U. S. Navy

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ShadIntel

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« Responder #120 em: Março 20, 2009, 02:08:11 pm »
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US Navy: 2 vessels collide in Strait of Hormuz

MANAMA, Bahrain – Two U.S. Navy vessels — a submarine and an amphibious ship — collided early Friday in the Strait of Hormuz between Iran and the Arabian peninsula, the U.S. Navy's 5th Fleet reported.

The military said in a statement that the collision occurred around 1:00 a.m. local time on Friday (5 p.m. EDT, Thursday).

The USS Hartford, a submarine, collided with an amphibious ship, the USS New Orleans.

According to the Bahrain-based 5th Fleet, 15 soldiers aboard the Hartford were slightly injured but able to return to duty. No injuries were reported aboard the New Orleans.

The New Orleans suffered a ruptured fuel tank, resulting in an oil spill of approximately 25,000 gallons (95,000 liters) of diesel fuel. Damage to both vessels is still being evaluated.

Both ships are currently operating under their own power.

The Navy said both ships were on regularly scheduled deployments to the region and conducting security operations.

http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20090320/ap_ ... ps_collide
 

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ShadIntel

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« Responder #121 em: Março 24, 2009, 01:16:33 pm »
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U.S. Navy Orders Another LCS Ship

The long-delayed order for a third Littoral Combat Ship came through March 23 when the U. S. Navy and Lockheed Martin agreed on a construction contract.

The ship, to be named Fort Worth (LCS 3), will be built at Marinette Marine Corp., in Marinette, Wis., and delivered to the Navy in December 2012.

The contract award comes after protracted negotiations between Lockheed and the Navy on a fixed-price incentive fee contract. The Navy did not disclose the amount of the contract award, citing the competitive nature of the contract award.

Congress has imposed a $460 million-per-ship cost cap on the LCS program, but the cost cap is not to take affect until the next budget.

Lockheed is in competition with General Dynamics to build the LCS. GD remains in negotiation with the Navy over a construction contract for the Coronado (LCS 4).

Only two LCS ships have been built thus far. The Freedom (LCS 1), from Lockheed, was commissioned in November and is at Norfolk, Va.; construction of GD's Independence (LCS 2) is continuing, with the ship expected to be delivered to the Navy this fall.

The troubled LCS program has experienced a spiraling series of cost overruns that have more than doubled the original $220 million-per-ship price tag for the new type of warship. The Navy revealed the cost growth at the beginning of 2007, and in April and October of that year canceled construction contracts with Lockheed and GD, respectively, for the second LCS ship from each of those companies. The Navy tried to renegotiate each of those second-ship contracts, ordered in 2006, to more favorable terms, which the shipbuilders were unable to meet.

The contract award announced March 23 uses funds appropriated in fiscal 2009, although the contract re-uses the hull number of the 2006 ship. Such a practice is unusual, in that the hull number is also considered an account identification number for bookkeeping purposes.

Revised acquisition costs for each of the first two ships have yet to be revealed by the Navy, and discussion of the new contract costs for LCS 3 and LCS 4 won't be revealed until after the next round of contract awards, to be conducted for the fiscal 2010 ships, according to a Navy spokesman.

"The amounts will be released when the fiscal 2010 competition is over," said Lt. Cmdr. Victor Chen, a spokesman for the Navy's acquisition team.

The Navy plans to ask for three more LCS ships in the 2010 budget request, with two ships going to the competitor offering the best terms.

All the new LCS ships are referred to by the Navy as "Flight 0+" ships, with minor modifications over the initial, Flight 0, ships.

A total of 55 LCS ships are to be procured by the Navy, which is leaving open the option to continue to build both designs or only one type.

Defense News
 

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nelson38899

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« Responder #122 em: Julho 23, 2009, 09:58:30 am »
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House panel adds two ships to Navy budget

Congressman John P. Murtha, Chairman of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense, announced today that the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense has completed and marked-up the Fiscal Year 2010 Defense Appropriations Bill.

