SOLO HAY QUE FIJARSE EN UNA COSA.

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Re: Guerra das Malvinas
« Responder #105 em: Maio 13, 2010, 05:08:07 pm »
Boa Tarde,

Ninguém sabe tudo sobre tudo.

Cuidado! Não se estique na sua fuga ao tópico senão corre o risco de ser censurado.

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Re: Guerra das Malvinas
« Responder #106 em: Maio 13, 2010, 06:08:46 pm »
Ruego a la administración, que no sea sectaria y borre el mensaje de perejil, o me sentiré legitimado para seguir con el of topic.
 

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Re: Guerra das Malvinas
« Responder #107 em: Maio 14, 2010, 11:47:08 am »
Bom Dia,

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A-4B Skyhawk “C-225”

This particular Skyhawk was one of the luckiest ones of the 1982 as it not only survived the war but also was flown in combat missions by the leaders that led some of the most significant actions of the South Atlantic (Malvinas / Falklands) war.

May 12th: Attack to HMS Glasgow and HMS Brilliant that were shelling Puerto Argentino / Port Stanley.

Two waves of 4 Skyhawks B were to attack with a 15 minutes interval.

The first wave (OF 1177) was named CUÑA and was led by 1st Lt Bustos and his wingmen were Lt. J. Ibarlucea, Lt. M. Nívoli and Ensg. A. Vázquez. They attacked with the sea on their backs thus giving the Sea Wolf system of HMS Brilliant an excellent chance to operate. Their windshields were covered with sea salt. Nívoli and Bustos were shot down practically over the ships, while Bustos crashed on the sea while calling his wingmen to join him. He had seen a 3rd Sea Wolf and touched the sea while trying to evade it. The only survivor was Vázquez who managed to drop his bomb and return to his base. They caused slight damage to the deck of the ship. After the debrief, still affected by what he had gone thru, Vázquez was asked what was he going to do next. After witnessing the death of his 3 friends, his only answer was: “Get ready for the next mission.” Everybody in the room was shocked and admired the resolution of this young Air Force officer.

The following attack was OF 1180 (ORO): Capt. Antonio (Tony) Zelaya in C-225, Lt. Arrarás in C-244, 1st Lt Gavazzi (C-248) and Alferez Dellepiane in C-239.

The inbound flight took place without problem, except for the fact that Zelaya’s navigational equipment broke and he was forced to navigate by compass and clock. The attack time had also being pushed forward 15 minutes and they tried to comply with it but they made it 7 minutes late (and 8 before the original time!).

When they arrived to the Goose Green area, Zelaya realized that there had been a drift in their direction and that they were now 4 miles to their right, when in fact they should have been 7 miles to their left. Hence, he corrected their heading.

On the radio, he was confirmed to proceed as originally planned. Nobody was talking on the radio.

On both sides he could see his wingmen, Arrarás and Gavazzi, flying even lower. Zelaya had to fly higher to check his maps and charts.

When the got to open sea, heading southeast, he descended even more. His idea was to fly on that heading for 3 minutes and if nothing was found, return to base.

The ships were not in the area where he was told they would be. He kept on flying and shortly afterwards they saw the two ships leaving the area at full speed after the attack of CUÑA. They were 20 NM to the south of the town. Nothing was said to his wingmen, as instructions had been given before take off: the leading section would attack the ship to the North, and the following one the ships to the South.

No missile was fired at them but guns and machine guns were in action. Even the noise of the AA could be heard over their jet engines.

As the planes were this time coming with the shore behind them, the Sea Wolf system had trouble locking on them and no missile was fired at them.

The only one who made a mistake was Zelaya himself, as he attacked the ship that was closer to him (the one on the South) so 3 ships attacked one and only 1 went for the ship that was to the North (following the other ship).

At the moment when he had to drop his bomb, Zelaya could only see his gun sight and the target. He still remembers the large radar antenna, turning. It was HMS Glasgow.

After jumping his target, Zelaya found himself turning at a height of 300 mts, trying to see what had happened to the ships. There was a great commotion in the sea close to the leading ship, and ripples on the sea, as if something had fallen there. Realizing that he was too high, he dove to the sea surface. All the pilots were shouting excitedly but radio silence was kept except for Gavazzi who said: “Long live the Homeland!”. Arrarás claimed that he had probably hit his target while Gavazzi was sure he himself had succeeded. Though officially Gavazzi is credited with the hit, recently Zelaya said that he believes that the pilot that hit Glasgow was in fact Arrarás.

The fact that the ships had been further South made them fly away from their original return route. Tony entered the islands at a 90 degree angle, in that place the coast runs in an angle, so they started to fly NW instead of W.

They flew back split in two sections. Arrarás was forming with Zelaya, 90 mts away. Gavazzi was leading Dellepiane some miles behind. They kept on flying low as they had lost contact with the MLV radar and they did not know whether they were being chased by Sea Harriers or not.

Now calmed down after the exciting attack, Zelaya checked his map and compass and realized he was off course, with a different heading. He saw something suspicious ahead of him, something shinning on the ground. He had a hunch and decided to break left. Gavazzi, instead, kept on moving ahead.

The AA guns in Darwin who mistook them for Harriers had caught them. Gavazzi’s plane was hit by one of the Argentine Army’s radar guided 35 mm guns and lost one aileron. He said: “My plane has turned upside down!” and immediately crashed, with no chance to eject. Dellepiane, very affected, kept on repeating that his leader had crashed and Zelaya ordered him to shut up and join them.

Now they were all silent and saddened. Dellepiane was forced to climb to save fuel but Gavazzi and Arrarás kept flying low for 90 kilometers more.

Their windshields now covered with a layer of salt, their landing was a difficult one. Vazquez plane landed ahead of them and accidentally left the runway before stopping.

As a result of their attack, HMS Glasgow received the hit of one of the 1,000 lb bombs that did not explode, fell into the sea on the other side of the ship and left two holes in the hull. Thru those, water was coming in. Engines and electric systems were also affected by the attack. After some days, the ship now unable to continue in the war theater due to the damage, returned to the UK.

