A China Como Futura Ameaça?

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Re: A China Como Futura Ameaça?
« Responder #90 em: Abril 22, 2012, 04:36:16 pm »
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"Tudo pela Nação, nada contra a Nação."
 

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Re: A China Como Futura Ameaça?
« Responder #91 em: Agosto 24, 2012, 11:46:00 am »
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Collision Course in the South China Sea
Vikram Nehru

Tensions in the South China Sea are ratcheting up. China and the Southeast Asian nations with competing territorial claims seem set on a collision course. Though still low, the probability of conflict is rising inexorably.

The current trajectory is lose-lose-lose for all concerned, including China, Southeast Asia and third-party countries in the Pacific Rim, such as the United States, that have a large stake in a peaceful South China Sea. At this point, the focus should not be resolving competing claims. Instead, diplomats must try to lower temperatures and get all sides to implement confidence-building measures to ensure peace and stability in the region. Only when cooler heads prevail can the concerned countries turn their attention to resolving the longer-term questions of the sovereignty and jurisdiction of the islands in the South China Sea.

The forty-year history of disputes in the region has seen a steady escalation in tension punctuated by occasional conflicts that have been quickly contained. Based on the vaguely defined "nine-dash line" (reduced from eleven dashes in 1953), China claims sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands and their adjacent seas in accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. The other side is represented by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and includes Brunei, Malaysia, Philippines and Vietnam, which have more modest, but nevertheless competing, claims that overlap with each other and with China.

The latest escalation in friction started with a confrontation between China and the Philippines over the Scarborough Shoal. There also were competing international bids by China and Vietnam for oil exploration in areas of the South China Sea contested by the two countries. Efforts by the Philippines and Vietnam to get the support of their ASEAN counterparts at a recent ministerial meeting resulted in ASEAN's inability to issue a communiqué for the first time in the organization's forty-five-year history.

Cambodia, ASEAN's chair for 2012, refused to make reference to disputes in the South China Sea, starkly revealing the not-so-subtle influence of China. But thanks to shuttle diplomacy by Indonesia's energetic foreign minister, Marty Natalegawa, ASEAN emerged with a face-saving "common position" that reiterated six principles adhering to the declaration of a code of conduct and the Law of the Sea. ASEAN's joint communiqué, however, still hasn't been issued.

Following Vietnam's June 2012 approval of a maritime law that declared sovereignty and jurisdiction over the Spratly and Paracel Islands in the South China Sea, China objected strongly and upped the ante by announcing steps to actively administer the disputed islands and the Macclesfield Bank, as well as 772,000 square miles of ocean within its "nine-dashed line." Sansha, a 1.5-kilometer islet in a disputed part of the South China Sea, has been declared a city that will include a local government responsible for overseeing the area. Legislators and a mayor have been elected, and the Chinese authorities announced plans to station a People's Liberation Army garrison there to monitor—and defend, if necessary—China's claims over the area.

These developments merely escalated tensions and served neither China's broader strategic interests nor those of the Southeast Asian claimant nations.

China's recent actions in the South China Sea are likely to severely damage its ability to influence the region and the world on other more important issues. For example, China's economic strength relies in part on its economic integration with Southeast Asia that has helped build globally competitive production networks. That integration, which depends on good bilateral relations with its neighbors, is now jeopardized.

China already has few friends in the region. In a speech last year, Vice Premier Li Keqiang (expected to be China's next prime minister) said that China sought to assure the world that its intentions are to cooperate with other countries to smooth its emergence as a global power. This idea of China's peaceful rise has been a cornerstone of Beijing's foreign-policy strategy. Unfortunately, its Southeast Asian neighbors do not see China's actions matching its rhetoric.

By taking provocative actions in the South China Sea themselves, Vietnam and the Philippines are not altogether blameless in the latest series of events. They don't need reminding, however, that a confrontation with China is not in their interests or those of the rest of Southeast Asia.

The region's impressive economic performance over the last two decades has benefitted enormously from China's growth engine. Major investments have been made in developing production networks, and continued good relations with China hold out promise for more. Worsening relations could put this at risk. More importantly, Southeast Asian countries recognize the dangers of any armed conflict with China, which could increase manifold if the United States were to be drawn into the fight.

Finally, the growing risk of conflict is not in the interest of the global community, especially for countries that rely on peaceful passage through the South China Sea and those on the Pacific Rim. The global economy, already suffering from myriad challenges, cannot afford yet another layer of uncertainty.

Certainly, the potential costs of conflict for the region and the world far outweigh any potential economic benefits contained in the seabed of the South China Sea—much of which is unknown in any case. Rather than the availability of hydrocarbons and fisheries, the South China Sea dispute is now increasingly being driven by domestic public opinion in the countries concerned that is fueled by military lobbies and strong nationalist sentiments.

Stepping back from the brink is in everyone's interests. But this has to be done in a way that builds mutual trust and confidence. The current escalating tit-for-tat dynamic between China and the two ASEAN claimants—Vietnam and the Philippines—must be stopped, difficult as that may be, and perhaps even reversed. It necessarily will involve a series of carefully choreographed actions to gradually unwind present positions in a way that can satisfy their respective domestic constituencies.