The subcommittee mark up includes $15 billion for the procurement of 10 Navy ships, two above the request (one DDG-51 Guided Missile Destroyer; one SSN-774 Attack Submarine; four Littoral Combat Ships--one more than request; two Intra-Theater Connector Ships [Joint High Speed Vessels]--one more than request; and two T-AKE Auxiliary Dry Cargo/Ammunition Ships). This is the first time since 1992 that the shipbuilding account was funded for 10 or more ships.

The mark up also includes $539 million for the continued development of the DDG-1000 Guided Missile Destroyer.

http://www.marinelog.com/DOCS/NEWSMMIX/ ... 00164.html
"Que todo o mundo seja «Portugal», isto é, que no mundo toda a gente se comporte como têm comportado os portugueses na história"
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nelson38899

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Re: U. S. Navy
« Responder #123 em: Novembro 03, 2009, 10:06:18 am »
Novo navio de assalto USS New York, com metal do World Trade Center

http://dn.sapo.pt/galerias/fotos/?content_id=1408378&seccao=Globo
"Que todo o mundo seja «Portugal», isto é, que no mundo toda a gente se comporte como têm comportado os portugueses na história"
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SSK

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Re: U. S. Navy
« Responder #124 em: Janeiro 16, 2010, 10:01:46 am »
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Coping With The Great American SSN Shortage
January 12, 2010: The U.S. Navy is facing a temporary SSN (nuclear attack submarine) shortage, and there is no solution that will not involve some pain. The problem is that new Virginia class subs cannot be built quickly enough to replace all the Cold War era Los Angeles class boats that have to retire. Even that will be delayed, at least for 16 Los Angeles class subs, that will get enough refurb to keep them at sea for up to two more years. Meanwhile, many of the shipyards used to build all those Los Angeles class boats, were discarded as part of the Peace Dividend for winning the Cold War.

The shortage will begin in 2022, when the number of SSNs will fall below 48. The bottom will be in 2028, when only 41 SSNs will be available, and the shortage won't end until 2034. While keeping boats at sea more than six months per cruise will insure that all current requirements (that need about ten boats at sea at any given time) are met, the navy won’t be able to meet its wartime need for 35 boats. Keep in mind that a certain number of boats are always laid up for upgrades, maintenance or repairs. And some of this work can be speeded up, or even put aside, to get boats to sea in wartime, or a major crises.

Keeping existing boats at sea for longer cruises also comes with a cost. For each additional day (beyond six months) you keep a crew at sea, a certain percentage of them will not stay in the navy. Those long months at sea are hard on the families, and sailors as well. Too much of that, and more of them leave. For submarine crews, the most highly trained, with the highest standards, in the navy, this is no small problem.

There are other ways around the problem. The navy and the shipyards have found ways to built SSNs more quickly. Currently it takes 70 months to build a Virginia. But in the next few years, that will be coming down to 60 months. For the navy, the worst solution is to change war plans, and peacetime use patterns of SSNs, and adapt to a smaller number of attack boats. The navy would rather not think of this, but politicians often do, so the navy must.
"Ele é invisível, livre de movimentos, de construção simples e barato. poderoso elemento de defesa, perigosíssimo para o adversário e seguro para quem dele se servir"
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nelson38899

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Re: U. S. Navy
« Responder #125 em: Junho 13, 2010, 11:36:09 pm »
"Que todo o mundo seja «Portugal», isto é, que no mundo toda a gente se comporte como têm comportado os portugueses na história"
Agostinho da Silva
 

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sergio21699

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Re: U. S. Navy
« Responder #126 em: Junho 15, 2010, 10:59:04 am »
Submarinos convencionais podem ser opção para a US Navy
Cortes no orçamento, forçam estudo sobre novas possibilidades

09.06.2010

A possibilidade de a marinha norte-americana vir a operar submarinos de propulsão diesel-electrica, é uma das possibilidades que decorrem da análise que alguns políticos em Washington parecem fazer sobre as futuras necessidades da guerra.
A utilização de submarinos convencionais [1] foi apenas uma das varias possibilidades numa marinha orientada para a redução de custos.
A responsabilidade pelas declarações é de Ike Skelton, o presidente da «House Armed Services Committee», a comissão de assuntos de defesa da Câmara dos representantes em Washington.