NOTE: of the 8 pilots that took part in this mission, only 2 survived the war: Zelaya and Dellepiane. Arrarás and Vázquez perished on the attack to the LCU Foxtrot on June 8th at Bluff Cove / Bahia Agradable. This vessel was sunk in this attack.

May 21st: San Carlos landings.

C-225 was flown by 1st Lt Mariano Velazco but had to return due to mechanical problems. The rest of the planes (ORION) joined the LEOs and together they attacked HMS Argonaut, hitting her with 2 bombs that left her out of service for the rest of the war.

May 25th: Attack and sinking of HMS Coventry.

OF 1236 (VULCANO): C-225 was flown by the Capt. Pablo Carballo with Lt Rinke as his wingman (Ensg Carmona was forced to return due to mechanical problems).

OF 1237 (ZEUS): 1st Lt. Mariano Velazco (C-207), Ensg. J. Barrionuevo (C-212). Lt. Osses also returned with mechanical issues.

During the morning, a 42-22 combo located to the north of Borbon / Pebble Is. had managed to shot down two Skyhawks with the Sea Darts from HMS Coventry (not 3 as claimed by David Hart-Dyke in his book). It’s important to highlight the fact that these planes were returning from their attacks to San Carlos, and were NOT on their way to attack the combo. In fact, they were climbing as they had been damaged and were loosing fuel. The crews in the ships were in high tension as they knew they had been located and they might attract the resources of the Argentine Air Force, which could not withstand such a dangerous couple placed on their route to San Carlos waters.

Each section had their own route, so they were flying using different routes.

The now well-known shape of the islands started to show on their windshields when a thin layer of salt started to form on Carballo’s oval windshield. This had happened in previous missions but had been solved by 1st Lt (biochemist) Haggi, who found a solution to fix the problem.

He immediately remembered non commissioned officer Escobar, a mechanic who had cleaned with all his love the windshield and who had asked Carballo if he was satisfied with his job. He had cleaned away the solution! Pablo thought he might have to return because it was difficult to look forward and also now his gunsight was useless. Therefore he would have to calculate the point where to drop his bombs and decided to keep on going.

They arrived to the first notification point, Puerto Ruiseñor, and contacted the Rayo (tactical support aircraft), generally operated by Vicecomodoro “Duro (Tough)” Pereyra and Major Medina. They would tell them if their target had moved, where the enemy CAPs where…

Carballo soon discovered he was not going to be able to follow the initial route, as he would not be able to fly above land from Puerto Ruiseñor onwards, to Rasa Island (West of Borbon Is), due to his now restricted visibility. Hence he started to fly a little bit away from the original route.

Skimming the water, as the only bumps are the waves, they flew towards the North of Gran Malvina / West Falkland.  To his left and slightly lower and behind, almost touching the sea, was his “Iron-made wingman” as he called him, Lt Rinke.

Suddenly they were warned by Ranquel (Pereyra):

“Careful as there is Harrier CAP entering the Sound from the South!”

Carballo acknowledged and understanding that he could get to my target before they could be intercepted, he decided to continue.  This CAP was being flown by the 800 Sqn pilots Neil Thomas and Dave Smith. Diving on the Skyhawks, Thomas was able to get visual while Dave was covering them, as all good wingmen do. At that moment, they were ordered to break as the ships were going to take on the incoming attackers. Frustrated, they turned away as they risked being shot down by their own side.

Once the VULCANOs turned at the other extreme of the island, they turned east and started to fly in the original direction. The nose of their planes started to look for the place where the target should be. There they were, in the horizon.

Pablo remembered a phrase that Pepe Biondi (a very famous Argentine comedian) would always repeat during his performances: “I am so lucky to get into unlucky situations…”

They were two dark dots, two impressive frigates against the horizon, covered in mist, away from the coast, deep in the sea. Carballo thought: “This time, it will be very tough as we will be exposed to their AA guns for a long time.”

They were a CL42 (HMS Coventry) and a CL22 (HMS Broadsword).

Carballo opened up all my engine, pressed the VHF button and said:

“OK girls, I have them in sight, Long Live the Homeland! Maximum power! To the one behind!” (The one to the West)

They started the bomb run. Carballo felt very small when he started with my only wingman, attacking those two huge steel constructions, that commenced their defensive fire the moment the Skyhawks entered the sea flying from Rasa Is, even though the planes were not in range. Their hits were at the beginning far ahead: water was dancing and jumping high and there were explosion in the air that formed a band that seemed to be alive. The ships were covered in smoke after each shot. Carballo thought they were in the middle of a sea battles movie. The wall of fire was very dense and both ships were firing with everything they had, and the salt on the windshield prevented Carballo from seeing how close their hits where. The windshield has 3 parts and he could only see thru the ones on the sides as the oval one (center) was covered in salt.

“Which one do we attack, sir?” asked Rinke.

“Let’s go to the one that’s behind, as it is less defended” Carballo answered.

Both ships started to accelerate, with high lips of water on their bows. They were heading East with approx 200 mts of distance between them.

The Sea Wolf system failed again, as it had happened on May 12th. This time, as the planes were flying so close, the system could not decide what target to shoot at first, so it turned itself off. It had to be reset manually, but the process takes some seconds, vital seconds that they did not have.

C-225 was hit under the right wing by the defensive fire put by the ships but Carballo kept on going. When the whole ship covered both sides of his blurred windshield, he let his 1,000 lb bomb go, waiting a little more time than usual due to his bad forward vision. He remembers that Coventry, the other ship, was still firing at them!

“Did you pass, #2?”

He did not answer immediately but then Pablo got very happy when I heard Rinke shout:

“Yes sir, I am here behind you and in sight!”

Almost at the same time, they heard another voice in the radio:

“I don’t see anything!” It was 1st Lt Velasco who was arriving.

Pablo shouted:

“They are just North of the IP (Rasa Is)! Go on, go on!”

And Alferez Barrionuevo said:

“Ok, we have them to the left”

An explosion lifted a column of water close to C-225 when he was fired at while escaping. Carballo said:

“I was hit, I think I was hit because I have felt several hits underneath” (I had been hit by a small piece of shrapnel under his right wing).

