What do Brazilian Admirals want?
Not a quiet expansion!
The swiss blog Offiziere.ch has recently published a piece by Paul Pryce which analyses the Brazilian Navy current endeavours and tries to figure what to bearing it is sailing. His argument concentrates on mapping the ‘quiet expansion’ of the said force — by looking at their purchase and native development programmes — and tries to approach the strategic dimension of it. While he does deliver a brief yet sound analysis, he fails to give a more accurate reading of the industrial dimensions of the issue, the often unspoken aspects of the civil-military relations in Brazil and the competition for budget between branches, the last one being of utmost importance. I would like to contribute to the debate by highlighting and furthering a few points he makes, as well bringing some new cues to the discussion.
Since the 1964 Military Coup and the restoration of democratic rule in the country, the civil-military relationship is yet to be seen as a positive factor in the country’s defence establishment, more broadly. Take for example the fact that even though military rule finished in 1985, it was not until 1999 that Brazil’s Ministry of Defence was established. Before that, armed force commanders would report directly to the President and be classed as ministers (until then, each branch had its own Ministry), frequently retaining a disproportionate amount of leverage. As this leverage fades away, some old-schoolers like to make their best to keep things the old way, or at least to retain as much ‘power’ as possible. For one, women are still not allowed in combat roles in the armed forces: some seventeen thousand serve on non-combat roles, but President Rousseff was vocal to change this scenario. This preclusion has been upheld in Brazilian armed forces on grounds long gone in modern armies, and the first military female pilot to solo fly for the Brazilian Air Force has only done so in 2003, while in the US it happened on the 40s. Furthermore, this is also visible on the various occasions in which elements (active and reserve) of the armed forces address strictly political issues, dismissing policy advanced by the government and actively repelling it. The process known as Comissão da Verdade (‘truth commission’, trying to uncover and bring knowledge about crimes committed during the dictatorship years) has been dismissed by the armed forces and vocally rebuked by the military clubs, formal associations of retired military officers, usually in their late years. I will not discuss this issue in detail, but this surely signals the still troubled nature of the civil-military relationship in the country: it is marred by fears of revanchism, shrouded in some mistrust and certainly configuring a rather turbulent sea to navigate. On a positive note, however, it is worth adding that the younger generations of military officers seem less and less prone to such behaviour, and keener to interiorize the civilian oversight that characterises the role of the armed forces in a Republic. Hopefully, Brazil will see a ‘modernised mind-set’ across its military ranks, to be noted in ten to fifteen years time.
Since before, but mainly starting during the period of military rule, the branches of service always have competed for prestige and, just as important, budget. This competition materialises in the pursuit of ‘pet projects’ that are almost self-justified, in that sense. The nuclear powered submarine is one of those projects. The three branches of the military competed (stress on competition) to obtain an edge on nuclear technology, pursuing different courses of action, and the Navy emerged ‘victorious’ in that process (refer to Matias Spektor’s work on the history of Brazil’s Nuclear Programme). It is something that is close to the heart of the Admirals, for a handful of reasons and might be that it is not very useful strategically — for the South Atlantic or the ‘Blue Amazon’ — but this doesn’t mean that it won’t be pursued, or seen as desirable.
Specifically within the Navy, building a Nuclear Submarine is seen as the final seal of excellency in in-force technology development. Both military shipbuilder Arsenal de Marinha do Rio de Janeiro and also the public technically-civilian-yet-military-ran ‘projects management company’ EMGEPRON — Empresa Gerencial de Projetos Navais are built upon the idea that the Navy has an industrial dimension. Naval officers (active on the first and retired on the second) work in both organisations, and keep very, very close to the command of the Navy, understandably. These represent the ‘military industrial compound’ branch of the Navy, and the topic of how the Defence policy in Brazil embraces the industrial dimension of defence is one lurking around. Incidentally, and connected to Brazil’s civil-military issues, each branch approaches it in its own terms, rather than policy streaming from the Ministry itself, which more passively tries to coordinate things. Once again, the recognition, empowerment and advertising of national shipbuilding savoir-faire is part of the reason why Brazil has been assertively seeking to natively develop and build ships. At the same time, Brazil’s defence sector (across branches) will only issue tenders for imports of military material that involve heavy technology-transfer and, in most cases, national manufacturing.