Ike Skelton, é um dos defensores da manutenção de uma marinha norte-americana com um número mais elevado de navios, considerando a velha máxima, de que «o número tem uma qualidade própria». Isto implica que um reduzido numero de sistemas muito sofisticados poderá ser menos eficiente que um numero maior de sistemas menos sofisticados mas mais baratos.

Para manter o objectivo de possuir uma força naval combatente de 313 navios, a marinha norte-americana precisa de um orçamento e de recursos financeiros que serão impossíveis de atingir ainda mais nas actuais condições económicas.
Para conseguir atingir o número de 313 navios operacionais modernos, vários caminhos estão em estudo.
O ciclo de vida dos navios deverá ser aumentado para mais alguns anos (os navios norte-americanos são normalmente utilizados por períodos muito mais reduzidos que os de outras marinhas). Entre as possibilidades estudadas está a de voltar a introduzir ao serviço da marinha dos Estados Unidos, submarinos convencionais de propulsão anaeróbica armados com mísseis de cruzeiro.

Segundo este conceito, se o mar durante a I guerra mundial foi dominado pelo couraçado Dreadnought e pelo porta-aviões na II guerra, os conflitos navais do futuro, serão dominados e decididos pelas redes de dados estabelecendo ligações com várias plataformas, entre as quais se contam os submarinos com propulsão AIP, que são os mais silenciosos navios submarinos que presentemente existem.

A capacidade destes navios para permanecer quase ocultos em praticamente qualquer lugar do mundo é especialmente importante. A presença ou a simples notícia da presença de navios norte-americanos em qualquer mar do globo, é importante do ponto de vista militar e político.


 :arrow: http://www.areamilitar.net/noticias/noticias.aspx?NrNot=927
-Meu General, estamos cercados...
-Óptimo! Isso quer dizer que podemos atacar em qualquer direcção!
 

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Upham

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Re: U. S. Navy
« Responder #127 em: Junho 15, 2010, 12:55:37 pm »
Boa tarde!

Segundo o que li, até aos anos 80 a marinha dos estados unidos ainda operava submarinos de propulsão convencional (construidos nos anos 50 e sendo os primeiros com o formato "Albacore"). Não terão é neste momento a capacidade tecnológica para a utilização da propulsão independente de ar.

Será isso, ou falta de vontade politica??

Cumprimentos
"Nos confins da Ibéria, vive um povo que não se governa, nem se deixa governar."

Frase atribuida a Caio Julio César.
 

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teXou

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Re: U. S. Navy
« Responder #128 em: Agosto 30, 2010, 05:44:50 pm »
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Continuous Active Sonar

August 26, 2010: A major problem with ASW (Anti-submarine warfare) is that your submarine detection software equipment is turned off most of the time, and when it is used it requires a lot of trained operators and lawyers (to deal with the growing number of lawsuits filed by NGOs seeking to protect sea animals from noise pollution). Ships depend on intelligence, usually from large organizations like the CIA or military intel operations, to alert them that a submarine threat might exist in their area.
For nearly a decade now, research has been underway on a solution in the form of Continuous Active Sonar (CAS). This is a low level sonar signal that operates like radar, providing a continuous flow of data on what might be down there. Current sonars send out a more powerful signal, but at a low rate (one or more a minute). This annoys underwater creatures, and lawyers representing the critters make it difficult for the navy to even train with this equipment. CAS is based on the growing effectiveness of passive sonar (that just listens, and uses an electronic library of sounds to identify enemy ships). CAS makes it possible to identify increasingly quiet submarines, that depend on their stealth to get close enough to fire a torpedo.

The problem with CAS is that it's been a tricky technology to perfect, although recently there have been some promising tests at sea. If CAS could be perfected and deployed, it would give ships round the clock warning of approaching submarines. With a mature CAS technology, it would also be able to detect approaching torpedoes, and deploy underwater decoys. Eventually, when someone gets CAS to work reliably for sailors to use regularly.
http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htsub/ ... 00826.aspx
"Obviamente, demito-o".