Given his recent success at shuttle diplomacy, Indonesia’s Natalegawa could well be the man to thread this needle. Perhaps helped by a small team of internationally recognized statesmen, he could shuttle between the three key claimant countries—China, Philippines and Vietnam—to broker a deal. Natalegawa's recently burnished credentials as a diplomat have earned him the confidence of both sides. Moreover, such an approach could satisfy Beijing's reluctance to enter multilateral negotiations over the South China Sea while still arranging a collective stand-down.

But make no mistake, the real leadership and courage will need to come from the claimant countries themselves. Given the high stakes involved, let's hope that such leadership is forthcoming.

Vikram Nehru is a senior associate and Bakrie Chair in Southeast Asian Studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace [3].

Links:
[1] http://www.addthis.com/bookmark.php?v=2 ... alinterest
[2] http://nationalinterest.org/profile/vikram-nehru
[3] http://carnegieendowment.org/
[4] http://nationalinterest.org/topic/globa ... ions/asean
[5] http://nationalinterest.org/topic/security/defense
[6] http://nationalinterest.org/topic/globa ... tional-law
[7] http://nationalinterest.org/topic/secur ... y-strategy
[8] http://nationalinterest.org/topic/security/peacekeeping
[9] http://nationalinterest.org/topic/secur ... ing-powers
[10] http://nationalinterest.org/region/asia ... asia/china
[11] http://nationalinterest.org/region/asia ... a/cambodia
[12] http://nationalinterest.org/region/asia ... /indonesia
[13] http://nationalinterest.org/region/asia ... hilippines
[14] http://nationalinterest.org/region/asia ... ia/vietnam

 :arrow: http://nationalinterest.org/print/comme ... a-sea-7380
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Re: A China Como Futura Ameaça?
« Responder #92 em: Agosto 24, 2012, 11:48:11 am »
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Preparing for War with China
James Holmes

For an operational concept that has never been published, the U.S. military’s AirSea Battle doctrine has elicited some fiery commentary. Or maybe it stokes controversy precisely because the armed forces haven’t made it official. Its details are subject to speculation. The chief source of information about it remains an unclassified, unofficial study [3] published in 2010 by the Washington-based Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.

The debate over AirSea Battle swirls mostly around technology and whether the doctrine is aimed at China. To answer the latter question first: Yes, it is about China. It has to be.

This is no prophecy of doom. From a political standpoint, war with China is neither inevitable nor all that likely. But military people plan against the most formidable capabilities they may encounter. And from an operational standpoint, China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) presents the sternest “anti-access” challenge of any prospective antagonist. Either strategists, planners and warfighters prepare for the hardest case, or the United States must write off important regions or options.

The PLA thus represents the benchmark for U.S. military success in maritime Asia, by most accounts today’s crucible of great-power competition. Other potential opponents, notably the Iranian military, fall into what the Pentagon terms “lesser-included [4]” challenges. If U.S. forces can pierce the toughest anti-access defenses out there—if they can crack the hardest nut—the softer defenses erected by weaker opponents will prove manageable.

That focus on anti-access is why AirSea Battle is about China—because it’s the gold standard, not because anyone expects, let alone wants, war in the Western Pacific.

The Technology

Anti-access is a catchy new name for the old concept of layered defense. Like all naval officers, I was reared on it. Think about air defense. When an aircraft-carrier task force goes in harm’s way, commanders dispatch “combat air patrols” around the fleet, concentrating along the “threat axis,” or direction from which air attack appears most likely. Interceptors from the carrier air wing constitute the first, outermost line of defense.

Then come surface-to-air missiles from the fleet’s picket ships. If attackers get past the fighter- and missile-engagement zones, “point” defenses such as short-range radar-guided missiles or gatling guns essay a last-ditch effort. Each defensive system engages assailants as they come within reach. Multiple engagements translate into multiple chances for a kill, improving the fleet’s chances of withstanding the assault. A corollary: defenses become denser and denser as an adversary closes in.

The same logic applies to coastal defense but on a grand scale. A nation intent on warding off adversaries fields a variety of weapons and platforms to strike at sea and aloft. These systems have varying ranges and design parameters. Tactical aircraft can fly hundreds of miles offshore and fire missiles that extend their lethal reach still farther. Missile-armed patrol boats have small fuel tanks and limited at-sea endurance, so they stick relatively close to home. The same goes for diesel-electric submarines.

If anti-access is about mounting layered defenses, AirSea Battle is about developing technologies and tactics for penetrating them. Thus, in some sense China and America are replaying the interwar years. War planning commenced in earnest following World War I. Imperial Japan planned to shut the U.S. Pacific Fleet out of the waters, skies and landmasses within a defense perimeter enclosing the Western Pacific, the China seas, Southeast Asia and parts of the Bay of Bengal. Not to be outdone, U.S. Navy officers devised and tested out war plans for breaching Japanese anti-access measures.

Weirdly, planners on both sides of the Pacific largely agreed on how the coming conflict would unfold. Japan would lash out at the U.S.-held Philippines. U.S. leaders would order the Pacific Fleet to relieve the islands, confronting the Imperial Japanese Navy with a numerical mismatch. Anti-access, Japanese style, meant forward-deploying warplanes to islands along the defense perimeter and submarines to adjacent waters. Aerial and undersea attacks would whittle the U.S. fleet down as it lumbered westward—evening the odds before a decisive battle somewhere in Asian waters.