Broadsword had stopped, with a hole his her hull, her landing deck and a hangar. The nose of her Sea Lynx was torn away by Carballo’s bomb (another unexploded one that fell on the other side of the sea!).

Velazco and Barrionuevo started their attack. Broadsword was pointing to the East, while Coventry, with a decision that’s important to highlight, turned west to cover the CL-22 and put herself between the ship and the attacking planes.

The 800 Sqn pair started to track the second wave of Argentine planes, but again they were called off by Broadsword.

As the attention of their enemies was now focused on the ZEUS, Carballo and Rinke were able to watch everything, while gently turning towards the continent.

With an unbelievable agility, faster than what anybody can imagine, Coventry turned towards the planes of the second section and a Sea Dart left the ship. The missile started to wave trying to find the target, but passed above and to the left of the planes who did not change their direction and then got lost, while Rinke was shouting:

“The missile, the missile!”

Then the ship put the side against the planes, as there is where it has more armament, and started to shoot at the planes. The Sea Wolf system had clearly acquired the targets. To prevent any mistake or mishap, the operator was controlling the system manually and had one on the Skyhawks clearly in the center of his screen. Ready to fire, the operator said: “You will die, b…!”. But when Coventry “shielded” Broadword, she blocked the later’s radar and the missiles could not be fired as they would have hit Coventry.

After dropping his bombs (Barrinuevos’ did not fall), Velazco asked the standard:

“Have you passed, #2?”

“Yes sir, you hit it perfectly, it was a CL42, I saw her clearly, I almost crashed against one of the domes, I saw your bombs hit the hull and in the other one, close to the water line, there was a column of smoke!”

HMS Coventry had been hit by 3 bombs on her port side one meter above the waterline. One failed to explode but nevertheless contributed to the posterior flooding. The second one entered below the bridge and spiraled down from deck 2 to deck 4, below the computer room and exploded killing everyone there almost immediately. The third bomb exploded as well, this time in the Forward Engine Room and killed everyone in the dinning room, located above the FER. With fire on board and taking water, the ship started to list and the damaged caused by the bombs only helped the water to rise to the upper decks. Sadly, 19 members of HMS Coventry lost their lives.

The 4 pilots started to shout at the same time while they were still being fired at, but the columns of water were quite behind. They shouted several “Long live our Homeland!”, sapukays (traditional shouts from the Corrientes province) and insults until a voice, believed to be the one of Vicecomdoro Duro Pereyra, commanded them:

“Silence on the radio!”

After a practically quite trip back, except for Carballo’s concern about his loss of fuel due to the slight damage to his plane (he even considered the option of ejecting in case he run out of fuel), they made it back to their base.

Thomas and Smith returned to their carrier, “spitting nails”, completely angered and frustrated as they could have prevented the catastrophe had they been given permission to engage the incoming Skyhawks.

With the runway in sight, Carballo pressed the button on his radio and said:

“In our Homeland day, with the landing strip in sight!”

To their “eyes”, the radar operators, he said:

“We are all returning with the mission accomplished!”

“Tala” (Rinke) said:

“I never thought the sight of the airport would seem so beautiful to me!” and asked Carballo:

“Sir, lets do a fly past over the base!” but he got rebuked:

“Are you nuts? We have survived the British and you want our own side to shoot us down!?”

As soon as they landed, the preliminary results of their attack were received. From the ground (Borbon/Pebble Is) the Argentine garrison was able to see that 2 minutes after the Skyhawks left the area, 4 Harriers arrived and flew over the ships. Shortly afterwards, choppers from San Carlos arrived to rescue the sailors, as the ship attacked by Mariano (HMS Coventry) sunk in approximately 20 minutes, while Broadsword limped away very slowly, her helicopter destroyed and with a fire on board that was controlled shortly afterwards.  

The place thru which, as tradition says, the Skyhawks crossed Borbon/Pebble Is on their way to their target (in Pebble / Borbon) has now been called “Skyhawk gap”.


Reference

Halcones de Malvinas, Pablo Carballo

Hostile Skies, Dave Morgan

Dios y los Halcones, Pablo Carballo

Historia Oficial de la Fuerza Aerea Argentina, volume VI

Emails with Allan White, Tony Zelaya, David Smith and Pablo Carballo.

Official Argentine Air Force website.

Four Weeks in May, David Hart Dyke


Pablo Calcaterra

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papatango

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Re: Guerra das Malvinas
« Responder #108 em: Maio 14, 2010, 03:56:30 pm »
Citação de: "smoketrails"
Os argentinos devem ter ficado intimidados com o primeiro ataque dos Sea Harrier a Port Stanley. É verdade que os Skyhawk ficavam mais perto de frota, mas também ficavam mais expostos a um ataque inglês.
É uma questão interessante, a de determinar o que passava pela cabeça dos comandos argentinos.
Tudo leva a crer que nunca pensaram na possibilidade de perder a guerra, pois estavam certos de que a Grã Bretanha não responderia.
Este foi o primeiro erro dos generais argentinos, no que foi uma curiosa repetição do inicio da II guerra mundial. Hitler também achava que eles não atacariam. Saddam Hussein, pensou o mesmo dos americanos.

Mas não deixa de ser curioso de analisar os acontecimentos, pois após a ocupação inicial das ilhas, os generais argentinos tinham perdido todo o espaço de manobra para promover uma eventual retirada.

Havia duas possibilidades de resposta britânica:
Na primeira hipótese, os ingleses esperariam para lançar uma operação na Primavera do hemisfério sul (ou seja, Outubro / Novembro de 1982) o que daria mais que tempo para reforçar as ilhas com meios mais eficazes.
Na segunda hipótese, os ingleses responderiam imediatamente, mas nesse caso seria impossível reunirem uma força suficientemente forte para expulsar os argentinos.

Os argentinos fizeram aparentemente uma análise completamente desastrada da realidade. Subestimaram os britânicos e sobrestimaram as suas capacidades.
É por isso possível, que o primeiro ataque britânico contra a capital das Malvinas fosse um primeiro alerta, mas creio que bastante tempo antes, os generais argentinos já sabiam que iam ter problemas pela frente.
A questão é saber se decidiram ir em frente por uma questão de orgulho pessoal, ou se o fizeram numa tentativa desesperada de salvar o regime...