H. Delgado 10/05/1958
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" Não Apaguem a Memória! "

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SSK

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Re: U. S. Navy
« Responder #129 em: Agosto 31, 2010, 07:46:11 pm »
Transmissão em contínuo não pode ter rate tem de ser em contínuo... Para tal teria de ter um "código", ou ágeis em frequência, para as transmissões não se anularem às outras. Isto seria uma aproximação ao que acontece nos radares em Continuous Wave, mas acústica "gimbra" de modo diferente.

Se pensarem que o som se propaga na água a uma velocidade aproximada de 1500 m/s, se um submarino pode adquirir um contacto e atacar a 15Km (para não dizer mais) a transmissão tem de ter pelo menos intervalos entre transmissão de 10s, caso contrário vai empastelar...

Ainda falta um pouco, mas é possível o CW Sonar.
"Ele é invisível, livre de movimentos, de construção simples e barato. poderoso elemento de defesa, perigosíssimo para o adversário e seguro para quem dele se servir"
1º Ten Fontes Pereira de Melo
 

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teXou

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Re: U. S. Navy
« Responder #130 em: Setembro 02, 2010, 11:43:00 am »
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New warships have serious problems
By Gary Robbins, UNION-TRIBUNE

Originally published August 31, 2010 at 10:14 p.m., updated September 1, 2010 at 1:33 p.m.

The Navy's new Littoral Combat Ships (LCS), which are supposed to be able to carry out a variety of missions at high speeds in shallow water, have serious design and technical problems that could mean the multi-billion dollar fleet won't deliver its "promised capability," says a report by the General Accountability Office (GAO).

The report raises questions about the ability of the program's two first ships -- USS Freedom and USS Independence -- to hunt submarines, deal with mines and to launch smaller boats, especially in heavy seas. The GAO also suggests that Freedom was deployed too early, and that the various problems have increased the price of the two ships' seaframes by almost $700 million. Many of the problems, says the report, stem from putting Freedom into service before issues with its frame were resolved and the ship was fully outfitted.

Freedom operates out of San Diego. Independence has been on the East Coast, undergoing upgrades, outfitting and testing. But San Diego is its assigned home port.

"Until mission packages are proven, the Navy risks investing in a fleet of ships that does not deliver promised capability," the GAO report says.

The report was released one week after the Navy announced that it has delayed a decision on which contractor will be chosen to build the next batch of LCS vessels. The contract is worth billions of dollars. The Navy said little about why it chose to postpone the decision until later this year.

Admiral Gary Roughead, Chief of Naval Operations, has acknowledged the large cost overruns on the program. But he said in a speech last year, the LCS "is a ship that is going to serve us very, very well regionally, and in the types of missions that we'll be performing."

Freedom was designed and built by an industry team led by Lockheed Martin . The company pursued a different design than General Dynamics, which led the team that built Independence. The companies and its partners are now building the third (LCS3) and fourth (LCS4) ships in the line. The Navy plans to build as many as 55 of the vessels at a cost of at least $25 billion.

The GAO report discusses a variety of design and technical problems with the frames of Freedom and Independence. It goes on to say that, "Key mine countermeasures and surface warfare systems have encountered technical issues that have delayed their development and fielding. Further, Navy analysis of LCS anti-submarine warfare systems found these capabilities did not contribute significantly to the anti-submarine warfare mission."

The report also says that ,"The Navy deferred testing of (Freedom's) launch, handling, and recovery system -- a system instrumental to deploying and recovering mission package elements (boats and unmanned vehicles) that, if not performing adequately, will impair LCS capability.

"To date, a full demonstration of this system remains incomplete. Navy simulations to date have identified risks in safely launching and recovering mission systems that experience pendulous motion during handling -- such as the remote multi-mission vehicles and unmanned surface vehicle systems."

Independence has encountered similar problems, especially when it comes to recovering boats and unmanned vehicles.

The Navy and its contractors have been trying the fix the various problems, an undertaking that has contributed to a large increase in the cost of the ships. GAO says the initial budget of Freedom's seaframe has grown from $215.5 million to $537 million. The budgeted cost of the Independence seaframe has increased from $256.5 million to $637 million.
http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/2010 ... -problems/
"Obviamente, demito-o".