Submarines and land-based tactical aircraft remain among the panoply of anti-access weaponry. Complementing them are missile-armed patrol boats acting as offshore pickets; shore-fired antiship cruise missiles; and antiship ballistic missiles with ranges conservatively estimated at [5]over nine hundred statute miles [5]. Beijing would expect the PLA Navy surface fleet to handle whatever remnants of the U.S. Pacific Fleet limped into East Asian waters following repeated aerial and subsurface onslaughts.

The Human Element

The hardware dimension of the U.S.-China strategic competition, however, is inextricable from the all-important human dimension. Weapons don’t fight wars, as strategic thinkers from U.S. Air Force colonel John Boyd [6] to Chinese Communist Party chairman Mao Zedong [7] remind us; people who operate weapons do. Both individuals and the big institutions they serve have deep-seated worldviews and ideas about how to cope with the strategic surroundings. A culture that comports with strategic and operational circumstances represents an asset. A culture that flouts reality is a huge liability.

So the struggle between AirSea Battle and anti-access is about more than developing gee-whiz technologies. A culture war is brewing between two great powers with very different conceptions of the relationship among land, air and sea power. And again, ideas matter. As naval historian Julian S. Corbett explains, armaments are “the expression in material of strategical and tactical ideas that prevail at any given time.” What hardware a nation’s armed forces acquire speaks volumes about how strategic leaders think about war—and how they may wage it.

China conceives of land-based forces as intrinsic to sea power and has done so at least since the inception of the People’s Republic. This composite conception of sea power comes as second nature for the PLA. Mao Zedong reportedly issued the PLA Navy’s founders three curt instructions: “fly, dive, fast!” Commanders, that is, premised maritime defense on short-range aircraft flying from airfields ashore, diesel submarines diving beneath the waves, and fast patrol boats armed with guns and missiles. These were the ancestors of today’s ultramodern anti-access force.

Maoist China viewed sea power as more than the fleet. It was an amalgam of seagoing and land-based platforms and weaponry. Accordingly, the navy remained close to home throughout Mao’s long tenure as CCP chairman. That’s markedly different from the U.S. Navy, which kept squadrons on foreign station from its earliest history. Forward deployment is in American seafarers’ DNA. Think Thomas Jefferson and the Barbary Wars. China, by contrast, has not forward deployed warships since the Ming Dynasty—and even then it did so only intermittently. The ongoing counterpiracy deployment off Somalia thus marks a break with centuries of historical practice.

The PLA Navy has remained true to its Maoist history even while constructing a blue-water fleet. Coastal defense remains the service’s core function, although it has vastly expanded its defensive zone.

If the PLA Navy needs to reinvent its institutional culture to operate far from Chinese coasts, the U.S. military faces an even stiffer cultural challenge in orienting itself to new realities. The post–Cold War U.S. military came to see naval power as a supporting arm of land power. The U.S. Navy projected power onto distant shores, supporting the army, Marines and air force as these sister services prosecuted air and ground campaigns in theaters such as Iraq and Afghanistan.

Facing no competitor of the Soviet Navy’s stature, the U.S. Navy leadership issued guidance stating that the navy could assume it commanded the sea. There was no one to contest its mastery. Thus, in the words of the 1992 directive "...From the Sea [8] [8]," the service could “afford to de-emphasize efforts in some naval warfare areas.” In practice, that meant capabilities like antisubmarine warfare and mine countermeasures—capabilities critical to surviving and prospering in anti-access settings—languished for two decades.

Only now are they being rejuvenated. As the anti-access challenge has come into focus, the navy has started scrambling to upgrade its weaponry and relearn half-forgotten skills. In all likelihood, the air force is in worse straits. Despite Billy Mitchell’s early experiments with using air power to defend American coasts—remember his famous 1920 sinking of a battleship [9] from the air—the modern U.S. Air Force does not consider fighting at sea one of its central purposes. The services have some way to go before they can put forth the cohesive effort AirSea Battle demands.

Punching the Pillow

In short, the Asian continental power takes a holistic view of sea power, while the power that rules the waves thinks of sea power as subsidiary to land power. This cultural inversion would favor PLA defenders in a U.S.-China war. After all, fighting offshore is familiar terrain for them, whereas U.S. leaders long assumed they no longer had to fight for sea control. The services must dispel that ingrained assumption. The advantage goes to China unless the U.S. Navy and Air Force undertake a cultural transformation ahead of time, learning to work together in the maritime domain.

Reinventing military institutions in peacetime invariably poses a high-order leadership challenge. It often takes some trauma—like defeat—to clear minds. What to do, short of that doomsday scenario?

First, we need an official AirSea Battle concept to jolt the services into action and impart direction. Let’s publish one. Second, the navy and air force must embrace the concept, forging themselves into a joint weapon of sea combat. And third, national leaders must hold the services accountable for this project. Franklin Roosevelt once compared the U.S. Navy to a pillow. Civilian officials could punch it as hard as they liked, but it sprang back to the same shape. One suspects the U.S. Air Force bureaucracy is the same way.

Keep punching, Washington.

James Holmes is an associate professor of strategy at the Naval War College and a contributor to Competitive Strategies for the 21st Century [10], just out from Stanford University Press. The views voiced here are his alone.