O periodo decisivo decorre entre 12 de Abril (quando os britânicos declaram a zona de exclusão de 200 milhas) e 19 de Abril.
Creio que é em 19 de Abril que os generais argentinos percebem finalmente que vão entrar numa guerra contra a Grã Bretanha, porque é nesse dia que tentam accionar o tratado TIAR, o tratado de assistência inter-americana, que não pode no entanto ser accionado, porque é um tratado defensivo e quem iniciou o conflito foram os argentinos.
É muito mais fácil enganar uma pessoa, que explicar-lhe que foi enganada ...
 

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Smoke Trails

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Re: Guerra das Malvinas
« Responder #109 em: Maio 29, 2010, 06:02:40 pm »
Boa Tarde,

Citar
UH-1H “AE-424”

Starting 1970, this famous helicopter was incorporated to the Argentine Army. With numbers AE-400 to AE-424, the last one was received in October 1978. Cruise speed is 204 km/h, can carry 10 soldiers and 2 machine guns in the doors, or 24 rockets in 2 rockets launchers. In the Aviation branch of the Army, there were part of the Assault Helicopters “A”, Batallon de Aviacion de Combate 601.

On April 23, 1982 with several of the other choppers of the Batallon already in the Malvinas/Falklands Islands, four more Hueys were disassembled and were prepared to be taken by plane (Hercules belonging to the Air Force). These were AE-406, 417, 418 and 424. After a two-hour flight, they landed in the runway and immediately proceeded to push the 424 out of the Hercules TC-65. Immediately, mechanics and technicians of the Batallon proceeded to work to put them together again. The crew of AE-424 was Capt. Jorge “Picho” Svendsen, 1st Sgt Medina and 1st Corporal “Negro” San Miguel (gunner) and on April 29th the chopper was ready to fly again. Svendsen was in charge of B Flight.

The Command Post was located in Moody Brook and reserves were built in Mount Kent.

Into action:

Between May 3rd and 8th, the Hueys carried out approximately 18 transport and recce missions.

On May 15th, AE-424 and AE-417 were sent to the San Carlos area to scout and look for possible British commandoes activities. The Special Forces team they were carrying found a Zodiac boat and signs of enemy activity in the area.

During a mission to carry weapons to the Argentine garrison in Darwin, two Pumas and two Hueys were ordered to land in a place different from the one they were used to. The reason: Harriers had dropped antipersonnel bombs. After refuelling and under red alert with 3 contacts in the radar, the helicopter pilots decided to take off to return to their main base, following individual routes. It’s believed that the bad weather protected them from the Harriers.

May 21st, a day to remember

The Argentine dispersal area in Mount Kent was attacked by a couple of Harriers from 1 Sqn RAF (Pook and Hare) that destroyed Chinook AE-521 and Puma AE-501. AE-418 was damaged while taking off and was forced to land in emergency. Everyone with their small caliber guns was firing at the Harriers (Hare’s plane was damaged). Other helicopters in the dispersal were AE412 / 13 / 17 / 22 / 24 and were not touched. After the danger was over, they all flew back to the area of Moody Brook.

Once there, and with all the choppers dispersed in the area, Svendsen heard on the radio that an Argentine Navy Skyhawk A-4Q (3-A-312) was arriving in emergency. It was the sole survivor of the first 3-plane TABANO section that had seriously damaged HMS Ardent. Hit by the guns of a Sea Harrier and loosing fuel, Navy Lt. Jose Arca decided to try to land in the runway in Argentino/Stanley. But it was then discovered that one of the main landing gears was lost and he was therefore forced to bail out. Svendsen had helped on the radio to guide him to touch down. Arca ejected over land but the wind carried him out to the sea, where he landed approximately 800 to 1,000 meters away of the coast. Capt. Svendsen did not think it twice and took off to rescue the pilot from the freezing waters. While “Picho” was flying the helicopter, Sgt “Vinagre” Santana was controlling the gauges and 1st Corporal San Miguel was trying to get hold of Arca and get him into the chopper. As Arca had his survival jacket and could not move his arms, this approach proved to be impossible. After 15 minutes of failure, Arca removed his jacket/vest and Svendsen sunk the skis of the Huey in the sea. Standing on these, San Miguel was able to take Arca from the arms and in that position; they flew very low back to the coast, from where he was immediately taken to the Hospital. Arca later commented that what hurt him most was the pain of the hits in his face that San Miguel was giving him, to prevent him from falling asleep. But San Miguel was following the orders to keep Arca awake, given by Svendsen.

For his action on this date, Svendsen and San Miguel were decorated with the medal issued by the Argentine Congress to Bravery in Combat.

On May 26th AE-412 / 13 / 22 and 24, led by Svendsen in 424 took off to the Douglas Paddock area (20 km. away from San Carlos) to retrieve the Combat Team Guemes, who had been walking for 3 days after trying to fight off the landings in San Carlos on the 21st. This team had managed to defend themselves by shooting down two helicopters and damaged another one that had the mission to capture them. 1st Corporal San Miguel saw the movement of people beneath them, after they had flown the area without finding anyone. The team led by 1st Lt. Carlos Esteban thought originally that they were British helicopters looking for them and were hiding.

May 28th: with the British paratroopers closing in on Darwin-Goose Green, a mission to reinforce the Argentine troops was ordered. One Puma (AE-508), Two Augustas (AE-334 / 331), six UH (AE-424 / 22 / 18 / 17 / 13 / 12) and one Chinook (H-93 Argentine Air Force) took the troops. These were forced to land a little bit away from their original destination due to the intensive enemy fire. Once in flight and returning to Argentino/Stanley, they received a request to take some injured soldiers back with them. So Svendsen (with Moreira and San Miguel), supported by Augusta AE-334 (Lt Florio and 1st Corporal Cravero) went back. Under fire again, they were able to rescue a NCO and four soldiers. For this rescue, Svendsen’s crew received again the same medal from the Congress (Bravery in combat).

