estreou-se com sucesso no comando da organização, ao planear o assassinato do Presidente Anwar Sadat que estava a promover a consolidação das relações entre o Egipto e Israel. Depois da morte de Sadat, as forças policiais egípcias iniciaram uma ‘caça ao homem’, que culminou com a captura de al-Zawahiri.

Durante os três anos que passou na cadeia, julgado por posse de arma ilegal, afirmou que foi torturado e agredido pelas forças prisionais. Posto em liberdade em 1984, partiu para o Afeganistão, onde decidiu ficar e ajudar os seus ‘irmãos’ muçulmanos a lutar contra o exército russo. Foi nas escarpas das montanhas paquistanesas que o médico egípcio conheceu o milionário saudita, Osama bin Laden e os dois tornaram-se inseparáveis.

Em 1998, as duas organizações terroristas, Al-Qaeda e a Jihad Islâmica Egípcia fundiram-se numa só - a ‘Frente Mundial Islâmica contra os judeus e os cruzados’, cujos objectivos consistem em destruir os interesses dos EUA e de Israel no mundo. Desde então, a ameaça do terrorismo paira sobre o Ocidente como uma espada de Dâmocles.

“SONHAVA ACORDADO”

Ayman al-Zawahiri, nascido a 19 de Junho de 1951, cresceu no seio de numa das famílias mais respeitadas do Egipto. O pai, dr. Rabie, era professor de farmacologia na Universidade de Ain Shams, no Cairo, enquanto que a sua mulher, Umayma, cuidava da casa e tratava dos filhos. Quando Ayman e a sua irmã gémea, Umnya, tinham apenas um ano, os al-Zawahiri mudaram-se para o elegante bairro de Maadi, mas nunca foram totalmente adoptados pela nata da sociedade egípcia e inglesa. O ordenado de um professor catedrático chegava para levar a família a passar o Verão nas praias de Alexandria, mas não dava para inscrever os cinco filhos do casal no Colégio Victoria, um dos estabelecimentos de ensino privado mais chiques de Maadi, onde as aulas ainda eram leccionadas em inglês. Os irmãos al-Zawahiri não tinham outra hipótese senão frequentar a escola secundária, e apesar dos grau de exigência ser inferior ao do colégio inglês, eram bons alunos.

Em pequeno, Ayman passava os dias a ler e a escrever poesia. “E claro, a rezar. Tinha todas as qualidades de um bom muçulmano”, admite o tio, Mahfouz Azzam. Era recatado, tinha poucos amigos e quase não participava em actividades desportivas – mas nunca recusava um convite para ir ao cinema, ver os filmes da Disney.

Enquanto estudante, começou a interessar-se pela medicina, com o objectivo de seguir as pisadas do pai. “Mas sempre suspeitei que era a política que lhe corria nas veias”, admite Samir Raafat, um dos mais antigos historiadores egípcios. “Ele era muito inteligente e todos os professores ficavam espantados com o seu raciocino, demasiado adulto.” Porém, parecia que estava sempre a sonhar acordado nas aulas. “Talvez a fazer planos.”

Com apenas 15 anos, Ayman al-Zawahiri começou a frequentar as reuniões secretas da Irmandade Muçulmana, conspirando contra o sistema político que vigorava no Egipto. Foi preso duas vezes por planear a morte de vários membros do Governo, mas só em 1981 é que foi julgado e condenado a uma pena de três anos de prisão. Contratempos que nunca travaram a sua luta: “Queremos que todo o mundo nos oiça. Somos muçulmanos que acreditamos na nossa religião e estamos preparados para combater os que se opuserem ao nosso sonho”, disse, em 1985.

COMBINAÇÃO EXPLOSIVA

Depois de se terem conhecido no Afeganistão, Osama bin Laden e o médico egípcio seguiram para o Sudão para traçar um plano para derrotar os Estados Unidos da América.