H. Delgado 10/05/1958
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" Não Apaguem a Memória! "

http://maismemoria.org
 

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teXou

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Re: U. S. Navy
« Responder #131 em: Setembro 02, 2010, 12:26:12 pm »
Não penso que se falou destes artigos.
Por conseguinte vou continuar com os problemas da US Navy.  :twisted:
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Navy shares blame for San Antonio's woes

Since the day the Navy commissioned it, the Norfolk-based amphibious ship San Antonio has been plagued with costly defects. Five years later, it sits along the Elizabeth River unfit to deploy.

Now a report says that the Navy, as well as contractors who designed and built the vessel, bears blame for the problems.

Released publicly Thursday, the report details findings from a six-month Navy investigation. While it looked only at the San Antonio, the inquiry could help answer questions about defects aboard the four other ships in its class that are now in service, including the New York.

The first of the five to take to the sea, the San Antonio has suffered the worst of the problems. In its short life, the $1.8 billion, 25,000-ton vessel has been called in for several major repairs worth at least tens of millions of dollars.

The most pressing of San Antonio's defects are with its four diesel engines, and that's where the Navy investigation focused. Fleet Forces commander Adm. John Harvey ordered the examination after crews discovered small metal bits embedded in the engines' bearings. Those bits had contaminated the engine oil, and that caused the bearings - and ultimately the engines - to fail.

But what allowed the bits and other contaminants to get in?

The investigation traced the problems to poor welding and shoddy work during the ship's initial construction, as well as to engine design defects. The San Antonio, which carries a 360-person crew, was built at Northrop Grumman's shipyard in Avondale, La. Its engine, a Colt-Pielstick, was made by Fairbanks Morse, although the Navy has not identified any defects in components manufactured by Fairbanks Morse, the company said.

But the Navy shares in the blame for failing to identify the flaws, the report says: If the government had properly overseen and inspected the vessel during construction, the problems could have been caught early.

Investigators also fault the San Antonio's crew for failing to uncover the defects before they caused major damage.

"Ship's force was slow to recognize lube oil contamination (because of) a variety of long-term issues," the report says. Specifically, it cites sailors who weren't properly trained and who didn't carry out vital systems checks.

Navy officials declined to discuss whether crew members were disciplined or consequences they could face.

"The chain of command has taken appropriate administrative action aboard San Antonio to hold accountable those responsible for the training and maintenance deficiencies aboard the ship," Naval Surface Force Atlantic said in a statement.

The report includes several pages detailing the training failures. The Navy requires 42 sailors aboard the San Antonio to complete a course on operating its engines; only three have. Fifty should have taken a class on the ship's lube oil system; only one has.

The report also says that unqualified sailors were teaching some training classes, that the lesson plans for others contain incorrect information, that months of training logs are missing, and that many sailors took courses on a system that doesn't exist on the San Antonio.

"I think it's clear that there were issues on several fronts," said Rear Adm. Dave Thomas, the commanding officer of Naval Surface Force Atlantic. He declined to say whether the San Antonio will be ready to deploy as scheduled later this year, although the report states it may not be.

Thomas said all the ships in the San Antonio class will receive improved engine oil filters, strainers and flushing systems. The Navy will implement new flushing procedures across the class and work to comply with the report's recommendation for better government oversight during ship construction, he said.

Eric Wertheim, author and editor of the Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World, said the Navy appears to be taking the problems seriously. "The Navy and the Defense Department should look at this as an example of how every step of the process can go wrong," he said. "Most of the problem seems to be with the shipbuilder, but the Navy's the one that really needs to figure how to stop this from happening again."

In a written statement, Northrop Grumman said the Navy's findings support those that emerged from an investigation earlier this year by a technical team that included contractors. Recommendations from that investigation are being implemented, the statement said.

The San Antonio was last deployed in March 2009. It has spent much of the past 16 months under repair at the Earl Industries shipyard in Portsmouth. The Navy wouldn't disclose how much it has spent fixing the ship since its commissioning, saying the government is still negotiating those costs with Northrop Grumman and other contractors.

The San Antonio underwent at least $39 million in repairs in 2007. It will take at least $7.5 million to fix its current problems, Thomas said.