May 29th: AE-424 with Svendsen took commandos to Mount Simmons. In the afternoon, they retrieved commandos from the area of Big Mountain, flying along with AE-424 (Lt Fernandez). As soon as they landed, they were warned about the presence of enemy helicopters. As it was almost night, both Hueys took off and after passing Mount Kent, with the lights of the town already in sight, Fernandez shouted on the radio: “To the ground, Picho!” Svendsen made such a violent maneuver that the commandos hit themselves with the roof of the chopper and San Miguel lost his machine gun (nicknamed Clotilde), which fell from the support. Flying very low a British helicopter passed by firing his guns. Fernandez was also chased for some minutes but as they got close to the town, the British left them alone.

June 5th: A nocturne mission to make the British believe that they were taking troops to some hills. At 21:15 Svendsen took off in AE-424 with 1st Lt. Perez Cometto and Corporal San Miguel. They saw some enemy helicopters in the Mount Kent area. While Perez was watching some enemy vehicles using his night vision goggles, they were ordered to return immediately as some enemy choppers had been detected flying from the North in their direction.

On June 6th, AE-424 / 18 and 22 took commandos behind the enemy lines in the Murrell Bridge area. Under fire, they were able to rescue some Argentine Navy Marines that had repelled an attack of the SAS.

Between June 8th and the 9th the Hueys repositioned several troops in hills and the coastline.

On June 11th, a second machine gun was installed on the other door of AE-424.

June 13th: AE-424 flew between 3.00 and 3.40 am to coordinate the fire of the Argentine guns, but at that moment the British ceased firing so the crew was unable to pinpoint the location of the enemy guns (west side of Mount Challenger).

After the cease-fire on the 14th, the six surviving Hueys were taken to the racetrack; among those, UH-424. Svendsen took injured soldiers to the Argentine Hospital Ship Irizar.

On June 15th, Svendsen now flying for the first time AE-409, was authorized by the British to look for stranded and injured soldiers. But the bad weather conditions prevented them from completing their mission.

AE-424 was one of the Hueys captured in flying condition by the British troops. “Picho” Svendsen retired from the Argentine Army with the grade of Lt. Colonel.


References

Angeles sobre la Turba, Antonio Falcon

Falklands Air War, Hobson

A-4Q, Nunez Padin


Pablo Calcaterra

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Re: Guerra das Malvinas
« Responder #110 em: Junho 05, 2010, 06:38:42 pm »
Citar
Argentina localizou o ‘Sheffield’ com ajuda de satélite soviético

Já era de conhecimento geral de que a Argentina obteve ajuda dos soviéticos durante a Guerra das Falklands/Malvinas. Mas agora começam a surgir mais detalhes sobre esta história.

Recentemente o escritor russo Sergey Brilev, filho de um diplomata soviético que morou em diversos países da América do Sul, lançou o livro “Fidel, futebol e as Malvinas”. Aos 10 anos de idade Brilev morava no Uruguai quando os argentinos desembarcaram nas Malvinas. Esta história, e o envolvimento de seu país no conflito, sempre o intrigaram.

Brilev procurou os arquivos de Moscou, mas foi barrado por ser “informação classificada”. Tentou então contactar alguns oficiais soviéticos que serviram no início da década de 1980. General Nikolai Leonov, da KGB, e General Valentin Varennikov, membro das forças soviéticas em Moscou, confirmaram o envio de informações para os argentinos durante o conflito.

Em seu livro, Brilev afirma que os argentinos foram capazes de localizar o contratorpedeiro HMS Sheffield graças à informação obtida pelos satélites de espionagem soviéticos em órbita sobre o Atlântico Sul. A versão oficial dos fatos sempre foi a de que um Lockheed P2V Neptune teria detectado a escolta da Royal Navy. A idade avançada e os problemas de manutenção dos Neptune sempre colocaram em cheque esta versão dos fatos. O autor do livro também afirma que o afundamento do RFA Atlantic Conveyor deveu-se às informações obtidas através do satélite Kosmos-1365.

Segundo o autor a ajuda dos soviéticos foi mais além. Um avião de vigilância marítima Tu-95 ‘Bear’ seguiu a frota britânica entre a costa francesa e a linha do Equador. Em algumas oportunidades a aeronave voou a 30/40 metros de altitude. Esta informação foi confirmada pelo coronel Georguiy Bulbenkov, então piloto da aeronave.

Mas a decisão de ajudar os argentinos aparentemente não veio das altas esferas do poder central de Moscou. Brilev entrevistou nada menos que Mikhail Gorbachov, na época um dos cabeças do Partido Comunista Soviético. Gorbachev foi claro, nunca houve uma decisão central do partido em ajudar a junta militar argentina. O autor conclui que esta foi uma decisão dos próprios generais.

Brilev lembra que o Uruguai e a Argentina foram os únicos dois países sul-americanos que não se juntaram ao embargo comercial, liderado pelos EUA, contra os soviéticos em 1979 quando o Afeganistão foi invadido. O militares ficaram muito agradecidos com o não alinhamento destes países.

FONTE: Mercopress
 

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Smoke Trails

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Re: Guerra das Malvinas
« Responder #111 em: Junho 11, 2010, 07:05:42 pm »
Boa Tarde,

Afinal não foram só os Ingleses que foram ajudados.
Talvez haja uma ponta de verdade na proposta soviética para afundar o Invencible.

Citar
IA-58 Pucará “A-533”

A very brief history of the FMA IA-58 Pucará

During the decade of 1960, the Argentine Air Force realized that needed a ground support and reconnaissance plane.
In 1968 the first glider, made entirely of wood, flew for the first time. On August 20th, 1969 the first prototype makes the initial flight of the Delfín, later called Pucará. It was powered by two Garret TPE 331-U303, which later on where changed to two French Turbomeca Azatzou.

The first series aircraft was delivered to the Air Force on November 15th 1974 (A-501). By 1975 there were four planes in service and they took part in combats against the communist guerrillas that wanted to “liberate” the Tucumán province in Northern Argentina.