Take as an example the F-X2 tender, held by the Brazilian Air Force and won by the Swedish manufacturer Saab, to supply new fighter jets to replace the ageing fleet. The deal can amount up to six billion US dollars, and accounts for up to 108 JAS-39(BR)E/F aircraft (to be delivered in three 36-aircraft tranches) for the Air Force and up to 24 units of a future embarkable variant being developed exclusively for the Navy (to operate onboard BNS São Paulo, currently Brazil’s only aircraft carrier, currently on dock awaiting retrofit). As a requirement of the tender, unrestricted technology transfer to Brazilian companies was attained, as well as including a number of Brazilian part suppliers and a factory that will be able to build a number of the contracted units in national territory, as well as different offset mechanisms. In the end, Brazil will even be able to export the Gripen to other countries after the infrastructure is built and the knowledge is transferred, and, guess what: the first customer could even be neighbouring Argentina! That is, of course, if diplomatic efforts succeed, considering that the United Kingdom still vetoes the transfer of all British military and dual-use technology to Argentina, still due to the Falklands/Malvinas imbroglio. The Gripen has just under 30% of British technology, yet, it would be complicated to replace those components to circumvent the veto. Westminster has been able to veto previous Argentinian attempts to obtain used aircraft from third parties, such as France, Spain and Israel. Meanwhile, Buenos Aires courts Beijing for armoured personnel carriers and 1800-ton ocean patrol vessels (aptly named Malvinas-class) built in China, begging the question as to whether maintaining the animosity over the Falklands/Malvinas is worth pursuing, when the possible outcome is an increased sino-argentine defence relationship (better the devil you know, anyone?), and specially when Buenos Aires markedly states that taking military action over the dispute is unreal. A discussion about the Argentinian Gripens and how/if they would tilt the scales on the Falklands/Malvinas is theme for another essay, but in short: the answer is no. While this southbound detour to Argentina might seemed unnecessary, a very vivid concern of Brazilian defence stakeholders is that relying on non-native technologies could restrict military capabilities in critical moments, or even create potential weaknesses in Brazil’s defence apparatus. This supports the belief that technology development — even if detached from immediate tactical or strategic considerations — is paramount to the country’s defence grand strategy.
Last but not least, understanding the submarine as a device intended fo swaggering rather than for actual strategic/tactical purposes could be conceptually useful. That works both in-branch, between-branch and to the outside audience. For the here intended, swaggering can be residually/negatively defined as an display of might which ‘is not aimed directly at dissuading another state from attacking, at repelling attacks, nor at compelling it to do something specific. The objectives for swaggering are more diffuse, ill defined, and problematic than that. Swaggering almost always involves only the peaceful use of force and is expressed usually in one of two ways: displaying one’s military might at military exercises and national demonstrations and buying or building the era’s most prestigious weapons. The swagger use of force is the most egoistic: it aims to enhance the national pride of a people or to satisfy the personal ambitions of its ruler’ (Art, 1980, p.10).
In-branch, means that the Navy establishment is very satisfied in appearing to become a blue-water Navy, and its officers happy to have the projected opportunity to command big ships with big crews, and even the idea of leading a Carrier Strike Group: something that only big navies have. The myth of a ‘strong / big Navy’ is common among the officers, with very few exceptions. All in all, Navy officers are embedded in a culture in which they aspire to command an aircraft carrier or a nuclear submarine, projecting power far away from home, but very few see a successful career endpoint as commanders of a rigid-hulled inflatable boat river force, or even in patrol ships.
The Brazilian Navy is also investing in smaller vessels, and the recently incorporated 500-ton Macaé-class ships (first of its natively developed and built class of patrol ships, based on the French Vigilante 400 CL54 project) as well as the three 2000-ton Amazonas-class offshore patrol ships (developed and built in Portsmouth, UK by BAe Systems) between 2010 and 2013.