The Navy announced in January that the newest ship in the San Antonio class, the New York, needed major engine repairs.
http://hamptonroads.com/2010/07/report- ... os-defects
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U.S. Aegis Radars' Readiness Plunges

The advanced radar systems aboard U.S. cruisers and destroyers are in their worst shape ever, according to an independent probe into U.S. Navy readiness, raising questions about the surface fleet's ability to take on its high-profile new mission next year defending Europe from ballistic missiles.

Poor training, impenetrable bureaucracy and cultural resignation have caused a spike in the number of technical problems and a dip in the operational performance of the Aegis system, considered the crown jewel of the U.S. surface force, the investigation found.

And if that's the situation with Aegis - which includes warships' iconic, hexagonal SPY 1 radar arrays - the panel wondered what that could mean for other, lower-profile equipment.

"The SPY radar has historically been the best supported system in the surface Navy, and coincidentally supports one of the most critical Navy missions today: ballistic missile defense. Yet SPY manpower, parts, training and performance are in decline."

If that's the case, the report said, "it can be assumed that less important systems could well be in worse material condition."

The findings came in the report of the "fleet review panel," convened last September by Adm. John Harvey, head of Fleet Forces Command, to conduct an outside assessment into the readiness of the surface force.

The seven-member panel, which was chaired by retired Vice Adm. Phillip Balisle and included two serving admirals, produced a comprehensive indictment of Navy decision-making since the late 1990s: Admirals' preoccupation with saving money, which led them to cut crews and "streamline" training and maintenance, led to a surface force that can't keep its ships in fighting shape.

The Balisle panel's report, which has not been publicly released, was obtained by Navy Times, a sister publication to Defense News. Navy officials in the Pentagon deferred questions about it to Naval Sea Systems Command.

NavSea officials did not respond by the time this newspaper went to press.

Although sailors and other observers have said before that cuts in crew sizes hurt readiness, Balisle's report is the first to detail so many problems with Aegis, widely considered the world's finest seagoing radar and combat system. It is so powerful and adaptable, in fact, the Obama administration is counting on it becoming a permanent ballistic missile defense shield for Europe next year, taking the place of ground-based sensors and weapons as U.S. warships make standing patrols in the Mediterranean.

But Aegis, like the rest of the fleet, has become a victim of personnel cuts and the Navy's labyrinthine internal organization, the report said. Casualty reports are up 41 percent from fiscal year 2004, and those requiring technical assistance are up 45 percent.

Over the same period, SPY radar performance, as observed by the Board of Inspection and Survey, has steadily worsened for cruisers and destroyers.

The report includes a sample of eight cruisers visited in the past several months by InSurv, whose scores on Aegis readiness form a distinct downward trend.

Causes

What's causing it? The panel found many reasons, including:

■ There aren't enough qualified people in the right jobs.

■ Sailors aren't fully trained on maintaining the radars.

■ It's too much work navigating the Navy bureaucracy to order replacement parts, and as such, crews have grown to accept "degradation," Balisle's panel found.

For example, ships are not ordering replacement voltage regulators, the report said, which SPY radars need to help manage their prodigious consumption of ship's power. Crews aren't ordering them because technicians can't get the money to buy spares, so commanders are knowingly taking a risk in operating their Aegis systems without replacements.

"The technicians can't get the money to buy spare parts," the report said. "They haven't been trained to the requirement. They can't go to their supervisor because, in the case of the DDGs, they likely are the supervisor. They can't repair the radar through no fault of their own, but over time, the non-responsiveness of the Navy system, the acceptance of the SPY degradation by the Navy system and their seniors, officers and chiefs alike, will breed (if not already) a culture that tolerates poor system performance. The fact that requests for technical assistance are up Navy-wide suggests there is a diminished self-sufficiency in the surface force. Sailors are losing their sense of ownership of their equipment and are more apt to want others to fix it."

Naval expert A.D. Baker III, a retired Office of Naval Intelligence analyst and longtime editor of "Combat Fleets of the World," called the Balisle findings "utterly damning."

"The Aegis readiness shortfall is just one of a vast number of problems related to pushing people too far and not giving them the training or funding resources to carry out their duties properly," Baker said.

He said the report's findings showed the Defense Department's priorities for European ballistic missile defense had been misplaced.