Links:
[1] http://www.addthis.com/bookmark.php?v=2 ... alinterest
[2] http://nationalinterest.org/profile/james-holmes
[3] http://www.csbaonline.org/publications/ ... e-concept/
[4] http://thomaspmbarnett.com/glossary/
[5] http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33153.pdf
[6] http://dnipogo.org/john-r-boyd/
[7] http://www.marxists.org/reference/archi ... /index.htm
[8] http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nav ... romsea.txt
[9] http://www.airforce-magazine.com/Magazi ... chell.aspx
[10] //www.amazon.com/gp/product/0804782423/ref=as_li_ss_tl?ie=UTF8&camp=1789&creative=390957&creativeASIN=0804782423&linkCode=as2&tag=thenatiinte-20">Competitive%20Strategies%20for%20the%2021st%20Century:%20Theory,%20History,%20and%20Practice%20(Stanford%20Security%20Studies)</a><img%20src="http://www.assoc-amazon.com/e/ir?t=thenatiinte-20&l=as2&o=1&a=0804782423"%20width="1"%20height="1"%20border="0"%20alt=""%20style="border:none%20!important;%20margin:0px%20!important;"%20/>%20
[11] http://nationalinterest.org/topic/security/defense
[12] http://nationalinterest.org/topic/security/great-powers
[13] http://nationalinterest.org/topic/secur ... y-strategy
[14] http://nationalinterest.org/topic/security/peacekeeping
[15] http://nationalinterest.org/topic/secur ... ing-powers
[16] http://nationalinterest.org/topic/secur ... e-military
[17] http://nationalinterest.org/region/asia ... asia/china
[18] http://nationalinterest.org/region/amer ... ted-states


 :arrow: http://nationalinterest.org/print/comme ... china-7352
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Re: A China Como Futura Ameaça?
« Responder #93 em: Setembro 05, 2012, 03:20:36 pm »
KYODO: U.S. Marines to Set Up Command Post on Palawan Island Facing South China Sea

Last Updated on Wednesday, 05 September 2012 13:48
Written by Kevin Kerrigan
Wednesday, 05 September 2012 12:23


Guam - Japan's Kyodo News Service is reporting that a contingent of  U.S. Marines is planing to set up an "advance command post" on the Western Philippine island of Palawan facing the South China Sea.

According to Kyodo, the plan calls for stationing 50 to 60 American marines on Palawan.

The news agency quotes an un-named "senior Philippine marine officer".

Construction on the command Post is slated to begin this month ahead of the annual Philippine-U.S. amphibious landing exercise in Palawan, reports Kyodo.

READ the Kyodo posting in FULL below:

Tuesday, September 4, 2012
U.S. Marines To Set Up Marine Command Post Facing South China Sea

MANILA (Kyodo)--The U.S. Marines plan to set up an "advance command post" on the western Philippine island of Palawan that faces the South China Sea, a senior Philippine marine officer told Kyodo News Tuesday.

An aerial view shows the Pagasa Island, which belongs to the disputed Spratly group of islands, in the South China Sea located off the coast of the western Philippines.

"The plan is to station 50 to 60 American marines in Palawan as an advance command post in the region," said the officer privy to the plan.

Palawan is an island province closest to the disputed Spratly Islands in the South China Sea being claimed in whole or in part by China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan, Malaysia and Brunei.

According to the officer, the plan includes converting a 246-hectare Philippine Marine Corps reservation in Samariniana town in Brooke's Point, in southeastern Palawan, into a joint marine operational command.

The officer said the 1.1 kilometer airstrip inside the reservation will be extended to 2.4 km to accommodate big U.S. military transport planes.

Construction work will begin in September in time for the annual Philippine-U.S. amphibious landing exercise in Palawan, he said.

"U.S. Marines will hire Filipino contractors to do the works because it will be costly if they bring their equipment over," he said.

More buildings will also be erected there, the officer said.

Aside from Samariniana, the source said the U.S. military is also looking at developing joint "operational bases" in other parts of Palawan, including Oyster Bay, Ulugan Bay, Macarascas town, Puerto Princesa City, Tarumpitao Point in Rizal and San Vicente town.

Palawan is just one of the areas identified both by Manila and Washington where U.S. Marines will train in a rotating deployment, the officer said.

He said that several military facilities in the Philippine main island of Luzon and Mindanao island in southern Philippines have also been "opened for access" for U.S. troops.

"These are choke points. These are very strategically located areas that can be used by both the U.S. and the Philippine forces," he said, adding that Americans can berth their warships and park their planes in the Philippines for "servicing and maintenance."

"The officer said the airstrip in Balabac, the southernmost island in the Palawan archipelago that was used by U.S. forces during World War ll, will also be restored and improved.

Another source said the Philippine military offered Palawan to Lt. Gen. Duane Thiessen, commanding general of the U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacific, during his visit to Palawan last April to attend the joint U.S.-Philippine war games.

Diplomatic and military sources said the United States specifically wants more access to Philippine airfields and ports for "servicing and maintenance" including refueling and repair of U.S. aircraft and ships.

These areas include military facilities in the former U.S. military bases Clark in Pampanga and Subic Bay in Olongapo, Poro Point in La Union, Sangley Point in Cavite, Laoag City on Luzon Island and Zamboanga on Mindanao, sources said.

Also being considered are similar facilities in Batanes, the northernmost Philippine island province closest to Taiwan, General Santos City in Mindanao and Cebu City in the central Philippines.

The sources said the number of U.S. troops that will be rotated through the Philippines reportedly hovers between 4,000 and 4,500, including U.S. Marines based in Okinawa, Japan.

But the sources said that the final size of the U.S. troops and details of the plan are still being finalized.