In 1978, with more planes now in service in the III Brigada Aérea (in BAM Reconquista, Santa Fe Province) a squadron was sent to the South to be ready in case the tensions with Chile became a war.

On December 31, 1979 this plane (A-533) having being completed in October of the same year, was delivered to the III Brigada Aérea.

The next important event in the life of the Pucarás was the 1982 war for the Malvinas/Falklands islands.

The very same day that the Argentine forces took the islands, a section of 4 Pucará arrived in Puerto Argentino / Port Stanley.

On April 8th four more planes were readied to go to the islands, having arrived first to Comodoro Rivadavia. Two days later, the planes were given their cammo colours for the theatre of operations.

On April 15th the BAM Condor was created in Darwin. The first landing of a Pucara took place on April 24th (Capt. Navarro, Major Vila in A-529).

On April 26th the above-mentioned Squadron crossed to the islands (Puerto Argentino / Stanley), and on the 29th they were deployed to BAM Condor.

During the attack on May 1st that destroyed A-527 and killed the pilot (Lt. Jukic) and 7 mechanics, A-502 was slightly damaged. Some shrapnel had hit the plane and the canopy but was fixed using the available resources: parts of another canopy, screws, bolts and pieces of metal.

As it would be very long to describe all the missions flown by the Pucarás during those almost 2 months, I will only focus on the ones flown by the plane built for this article: A-533.

On May 15th, after the SAS raid on Borbón/Pebble Island, four Pucarás (call sign POKER) took off from Comodoro Rivadavia, in the continent, to reinforce the garrison in the islands. They were armed with 4 rocket pods. A MU-2B 60 guided them and they landed in the BAM Condor. The pilots were: Leader Vice Commodore Saul Costa, #2 Ensign Lema, #3 1st Lt Juan Micheloud and #4 Ensign Diaz in A-533.

(Missions ordered from the islands had no O.F. number.)

May 17th, the first mission for this plane: reports from Port Howard stated that 2 enemy landing crafts were navigating along Puerto Salvador bay. Five planes flew in this mission for more than 2 hours but were unable to find the targets. They spotted Harriers but the British pilots did not see the Argentine planes. A-516 (Capt Grünert) and A-533 (Lt. Calderon) turn was from 10:00 am till 12:00 pm.

May 21st, at 4 pm and after the first missions against the British troops in the vicinity of San Carlos were flown, Lt Gimenez flew the plane to BAM Malvinas (Puerto Argentino/Port Stanley), along with A-516 (Lt. Cruzado).

May 24th, at 2 pm a section of two planes (Lt Brest in A-533, Lt Címbaro in A-516) flew a mission looking for EW devices in the Bezuchere Is, which had been potentially detected by the Argentine Navy. They returned without engaging at 4 pm.

May 26th, call sign FIERRO. Two Pucarás to find the enemy located North of Darwin. Lt. Cruzado (A-533) and Lt. Gimenez (A-509)

May 28th, engagement with British troops attacking Darwin-Goose Green. Call sign NAHUEL: A-537 (Capt. Vila), A-533 (Lt. Címbaro), A-532 (1st Lt. Argañaraz), all armed with rockets. They took off at 8.00 am and returned at 9.20 am. They attacked the enemy and were fired at with Blow Pipes that missed their targets. Capt. Vila recounts that they were told that from the smoke onwards, it was all enemies. It was good information. They over flew the first group of soldiers and attacked the following one. The pilots were surprised as the soldiers, instead of running for cover or ducking, fired at them with their guns, still standing. The first two Pucarás fired their rockets at the soldiers. Argañaraz saw a missile flying towards Címbaro (fired by a soldier of 43 Air Defense Battery, Royal Artillery) and shouted him to break. Thanks to the warning, A-533 evaded the missile. Then Argañaraz saw that the group that had fired the missile was running towards a small house. He aimed his rockets and fired. At that moment, everything in front of him turned red and the plane flipped inverted and out of control. Another AA portable missile had misfired and exploded on the ground just in front of him. It was impossible to eject. He tried to level it and managed to regain control. The planes kept on flying low (ceiling was only 50 meters) and returned over Darwin to show them their support. Here the reception was even worse than the British one. Red tracers could be seen everywhere. Vila’s plane was hit by friendly fire. He thought that Argañaraz had been shot down and told the controller that two planes were returning. The radar had three planes returning, one of them some distance behind the first two ones. Finally, #3 was able to make his radio work and communicated: “Of course there are 3 planes! The “Gaucho” (his war name) is also coming back!” When Vila landed back in Puerto Argentino, 50 impacts were found on his plane. A-537 was now out of action. Pilots were waiting anxiously at the base to jump on the retuning planes and take part in the next attack, while the pilots that had just finished their mission could rest. The two remaining serviceable planes took off immediately in the following mission, manned by rested pilots.

The follow up mission (call sign BAGRE): Capt Grünert (A-533), Lt Russo (A-532), armed with 4 rockets launchers (LAU-61) with 19 rockets each, 7.62 mm machine guns and 20 mm guns. They took off at 9.20 am. They were flying extremely low over the water (5 meters) and they attacked with the sea behind them when they reached Goose Green. It was raining heavily and was hard to see. Russo saw a blast under Grünert’s plane, which started to turn left and then fired his rockets at the British positions. Thinking that A-533 was doomed, Russo followed his leader and asked him if he was going to eject. Grünert explained his wingman that he had everything under control and asked, in turned, if he had fired. As Russo had not fired, he was ordered to go back and attack the British troops. Under heavy AA fire, A-532 attacked again. V. Com. Pedrozo, in charge of the Air Force detachment at Goose Green/Darwin, asked Russo if he still had armament left. As he still had his guns loaded, Pedrozo commanded him to attack for a third time. Hearing this, Grünert told his wingman not to do it, as he would be too lucky to get away with it for a third time. Both planes returned to Puerto Argentino in clouds, where they crossed a Harrier according to the radar controller, but flying in such a bad weather they did not see it. They reached Puerto Argentino, where the next section of Pucarás (Gimenez/Címbaro) had already left on their mission.

Upon landing, it was discovered that A-533 had received 4 impacts on her left engine and 58 on the fuselage. But still managed to get her pilot back to base, though now it was also out of service.