"This will significantly affect our putative BMD capability. The [Pentagon's] money is going to missile development and procurement, not to maintenance of the detection and tracking system - without which the best missiles in the world won't be of much use."
http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i= ... =FEA&s=CVS
"Obviamente, demito-o".

H. Delgado 10/05/1958
-------------------------------------------------------
" Não Apaguem a Memória! "

http://maismemoria.org
 

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teXou

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Re: U. S. Navy
« Responder #132 em: Setembro 25, 2010, 02:04:43 pm »
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EMALS Readies for Launch with Super Hornet

NAVAL AIR SYSTEMS COMMAND, PATUXENT RIVER, Md. – The Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS) completed catapult commissioning testing for its system functional demonstration at NAVAIR Lakehurst, N.J., last week.

“The team has successfully completed no-load and dead-load launches in all areas of the required performance envelope,” said Capt. James Donnelly, Aircraft Launch and Recovery Equipment program manager. “The program’s test performance and data supports moving from SFD commissioning to full SFD testing.”

Among the test points accomplished, the team recently completed a 154-knot dead-load launch equivalent to the weight of an F/A-18E Super Hornet, the first platform to be launched by EMALS scheduled this fall.

Moving into SFD marks the opening of the test program window for the F/A-18E launch and future launches. The F/A-18E is currently being instrumented and test data is being analyzed in order to obtain flight clearances and launch approval for later this year.

“Full SFD demonstrates the significant progress the EMALS program is making in Lakehurst,” said Ms. Lisa Nyalko, program executive officer for tactical aircraft programs (Acting). “Completing commissioning testing brings us one step closer to our first aircraft launch this fall and more importantly, to our on-time delivery of EMALS to CVN 78.”

SFD testing began Sept. 12 and will continue to demonstrate system operation and hone software development/maturation simultaneous to hardware production on the first ship set.

“The production and delivery of EMALS and SFD are two distinct efforts,” said Cmdr. Russ McCormack, deputy program manager for future systems. “Hardware production is occurring independently from the system functional demonstration as component operation was previously proven in the High Cycle Testing and Highly Accelerated Life Testing phases of the program.”

The EMALS program will begin delivery of the first ship set to CVN 78 in 2011.

http://www.navair.navy.mil/press_releas ... site_id=15
"Obviamente, demito-o".

H. Delgado 10/05/1958
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" Não Apaguem a Memória! "

http://maismemoria.org
 

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teXou

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Re: U. S. Navy
« Responder #133 em: Novembro 15, 2010, 09:25:07 am »
"Obviamente, demito-o".

H. Delgado 10/05/1958
-------------------------------------------------------
" Não Apaguem a Memória! "

http://maismemoria.org
 

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teXou

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Re: U. S. Navy
« Responder #134 em: Dezembro 06, 2010, 12:12:53 pm »
Citar
Impressionnante mise à flot pour le troisième LCS américain



Si les lancements sur cales inclinées deviennent rares, ceux par le travers le sont encore plus. C'est, pourtant, toujours de cette manière que les chantiers Marinette Marine, dans le Wisconsin, procèdent à la mise à flot des navires qui y sont construits. Samedi, le futur USS Fort Worth, troisième Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) américain et second prototype du consortium emmené par Lockheed Martin, a été lancé dans la rivière Menominee. Longue de 11.5 mètres, la coque a glissé par le travers, provoquant une impressionnante vague lors de son entrée dans l'eau. Sistership de l'USS Freedom (LCS 1), livré à l'US Navy fin 2009, le nouveau bâtiment affichera, comme son aîné, un déplacement de plus de 3000 tonnes et pourra atteindre la vitesse de 45 noeuds grâce à deux turbines à gaz MT30 et quatre hydrojets Kamewa 153SII fournis par Rolls-Royce. L'armement de base comprendra une tourelle de 57mm, des mitrailleuses et un système surface-air RAM. Grâce à l'embarquement de modules interchangeables, le bâtiment peut être configuré pour la lutte anti-sous-marine en eaux côtières ou la lutte antinavire.


http://www.meretmarine.com/article.cfm?id=114749
"Obviamente, demito-o".

H. Delgado 10/05/1958
-------------------------------------------------------
" Não Apaguem a Memória! "

http://maismemoria.org