Sabe-se que foi Ayman quem convenceu o milionário saudita a trocar uma vida de luxo pela causa islâmica. “Ele era um terrorista experiente e tornou Osama mais radical, mais anti-americano e violento”, comenta uma fonte da CIA. Peter Bergen, analista da CNN, corrobora: “al-Zawahiri é o ideólogo. Osama tem o carisma e os meios financeiros. É uma combinação explosiva.”

Os serviços secretos americanos já sabiam que Ayman estava disposto a tudo para se fazer ouvir, mas o mundo só começou a levar a sério as ameaças quando as embaixadas americanas em Nairobi, no Quénia, e em Dar-es-Salam, na Tanzânia, foram atacadas a 7 de Agosto de 1998, e perderam a vida 223 pessoas.

Depois de ter obtido provas da responsabilidade de Osama bin Laden nos ataques, Clinton ordenou o bombardeamento de seis campos de treino no Afeganistão e de uma fábrica de armas químicas no Sudão.

“Queremos informar os americanos que a mensagem deles foi recebida. Aconselhamos-lhes a lerem com atenção a nosso resposta, que vai ser escrita numa linguagem que eles compreendem bem”, foi a resposta veloz da Al-Qaeda. Em Outubro de 2000 é atacado o navio norte-americano USS Cole, ao largo da costa do Iémen.

Com os ataques a Nova Iorque e Washington, onde morreram cerca de três mil pessoas, o médico saltou para o segundo lugar da lista dos fugitivos mais procurados pelo FBI. O Governo dos Estados Unidos oferece uma recompensa de 25 milhões de dólares a quem fornecer informações que conduzam à detenção ou condenação de al- Zawahiri. Uma cartada que podia ser determinante para a reeleição de George W. Bush.

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mas nunca recusava um convite para ir ao cinema, ver os filmes da Disney.
 :nice:
Um dos primeiros erros do mundo moderno é presumir, profunda e tacitamente, que as coisas passadas se tornaram impossíveis.

Gilbert Chesterton, in 'O Que Há de Errado com o Mundo'






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Fábio G.

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« Responder #3 em: Maio 26, 2004, 10:17:53 am »
DN

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Al-Qaeda tem 18 mil combatentes
ANTÓNIO RODRIGUES
A Al-Qaeda está viva e pronta a atacar. Esta é a principal conclusão a retirar da análise anual do mundo feita pelo Instituto Internacional de Estudos Estratégicos (IISS) britânico. Tendo reformado a sua forma de actuar, acentuando a confiança em pequenos grupos locais que funcionam autonomamente, a rede de Ussama ben Laden tem 18 mil homens prontos a atacar alvos nos Estados Unidos e na Europa.

Como explicou John Chipman, o director do IISS, ontem numa conferência de imprensa em Londres em que apresentou o Estudo Estratégico 2003/4, «os atentados de Madrid em Março de 2004 sugerem que a Al-Qaeda se reconstituiu totalmente, definiu bem os seus alvos nos EUA e nos seus mais próximos aliados ocidentais na Europa e estabeleceu um novo e efectivo modus operandi que aproveita cada vez mais os seus aliados locais».

Para a Al-Qaeda, a guerra do Iraque permitiu que a sua organização e os seus aliados «concentrassem energias e recursos», ao mesmo tempo que permitia «diluir os da coligação antiterrorista».

Presente em mais de 60 países, a rede de Ben Laden tem mais de 18 mil homens que pode utilizar. O cálculo é feito de forma simples. Relatórios de serviços secretos referem que a Al-Qaeda treinou pelo menos 20 mil combatentes nos seus campos do Afeganistão antes de os EUA e aliados terem derrubado o regime talibã. Desde 2001, calcula-se que apenas tenham sido mortos ou capturados mais ou menos dois mil desses combatentes.

Sem usar as palavras de forma directa, o IISS mostra que a guerra do Iraque em nada ajudou a luta contra o terrorismo fundamentalista islâmico, antes pelo contrário.