While those can maybe be a sign of a more balanced equipment strategy and a recognition that even blue-water navies can’t neglect coastal protection (unless you have a Coast Guard, something that the Brazilian Navy have opposed). Still, the seven contracted Macaé-class ships and the three discounted Amazonas-class ships cost a fraction of the nuclear programme, and are even more insignificant if compared to the broader effort to re-equip the submarine (PROSUB) and surface fleets (PROSUP). It is a symptomatic grandeur: Brazillian Navy’s ambitions to operate three aircraft carriers and to have the southern hemisphere’s largest submarine force by 2050.
Between-branch, having (and mainly justifying) a big Navy means more resources from the defence budget being channelled to the Navy. Which in turn means more ships, more support structures and, consequently, need for more personnel, more command posts and more responsibility that, in turn, require better salaries. If the force can assert its usefulness and efficiency to the Ministry of Defence, it is more likely that it will receive more resources than its counterparts, or at least that is the rationale behind that discourse.
To the outside audience, is where the Foreign Policy and Defence Policy purchase is, and incidentally is where the Navy focuses its efforts. President Rousseff proudly declared that Brazil is now part of limited group of nations that ‘have access’ to nuclear submarines, and even highlighted that this group of nations was coincident to the ones who have a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council, an old aspiration in Brasilia. She also boasted that starting to natively build submarines was a ‘symbol of a new Brazil being created’, further supporting the idea that there’s a good measure of symbolism in the decision to obtain this technology. Even if we are not sure how these vectors of power will be useful, it is likely that — one way or the other — they will, even if only to assert that Brazil is a country that deserves to be considered in the great power club. Because great powers have great navies, it always has been so (Cable, 1920). Pitching this aspect allows the Navy to get buy-in from the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As this is also good for increasing the defence political relevancy (and thus defence budget), the between-branch competition is made carefully as not to hinder the widespread benefits of a growing budget, so we shouldn’t expect the Army or the Air Force to openly criticise the Nuclear Submarine project either.
Finally, about the diplomatic questions the Brazilian Navy may raise, I wouldn’t worry much on the nuclear proliferation side. The Nuclear Programme (both civilian and military) was always a significant part of the country’s foreign policy. It continues to be relevant, and as such is is delicately managed: Brazil’s has agreed not to develop nuclear weapons but wishes to retain nuclear technology for other purposes, something that can prove complicated/too restrictive within the non-proliferation regime, requiring delicate diplomatic management. Exporting nuclear technology (especially to ‘rogue’ players) would certainly backfire and cause more trouble than good. I would agree with the argument that Brazil seeks to affirm itself and and be part of the club, rather than destabilise the delicate nuclear regime.
Which brings me to my second point about diplomacy: apparently, Brazil wants to be part of the club of great powers. It doesn’t want only to be admitted to the club, it wants the other members to recognise it — by deeds, not words — as a peer. So, Brazil doesn’t want to be part of an agreement with NATO that puts Brazil in the ‘follower’ stance, but rather on the ‘partner’ position. If NATO wants to approach Brazil for initiatives towards expanding cooperation regarding the South Atlantic, it has to do so by courting Brazil’s legitimacy as a big regional player and full-fledged partner in the area. If NATO envisages a ‘partnership’ in the moulds of the one the Alliance has with Ukraine or Georgia, it surely won’t fly in Brasilia. And also not a partnership such as the one it has with Russia either. And is that politically possible — across both Southern and Northern latitudes over the Atlantic?
By any rate, it is unlikely that Brazil’s nuclear submarine will be seen projecting power anywhere far away from its coasts anytime soon. The dual purpose of the Brazilian defence procurement makes it hard to sum up a detailed answer to the question of where Admirals are going. Are they more concerned with the defence industry or with operationality? Are they seeking means to swagger internationally or they are hedging (im)possible futures? Are they in line with or rather trying to shape Brazil’s defence and foreign policy grand strategies? These seem to be the crucial questions to be asked and that I hope to have shed some light upon. If I can allow myself, here’s a cautionary note: it seems more probable that Brazil’s future naval challenges will look something like the 1961–63 Lobster War than like the Battle of the Pacific. Unchallenged control of the South Atlantic is an understandable — yet delusional — desire. The ‘quiet expansion’ of the Brazilian Navy is far from quiet, even if it does not get the same amount of attention than the naval endeavours of China and India.
Fonte:
https://medium.com/imminent-crisis-wors ... 6fdfdefa00