June 13th: A-533 was back in flying condition after several days of repairs.

June 14th, the last 4 flyable Pucarás were readied for a close support mission and then they were to fly back to the continent. They had two drop tanks under the wings (318 lts) and 3 x LAU-61 rocket launchers in a TER under the fuselage. The cease-fire prevented them from carrying out this mission and they fell intact into British hands.

After the war: A-533 was shipped to the UK aboard Tor Caledonia in August 1982. Allocated serial ZD486 for tests at A&AEE Boscombe Down in September 1982, in never flew again. It was preserved at the Museum of Army Flying, Middle Wallop from February 15th, 1984. Pictured (in somehow rough shape) in 1990, the plane has been scraped and only the cockpit remains, back now at Boscombe Down. The bonnet part and a few other small parts ended up at Flixton on the Norfolk & Suffolk Av Museums example.

What happened to the pilots that flew A-533 during the war?

Lt. Calderón: Survived the war.

Lt. Gimenez: flew several missions, shot down a Scout helicopter on May 28th but perished when his plane crashed on a hill in bad weather on his return leg.

Lt. Brest: flew several missions and survived the war.

Lt. Cruzado: shot down and taken prisoner in the Goose Green/Darwin area on May 28th after flying several missions.

Capt. Grünert: another experienced pilot that survived the war.

The Pucarás had a distinguished performance during the war, attacking the ground troops from May 21st until June 10th. Rockets and bombs along with the internal armament (4 x 7.62 machine guns and 2 x 20 mm cannons) were the usual armament, thought an attack with Napalm took place on May 28th and another one was planned when the garrison surrendered on June 14th. A testimony of the sturdiness of this plane is the fact that only 3 Pucarás were shot down in combat: A-511 (Maj. Tomba) shot down by the Sea Harrier of “Sharky” Ward, A-531 (Capt. Benitez) by a Stinger missile, A-555 (Lt. Cruzado) by multiple small arms fire hits. One Scout helicopter was shot down by Lt. Gimenez (A-537) but the pilot crashed in small clouds against Blue Hill on the return leg. During the same mission, Lt. Címbaro in A-532 claimed hits another Scout that had landed trying to avoid the attacks of his Pucará. Due to its low speed and high maneuverability, the Pucarás were able to follow every single evasive action the helicopters were taking. Jeff Nibblet, having survived Címbaro’s attacks, later stated that the Argentine planes were skilfully handled and used their great speed range and maneuverability to attack the Scouts from all angles, altitudes and speeds. They proved to be more difficult to evade than jet planes.

In total, the Pucará Squadrons flew 103 sorties, suffered 3 planes shot down, 4 captured in flying condition on June 14th and the rest (18) were destroyed on the ground by air attacks, the SAS raid on Borbón/Pebble Island or shelling by the ships of the Royal Navy.

In Foreign Service, the Pucará served in the Colombian and Sri Lanka Air Forces and is still in service in the Fuerza Aérea de Uruguay and the Argentine Air Force (Fuerza Aérea Argentina). Failed sales include Iraq and Mauritania.

In total, besides 3 prototypes, 105 units were produced. It can probably be said that it has been one of the most successful design of the Fábrica Militar de Aviones, along with the Pulqui II and the Pampa.

Performance:
Max speed: 520 km/h
Ceiling 10,000 mt
Range 3040 kg.
Engines: 2 Turbomeca Asatzou XVIG of 1022 shp.
Armament: A ventral station for up to 1,000kg and 2 stations on the wings for 500 kg of bombs, rockets, Napalm (for a grand total of 2,000 kg).


References

IA-58A Pucara by Cettolo, Mosquera & Nunez Padin (1997).

Historia Oficial de la Fuerza Aerea Argentina. Volumen 6, Tomo 1.

Falklands Air War, Hobson.

FMA IA-58 Pucara, 30 años en Servicio by Mosquera, Claria, Cettolo, Gebel, Marino y Posadas.


Pablo Calcaterra

Cumprimentos
 

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|FIT|_Benny

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Re: Guerra das Malvinas
« Responder #112 em: Setembro 05, 2010, 04:13:38 pm »
Lamentavelmente os Generais argentinos eram loucos, queriam porque queriam de qualquer forma e a qualquer custo conquistar territórios.
Se não fosse isso, talvez o Chile e até mesmo o Brasil pudessem de alguma forma terem ajudado na luta e conquista do território contra os ingleses. Aí, seria inevitável uma intervenção dos EUA também nesse conflito.
Mas... Como os generais eram "valentes" e loucos, foram sozinhos, ficaram isolados e se deram mal.
Bye bye
Benny
"...Há amigos mais chegados que um irmão..." Provérbios 18.24
Viajar é viver: http://www.penaviagem.blogspot.com
 

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Thiago Barbosa

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Re: Guerra das Malvinas
« Responder #113 em: Abril 05, 2011, 08:15:29 pm »
Os ingleses iniciaram a guerra quando expulsaram os argentinos das Malvinas em 1832/1833. As Malvinas são argentinas, não há dúvidas.
 

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Luso-Efe

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Re: Guerra das Malvinas
« Responder #114 em: Abril 07, 2011, 07:55:03 pm »
Os Argentinos é que atacaram, e os Ingleses partiram os Argentas todos, é isso que fica para a história, e aquilo vai ser Inglês "sine die", e se não fosse a bem era a mal.

A Thatcher não teve problemas em ameçá-los com a bomba.

Para além disso isto levou ao fim do Tratado Interamericano de Assistência Recíproca, ou melhor ele no fundo continuou a existir, mas ninguem o leva a sério.

Cumprimentos.
Chamar aos Portugueses ibéricos é 1 insulto enorme, é o mesmo que nos chamar Espanhóis.

A diferença entre as 2 designações, é que a 1ª é a design. Grega, a 2ª é a design. Romana da península.

Mas tanto 1 como outra são sinónimo do domínio da língua, economia e cultura castelhana.