Incapaz de vencer a batalha no terreno, a guerra levou ainda à divisão das principais potências ocidentais, que tinham cerrado fileiras com os EUA no caso da ofensiva no Afeganistão.

«Politicamente, dividiu os EUA e as principais potências europeias, deixando o Reino Unido no meio numa desconfortável posição, induzindo outros governos à incerteza sobre a extensão da contribuição para o esforço do pós-guerra», refere o relatório.

A somar a isso, explica também o documento, «a guerra do Iraque e a fase posterior levantaram questões muito sérias sobre guerra preventiva como meio de contra-proliferação e sobre os usos e abusos da espionagem como base para a acção militar».

Além da Al-Qaeda, o IISS alerta para a possibilidade do recrudescimento de conflitos regionais noutras partes do globo, devido ao facto do esforço militar dos EUA estar quase exclusivamente focado no Iraque. Como mostra a recente decisão dos EUA em desviar para o Iraque 3500 soldados que guardavam a fronteira coreana.



Perspectivas

EUA precisam de recuperar prestígio perdido

MÉDIO ORIENTE O Estudo Estratégico 2003/4 do IISS diz que o Iraque retirou muita da energia diplomática que os EUA poderiam ter investido no processo de paz do Médio Oriente, levando a que este fosse deixado na mão do «unilateralismo israelita» e da «incompetência palestiniana». No entanto, este «foi o ano em que o Partido Likud, o guardião institucional da chama, abdicou do sonho do Grande Israel».

LÍBIA «O acordo líbio foi um brilhante êxito para a diplomacia britânica», diz o relatório do IISS, porque «removeu a ameaça potencial de que a Líbia pudesse vir a adquirir armas nucleares, contribuindo para a instabilidade e a proliferação no Médio Oriente. Para Washington, o acordo pode servir de modelo nas negociações com a Coreia do Norte e o Irão, embora estes dois países não pareçam interessados em seguir o exemplo. A Administração Bush cedeu a iniciativa diplomática à China, no caso da Coreia do Norte, e à Europa, no caso do Irão.

ÍNDIA-PAQUISTÃO O Presidente Pervez Musharraf, que a semana passada recebeu a notícia de que o Paquistão será reintegrado na Commonwealth, continua a ganhar dividendos internacionais pela participação na luta contra o terrorismo. Também pelo facto de o acordo de cessar-fogo com a Índia, em vigor desde Novembro, estar a ser «escrupulosamente observado». O IISS acrescenta, no entanto, que «o processo de paz continua frágil», pois «as conversações formais ainda não começaram, mísseis balísticos com capacidade nuclear continuam a ser testados regularmente e a possibilidade de más interpretações ou maus cálculos mantém-se elevada».

CONCLUSÃO Os EUA estão a ter dificuldades na actualidade para conseguir equilibrar o exercício do seu poder com a manutenção do seu prestígio. (...) Os EUA começam a perceber a horrível verdade de que a primeira lei da manutenção da paz é igual à primeira lei forense: todo o contacto deixa marca. Infelizmente, demasiadas marcas más foram feitas ultimamente e muitas boas serão precisas para que os EUA recuperem a sua reputação.

 

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Fábio G.

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« Responder #4 em: Junho 04, 2004, 11:01:59 am »
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Acção conjunta americano-afegã abate 13 supostos talibãs

Treze supostos guerrilheiros talibã foram mortos, na quarta-feira, no decurso de uma operação militar conjunta entre soldados norte-americanos e as milícias pró-governamentais afegãs, na província de Kandahar, sul do Afeganistão.



Segundo fontes da administração local, a operação envolveu uma centena de milicianos afegãos, apoiados por dezenas de militares e helicópteros norte-americanos.
A operação, que continua a decorrer, tem por objectivo a perseguição de meia centena de talibãs.

04-06-2004 10:41:20