Philippine and U.S. officials are mum about the plan to increase the American presence in the Philippines, a long-time U.S. ally which 20 years ago kicked the U.S. forces out from their huge naval and air bases in the country.

U.S. Ambassador Harry Thomas told a business forum last week that "the close partnership we have with the Philippines, as we work together to advance our shared interests on regional strategic issues, on security and economic cooperation, means that the U.S. and the Philippines are writing a new chapter in our longstanding alliance, and building a relationship for the coming century, and beyond."

China has territorial disputes with U.S. allies, including the Philippines, over islands, shoals, cays and reefs in the South China Sea. It has behaved assertively in recent years, alarming the Philippines and other claimants.

The United States has repeatedly said it will not take sides, while urging claimants to resolve the dispute peacefully.

The Philippines' 1987 constitution bans permanent foreign military basing in its soil. But the U.S. maintains strong security ties with the Philippines through a 1951 mutual defense treaty.

In 1998, Washington and Manila forged a visiting forces agreement, paving the way for increased military cooperation under the 1951 treaty.

Under the agreement, the U.S. has conducted ship visits to Philippine ports and resumed large combined military exercises with Philippine forces.

Currently, at any one time since 2002, there are about 600 combined U.S. troops "rotating" in Zamboanga, mainly providing "counterterrorism assistance and training" to Philippine soldiers combating Muslim extremists in southern Philippines.

 :arrow: http://www.pacificnewscenter.com/index. ... Itemid=156
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Re: A China Como Futura Ameaça?
« Responder #94 em: Setembro 18, 2012, 01:12:58 pm »

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China e Japão à beira de conflito
Rochedos de Senkaku, poderão provocar problemas sérios
17.09.2012

Vários governos têm vindo nos últimos dias a manifestar suas preocupações com o degradar da relação entre a China e o Japão, por causa da posse das ilhas de Senkaku (nome da maior das ilhas do arquipélago que tem um comprimento máximo de cerca de 3,400 metros ).
http://areamilitar.net/noticias/noticia ... NrNot=1243

Está quase...
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Re: A China Como Futura Ameaça?
« Responder #95 em: Setembro 18, 2012, 03:15:50 pm »
Penso que a posição que os Estados Unidos tomarem será preponderante, já que são eles que dominam o mar.

Vamos ver o que acontece.
 

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Re: A China Como Futura Ameaça?
« Responder #96 em: Setembro 18, 2012, 04:16:18 pm »
Será mais um ponto de viragem na história da humanidade. A queda dos EUA ou a 3ª guerra mundial...
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Re: A China Como Futura Ameaça?
« Responder #97 em: Setembro 18, 2012, 11:24:58 pm »
Panetta pede a China que aumente contactos militares com os EUA


O secretário da Defesa norte-americano, Leon Panetta, pediu hoje à China que aumente as suas relações militares com os Estados Unidos a fim de reduzir o risco de um confronto, num momento de escalada de uma disputa territorial entre a China e o Japão, importante aliado dos EUA na região.
 
 Panetta, na sua primeira viagem a Pequim desde que assumiu o cargo, admitiu divergências entre a China e os EUA a respeito da segurança marítima no leste da Ásia, e disse que uma melhoria nas relações iria «promover a paz, a estabilidade e a segurança em toda a região Ásia-Pacífico».
 
Panetta e o ministro chinês da Defesa, Liang Guanglie, disseram ter tido uma conversa franca sobre questões complexas, inclusivamente as vendas de armas dos EUA a Taiwan, a mudança no foco estratégico dos EUA para a Ásia-Pacífico, a segurança cibernética e a disputa territorial entre Pequim e Tóquio.
 
Vários protestos ocorreram nos últimos dias na China devido à disputa territorial, tendo como alvos missões diplomáticas e filiais de companhias japonesas. Na terça-feira, completam-se 81 anos sobre o início da ocupação japonesa em parte da China continental.
 
«A respeito das actuais tensões, estamos a pedir calma e moderação a todos os lados, e encorajamo-los a manter canais abertos de comunicação a fim de resolver essas disputas diplomaticamente e pacificamente», disse Panetta.
 
Pequim e Tóquio disputam um grupo de ilhas desabitadas no mar do Leste da China, numa região com reservas potencialmente enormes de gás. A China, que designa as ilhas de Diaoyu, diz reivindicá-las desde a dinastia Ming.
 
O ministro chinês disse que o governo japonês causou a actual escalada do conflito ao anunciar na semana passada que nacionalizaria as ilhas  -designadas por Tóquio de Senkaku - comprando-as ao seu proprietário particular japonês.
 
Na conferência de imprensa, o ministro chinês disse que o seu país «se reserva o direito de tomar mais medidas», mas que, «naturalmente, tendo dito isto, ainda espera uma solução pacífica e negociada para essa questão».
 
A visita de três dias de Panetta à China é parte de um esforço para reforçar as relações entre os militares dos dois países, de modo a evitar os contactos apenas intermitentes do passado.
 
Panetta deve reunir-se com o vice-presidente Xi Jinping, que deverá assumir a presidência no próximo ano.

Lusa
 

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P44

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Re: A China Como Futura Ameaça?
« Responder #98 em: Setembro 19, 2012, 11:29:32 am »
China Launching Gold Backed Worldwide Currency - Now the Americans will have to find a reason to go to war against China !!
Thursday - Aug 30, 2012, 12:55pm (GMT+5.5)



According to an article, China is recasting all of their gold reserves into small one kilo bars in order to issue a new gold-backed currency. Many say this will disrupt global trade and will eventually cause a collapse of the US dollar.
 