Viva Portugal
 

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Thiago Barbosa

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Re: Guerra das Malvinas
« Responder #115 em: Abril 08, 2011, 04:59:11 am »
O TIAR tinha serventia nos tempos de Guerra Fria, com o final dela, passou a ser algo nulo. Será que Thatcher lançaria um ataque nuclear a Córdoba mesmo? Não faço idéia, mas... que mulher terrível. As Malvinas são argentinas e é correta a reivindicação.
 

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Luso-Efe

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Re: Guerra das Malvinas
« Responder #116 em: Abril 10, 2011, 12:48:58 am »
Thiago.

Se lançaria?  :!:

Aquilo foi para intimidar e para acabar com o conflito rapidamente. Um pais não faz uso da arma nuclear por dá cá uma palha, apesar de o conflito ter provocado bastantes vitimas, mas não era motivo para se usar a bomba, isso na minha opinião nem nunca passou pela cabeça das altas esferas militares Inglesas.

Em relação á pertença das ilhas, internacionalmente são reconhecidas como território Inglês, os Argentinos têm as suas pertensões, mas não me parece que o quadro se altera nas próximas décadas.  :idea:

Em relação ao Brasil, eu sou um dos Portugueses que tenho todo o gosto em ver o Brasil subir no contexto internacional, não tarda nada é a quinta potência mundial, digo-vos isto do fundo do coração para mim é um orgulho ver o Brasil subir no panorama internacional, e digo isto sem qualquer tipo de neo-colonialismo, de verdade, vejo o Brasil como uma semente lançada pelos Portugueses na América do sul, que cresceu, tornou-se independente, trilhou o seu caminho  neste momento esta entre as 5 maiores potencias mundias.  :G-beer2:

Só vos falta umas forças armadas poderosas, umas forças armadas em condições á imagem do vosso poderio económico.

E não se esqueçam de olhar aqui para o irmão mais velho do lado de lá do atlântico, só temos que unir esforços, gostei muito da entrevista da Dilma, pode ser que seja desta que as relações se intensificam mais.

E não digo isto de agora, já o digo há algum tempo.

viewtopic.php?f=10&t=3652&start=1005

Cumprimentos.
Chamar aos Portugueses ibéricos é 1 insulto enorme, é o mesmo que nos chamar Espanhóis.

A diferença entre as 2 designações, é que a 1ª é a design. Grega, a 2ª é a design. Romana da península.

Mas tanto 1 como outra são sinónimo do domínio da língua, economia e cultura castelhana.

Viva Portugal
 

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Thiago Barbosa

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Re: Guerra das Malvinas
« Responder #117 em: Abril 10, 2011, 04:14:42 am »
Luso, sempre achei que o poder de dissuasão de uma arma nuclear é mais útil do que o próprio emprego dela. Dizem que os ingleses trouxeram cargas de profundidade nucleares, provavelmente como elemento dissuasão. Não acho que a posse das ilhas serviria como entrave para o domínio brasileiro deste lado do Atlântico e sobre a rivalidade que há entre Brasil e Argentina, acho que talvez isso venha sendo superado durante as décadas.

Qualquer brasileiro sensato tem um certo carinho por Portugal, como não poderia deixar de ser. Não vejo o Brasil evoluir sem Portugal como parceiro.  :G-beer2:

Quanto a só nos faltar forças armadas mais capazes, discordo. rs A infraestrutura do Brasil não é boa, a saúde pública terrível, como a educação. A segurança pública adotou uma boa política e tenho muita fé nela, espero que em uma década já tenhamos superado esse problema que sempre foi grave e claro, reforçar as forças armadas é algo urgênte. O Brasil é um país enorme, com uma fronteira e um litoral imenso, precisa se armar adequadamente. Nos falta muitas coisas, mas acho que estamos indo pelo caminho certo e aos poucos vamos alçar vôos mais alto. =)
 

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Luso-Efe

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Re: Guerra das Malvinas
« Responder #118 em: Abril 10, 2011, 10:38:54 pm »
Barbosa.

A dissuasão faz parte da estratégia muitas vezes, e para mim nesse caso concreto, a ameaça da Thatcher foi na minha opinião para obrigar os Argentinos à rendição. :!:

Em relação às ilhas, é o que eu lhe digo, ao Brasil nem quece nem arrefece, se os Ingleses tivessem ai estacionada um grande destacamento naval, ai ainda se podiam sentir incomodados, assim penso que não.

Em relação à vossa situação nomeadamente urbana, São Paulo e Rio de janeiro, a estratégia do Lula de varrimento das favelas e de instalação de unidades de policia pacificadora parece-me o caminho, tem é que ser alargado. :G-beer2:

Ao nivel das forças armadas, penso que o Brasil precisa de investir principalmente na Força Aeréa e na Marinha, tal como disse acosta Brasileira é imensa.

Ao nivel da FAB era decidir de vez o caça que a vai equipar, e acima de tudo o negócio tem que incluir a importação do Know-How necessário para permiir ao Brasil estar a produzir os seus próprios caças a médio prazo.

Ao nível naval, o acordo com os Franceses para a compra submarinos nucleares e  partilha de informação nuclear penso que foi uma excelente ideia, foi aprovado no senado Brasileiro nesta semana.

http://www.senado.gov.br/noticias/verNo ... licativo=2

http://www.militar.com.br/blog13780-Bra ... es-frances

Ao nivel da Marinha têm que começar a pensar num Porta-Aviões em condições também, porque o São Paulo quando ai chegou já ia meia fora de prazo.

Cumprimentos.
Chamar aos Portugueses ibéricos é 1 insulto enorme, é o mesmo que nos chamar Espanhóis.

A diferença entre as 2 designações, é que a 1ª é a design. Grega, a 2ª é a design. Romana da península.

Mas tanto 1 como outra são sinónimo do domínio da língua, economia e cultura castelhana.

Viva Portugal
 

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HaDeS

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Re: Guerra das Malvinas
« Responder #119 em: Abril 23, 2011, 07:38:20 pm »
Bom, se a França não tivesse puxado o tapede dos argentinos talvez eles tivessem dito sucesso A força aérea argentina atual praticamente inexiste, e portanto não tem mais a mínima condição de recuperar essas ilhas.