There can be no doubt that the US dollar will soon be history. China is recasting all of their gold reserves into small one kilo bars in order to issue a new gold backed global currency. This is surely a strategic part of their recent push to sign new trade agreements with Russia, Japan, Chile, Brazil, India, and Iran. The cat is now out of the bag, the US will be given the bums rushby the largest trading nations in the world and the dollar will go down in flames. GATA now estimates that 80% of the gold that investors believe they have in allocated accounts is long gone, the majority of it probably wound up in China.
 
China is well along an ambitious plan to recast large gold bars into smaller 1-kg bars on a massive scale. A major event is brewing that will disrupt global trade and assuredly the global banking system. The big gold recast project points to the Chinese preparing for a new system of trade settlement. In the process they must be constructing a foundation for a possible new monetary system based in gold that supports the trade payments. Initially used for trade, it will later be used in banking. The USTBond will be shucked aside. Regard the Chinese project as preliminary to a collapse in the debt-based US Dollar system. The Chinese are removing thousands of metric tons of gold bars from London, New York, and Switzerland. They are recasting the bars, no longer to bear weights in ounces, but rather kilograms. The larger Good Delivery bars are being reduced into 1-kg bars and stored in China. It is not clear whether the recast project is being done entirely in China, as some indication has come that Swiss foundries might be involved, since they have so much experience and capacity.
 
The story of recasting in London is confirmed by my best source. It seems patently clear that the Chinese are preparing for a new system for trade settlement system, to coincide with a new banking reserve system. They might make a sizable portion of the new 1-kg bars available for retail investors and wealthy individuals in China. They will discard the toxic US Treasury Bond basis for banking. Two messages are unmistakable. A grand flipped bird (aka FU) is being given to the Western and British system of pounds and ounces and other queer ton measures. But perhaps something bigger is involved. Maybe a formal investigation of tungsten laced bars is being conducted in hidden manner. In early 2010, the issue of tungsten salted bars became a big story, obviously kept hush hush. The trails emanated from Fort Knox, as in pilferage of its inventory. The pathways extended through Panama in other routes known to the contraband crowd, that perverse trade of white powder known on the street as Horse & Blow, or Boy & Girl.

Read more: http://www.indiavision.com/news/article ... z26uVAmg8u
"[Os portugueses são]um povo tão dócil e tão bem amestrado que até merecia estar no Jardim Zoológico"
-Dom Januário Torgal Ferreira, Bispo das Forças Armadas
 

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Lusitano89

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Re: A China Como Futura Ameaça?
« Responder #99 em: Novembro 25, 2012, 10:30:26 pm »
Estratégia nas Relações Sino-Japonesas
Tiago Alexandre Fernandes Maurício


A lógica paradoxal da estratégia tem escapado a compreensão da maioria dos analistas dedicados à Ásia Oriental. Nesta que será uma das questões fundamentais do século XXI, o seu senso comum induz-lhes a ditar que a ascensão Chinesa tem fortalecido a sua posição internacional; pela mesma assunção, declaram ser o declínio Japonês caracterizado pelo seu enfraquecimento. Contrariando a opinião prevalecente, podemos afirmar o seu exacto oposto: a posição da China tem enfraquecido precisamente pela sua rápida ascensão, da mesma forma que o Japão tem sido fortalecido devido à sua fraqueza.

O domínio da estratégia, como Luttwak tratou, é caracterizado pelo confronto Clausewitziano entre duas ou mais vontades opostas, onde a existência de uma lógica paradoxal - contrária ao senso comum - promove este encontro antagónico. Neste sentido, a natureza da ascensão Chinesa é, ela própria, a razão do seu principal enfraquecimento, pela sua incapacidade em manobrar as crescentes vontades que se lhe opõem. Por outras palavras, a rápida acumulação de poder pela China invoca uma reacção contrária proporcional à sua intensidade, minando a sua posição face ao status quo ante. Por seu turno, o Japão tem beneficiado pelas mesmas razões que o tornam vulnerável à vitalidade do seu vizinho continental.

Para demonstrar este raciocínio, atentemos a quatro dimensões concretas. Em primeiro lugar, a importância de alianças e parcerias securitárias. Do lado Chinês, Beijing está desprovido de alianças funcionais que suportem e avancem os seus interesses e weltanschauung. Laços privilegiados com a Coreia do Norte, o Paquistão, e a Birmânia, entre poucos mais, dificilmente constituem uma firme base de apoio enquanto potência emergente com ambições globais. Como Minxin Pei reconheceu, a China poderá tornar-se a mais isolada das super-potências, e cujos parceiros apresentar-lhe-ão mais encargos do que benefícios. A sua proximidade com Pyongyang é exemplo disso.

Por seu turno, o Japão avança com uma campanha diplomática em todas as frentes. Com efeito, nos últimos anos, Tóquio tem registado progresso no fomento de antigas e novas parcerias, como é o caso da Índia, da Austrália, da Nova Zelândia, e até, em certo grau, com a Coreia do Sul. Enquanto algumas delas adquirem relevância num contexto estratégico de resposta à China, outras também servem prioridades distintas, como sejam a procura de um maior multilateralismo e favorecimento de cooperação militar para além da aliança com os Estados Unidos.

Em segundo lugar, o pujante crescimento económico Chinês criou um ambiente desfavorável à sua maior afirmação política e securitária. Receando uma excessiva dependência da arma económica Chinesa, vários parceiros regionais têm procurado diversificar o seu modelo de crescimento ao investir no desenvolvimento interno e em espaços regionais de cooperação. O crescimento do comércio intra-regional no Sudeste Asiático atesta este facto, embora também sejam de destacar recentes investidas por parte da Austrália, Índia, Coreia do Sul, Tailândia e Indonésia.

O Japão, embora profundamente envolvido na modernização do modelo macro-económico Chinês, vê a sua posição reforçada perante as profundas transformações impostas pela ascensão do gigante vizinho. Beneficiando de uma postura menos assertiva e de vantagens em sectores-chave, o Japão possui agora os incentivos para investir em mercados tradicionalmente menos receptivos a capital nipónico.

Em terceiro lugar, as reivindicações do Partido Comunista Chinês face às inúmeras disputas territoriais pendentes constituem um dos mais flagrantes exemplos da paradoxal lógica da estratégia. Mais fraca e vulnerável, a China dos anos 1970 e 1980 realizou inúmeras concessões perante os seus vizinhos. As disputas foram comummente resolvidas com pusilanimidade, em que Beijing cedia frequentemente parcelas equivalentes a setenta cinco por cento dos territórios em causa, e não raras vezes abdicando da totalidade das reivindicações. Mais do que princípios vagos de soberania e orgulho nacional, estava em causa a reforma interna da sociedade e a fundação dos pilares de crescimento económico que hoje lhe assistem.

O panorama contemporâneo é deveras distinto. Nos mares do Sul e Leste da China, temos assistido a uma escalada de retórica política, presença naval e recrudescimento económico, afectando gravemente a paz e estabilidade regionais. O caso das Ilhas Diaoyu/Senkaku são exemplo disso, quando antes existira um tácito acordo Sino-Japonês para arquivar a disputa e enfatizar antes a cooperação económica. Para a China de hoje, várias vezes mais forte em poder relativo, aquela fora uma postura excessivamente concessionária e contrária aos interesses nacionais. A reacção tem sido proporcional: as forças navais da região têm registado aumentos significativos em orçamentos e capacidades, frequentemente envolvendo um reforço da aliança ou parceria de poderes regionais com os Estados Unidos. Contactos e colaboração entre países vizinhos também têm sido objecto de maior atenção, num ambiente cada vez mais desfavorável à projecção da influência Chinesa.

Por último, a continuada modernização e expansão das capacidades militares do Exército de Libertação Popular e restantes Ramos, sinal último da ascensão do poder Chinês, é um dos factores que mais tem contribuído para o seu enfraquecimento. Questionando-se sobre as funções estratégicas que estas forças servirão, as principais potências regionais têm procurado limitar - senão conter - esta crescente expansão militar. Várias iniciativas, frequentemente lideradas pelos Estados Unidos, nas quais o Japão participa,constituem um exemplo da resistência que o crescente poder Chinês invoca. Desde a celebração de pactos para partilha de informações estratégicas, colaboração em exercícios militares conjuntos, relaxamento da proibição de exportação de armas, até ao fortalecimento da aliança Nipo-Americana, o perfil de segurança Japonês está em mudança. Novamente, os parceiros incluem a Índia, a Austrália, a Nova Zelândia, as Filipinas e, em casos limitados, a Coreia do Sul.

A conclusão é tão paradoxal quanto verdadeira. A ascensão da China resultou no seu inexorável enfraquecimento, e será necessária grande disciplina estratégica para reverter os danos causados. Combinar a sua vitalidade económica com uma redução de gastos militares, uma postura mais concessionária em matéria de disputas territoriais e favorecimento de alianças e parcerias contribuirão para esse fim.

Jornal Defesa
 

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Lightning

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Re: A China Como Futura Ameaça?
« Responder #100 em: Novembro 26, 2012, 09:08:31 pm »
Uma coisa acho verdade, a China mesmo super potência, não vai ser estilo Estados Unidos, na melhor das hipoteses vai ser tipo União Soviética, é que a China não tem hipotese de dominar o mar "naturalmente", isto é, sem entrar em conflito com outrãs nações, é que os EUA tem uma enorma vantagem, tem zona costeira no Atlântico e zona costeira no Pacifico, e nenhuma dessas costas está bloqueada por outras nações, tem acesso livre ao mar, o que dá aos EUA livre acesso a mais de metade do mundo, só os mares fechados (Mediterraneo, Báltico, etc) e o Oceano Indico é que eles precisam de transitar perto de nações aliadas.

A China pelo contrário, apesar de ter uma grande costa no Pacifico, essa costa está "cercada" por paises aliados dos EUA (Coreia do Sul, Japão, Taiwan, Filipinas) que lhe impedem o livre acesso ao Pacifico e Indico (Singapura), por isso é que a China anda a causar toda esta confusão com o Japão, Vietname, Filipinas, etc, por causa de ilhas no mar do sul da china, eles querem ter acesso livre às linhas de comunicação maritimas para o Pacifico e Indico.

A China vai ser "naturalmente" uma grande potencia terrestre, na Ásia, mas maritima no Pacifico não, só se entrar em guerra e impor a sua vontade.
 

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Cabecinhas

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Re: A China Como Futura Ameaça?
« Responder #101 em: Dezembro 01, 2012, 09:06:00 pm »
A China está a anos luz do Japão no que toca ao mar e ar... dali não vai levar nada.
Um galego é um português que se rendeu ou será que um português é um galego que não se rendeu?
---
 

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Re: A China Como Futura Ameaça?
« Responder #102 em: Dezembro 30, 2012, 12:48:50 am »
Citação de: "Cabecinhas"
A China está a anos luz do Japão no que toca ao mar e ar... dali não vai levar nada.
China fabricará bombardeiro Backfire
http://areamilitar.net/noticias/noticia ... NrNot=1268

China compra linha de produção do Tu-22M
http://www.aereo.jor.br/2012/12/29/chin ... do-tu-22m/
https://www.youtube.com/user/HSMW/videos

"Tudo pela Nação, nada contra a Nação."
 

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Lusitano89

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Re: A China Como Futura Ameaça?
« Responder #103 em: Janeiro 07, 2013, 01:30:38 pm »
Ásia é terreno fértil para o nacionalismo


São desabitadas e não somam mais de sete quilómetros quadrados mas, tanto na China como no Japão, são relevantes ao ponto de criarem a pior crise diplomática das últimas décadas entre as duas potências asiáticas: «A ocupação ilegal do território chinês das ilhas Diaoyu por parte de extremistas japoneses foi uma provocação grave que viola a soberania territorial da China», anunciou o porta-voz do Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros de Pequim em Setembro, depois de dois japoneses terem divulgado um vídeo com a sua chegada ao arquipélago a que chamam de Senkaku.

Nos dias seguintes percebeu-se que o sentimento entre a população chinesa coincidia com a posição oficial do seu Governo na disputa em torno de uma ilhas em que até no nome os países divergem. Dezenas de cidades do país viveram as maiores manifestações anti-Japão em décadas, com lojas pilhadas, carros de fabrico japonês destruídos na via pública e até vidros partidos na embaixada do país em Pequim.

Alguns trabalhadores nipónicos foram obrigados a regressar a casa durante o encerramento temporários de fábricas da Toyota, Panasonic ou Nissan na China até que a escalada da violência levou o ministro chinês da Defesa a colocar água na fervura: «Queremos uma solução negociada e pacífica e esperamos poder cooperar com o Governo japonês», afirmou Liang Guanglie, dando o mote para um apaziguamento que não chegou sem recurso à força e ao gás lacrimogéneo.

Viragens à direita

Do outro lado, Shinzo Abe era eleito o candidato do maior partido da oposição japonesa fazendo duras críticas ao então primeiro-ministro Yoshihiko Noda pela sua fragilidade face à China. «O maravilhoso mar japonês e o seu território estão sob ameaça», afirmou Abe em Setembro, defendendo que o arquipélago é «parte inata do território japonês» e garantindo estar disposto a «proteger a vida dos japoneses a todo o custo».

Abe, que no seu primeiro mandato entre 2006 e 2007 tentou criar uma organização de democracias da Ásia e do Pacífico que incluísse Japão, EUA, Austrália e Índia – sem nunca o conseguir devido à forte oposição chinesa –, foi eleito primeiro-ministro em Dezembro, já depois de se saber que Xi Jinping, um dos ‘herdeiros’ do Partido Comunista com mais ligações ao exército, será o Presidente chinês na próxima década.

Ao mesmo tempo, as eleições na Coreia do Sul deram a vitória aos conservadores de Park Geun-hye, a futura Presidente que já criticou duramente o apoio constante de Pequim à ditadura que vigora no Norte da península coreana.

Declarações e resultados eleitorais que são vistos como consequência de uma década em que Pequim assumiu o objectivo de dominar a região asiática, intensificando disputas territoriais com quase todos os seus vizinhos enquanto engorda cada vez mais o seu exército: segundo números citados pelo Washington Post em Outubro, a China passou de 20 mil milhões de dólares aplicados na Defesa em 2002 para 120 mil milhões em 2011.

Um contra todos

E as autoridades de Pequim não enervam os vizinhos apenas com investimento militar: em Novembro os passaportes do país foram redesenhados para que o mapa nacional inclua um grupo de ilhas no Mar do Sul da China, que são também reclamadas por Filipinas, Vietname, Taiwan (Formosa), Malásia, Indonésia e Brunei. No último ano foram raras as semanas em que não houve avisos diplomáticos, fosse devido à exploração de gás na região (Filipinas), ou a prospecções para encontrar petróleo (Vietname) ou apenas para controlar uma rota comercial que representa mais de cinco biliões de dólares anuais.

O último exemplo deu-se a meio de Dezembro, quando as Filipinas assinaram um acordo de cooperação militar com Washington. O negócio prevê um aumento no número de tropas, aviões e navios norte-americanos no país, o que levou Xi Jinping, em visita à frota que controla o Mar do Sul da China, a pedir aos militares para se «intensificar a preparação para um conflito», segundo a agência estatal de notícias Xinhua. Que no mesmo texto apelidava as Filipinas de «país oportunista e perturbador».

Para já, as ameaças não passam disso mesmo, mas a chegada de mais governantes nacionalistas pode intensificar um sentimento já palpável entre as populações.

SOL
 

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Cabeça de Martelo

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Re: A China Como Futura Ameaça?
« Responder #104 em: Janeiro 17, 2013, 11:52:23 am »
7. Todos os animais são iguais mas alguns são mais iguais que os outros.